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Summary 
This doctoral thesis combines two papers and a monograph in order to contribute to the 
research on taxation procedure that focuses on the interdependent relationship between 
taxpayers and tax authorities. Based on survey data from German revenue agents, these 
individual investigations take as their starting point selected parameters that underlie the 
characteristics of one or both involved parties. 
The first paper empirically investigates the effect of family ownership and family 
management as determinants of tax planning aggressiveness. The results provide evidence 
that family firms are not generally less tax aggressive as suggested in previous research.  
The second paper examines which negotiation strategies used by tax auditors, how these 
strategies affect audit outcome, and which factors determine the use of different negotiation 
strategies by tax auditor. The results indicate that tax auditors use predominately competitive 
negotiation tactics and make their choices depending on the perceived strategies of their 
opponents. 
The monograph analyzes possible factors influencing revenue agents’ working time 
consumption during tax audits. The results show a strong dependence of time-on-task on 
characteristics of the audit itself and of the executing agent, but only to a limited extent on 
characteristics of the audited taxpayer. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Dissertation umfasst zwei Beiträge und eine Monografie zum Forschungsbereich des 
Besteuerungsverfahrens. Im Fokus stehen dabei die interdependenten Beziehungen 
zwischen Steuerpflichtigen und Steuerverwaltung. Die einzelnen Untersuchungen 
betrachten ausgesuchte Parameter einer oder beider Parteien und basieren auf 
Befragungsdaten deutscher Betriebsprüferinnen und Betriebsprüfer. 
Der erste Beitrag untersucht empirisch, inwieweit die Aggressivität der Steuerplanung von 
Unternehmen dadurch beeinflusst wird, dass die Mehrheit der Anteile und die Führung des 
Unternehmens in einer Familie vereint sind. Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass solche 
Familienunternehmen nicht – wie die bisherige Forschung aufzeigt – grundsätzlich weniger 
aggressive Steuerplanung betreiben.  
Der zweite Beitrag widmet sich den Verhandlungsstrategien von Betriebsprüferinnen und 
Betriebsprüfern. In ihm wird beleuchtet, wie diese das Ergebnis der Prüfung beeinflussen 
können und welche Faktoren wiederum die Auswahl aus den verschiedenen Strategien 
determinieren. Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass Betriebsprüferinnen und 
Betriebsprüfer überwiegend kompetitive Verhandlungstaktiken anwenden und dass sie ihre 
Auswahl in Abhängigkeit der wahrgenommenen Taktik des Verhandlungspartners treffen. 
Die Monografie analysiert mögliche Einflussgrößen auf den Zeitverbrauch der Prüfenden 
während der Prüfung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Zeitaufwand in einem starken Maße 
von den Eigenschaften der ausführenden Prüferin bzw. des ausführenden Prüfers und von 
der Betriebsprüfung selbst, jedoch nur beschränkt von den Eigenschaften des geprüften 
Steuerpflichtigen abhängt. 
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I  Introduction 
1 Research Incentive 
Tax administrations face the challenge of rebuilding, maintaining or expanding the 
efficiency of tax enforcement and tax collection. In Germany, e.g., Engels (2006) has drawn 
attention to considerable shortcomings in relation to tax enforcement. The causes are 
manifold and appear not only in Germany. Particular highlights were and are the limited 
institutional capacities and the changeover or adaptation to predominately digital processes. 
Furthermore, the traditional “enforcement” paradigm has begun to crumble. Strategies to 
improve taxpayers’ compliance should not be restricted to extension of tax audits and threats 
of punishment. Instead, it is just as advisable to reflect the various motivations that lie behind 
taxpayers’ compliance decisions (Alm et al. 2010; OECD 2015: 123). However, taxpayers 
do not make such decisions in a vacuum. It is conceivable, on the one hand, that their actions 
can arise from a perceived or expected treatment on the part of the tax authority, and 
taxpayers’ behavior can be triggered by a specific reaction from the other side. In short, the 
relationship between both parties is interdependent even if they have not had significant 
personal contact (see also Smith 1992).  
In order to provide evidence of this multidimensional nature, it is clearly important to 
investigate real tax audit cases. The reasons for this are twofold, firstly because tax audits 
still constitute the main direct and indirect measure within the framework of tax enforcement 
(for an overview on effects of audits see Kirchler et al. 2008; Ratto et al. 2013), and secondly 
since the involved parties interact during the audit directly and over a longer period. 
Therefore, tax auditors1 are the “public face” of the tax authority (OECD 2006) and, in the 
first instance, the sole decision maker. As a result, it can be assumed that their actions are 
governed by instructions and rules but also by individually applied tactics. The latter can 
chiefly stem from the perceived behavior of the auditee which the auditor experiences 
beforehand or during the audit. The consequence is that the auditor realizes a particular 
outcome at first glance. Moreover, audited taxpayers will consider their own behavior 
patterns on the basis of experience during the audit. In so doing, they take into account not 
only the detected adjustment, but also the way in which the auditor detects and enforces the 
                                                 
1  According to German tax law no distinction is made between the different names tax auditor and revenue 
agent so that both are used interchangeably. 
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breaches or fails to detect them, respectively (see e.g., Andreoni et al. 1998; DeBacker et al. 
2015b). Furthermore, audited taxpayers affect non-audited taxpayers due to “unofficial” 
reported personal experience (Alm et al. 2009). 
My doctoral thesis aims to gain a greater understanding of these complex interactions. In 
detail, the first part deals with the tax compliance behavior of family firms and extends prior 
research. The second and the third parts scrutinize tax auditors’ negotiation strategies and 
their time consumption during tax audits, respectively. These studies reveal novel research 
results in both areas. 
2 Objects of Investigation and Main Findings 
This thesis comprises three separate research projects focusing on closer inspections within 
the taxation procedure. All projects are based on a survey of experienced German tax 
auditors, but the emphases relate to different specific determinants of the interdependent 
relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities.  
2.1 Tax Planning Strategies of Family and Non-Family Firms 
The second chapter2 empirically investigates the effect of family ownership and family 
management as determinants of tax planning aggressiveness. Family-controlled businesses 
represent the majority of firms in many countries (e.g., Faccio/Lang 2002) and previous 
research shows the impact of firm characteristics on tax aggressiveness (for an overview see 
Hanlon/Heitzman 2010). However, up to now only Chen et al. (2010) have studied the tax 
aggressiveness of family firms. Chen et al. (2010) have found that the different cost-benefit 
structure leads to a lower tax aggressiveness among family firms. But, their study is 
restricted because the data are based on financial accounting data from listed firms only. As 
a result, the researchers did not have the opportunity to investigate tax avoidance activities 
that reduce financial and taxable income equally (“conforming avoidance”), and to examine 
whether their findings were also applicable to private firms. Our study deals with both 
shortcomings. Moreover, we explicitly consider the auditor’s ability and effort expended in 
detecting aggressive tax planning activities. Hence, our study contributes to research into tax 
aggressiveness and into family firm and fleshes out the findings of previous research. 
                                                 
2  Chapters II is based on a research paper co-authored with Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus, Leibniz University of 
Hanover, and Prof. Dr. Daniela Lorenz, Free University of Berlin. 
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Our results provide evidence that family firms are not generally less tax aggressive as 
suggested in prior research (Chen et al. 2010). Only in cases of tax avoidance activities that 
are treated differently in financial and tax accounting (“non-conforming avoidance”) do 
family firms indeed behave less aggressively. However, where conforming tax avoidance is 
concerned, we find family firms are even more tax aggressive than non-family firms. Taken 
together, a significant (negative) overall effect of family firms on tax aggressiveness is only 
prevalent if a firm is not only controlled but also managed by a family. Finally, our results 
provide evidence that family-managed firms that are required to publish information about 
tax expenses, and are thus more easily revealed as tax planners, apply fewer non-conforming 
tax planning strategies. We conclude that these firms fear potential reputational risks 
resulting from tax avoidance more strongly, and this finding is consistent with the lines of 
argument put forward in past research. 
Our results should be a valuable tool for investors and researchers relying on financial 
statement data to study a firm’s tax policy. As we have shown for family firms, investors 
who focus solely on effective tax rates may come to misleading conclusions due to the 
disregard of conforming tax avoidance. Yet further research is advisable, as legal tax 
avoidance activities that are accepted by tax authorities and do not result in tax adjustments 
are not captured in our data set. Moreover, the tax audit outcome on which our study is based 
refers only to income taxes even though applied aggressive tax planning strategies may also 
relate to other taxes, e.g., value added tax (for an overview of tax gap estimations from the 
perspective of tax authorities see TGPG 2016). 
2.2 Negotiating with the Tax Auditor: The Effect of Tax Auditors’ Negotiation 
Strategy on Firms’ Tax Adjustments 
In the third chapter3, we examine the negotiation strategies tax auditors use, how these 
strategies affect audit outcome, and which factors determine the use of different tax auditor 
negotiation strategies. Observations from tax audit practice suggest the important role played 
by negotiations in the assessment of a firm’s final tax burden. However, whereas negotiation 
between involved parties is widely accepted in financial accounting research 
(Antle/Nalebuff 1991), prior tax research is almost silent with respect to tax audit 
                                                 
3  Chapters III is based on a research paper co-authored with Prof. Dr. Kay Blaufus, Leibniz University of 
Hanover, Prof. Dr. Daniela Lorenz, Free University of Berlin, and Alexander N. Schwäbe, Leibniz 
University of Hanover.  
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negotiations. This chapter provides a first attempt toward an understanding of tax audit 
negotiations. While doing so we take into account that tax adjustments do not only depend 
on the chosen negotiation strategies, but also on characteristics of firms and auditors. 
However, several questions remain open for future research. Nevertheless, our results pose 
a challenge for governments that aim at introducing enhanced relationship programs. 
Our results show that on average about 40 % of the detected pre-negotiation audit differences 
are assessed after tax audit negotiations. Thereby the negotiation outcome depends 
significantly on the auditor’s choice of negotiation strategy. Our results indicate that the 
majority of tax auditors prefer competitive negotiation tactics, either purely or mixed with 
cooperative elements, whereas purely cooperative or neutral negotiation strategies are rarely 
used. The use of a competitive negotiation strategy increases auditors’ negotiation rate by 
ten percentage points. Our results further indicate that the effect of negotiation strategy 
depends on the time frame of the respective adjustments. The choice of strategy is most 
important if the negotiated issue results in permanent tax revenue (tax burden) for the auditor 
(taxpayer). Finally, our results reveal that the choice of strategy is not greatly affected by 
firm or auditor characteristics, but is rather determined by the opponents’ negotiation 
strategy as perceived by the tax auditor. 
2.3 Determining Factors of Tax Auditors’ Time Consumption 
In the fourth chapter, the focus is on tax auditors’ time consumption before, during and after 
the audit insofar as it relates to the preparation, conducting and completion of an audit. Tax 
authorities need such information for proactive staff planning and for performance 
evaluations of fielded agents. Due to the latter, it can be assumed that auditors are affected 
to a greater or lesser extent so that they adapt their working methods to the exigencies of 
various situations as necessary. This implies that taxpayers are exposed to audit intensities 
which are difficult to calculate and compare. In turn, it can be assumed that auditors also 
adapt their working methods depending on characteristics of the audited taxpayer and of the 
audit itself. Furthermore, it seems obvious that the expended time also depends on personal 
qualities of the auditors themselves. Thus it appears that these influencing factors affect the 
time-on-task in total and with no specified tendency in each case. As a result, it can be stated 
that the time consumption is interdependent from the point of view of each of the involved 
parties.  
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However, research into tax audit time has so far been relatively sparse. The few studies that 
exist on the subject investigated audit time as a benchmark for audit quality and auditor’s 
effort (e.g., Alissa et al. 2014; Sinha 2007, 2010), but they failed to identify the main drivers 
of audit time themselves. In order to fill this gap, I have studied a large number of possible 
factors, emphasized the main findings, and addressed further research topics. It must be 
strongly stressed that time consumption, considered as differentiated according to time spent 
on auditing and on reporting, depends on the task complexity, basic conditions during the 
audit, and on auditors’ experience.  
Task complexity is measured by a scale of legal requirements for book-tax conformity, group 
affiliation, industry, and the legal form of the undertaking. In summary, the results largely 
confirm the expected increase in time spent in the event of increasing complexity and, 
moreover, reveal that auditors adapt their working methods depending on the constituted 
legal forms of auditees. This, in turn, leads to a large extent to auditors’ tendency to 
compensate for increased report time in the case of partnerships due to lower effort during 
the audit when time pressure is a factor. 
The results of several examined factors which determine the audit itself show, at least in 
part, an influence on the time used if basic audit conditions differ from common practice. 
This applies in the event of auditors’ suspicion of tax evasion, diverse places of audit, 
auditing of more or less than three concluded fiscal years, follow-up audits, or short and long 
audit duration, respectively, whereas an additional involvement of specialized auditors and 
an achievement of consensus on auditor’s findings do not influence auditors’ time 
consumption. Furthermore, the outcome of audits affects only the report time. 
Auditors’ experience consists of life and work experience. The results show only a limited 
positive effect of experience on time, particularly rarely in the case of highly experienced 
auditors. The latter do not seem to be capable of or willing to adapt their working methods 
in the event of audits with lesser task complexity than usual. Finally, concerning gender, my 
study reveals that female and male auditors use the same information processing in the 
presence of time pressure so that their time consumption does not differ. However, as soon 
as time pressure is lessened, female auditors spent less time on complex tasks. This concurs 
with recent research and confirms laboratory findings (Breesch/Branson 2009; 
Chung/Monroe 2001; O’Donnell/Johnson 2001).  
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II  Tax Planning Strategies of Family and Non-Family Firms 
1 Introduction 
Taxes present a significant cost to firms and, therefore, one might expect that reducing taxes 
should always increase firm value. Previous research finds, however, that aggressive tax 
planning strategies may lead to significant non-tax costs that can outweigh the tax saving 
benefits. Thus, aggressive tax planning could also negatively affect firm value (Desai et al. 
2007; Hanlon/Slemrod 2009; Mironov 2013) or even increase stock price crash risk (Kim et 
al. 2011). Moreover, firms’ tax planning activity may reduce the debt ratio and the cost of 
debt (Graham/Tucker 2006; Lim 2011). Knowledge about the determinants of a firm’s tax 
planning strategy is, therefore, important for shareholders and other stakeholders of a firm 
as well as for potential investors. 
Previous research shows the impact of firm characteristics such as size, profitability, and 
corporate governance structure on tax aggressiveness (for a review see Hanlon/Heitzman 
2010). Surprisingly, however, up to now there is only the study of Chen et al. (2010) who 
investigate the tax aggressiveness of family firms. This is surprising because in many 
countries family-controlled firms present the majority of firms (e.g., Faccio/Lang 2002), and 
family firms differ with respect to benefits and costs of tax planning from their non-family 
counterparts (Chen et al. 2010). Chen et al. (2010) find that the different cost-benefit 
structure leads to a lower tax aggressiveness of family firms indicating that, in particular, 
family firms take into account agency costs resulting from potential conflicts between 
majority and minority shareholders and place a higher weight on pecuniary and reputational 
costs resulting from an IRS penalty. 
However, due to their data the study of Chen et al. (2010) is restricted in two ways. First, as 
many others (e.g., Chyz et al. 2013) Chen et al. (2010) must rely on financial accounting 
data to measure tax aggressiveness due to tax privacy laws. One important drawback is that 
financial accounting measures do not capture tax avoidance activities that reduce both, 
financial and taxable income (so-called “conforming avoidance”). If, however, family firms 
make more use of conforming tax avoidance which is reasonable because of their lower 
financial accounting constraints compared to their non-family counterparts, then the overall 
level of family firms’ tax aggressiveness is still an open issue. Similarly, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) conclude that despite a remarkable number of tax aggressiveness studies, 
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“the field cannot explain the variation in tax avoidance very well” (Hanlon/Heitzman 2010: 
145). In order to avoid this shortcoming, our analysis is based on tax audit data raised in a 
survey of German tax auditors. We measure tax aggressiveness as the magnitude of tax audit 
adjustment required by tax authorities (DeBacker et al. 2015a) and are thus able to capture 
conforming as well as non-conforming tax avoidance activities. 
A second limitation of Chen et al. (2010) is that they study listed firms only. Research shows, 
however, that private and listed firms differ in their economic decisions, in general, as well 
as in the context of tax avoidance (e.g., Mills 1998: 347; Mills/Newberry 2001; Slemrod 
2007). In particular, private and public family firms may differ with respect to non-tax costs 
of tax avoidance such as reputational risk, and agency costs because majority-minority 
shareholder conflicts are usually more pronounced in public family firms than in private 
family firms. In the present study, our data includes mainly private firms enabling us to 
investigate if the results of Chen et al. (2010) are generalizable to private family firms. 
Using tax audit adjustments as proxy for firms’ tax aggressiveness level has the obvious 
advantage that we do not have to rely on measures that are also influenced by non-tax 
planning objectives such as earnings management. Moreover, as we have mentioned above 
tax audit adjustments cover both, conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance. However, 
relying on tax audit data has the disadvantage that audit adjustments are also influenced by 
the abilities of auditors to detect and correct extensively aggressive tax planning strategies. 
Although, it is obvious that auditors differ in their abilities and effort (Feinstein 1990, 1991), 
this aspect has been neglected in most previous studies using tax audit data. To address this 
objection, we use experiential questionnaires, i.e., auditors were asked to report information 
about their last two cases. This technique has already been used successfully in accounting 
research (e.g., Gibbins/Trotman 2002) and allows us to elicitate not only firm characteristics 
and audit results but also auditor characteristics. Thus, we are able to control for 
heterogeneous auditor abilities in the detection process. Applying a (fractional) detection 
controlled estimation technique (Feinstein 1991), we are able to study, for the first time, 
which specific auditor characteristics affect audit adjustments and show that not controlling 
for these characteristics would lead to misleading results with respect to the determinants of 
firm’s tax aggressiveness. 
We find that family firms, i.e., those firms that are controlled by a family owning more than 
50 % of all shares, are not less tax aggressive in general if one studies the overall tax planning 
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activity. Only if one considers non-conforming tax planning solely,—as Chen et al. (2010) 
do—family firms behave less aggressive. In contrast, regarding conforming tax avoidance 
family firms are significantly more tax aggressive than non-family firms suggesting that 
lower financial accounting constraints of family firms play an important role. These 
opposing effects explain why we find no difference between family and non-family firms 
regarding overall aggressiveness. However, an increasing family impact on management 
decisions decreases overall aggressiveness. In particular, we find that family-managed firms 
are less aggressive. In addition, we provide evidence that larger and listed family firms that 
have to publish information about current tax expense in their financial accounts are less tax 
aggressive than their non-family counterparts. This indicates that family firms indeed place 
a higher weight on reputational risks than their non-family counterparts. 
Our results show the relevance of non-tax costs such as reputational risks, agency costs, and 
financial accounting constraints. We thereby contribute not only to the strand of tax 
aggressiveness literature that argues that a firm’s tax planning decision results from a trade-
off between tax benefits and non-tax costs (e.g., Desai/Dharmapala 2006; Desai et al. 2007; 
Guedhami/Pittman 2008) but also to the emerging body of family firm research that so far 
has almost neglected the impact of taxes (e.g., Siebels/Knyphausen-Aufseß 2012 review 
family research and do not even mention the potential effect of taxes on family firms). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe 
the institutional background of tax audits in Germany. In section II 3, we derive our 
hypotheses. In section II 4, we explain the econometric strategy of the detection controlled 
estimation. The dataset is described in section II 5. The results are provided and discussed 
in section II 6, and section II 7 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background: Tax Audits in Germany 
Germany has a relatively strong tax enforcement (Atwood et al. 2012). All tax returns are 
subject to a preliminary audit by internal revenue officers. Similar to other countries, the 
German revenue service conducts also field audits to detect and prevent noncompliance. The 
ratio between tax auditors and taxpayers is particularly high in Germany compared to other 
countries, e.g., the United States. Despite a remarkably higher number of US firms the 
number of tax auditors is almost the same in Germany and the US. In the year 2010, 13,210 
employees of the German revenue service (full-time-equivalent positions) work as tax 
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auditors compared to 13,879 in the US.4 This leads to a higher audit risk for German firms 
compared to their US counterparts. 
In the year 2010, 8,571,515 German firms were registered for tax purposes with 203,903 
among them being subject to a field tax audit. The resulting additional tax burden (including 
interest charges) amounts to € 16.8 billion. Concerning the selection procedure of the 
revenue service all registered firms are first classified into six classes according to their size. 
Size is measured using industry-specific annual profit and sales thresholds. An overview of 
the thresholds is given in Appendix H. In contrast to other countries like the US, all firms 
that belong to the first largest, second largest and third largest class are subject to a field 
audit for every tax year. For these firms the audit probability equals one. The other firms are 
either computer-selected for tax audits according to a mixture of random choice and firm 
characteristics or selected due to the result of the preliminary audit of the internal revenue 
officer.5 In addition, information gained from previous audits of the taxpayer or other 
taxpayers can lead to a tax audit. Whether the pre-selected firms are actually audited depends 
on the evaluation of the assigned auditor who decides if the firm is worth of examination.   
Field audits are usually conducted in the firm’s office and will last from three to five days 
for small firms up to several months for large firms. As in the US, typically one audit 
encompasses three tax years. The auditor examines the firms’ books and records in order to 
investigate if tax law has been correctly applied. The audit ends with a report of all audit 
adjustments. The audit report contains each individual adjustment, the amount of adjustment 
proposed, reasons for the adjustment, and the effect of the adjustment on taxable income. 
According to the report the firm receives a new tax assessment notice which is legally 
binding unless the taxpayer appeals within one month.  
Comparable to the US, German tax auditors are required to conduct three year studies of tax 
law and accounting. After graduation they usually start working as an internal revenue 
officer for a few years. Depending on their performance they can apply for a job as tax 
                                                 
4  In the present study we use the expression “tax auditors” for all employees of the revenue service that 
conduct field (face-to-face) examinations at the taxpayer’s place of business or in the office. This definition 
corresponds to the US revenue agents as wells as the US tax compliance officers. 
5  In order to avoid selection bias in the empirical analysis we weight our sample according to the taxpayers‘ 
characteristics in the total population. The corresponding information was provided by the revenue service. 
See section II 5.1.  
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auditor. All new tax auditors receive both, classroom and on-the-job training lasting 
altogether five years.  
It is important to note that audit adjustments do not solely result from illegal tax evasion. 
Adjustments may also reflect legal tax avoidance or unintentional misreporting. Because tax 
law leaves room for discretionary decisions the auditor’s assessment may differ from the 
firm’s calculation of taxable income. Therefore, the auditor might demand adjustments, even 
though legal limitations have not been exceeded. German law distinguishes between legal 
tax avoidance and illegal tax evasion that have in common the taxpayers’ attempt to reduce 
their tax liabilities. Tax avoidance as such is neither prohibited nor punishable as long as the 
taxpayer does not provide any inaccurate or incomplete information to the revenue service 
(Brown 2012: 165). Tax avoidance includes, e.g., income shifting between related parties, 
between different tax years or between different income categories, the exploitation of 
ambiguities in tax law and the inherent leeway in accounting rules. In contrast, if the taxpayer 
provides intentionally inaccurate or incomplete information to the tax authorities in order to 
reduce his tax burden, this behavior will be punished as tax evasion. If the taxpayer does not 
intentionally misreport, but disregards due care in a particularly high degree, tax authorities 
set an administrative fine. 
3 Hypotheses Development 
Previous research confirms the impact of firm characteristics on tax aggressiveness (for a 
review see Hanlon/Heitzman 2010). Firms vary in their tax avoidance activities because they  
• differ in avoidance opportunities (e.g., only if a firm belongs to a multinational, it 
may use international transfer pricing to shift profits in low-tax countries), 
• have different benefits of tax avoidance (e.g., tax savings differ due to different 
marginal tax rates), 
• differ in tax awareness (e.g., large firms have their own tax department and/or 
purchase professional tax advise while 20 % of the micro firms have neither own tax 
professionals nor hire advice), or 
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• differ in costs that are associated with tax avoidance (e.g., reputational losses, 
planning costs and potential penalty or interest payments if the revenue service does 
not accept the avoidance activity).6 
In particular, the above-mentioned opportunities, benefits, awareness and costs of tax 
avoidance may differ substantially between family and non-family firms (Chen et al. 2010). 
To distinguish between both firm types, we define family firms as firms where one family 
holds more than 50 % of the shares.7  
The greater control of family owners could imply better opportunities to avoid taxes, e.g., 
through related party transactions. Moreover, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) and Desai et 
al. (2007) argue that tax avoidance strategies are not only applied in order to save taxes but 
also in order to use the tax induced complexity to conceal real performance and to extract 
rents, e.g., through earnings management. This opportunity is more pronounced in firms with 
dominant shareholders, such as family firms. In our analyses, we will control for 
opportunities (measured by size, multinationality, controlling company) to avoid that our 
results are driven just by different tax avoidance opportunities.  
In addition, due to its high ownership the family receives a large part of the tax savings. 
According to Chen et al. (2010) family firms thus benefit more from tax savings. Moreover, 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family firms have better profitability than non-family 
firms (and likely less loss carry forward). Thus, the marginal tax rate and, therefore, the 
benefit of tax avoidance should be higher in family firms. To ensure that our results are not 
driven by these differences in profitability we will control for profitability in our analyses. 
On the other hand, family firms might engage in less tax planning due to a lack of awareness, 
e.g., when family firms reserve powerful working positions for family members instead of 
choosing employees based on competency and skills only. Consequently, knowledge 
heterogeneity and consciousness of tax planning opportunities might be reduced. As we find 
significant differences in the awareness of tax avoidance between family firms and non-
family firms, we will control for this effect in our analyses.  
                                                 
6  See e.g., Alstadsæter/Jacob 2013a. 
7  In additional analyses we also apply an alternative definition of family firms, i.e., firms that are not only 
controlled but also managed by one family. 
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In addition, family firms might also be less tax aggressive than non-family firms due to 
higher non-tax costs of tax avoidance: Family owners are often underdiversified and have 
their wealth tied disproportionally to their firms (Chen et al. 2010). This implies that they 
should behave more risk-averse (Anderson et al. 2012; Strebulaev/Yang 2013) and hence, 
act less tax aggressive, e.g., because of greater fear of being audited or publicly “named and 
shamed” as being too tax aggressive. In addition, family owners have on average a longer 
investment horizon. In contrast to short-term investors, they cannot avoid the consequences 
of a tax audit and the possible detection (Chen et al. 2010). This makes family owners similar 
to labor unions as important long-term stakeholders for whom Chyz et al. (2013) show that 
they decrease firms’ tax aggressiveness. Previous research confirms that family firms also 
differ in their agency costs (Ang et al. 2000). If minority shareholders anticipate the above-
mentioned rent extraction opportunities of dominant family owners, they might impose costs 
for controlling and monitoring systems, or, a price discount on the firms’ stock in case of 
publicly traded companies.  
All in all, family firms have better opportunities and higher benefits of tax avoidance but at 
the same time they might be less aware of tax planning opportunities and face higher non-
tax costs of tax avoidance. However, as we control for differences in opportunities, benefits, 
and awareness, our family firm variable should mainly capture different non-tax costs. In 
line with the results of Chen et al. (2010) we expect that these costs (agency costs due to the 
conflict between majority and minority shareholders or other stakeholders) and the higher 
weighting of risks associated with tax planning result in lower non-conforming tax 
avoidance in family firms.  
H1: With respect to non-conforming tax avoidance family firms are less tax 
aggressive than non-family firms.  
Besides non-conforming tax avoidance strategies firms might also engage in tax planning 
activities that affect both, financial as well as tax accounting. The aggressiveness measures 
used by Chen et al. (2010) do not capture such conforming tax avoidance. However, 
particularly in countries with a high conformity level between financial and tax accounting, 
the disregard of conforming tax avoidance may lead to misleading results.  
In addition to the above-mentioned reasons for and against tax planning there exist additional 
arguments which are applicable to conforming avoidance only and thus require a 
13 
 
reevaluation of the cost-benefit trade-off. First, conforming avoidance mainly results from 
temporary income-shifts and the benefits are thus not permanent, i.e., they are generally 
smaller. Second, audits are more likely to be conducted if tax avoidance is obvious. Mills 
(1998) finds IRS audit adjustments are positively related to large book-tax-differences. If, 
however, a firm applies a conforming tax avoidance activity no differences between financial 
and tax accounting arise. Thus, there is a lower potential audit risk associated with 
conforming tax avoidance. However, both arguments are equally applicable to all firms and 
cannot explain differences in conforming tax avoidance between family firms and non-
family firms whereas the following arguments do: prior research argues that family firms 
also perceive noneconomic goals such as maintaining (financial) independence and control 
over the firm (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007). Thus, they use less external financing, are less 
dependent on creditors’ and investors’ evaluation of the financial accounts. Moreover, 
private family firms are able to use alternative pay-out channels other than dividends in order 
to satisfy consumption needs (Alstadsæter/Jacob 2013b) and are thus less dependent from 
dividend payouts which are often limited to profits in financial accounts. Both arguments 
point towards lower financial accounting constraints because such firms do not have to report 
high profits in their financial accounts. Hence, costs of conforming avoidance should be 
lower compared to non-family firms. Therefore, the negative effect of family ownership on 
tax aggressiveness obtained by Chen et al. (2010) might only be prevalent with regard to 
non-conforming avoidance strategies. Instead we expect family firms to have a positive 
effect on conforming tax avoidance due to family firms’ lower financial accounting 
constraints.  
H2: With respect to conforming tax avoidance family firms are more tax aggressive 
than non-family firms. 
In sum, we expect family firms to behave less tax aggressive with respect to non-conforming 
tax avoidance and more tax aggressive as far as conforming tax avoidance is concerned. It 
is thus an empirical question whether or not family control has a significant impact on firms’ 
overall tax aggressiveness. Therefore, our third hypothesis to be tested is: 
H3: With respect to overall tax avoidance, the degree of tax aggressiveness differs 
between family firms and non-family firms. 
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Finally, prior research argues that family firms may be more concerned with potential 
reputational losses of being claimed as tax aggressive (Chen et al. 2010). Hence, they want 
to protect the family reputation or the “family name” by avoiding the risk that the public 
becomes aware of, e.g., a very low effective tax rate and, hence, that the firm is “named and 
shamed” as tax aggressive. Obviously, this argumentation refers to non-conforming tax 
avoidance solely and applies only if a firm is obliged to publish tax information such as tax 
expenses from which the effective tax rate can be derived. Due to particularities of German 
reporting obligations we are able to identify these firms for which non-conforming tax 
planning is publicly revealed more easily. Besides listed firms also large corporations that 
exceed certain size thresholds have to disclose such tax information, and are thus exposed to 
reputation risk. As family firms are more risk-averse, we formulate our fourth hypothesis as 
follows. 
H4: With respect to non-conforming tax avoidance, family firms that have to publish 
tax information are less tax aggressive than their non-family counterparts. 
4 Estimation Strategy 
To measure tax aggressiveness we use audit adjustments that can arise in the course of legal 
tax avoidance activities as well as illegal tax evasion.8 However, these adjustments also 
depend on auditor’s ability and effort to detect aggressive tax planning activities. To control 
for this effect, our econometric methodology is built on earlier models developed by 
Feinstein (1990, 1991) who introduced a maximum-likelihood-estimation that accounts for 
the impact of decisions made during different stages of the tax audit process on its outcome. 
We implement a two-stage detection controlled estimation (DCE) framework which is 
visualized in Figure 1. First, a firm can either choose to conduct no tax planning (N=0) or to 
avoid taxes to some extent (N>0). However, the resulting tax planning amount is not directly 
observable, since the tax auditor might fail to uncover all tax planning activities. We assume 
the auditor assignment to be exogenous and random.9 Depending on the auditors’ abilities 
either all, some or no tax planning can be identified during the tax audit. Therefore, in the 
second stage we model the auditors’ detection rate, D ∊[0,1]. Only the detected tax planning 
                                                 
8  Our data allows us to clearly identify cases where evasion is suspected. Therefore, we also separated illegal 
and legal tax planning activities in additional sub-sample analyses, see robustness checks in section II 6. 
9  Our data supports this assumption as there is no high correlation between auditor and firm characteristics. 
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amount, i.e., the tax adjustments A that equal the tax planning amount times the rate of 
detection, 𝐴 = 𝑁 ∙ 𝐷, is observed. 
Figure 1: Stages during Tax Audit Process 
 
In order to derive estimates for both stages of the tax audit process we have to distinguish 
between cases with positive adjustments and those with zero adjustments according to Figure 
1. The latter one can either result from perfectly compliant companies, when no tax 
avoidance takes place at all, or from undetected noncompliance, whenever an auditor was 
incapable to detect any portion of an existing tax planning amount N. Analogously, we 
observe nonzero adjustments, when the company takes actions of tax planning and the 
auditor was able to uncover these in total or at least to some positive extent. The likelihood 
for the occurrence of both cases equals the product of each path’s likelihood. Therefore, the 
maximum likelihood estimation maximizes the following log likelihood function by 
selecting appropriate parameters of the underlying distributions of N and D. 
ln 𝐿 =         ∑ ln[  𝑃(𝑁 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑁 > 0) · 𝑃(𝐷 = 0)  ]                                 𝐴=0                    +∑ ln[  𝑃(𝑁 > 0) · 𝑃(𝐷 = 1) + 𝑃(𝑁 > 0) · 𝑃(0 < 𝐷 < 1)  ]𝐴>0                             (1) 
In order to model the extent of tax planning at the first stage we formulate a tobit 
specification with N* being a latent variable measuring the firm’s propensity to plan taxes.  𝑁∗ = 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁 + 𝜖𝑁        (2) 
The vector 𝑥𝑁 contains all firm characteristics that might have an influence on the tax 
planning decision. The random disturbance 𝜖𝑁 is assumed to be normally distributed with 
16 
 
zero means and standard deviation 𝜎𝑁. 𝛽𝑁 and 𝜎𝑁 are the parameters to be estimated. The 
resulting tax planning amount is denoted by N, with 
𝑁 = {  𝑁∗      if 𝑁∗ > 0 (positive tax planning amount)  0         otherwise (zero tax planning amount).         (3) 
Under the distributional assumptions on 𝜖𝑁 the corresponding likelihoods for the occurrence 
of tax planning in amount of N is 𝑃(𝜖𝑁 = 𝑁 − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁) = 1𝜎𝑁 𝜙 (N−𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 )      (4) 
and for a zero tax planning amount  𝑃(𝜖𝑁 ≤ −𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁) = 1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁 𝜎𝑁 ).       (5) 𝜙 and Φ are the standard normal density function and standard normal cumulative 
distribution, respectively.  
If the auditors were always able to fully uncover tax planning activities this model could be 
estimated directly. However, what is often neglected is the fact that detection abilities of the 
auditors can be imperfect. Instead of the true extent of tax planning amount N, only the 
detected tax planning amount A is observable. Therefore, we have to model the detection 
rate D of noncompliance in a second step. Since detection is usually not “all-or-nothing” we 
also take into account the possibility of partial detection, whenever an auditor uncovers some 
fraction of true tax planning, by adopting the fractional detection specification of Feinstein 
(1991). Denote by D the detection rate and let D* be the underlying latent variable measuring 
the propensity to detect, then 𝐷∗ = 𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷 + 𝜖𝐷        (6) 
and  
𝐷 = { 1          if 𝐷∗ ≥ 1  (complete detection)            𝐷∗      if 0 < 𝐷∗ < 1 (fractional detection)  0         if 𝐷∗ ≤ 0 (no detection).                           (7) 
The vector 𝑥𝐷 is a set of variables associated with the auditors’ detection abilities, e.g., 
expertise or intelligent effort. Again, 𝛽𝐷 is the parameter vector that is to be estimated and 𝜖𝐷 is the unsystematic disturbance assumed to be normally distributed with 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝐷2). 
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Moreover, we assume 𝜖𝐷 and 𝜖𝑁 to be independent.10 This allows us to derive the likelihoods 
for the occurrence of complete detection 𝑃(𝜖𝐷 ≥ 1 − 𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷) = 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷−1𝜎𝐷 ),       (8) 
detection of a fraction D 𝑃(𝜖𝐷 = 𝐷 − 𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷) = 1𝜎𝐷𝜙 (𝐷−𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷 𝜎𝐷 )       (9) 
and no detection 𝑃(𝜖𝐷 ≤ −𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷) = 1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷𝜎𝐷 ).                 (10) 
Note that neither the true level of tax avoidance N nor the detection rate D is directly 
observable in the data. Only tax adjustments, A = 𝑁 ∙ 𝐷 , are observed. However, our model 
allows us to extract information about each stage separately. To illustrate our point, consider 
two equally competent auditors reviewing two companies, then differences in tax 
adjustments can only result from different levels of the (unobservable) tax planning amount. 
Analogously, companies with resembling covariates 𝑥𝑁 should have a similar amount of 
(unobserved) tax planning. If, however, their observable adjustments turn out to be very 
different this can only result from differences in the auditor’s ability to detect 
noncompliance.  
According to the above specified probabilities (4), (5) and (10) the likelihood of observing 
zero adjustments amounts to 
                            𝑃(N = 0)   +   𝑃(N > 0)   ∙   𝑃(D = 0)   
=  1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) + ∫ 1𝜎𝑁 𝜙 (𝑁 − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 )∞0 ∙ [1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷𝜎𝐷 )] 𝑑𝑁.                            (11) 
 
Analogously, the likelihood for the occurrence of positive adjustments consists of the 
following components. 
                                                 
10  Feinstein (1991) and Li (2013) also estimated a model with an arbitrary correlation between the errors of 
the noncompliance and detection equation. However, the estimation results were similar to those without 
correlation between the two stages. 
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                            𝑃(N > 0) ∙ 𝑃(D = 1) + 𝑃(𝑁 > 0) · 𝑃(0 < 𝐷 < 1) 
  = 1𝜎𝑁 𝜙 (A − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) ∙ 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷 − 1𝜎𝐷 )+ ∫ 1𝐷 𝜎𝑁 𝜙(𝐴𝐷 − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) ∙ 1𝜎𝐷 𝜙(𝐷 − 𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷 𝜎𝐷 )  𝑑𝐷                                 (12)10  
Note that we replaced the true evasion N by 
𝐴𝐷 . Consequently, the integral runs over D instead 
of true tax planning N and thus, it has finite bounds (0, 1) which is computational preferable. 
The factor 
1D represents the determinant of the Jacobian matrix that is necessary when making 
such changes of variables within integral calculations.11   
Combining both cases in the log likelihood function (1) and rearranging12 finally leads to 
 ln 𝐿 =                ∑ ln [1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝑁′ 𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) ∙ 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷𝜎𝐷 )]𝐴=0                                                   
+∑ ln [ 1𝜎𝑁 𝜙(A − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) ∙ 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷 − 1𝜎𝐷 )𝐴>0                  (13) 
                                 +∫ 1𝐷 𝜎𝑁 𝜙(𝐴𝐷 − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 )10 ∙ 1𝜎𝐷 𝜙(𝐷 − 𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷 𝜎𝐷 )  𝑑𝐷] 
Besides the estimation parameters 𝛽𝑁 ,  𝛽𝐷 ,  𝜎𝑁 and 𝜎𝐷 the log likelihood function contains 
the observable covariates 𝑥𝑁 and 𝑥𝐷 as well as the observable tax audit outcome, i.e., the tax 
adjustments A. The unobserved level of tax avoidance N is replaced by A/D and it is 
integrated over the unobserved detection rate in order to capture all possible values of D.  
This allows us to base our maximum likelihood estimation on this equation. 
However, before describing the data in the next section, we want to address important issues 
associated with the above model specification. First, according to Figure 1 we rule out false 
detection, i.e., in our specification auditors never falsely uncover some noncompliance when 
no tax planning activities actually took place. Second, our data contains very few cases with 
                                                 
11  This Jacobian term was wrongfully missing in Feinstein (1991). We thank Jonathan Feinstein for advising 
us of the correction. 
12  A detailed derivation of the log likelihood function is shown in Appendix B. 
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negative adjustments. Since our model distinguishes between zero and positive audit 
outcomes only we treat such cases like cases with zero adjustments. This shows that some 
noncompliance might also result from unintentional errors instead of deliberate tax planning 
activities. In order to control for unintentional misreporting in our estimation model we will 
include a variable measuring the professional competence of the company. Another 
important statistical issue in detection controlled estimations is the identification problem 
which arises whenever the explanatory variables in both, equation (2) and (6) vary 
identically. In this case the decomposition of observable tax adjustments A= 𝑁 ∙ 𝐷 into the 
two components N and D is not unique and thus, identification fails.13 However, this is not 
a problem in our data set, because xN and xD contain disjoint variables which allows unique 
identification of the parameters. 
5 Data 
5.1 Sample Selection 
Due to German tax privacy laws researchers do not have access to tax audit data. Even the 
German revenue service itself is not allowed to match tax audit data with individual 
information about the auditor. Therefore, the only opportunity to raise audit as well as 
auditor data is to conduct a survey among auditors. With the official approval of the local 
Berlin government we surveyed tax auditors working in Berlin. Berlin is one out of 16 
German states as well as the capitol and largest city in Germany. We used an advanced tax 
law training course which was obligatory for tax auditors to conduct our survey. One of the 
authors taught this course and handed out the questionnaires to participants at the end of the 
first day of the two days lasting course. The course took place between October 2010 and 
February 2011. In sum, 646 tax auditors attended the course from which 610 participated in 
our survey. Thus, we achieved a high response rate of 94 %.  
To gain relevant information about audit cases, we use so-called “experiential 
questionnaires” that are already used successfully in accounting research (e.g., 
Gibbins/Trotman 2002). We ask auditors to report about their last two cases they have 
experienced and are able to describe in detail. Before developing the questionnaire, we 
conducted several pre-survey interviews to gain information about firm characteristics 
                                                 
13  See Feinstein (1990) for a formal proof. 
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auditors are usually aware of after having completed a case. Thereby, it turns out that 
auditors generally remember central key characteristics of a case, e.g., the audit result 
(additional tax burden), the firm’s size (profit and sales), audited tax years, and industry. 
One reason why the audit result and the mentioned firm characteristics are in general well 
remembered is simply that auditors have to fill out several forms after completing a case in 
which they have to report this data to the revenue agency. Another reason is that audit results 
may (at least indirectly) affect the personal performance evaluation of the auditor. In 
particular, the last point makes it important that we assure auditors’ anonymity. Therefore, 
we did not collect any identifying information and committed us officially to not hand over 
non-aggregated data to the revenue service. 
Our questionnaire consists of two parts. In the first part auditors report on their last two audit 
cases, in the second part they have to answer several socio-demographic questions. The 
survey questionnaire is attached in Appendix I. The questionnaire was pre-tested by two 
auditors who did not participate in the final survey and one head of a local tax audit 
department to ensure that all questions are understandable and the questionnaire is feasible. 
On average, participants needed about thirty minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
Altogether, we receive information about 1,244 unique audit cases, i.e., the data set is free 
of duplicate entries.14 From these cases we eliminate those that differ in their tax treatment 
from “normal” business income (e.g., nonprofit associations, charitable trust, agriculture and 
non-business income). Thus, we obtain 1,104 cases. Furthermore, due to some outliers in the 
dependent variable we truncated our data set at 98 % in each size category which results in 
a final sample size of 1,078. In Berlin, auditors completed 8,681 tax audits during the year 
2010. Thus, our sample represents 12 % of all completed cases. The revenue service 
provided us with data containing the average audit results of all cases completed in 2010. As 
Appendix A Table 10 shows, the average audit result (additional tax burden) per size 
category is similar in the sample and the population of all audit cases. 
To conduct multivariate analyses, we need complete information regarding independent and 
control variables. The number of observations with complete covariates amounts to 804. Out 
of these only 728 observations additionally contained information about the kind of tax 
                                                 
14  Some auditors voluntarily reported information about further cases in an additional questionnaire which 
was provided on request by the author who taught the training course. Thus, we received slightly more than 
the expected 1,220 (= 610 × 2) cases. 
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planning activities (conforming/non-conforming) that led to tax adjustments. Table 1 shows 
the sample selection for our analyses. 
Table 1: Sample Selection (Chapter II) 
Sample selection step Remaining 
number of cases 
Original sample 1244 
Less “non-business-cases” 1104 
Less outliers (98 % truncation) 1078 
Less cases with incomplete covariates 804 
Less cases without information on adjustments’ origin 
(conforming/non-conforming tax planning activities) 
728  
 
One further issue is that our sample of audited firms is not representative for the whole 
population of companies in Berlin because firms are not randomly selected for audits. 
However, the revenue service provided us with a data set regarding all 401,411 Berlin firms 
that contains information about industries, legal forms and firm size categories. In order to 
derive unbiased estimates, we weight the observations according to the relative frequency of 
the taxpayers’ characteristics in the population. To this end, we first cross tabulate the 
companies contained in our data set as well as all 401,411 companies of the total population 
in Berlin with respect to twelve industries, two legal forms and five firm size categories and 
calculate the corresponding relative frequencies. The weights for our analysis are then 
calculated as the ratio of the relative frequency in the total population to that in our sample. 
Thus, the weighting leads to the exact same proportions of industries, legal forms and size 
categories as observed in the total population. Unless otherwise stated the descriptive 
statistics as well as estimation results will be based on the weighted data set. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1 Magnitude of Adjustments 
According to our model specification the survey contained questions on three categories. 
The first set of questions provides information about firm characteristics that might influence 
the tax planning decision, hence xN. Next we obtained information about the tax auditor 
himself in order to derive variables xD that can explain variations in detection rates. Finally, 
the survey also contained questions on the tax audit outcome, i.e., the extent of additional 
tax burden or the change in financial loss. The tax adjustments were then calculated by 
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dividing this tax audit outcome by a tax rate being dependent on the legal form of the 
companies.15 Moreover, the auditors also reported the fraction of total tax audit outcome 
resulting from tax avoidance strategies that are treated differently in financial and tax 
accounting. This allows us to decompose total tax adjustments into conforming and non-
conforming avoidance activities.  
According to the summary statistics in Table 2 the average total adjustments amount to 
€ 37.3 k from which € 12.9 k result from conforming tax planning activities and the 
remaining € 24.3 k from non-conforming activities. However, the median indicates that total 
adjustments of 50 % of the firms did not exceed € 7.9 k. The table also shows that out of 728 
firms 453 companies are controlled by a family, i.e., a family holds more than 50 % of shares. 
On average, family firms have lower total adjustments amounting to € 20.3 k, whereas mean 
adjustments of non-family firms are € 88.7 k. However, this difference is statistically not 
significant. Most of the family firms’ adjustments result from conforming tax avoidance 
strategies which are significantly higher compared to non-family firms. In addition, Table 2 
shows that on average non-conforming tax planning activities yield in only € 6.1 k for family 
firms and for non-family firms € 79.7 k.  
In order to control for size effects we scale adjustments with sales. This leads to a ratio of 
15.6 % for total adjustments. There is no significant difference in mean ratios of total 
adjustments to sales between family firms (15.5 %) and non-family firms (15.8 %). 
However, the ratio of adjustments resulting from conforming (non-conforming) tax planning 
activities to sales is significantly higher (lower) for family firms than for non-family firm. 
All the numbers are based on the weighted data set. Table 12 (Panel A) in the Appendix C 
shows the statistics for the unweighted sample which includes disproportionately many large 
companies with a high degree of noncompliance. Accordingly, the mean tax adjustments 
without weighting amount to almost € 179.0 k. 
  
                                                 
15  The applied tax rate for corporations includes corporate income tax, local trade tax, and solidarity surcharge. 
Partnerships are not subject to German income tax, only the partners are. However, we can use a uniform 
tax rate of 35 % for partnerships because the revenue service requires all auditors to use this tax rate to 
calculate the tax burden in the case of partnerships. For sole proprietorships the individual marginal income 
tax rate applies. A proxy for the latter one was obtained from the German income tax statistics with respect 
to income category and industry classification. 
 Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Adjustments 
The table shows mean, median (p50) and standard deviation (sd) of total adjustments and their decomposition in adjustments due to conforming and non-conforming tax 
avoidance activities (total and in % of sales) by family and non-family firms. The last column reports the two-sided p-values for the mean difference between family firms 
and non-family firms based on T-tests. Detailed descriptions of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 (Panel A) in the Appendix C. All numbers are based on 
the weighted data set. 
 
Total  
(N=728) 
Family-Controlled Firms 
(N=453) 
Non-Family Firms  
(N=275) 
Mean 
Comparison  
Variable Mean p50 SD Mean p50 SD Mean p50 SD p-value 
Adjustments in € k 37.252 7.899 207.607 20.343 7.996 54.950 88.709 7.384 493.747 0.199 
      Conforming in € k 12.910 3.654 69.812 14.205 5.013 48.904 8.972 0.000 128.913 0.076 
      Non-Conforming in € k 24.342 0.000 183.301 6.138 0.000 20.367 79.737 3.692 445.986 0.166 
           
Adjustments/Sales 0.156 0.049 0.410 0.155 0.062 0.392 0.158 0.027 0.416 0.945 
      Conforming/Sales 0.108 0.013 0.383 0.130 0.033 0.389 0.042 0.000 0.219 0.001 
      Non-Conforming/Sales 0.048 0.000 0.168 0.025 0.000 0.088 0.116 0.012 0.347 0.016 
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5.2.2 Variables in Tax Planning Equation 
Our questionnaire also reveals information about specific firm characteristics of interest that 
might influence the amount of true (detected and undetected) tax planning. As shown in 
Table 3 75.3 % of the companies have majority shareholdings of one family and we want to 
test empirically whether or not those family firms differ in their degree of tax aggressiveness 
compared to non-family firms as proposed in prior literature. In order to ensure that results 
are not driven by systematic differences between family firms and non-family firms we add 
the following control variables to the tax planning equation that might be able to explain tax 
aggressive behavior.  
In particular, firms that are obliged to publicly report information on tax expenses, from 
which the effective tax rate can be derived, might differ in their degree of tax planning. On 
the one hand these firms might be more engaged in tax avoidance if their shareholders reward 
such behavior as part of the shareholder value maximization. On the other hand they might 
refrain from aggressive tax avoidance because of reputation risks. Due to German 
particularities of reporting obligations for listed and large companies it is possible to identify 
such firms for which we expect tax planning to be publicly revealed more easily. The 
corresponding percentage of such tax publishing firms amounts to 2.5 % in the total sample 
and 0.2 % (9.5 %) for family (non-family) firms. Since we expect family firms to place more 
weight on the reputation risk argument, we will use this variable to test H4.  
Since opportunities for tax planning and audit probability increases with firm size we 
additionally control for SALES. The average sales amount to € 409 k, ranging from € 77.5 k 
to € 48 M. Family firms with € 281 k mean sales are significantly smaller than non-family 
firms with € 798 k mean sales. Furthermore, the opportunities for tax planning are also 
increased when business structures are highly complex. Thus, the dummy variables 
CONTROLLING COMPANY (controlling company within the whole group) and 
MULTINATIONALITY (involvement in foreign affairs) might be associated with higher tax 
adjustments. However, no significant differences between family firms and non-family firms 
exist. In order to control for the fact that some tax adjustments might result from 
unintentional errors instead of deliberate tax planning activities we construct the variable 
NO-AWARENESS which equals 1 if the firm neither incorporates a separate tax department 
nor engages professional advisors for tax-related issues. The corresponding percentage of 
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firms amounts to 18.7 % for family firms and 5.4 % for non-family firms, with the difference 
being highly significant.  
Furthermore, if a company experiences loss it is likely that they do not have to pay taxes. 
Therefore, the benefits from aggressive tax planning behavior are expected to decrease 
whenever loss occurs. On the other hand the loss variables might not only measure the tax 
rate effect but also financial constraints. E.g., Chan and Mo (2002) find a positive effect of 
losses on tax adjustments and argue that “loss-making companies experienced greater 
financial stress and were motivated to reduce present or future cash outflows through 
misstatements”. According to Table 3 16.9 % of companies in our data set have recently 
experienced losses during the audit period whereas 12.3 % have losses carried forward from 
previous periods. Compared to non-family firms, losses and losses carried forward are 
significantly less likely to occur in family firms. Since prior research (e.g., Anderson/Reeb 
2003) also finds family firms to perform better we also control for RETURN ON SALES. 
According to the descriptive statistics family firms indeed have significantly higher 
RETURNS ON SALES than non-family firms. Finally, we add CORPORATION to control 
for differences in tax compliance between different organizational forms (Tedds 2010) as 
well as several industry dummies in order to control for differences among industries.  
Table 12 (Panel B) in the Appendix C compares the descriptive statistics of the above-
mentioned variables in the unweighted and weighted data set. Particularly, the unweighted 
observations include an augmented proportion of large companies with high sales which 
stresses the need to weight the sample according to the relative frequency of the taxpayers’ 
characteristics in the population. 
 
 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Firm Data 
The table shows mean, median (p50), and standard deviation (sd) of firm characteristics in the total sample and by family and non-family firms. The last column reports the two-
sided p-values for the mean difference between family firms and non-family firms based on T-tests. Detailed descriptions of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 
(Panel B) in the Appendix C. All numbers are based on the weighted data set. 
 
Total Firms  
(N=728) 
Family Firms  
(N=453) 
Non-Family Firms  
(N=275) 
Mean 
Comparison 
Variable Mean p50 SD Mean p50 SD Mean p50 SD p-value 
Family-Control 0.753 1 0.432 1.000 1.000 0 0.000 0 0 - 
Tax Publication 0.025 0 0.156 0.002 0 0.039 0.095 0 0.363 0.033 
Controlling Company 0.008 0 0.087 0.009 0 0.085 0.004 0 0.076 0.509 
Sales in € k 408.860 77.500 1,722.343 281.046 77.500 1,011.334 797.811 302.500 3,501.477 0.000 
No-Awareness  0.154 0 0.361 0.187 0 0.355 0.054 0 0.278 0.003 
Multinationality  0.028 0 0.166 0.025 0 0.143 0.038 0 0.236 0.645 
Loss  0.169 0 0.375 0.100 0 0.273 0.377 0 0.599 0.002 
Loss Carry Forward 0.123 0 0.329 0.072 0 0.236 0.278 0 0.554 0.004 
Return on Sales  0.233 0.206 0.284 0.269 0.206 0.277 0.122 0.053 0.209 0.000 
Corporation 0.116 0 0.320 0.039 0 0.175 0.351 0 0.590 0.000 
Ind_Construction 0.061 0 0.239 0.058 0 0.213 0.070 0 0.315 0.661 
Ind_Banking/Insurance 0.032 0 0.177 0.023 0 0.136 0.061 0 0.296 0.365 
Ind_Accommodation/Food Service 0.038 0 0.192 0.039 0 0.177 0.035 0 0.226 0.707 
Ind_Retail 0.074 0 0.262 0.089 0 0.258 0.029 0 0.208 0.000 
Ind_Wholesale 0.020 0 0.140 0.024 0 0.138 0.009 0 0.114 0.330 
Ind_other Services 0.362 0 0.481 0.336 0 0.430 0.438 0 0.614 0.260 
Ind_Manufactoring 0.022 0 0.147 0.018 0 0.120 0.035 0 0.227 0.399 
Ind_Information/Communication 0.059 0 0.237 0.005 0 0.065 0.225 0 0.516 0.039 
Ind_Transport/Food/Beverages/Utility 0.022 0 0.148 0.029 0 0.152 0.003 0 0.065 0.003 
Ind_Freelance 0.309 0 0.463 0.380 0 0.442 0.096 0 0.364 0.000 
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5.2.3 Variables in Detection Equation 
Besides the firm characteristics we also obtained information about the tax auditor. We 
condense this information to several variables measuring the auditors’ effort and 
professional abilities which serve to explain the variation in individual detection rate of the 
auditors. A possibility to measure the auditors’ effort refers to the “de minimis rule” which 
prevails in German tax authorities. Depending on the firm size this rule defines the amount 
of taxes that should at least result from an audit in order to not be considered as a so-called 
“bagatelle case”16. The “bagatelle ratio” is used by the tax authority as one criterion to 
evaluate auditor’s performance. Another criterion is the number of cases the auditor 
completed in one year. Due to this statistical pressure, it is likely that some auditors 
discontinue the tax audit after reaching the given “bagatelle” threshold. Only very diligent 
and ambitious tax auditors continue auditing beyond de minimis limit. The variable EFFORT 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the auditor strongly disagrees (on a 5 point Likert scale) 
that he automatically fulfills his audit goal when reaching the de minimis threshold. 
Therefore, we expect EFFORT to be associated with higher detection rates. As shown in 
Table 4, the corresponding percentage of auditors amounts to 41.5 %.  
Besides the proportion of male auditors (44.5 %) Table 4 additionally informs about the 
dummy variable CAREER which amounts to 0.035 on average. CAREER is designed as a 
proxy for an auditor’s past performance. The dummy variable takes on the value of one if 
the auditor is not older than 40 years and works less than 20 years in the tax administration, 
but already receives an above average salary wage. We expect CAREER to be positively 
related with the auditor’s detection rate. Moreover, the auditors’ abilities to detect tax 
avoidance might be positively linked to the number of training courses an auditor attends. 
The average number of trainings per year amounts to 2.38, ranging from 0 to 10.   
Table 4: Descriptive Summary of Auditor Data 
The table shows mean, median (p50) and standard deviation (sd) of auditor characteristics. Detailed 
descriptions of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 (Panel C) in the Appendix C. All numbers 
are based on the weighted data set. Sample size is N=728. 
Variable Mean p50 SD 
Effort  0.415 0 0.493 
Male  0.445 0 0.497 
Career 0.035 0 0.185 
Trainings 2.378 2 1.156 
                                                 
16   According to the administration‘s “de minimis rule”, „bagatelle cases" are audits that lead to low additional 
taxes. For the definition of the size categories see Table 72 in Appendix H. 
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6 Results 
Table 5 presents the estimation results based on the log likelihood function (13) for the 
weighted sample. Six different model specifications are reported in order to test our four 
hypotheses: First, we distinguish between estimations with total adjustments as dependent 
variable (specification (1)) and those based on adjustments resulting from only conforming 
or non-conforming tax planning activities (specifications (2) and (3)). Specifications (4) to 
(6) additionally incorporate interaction terms between the family firm dummy and the 
variable TAX PUBLICATION in order to test H4. Note that collinearity problems are ruled 
out in our study as the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors 
in Table 13 and Table 14 in the Appendix C show. Since prior research (e.g., Hanlon et al. 
2007) finds a non-linear effect of firm size on tax aggressiveness, we control for sales and 
squared sales. As far as the industry dummies are concerned we use the freelance industry 
as reference category. 
Our first hypothesis to be tested suggests that family firms are less tax aggressive as far as 
non-conforming tax planning activities are concerned due to higher costs of tax avoidance. 
In particular, family firms might be more risk averse than non-family firms and are thus less 
likely to engage in tax planning. According to model specification (3) we indeed find the 
expected negative coefficient of family firms which confirms H1. This result is in line with 
Chen et al. (2010) who use effective tax rates as measure of tax aggressiveness which capture 
non-conforming tax avoidance only. However, this is only half of the story as firms can also 
apply tax avoidance strategies that are treated equally in financial and tax accounting and 
are thus not captured by effective tax rates. Accordingly, our second hypothesis focuses on 
such conforming tax avoidance. Because family firms are generally less dependent on 
external financing in order to maintain financial independence they do not need to report 
high profits and thus face less financial accounting constraints. We therefore expect family 
firms to be more tax aggressive than non-family firms with respect to conforming tax 
avoidance. Specification (2) shows a significantly positive effect of family control on 
adjustments resulting from conforming tax avoidance. Consequently, we can confirm H2, 
too. This result highlights the importance to consider both conforming as well as non-
conforming tax avoidance (Hanlon/Heitzman 2010).  
The third hypothesis focuses on the overall effect. We find family firms to be less tax 
aggressive with respect to non-conforming tax avoidance and more tax aggressive as far as 
conforming tax planning is concerned. It is thus an empirical question which effect 
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dominates. Specification (1) uses total adjustments as dependent variable and shows that 
family firms do not significantly differ from non-family firms in their degree of tax 
aggressiveness which rejects H3. Apparently, the insignificance results from an offset of 
both afore-mentioned effects.  
The last hypothesis to be tested, H4, considers an additional determinant of tax 
aggressiveness. For firms that have to publish information on tax expenses (TAX 
PUBLICATION=1), tax planning is publicly revealed more easily. According to prior 
research (e.g., Chen et al. 2010) family firms that are in the focus of public attention are 
more concerned about potential reputation damage resulting from tax avoidance than non-
family firms and are thus less likely to engage in extensive tax planning. In order to test this 
expectation we separate the effect of family firms with such expanded reporting obligations 
by incorporating an interaction term between the family firm dummy and the variable TAX 
PUBLICATION. Model specification (6) is based on adjustments from non-conforming tax 
planning only. As expected it shows a significantly negative interaction term which indicates 
that the negative main effect of family firms becomes even stronger for family firms that are 
obliged to publish information on tax expenses. Compared to non-family firms with such 
enhanced reporting obligations they are less tax aggressive which supports the argument of 
different weighting of reputation risk. Consequently, we find evidence for H4. In contrast, 
specification (5) is based on adjustments due to conforming tax planning and reports an 
insignificant interaction term. This is the case because the reputation risk argument does only 
apply to non-conforming tax avoidance because conforming tax planning is generally not 
observable anyways. Also, the effect of tax publishing family firms on total adjustments is 
insignificant as reported in specification (4).  
Finally, the results are largely in line with our above considerations with respect to the 
control variables. All model specifications show that tax publishing firms are more tax 
aggressive with respect to total, conforming and non-conforming tax avoidance as the main 
effect of TAX PUBLICATION is significant and positive. This effect stems from a 
shareholder-value approach which applies to firms in the focus of public attention and also 
requires optimizing the effective tax rate, e.g., by means of tax planning. The variables 
CONTROLLING COMPANY and MULTINATIONALITY might positively affect the true tax 
planning amount. This results from increased complexity which offers better opportunities 
for tax avoidance. However, we find positive coefficients only for non-conforming and total 
tax avoidance. The variables SALES and SALES^2 are naturally collinear and thus have to 
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be interpreted with caution. However, as we find positive coefficients for one variable and 
negative effects of the other, the effect of firm size on tax aggressiveness does not seem to 
be linear which confirms prior research (Hanlon et al. 2007). Moreover, the variable loss has 
a negative significant sign in specifications (2) and (5) indicating that a lower tax rate leads 
to less conforming tax avoidance. However, there is are positive significant effects in models 
(3) and (6) which may result from financial constraints, i.e., loss companies might be more 
eager to improve the financial situation of the firms, e.g., by applying more aggressive tax 
avoidance strategies (Chan/Mo 2002). In specifications (1) and (4) it may be that both 
opposing effects – the lower tax rate incentive on the one hand and the higher incentive to 
reduce cash outflows – compensate each other which results in insignificant effects. Also 
the sign of the variable NO-AWARENESS differs with the underlying model specification. 
Firms without tax planning expertise are on the one hand more likely to undeliberately 
misreport, and on the other hand they might not be able to identify and exploit tax reducing 
strategies. Finally, Table 5 also shows that particularly firms operating in the construction, 
accommodation, transport and food services industries are more tax aggressive.  
Concerning the detection equation the following results hold: Auditors that show strong 
effort (EFFORT=1) and attend more trainings are able to detect a significantly larger fraction 
of both, total and conforming tax planning. Moreover, we identify significant gender effects. 
Detection rates of total and non-conforming tax avoidance activities significantly increase 
when audits are conducted by male auditors and by auditors with above-average past 
performance (CAREER=1). 
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Table 5: Estimation Results – Family-Control 
The table presents the coefficients of the estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *. ** and ***. Detailed descriptions 
of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix C.  
 Dependent Variable (1) 
Total Adjustments 
(2) 
Conforming  
(3) 
Non-Conforming  
(4)                  
Total Adjustm. 
with Interaction 
(5)        
Conforming  
with Interaction 
(6)                 
Non-Conforming 
with Interaction 
Independent variables in evasion equation xN     
 Const 
 
0.714***     
(0.147) 
0.947***     
(0.141) 
-0.399***         
(0.04) 
0.598***     
(0.143) 
0.962***     
(0.191) 
-0.422***     
(0.071) 
 Family-Control      
                                
-0.03            
(0.121) 
0.632***     
(0.136) 
-0.132***       
(0.048) 
0.043           
(0.117) 
0.629***     
(0.146) 
-0.12***     
(0.035) 
 Family-Control*Tax Publication 
    
0.029           
(0.299) 
-2.271      
(1.993) 
-0.86**        
(0.426) 
 Tax Publication 
 
2.651***     
(0.392) 
6.054***     
(0.604) 
1.303***        
(0.253) 
2.978***     
(0.337) 
6.234***     
(0.671) 
1.208***     
(0.168) 
 Controlling Company 
 
2.566***     
(0.631) 
-1.312**     
(0.627) 
0.732***        
(0.218) 
2.663***     
(0.788) 
-1.152*     
(0.663) 
0.739***     
(0.114) 
 Sales 
 
-0.717***     
(0.077) 
-1.935***     
(0.243) 
0.11***         
(0.029) 
-0.514***     
(0.134) 
-1.698***     
(0.137) 
0.177***     
(0.021) 
 Sales^2 
 
0.451***     
(0.002) 
1.13***      
(0.076) 
-0.002***       
(0.001) 
0.39***      
(0.018) 
0.787***     
(0.004) 
-0.002***     
(0.001) 
 No-Awareness 
 
0.196           
(0.122) 
0.301***     
(0.104) 
-0.083**        
(0.039) 
0.213*        
(0.121) 
0.313**      
(0.133) 
-0.077*       
(0.041) 
 Multinationality 
 
4.502***     
(0.408) 
-1.769***     
(0.338) 
0.362***        
(0.104) 
4.146***     
(0.387) 
-2.01***     
(0.511) 
0.364***     
(0.104) 
 Loss 
 
-0.102         
(0.142) 
-0.743***     
(0.145) 
0.111**         
(0.054) 
-0.036          
(0.157) 
-0.774***     
(0.154) 
0.116**       
(0.047) 
 Loss Carry Forward 
 
0.311**       
(0.155) 
-0.214     
(0.174) 
0.092              
(0.058) 
0.267           
(0.171) 
-0.219      
(0.185) 
0.087*        
(0.049) 
 Return on Sales 
 
0.098           
(0.157) 
-0.93***     
(0.173) 
0.265***        
(0.042) 
0.122             
(0.15) 
-0.98***     
(0.198) 
0.276***     
(0.063) 
 Corporation 
 
-0.035          
(0.161) 
-0.874***     
(0.194) 
0.149***        
(0.036) 
-0.051          
(0.158) 
-0.83***     
(0.207) 
0.143***     
(0.054) 
 Ind_Construction 
 
0.763***     
(0.218) 
1.092***     
(0.248) 
0.361***        
(0.061) 
0.775***     
(0.219) 
1.217***     
(0.335) 
0.346***     
(0.072) 
 Ind_Banking/Insurance 
 
0.161           
(0.259) 
-0.307**     
(0.147) 
0.448***        
(0.114) 
0.154           
(0.227) 
-0.312      
(0.296) 
0.414***     
(0.103) 
 Ind_Accommodation/Food Service 
 
1.413***     
(0.253) 
1.387***     
(0.265) 
0.327***        
(0.068) 
1.422***     
(0.248) 
1.419***     
(0.243) 
0.323***        
(0.08) 
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 Ind_Retail 
 
0.673***     
(0.185) 
0.025      
(0.187) 
0.39***         
(0.066) 
0.663***     
(0.169) 
0.033      
(0.201) 
0.387***     
(0.077) 
 Ind_Wholesale 
 
-2.729***     
(0.37) 
2.856***     
(0.501) 
-0.091            
(0.089) 
-2.284***     
(0.323) 
3.062***     
(0.529) 
-0.105         
(0.127) 
 Ind_other Services 
 
0.403***        
(0.1) 
-0.126      
(0.108) 
0.417***       
(0.053) 
0.4***        
(0.104) 
-0.168      
(0.12) 
0.406***       
(0.07) 
 Ind_Manufactoring      
 
0.767**       
(0.325) 
-1.148***     
(0.246) 
0.66***         
(0.104) 
0.832**       
(0.329) 
-1.056***     
(0.311) 
0.655***     
(0.109) 
 Ind_Information/Communication 
 
-0.056          
(0.196) 
-0.191      
(0.205) 
0.441***        
(0.079) 
0.026           
(0.208) 
-0.253      
(0.238) 
0.427***     
(0.088) 
 Ind_Transport/Food/Beverages/Utility 
 
0.998***     
(0.183) 
1.537***     
(0.319) 
0.207**         
(0.089) 
0.768*        
(0.398) 
1.558***     
(0.289) 
0.205**       
(0.098) 
Independent variables in detection equation xD    
 Const 
 
0.007***     
(0.002) 
0.006***     
(0.002) 
0.017              
(0.023) 
0.007***     
(0.002) 
0.005***     
(0.002) 
0.022           
(0.021) 
 Effort 
 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
-0.003             
(0.015) 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
-0.005         
(0.013) 
 Male 
 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
-0.002      
(0.001) 
0.048***        
(0.015) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
-0.002      
(0.001) 
0.046***     
(0.013) 
 Career 
 
0.387***     
(0.003) 
-0.002      
(0.003) 
1.369***        
(0.037) 
0.349***     
(0.003) 
-0.002      
(0.003) 
1.485***     
(0.037) 
 Trainings 
 
0.002***     
(0.001) 
0.001*      
(0.001) 
0.007              
(0.006) 
0.002***     
(0.001) 
0.001*      
(0.001) 
0.006           
(0.006) 
 σN       0.882 0.824 0.277 0.888 0.849 0.27 
 σD           0.012 0.012 0.07 0.011 0.012 0.069 
LogLikelihood 1.738 1.333 0.426 1.743 1.321 1.338 
Sample Size 728 728 728 728 728 728 
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6.1 Alternative Definition of Family Firms 
All results concerning the family effect on tax aggressiveness are so far based on the variable 
FAMILY-CONTROL which takes a value of one if a family holds more than 50 % of the shares. 
However, different family firm definitions are possible. In particular, we construct the variable 
FAMILY-MANAGEMENT which equals one if a family not only holds the majority of shares 
but also manages the firm. This is true for 72.3 % of the sample (418 out of 728 cases). In these 
cases owner-manager conflicts do not exist and the family is in a better position to enforce its 
interests. Concerning the decision making of family firms previous research confirms this 
assumption as it shows that family impact is mostly driven through management involvement 
(Ampenberger et al. 2013). Moreover, we have argued that family firms behave more risk-
averse, e.g., due to an underdiversification of wealth. If a family member serves as firm 
manager, not only financial but also human resources are tied to the firm, and the family firm 
might thus behave even more risk-averse. This points towards a lower degree of tax 
aggressiveness for family-managed firms. The results based on this family firm definition are 
presented in Table 6. 
Compared to the before-applied definition the results concerning H1 and H2 remain 
qualitatively unchanged (see specifications (3) and (2)). Accordingly, family firms are less tax 
aggressive with respect to non-conforming tax avoidance (e.g., due to stronger risk aversion of 
family firms) and more tax aggressive as far as adjustments from solely conforming tax 
planning are concerned (due to fewer financial accounting constraints of family firms). The 
increased absolute size of the coefficients indicates that the effect on tax aggressiveness is 
indeed stronger when the variable FAMILY-MANAGEMENT is used instead of FAMILY-
CONTROL. Again, we can confirm H1 and H2. The third hypothesis focuses on total 
adjustments. In contrast to Table 5, specification (1) now shows a significantly negative family 
effect on the degree of tax aggressiveness which confirms H3. This result reveals that family 
firms are less tax aggressive with respect to overall tax avoidance only if the controlling family 
members manage the firm.  
H4 is tested in specification (6). Family firms that have to publish information on tax expenses 
place stronger weight on reputation risk of being tax aggressive. Therefore, they are less 
engaged in non-conforming tax planning compared to tax publishing non-family firms, as the 
negative significant interaction term confirms. Again, as expected we do not find such 
differences when conforming tax planning are concerned. However, in contrast to the former 
less strict family firm definition, we now find evidence for tax publishing family firms being 
34 
 
less tax aggressive with respect to total adjustments. We thus conclude that they fear reputation 
risk more heavily than non-family firms but are able to enforce a lower degree of total tax 
planning only if the family member serves as CEO. All other control variables remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table 6: Estimation Results – Family-Management 
The table presents the coefficients of the estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *. ** and ***. Detailed descriptions 
of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix C.  
 Dependent Variable (1) 
Total Adjustments 
(2) 
Conforming  
(3) 
Non-Conforming  
(4)                 
Total Adjustm. 
with Interaction 
(5)        
Conforming  
with Interaction 
(6)                 
Non-Conforming 
with Interaction 
Independent variables in evasion equation xN     
 Const 
 
0.97***      
(0.117) 
0.87***      
(0.157) 
-0.365***      
(0.084) 
0.973***     
(0.173) 
0.877***     
(0.173) 
-0.215***     
(0.048) 
 Family-management      
                                
-0.306***     
(0.11) 
0.715***     
(0.115) 
-0.261***      
(0.061) 
-0.324**     
(0.151) 
0.716***     
(0.132) 
-0.168***     
(0.043) 
 Family-management*Tax Publication 
    
-3.997***     
(1.341) 
-2.262      
(1.989) 
-0.994***     
(0.274) 
 Tax Publication 
 
2.415***     
(0.336) 
5.983***     
(0.635) 
1.098***       
(0.188) 
3.576***     
(0.305) 
6.173***     
(0.692) 
1.243***     
(0.111) 
 Controlling Company 
 
2.668***     
(0.427) 
-1.36***     
(0.243) 
0.895***       
(0.148) 
4.527***     
(0.527) 
-1.359**     
(0.672) 
0.618***     
(0.167) 
 Sales 
 
-0.685***     
(0.076) 
-1.916***     
(0.261) 
0.18***         
(0.038) 
-0.406***     
(0.078) 
-1.949***     
(0.156) 
0.203***     
(0.018) 
 Sales^2 
 
0.438***     
(0.004) 
1.125***     
(0.081) 
-0.009***       
(0.002) 
0.127***     
(0.003) 
1.138***     
(0.006) 
-0.004***     
(0.001) 
 No-awareness 
 
0.24*            
(0.131) 
0.301**      
(0.126) 
-0.06                
(0.043) 
0.277**        
(0.136) 
0.298**      
(0.129) 
-0.044          
(0.035) 
 Multinationality 
 
4.566***     
(0.421) 
-1.753***     
(0.458) 
0.469***       
(0.136) 
3.921***      
(0.41) 
-1.759***     
(0.475) 
-0.055         
(0.098) 
 Loss  
 
-0.136          
(0.128) 
-0.727***     
(0.149) 
0.114**         
(0.052) 
-0.163         
(0.157) 
-0.729***     
(0.148) 
0.058*         
(0.035) 
 Loss Carry Forward 
 
0.249           
(0.163) 
-0.185      
(0.177) 
0.077              
(0.048) 
0.289           
(0.211) 
-0.188      
(0.169) 
0.038           
(0.027) 
 Return on Sales 
 
0.113           
(0.151) 
-0.913***     
(0.167) 
0.297***        
(0.075) 
0.085           
(0.157) 
-0.917***     
(0.185) 
0.202***     
(0.049) 
 Corporation 
 
-0.092          
(0.123) 
-0.822***     
(0.197) 
0.132**         
(0.054) 
-0.055          
(0.178) 
-0.819***     
(0.194) 
0.044           
(0.037) 
 Ind_Construction 
 
0.765***     
(0.212) 
1.063***      
(0.34) 
0.386***        
(0.092) 
0.878***     
(0.226) 
1.063***      
(0.36) 
0.216***     
(0.058) 
 Ind_Banking/Insurance 
 
0.109           
(0.197) 
-0.332**      
(0.13) 
0.497***        
(0.125) 
0.329           
(0.273) 
-0.332      
(0.323) 
0.255***     
(0.076) 
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 Ind_Accommodation/Food Service 
 
1.443***     
(0.257) 
1.37***      
(0.223) 
0.353***       
(0.089) 
1.487***     
(0.283) 
1.368***     
(0.311) 
0.201***     
(0.059) 
 Ind_Retail 
 
0.692***     
(0.144) 
0.015      
(0.168) 
0.434***       
(0.101) 
0.696***     
(0.171) 
0.014      
(0.193) 
0.257***     
(0.063) 
 Ind_Wholesale 
 
-2.713***     
(0.369) 
2.794***     
(0.571) 
-0.142            
(0.109) 
-2.126***     
(0.425) 
2.801***     
(0.592) 
0.156          
(0.097) 
 Ind_other Services 
 
0.36***      
(0.077) 
-0.135      
(0.088) 
0.43***      
(0.088) 
0.337***     
(0.091) 
-0.131      
(0.113) 
0.251***     
(0.056) 
 Ind_Manufactoring      
 
0.712***     
(0.258) 
-1.055***     
(0.188) 
0.658***     
 (0.131) 
0.74**     
 (0.321) 
-1.053***     
(0.306) 
0.393***     
(0.104) 
 Ind_Information/Communication 
 
-0.23       
(0.151) 
-0.129      
(0.206) 
0.404***       
(0.122) 
-0.209         
(0.237) 
-0.143      
(0.224) 
0.131**       
(0.053) 
 Ind_Transport/Food/Beverages/Utility 
 
1.017***       
(0.37) 
1.517***     
(0.214) 
0.253**         
(0.114) 
0.819***     
(0.298) 
1.521***     
(0.368) 
0.147*        
(0.079) 
Independent variables in detection equation xD    
 Const 
 
0.006***     
(0.002) 
0.006***     
(0.002) 
0.02                
(0.019) 
0.006***     
(0.002) 
0.006***     
(0.002) 
0.054**      
(0.026) 
 Effort 
 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
0.004                  
(0.013) 
0.006***     
(0.001) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
0.005           
(0.015) 
 Male 
 
0.005***     
(0.001) 
-0.002      
(0.001) 
0.043***        
(0.012) 
0.004***     
(0.001) 
-0.002      
(0.002) 
0.032**       
(0.015) 
 Career 
 
0.425***     
(0.003) 
-0.002      
(0.003) 
1.44***         
(0.037) 
0.426***     
(0.003) 
-0.002      
(0.003) 
1.493***     
(0.037) 
 Trainings 
 
0.002***     
(0.001) 
0.001*      
(0.001) 
0.005              
(0.005) 
0.002***     
(0.001) 
0.001      
(0.001) 
0.003           
(0.006) 
 σN       0.883 0.826 0.299 0.892 0.824 0.169 
 σD           0.011 0.012 0.06 0.011 0.012 0.077 
LogLikelihood 1.838 1.338 0.46 1.749 1.339 0.446 
Sample Size 728 728 728 728 728 728 
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6.2 Subsample Analyses 
In this section we perform subsample analyses in order to investigate the robustness of our 
results in more homogeneous subsamples. In particular, we remove cases of illegal tax evasion 
(Subsample 1) or cases when the auditor and company did not come to an agreement about the 
relevant tax adjustments (Subsample 2). In the latter case the firm has appealed to the revenue 
service and the concrete amount of audit adjustments is, therefore, uncertain depending on the 
decision of the administrations’ office of tax appeals or a tax court decision.  
As shown in Table 7 and Table 8 most of our results remain qualitatively unchanged. In 
particular, in both subsample analyses we find family firms being less tax aggressive with 
respect to non-conforming tax avoidance (H1) and more tax aggressive as far as conforming 
avoidance strategies are concerned (H2). This holds independently from the applied definition 
of family firms. Moreover, we find evidence for the former effect to dominate as long as a 
family member manages the firm (H3). Accordingly, family management has a significant and 
negative effect on total tax planning as shown in specification (4). In the subsample with 
agreement cases only, we can even confirm H3 when the weaker family definition (family 
control) is applied. However, in the subsample without cases of illegal tax evasion, we cannot 
confirm that family firms for which tax planning can publicly be revealed, are less tax 
aggressive (H4) whereas we do find evidence for H4 in the subsample with agreement cases 
only (see Table 8, specification (6)). 
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Table 7: Subsample – without Evasion Cases 
The table presents the coefficients of the estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *. ** and ***. Detailed descriptions 
of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix C.  
 Dependent Variable (1) 
Total Adjustments 
(2) 
Conforming  
(3) 
Non-Conforming  
(4)                  
Total Adjustm. 
with Interaction 
(5)        
Conforming  
with Interaction 
(6)                 
Non-Conforming 
with Interaction 
Panel A: Family-Control    
 Const 
 
0.432*** 
(0.079) 
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.547* 
(0.309) 
0.434*** 
(0.088) 
0.047*** 
(0.015) 
-0.524*** 
(0.122) 
 Family-Control      
                                
-0.05  
(0.061) 
0.028*** 
(0.011) 
-0.139* 
(0.073) 
-0.052 
(0.07) 
0.032*** 
(0.012) 
-0.127** 
(0.058) 
 Family-Control*Tax Publication 
    
0.624 
(1.121) 
-0.095 
(0.128) 
-1.064 
(0.659) 
 Tax Publication 
 
1.336*** 
(0.251) 
0.121** 
(0.052) 
1.057*** 
(0.259) 
1.313*** 
(0.253) 
0.167*** 
(0.057) 
1.104*** 
(0.22) 
 Control Variables+Detection Equation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 σN       0.458 0.048 0.353 0.456 0.055 0.335 
      LogLikelihood 1.845 1.588 0.443 1.845 1.588 0.445 
      Sample Size 665 665 665 665 665 665 
Panel B: Family-Management       
     Const 0.406***  
(0.074) 
0.027** 
(0.013) 
-0.409*** 
(0.1) 
0.404*** 
(0.067) 
0.025* 
(0.013) 
-0.388*** 
(0.101) 
      Family-Management -0.130** 
(0.055) 
0.038*** 
(0.012) 
-0.272*** 
(0.063) 
-0.128** 
(0.065) 
0.037*** 
(0.011) 
-0.260*** 
(0.07) 
      Family-Management*Tax Publication 
   
-1.153 
(1.352) 
-0.119 
(0.13) 
-0.838 
(0.617) 
      Tax Publication 1.042*** 
(0.170) 
0.107** 
(0.046) 
1.026*** 
(0.206) 
1.055*** 
(0.2) 
0.111** 
(0.053) 
1.058*** 
(0.225) 
      Control Variables+Detection Equation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
      σN 0.439 0.049 0.338 0.439 0.046 0.322 
      LogLikelihood 1.854 1.602 0.456 1.855 1.602 0.457 
      Sample Size 665  665 665 665 665 665 
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Table 8: Subsample – only Agreement Cases 
The table presents the coefficients of the estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *. ** and ***. Detailed descriptions 
of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix C.  
 Dependent Variable (1) 
Total Adjustments 
(2) 
Conforming  
(3) 
Non-Conforming  
(4)                  
Total Adjustm. 
with Interaction 
(5)        
Conforming  
with Interaction 
(6)                 
Non-Conforming 
with Interaction 
Panel A: Family-Control    
 Const 
 
0.583*** 
(0.058) 
0.143*** 
(0.031) 
-0.109* 
(0.058) 
0.502*** 
(0.078) 
0.091*** 
(0.023) 
-0.098* 
(0.056) 
 Family-Control      
                                
-0.114** 
(0.049) 
0.054** 
(0.024) 
-0.092** 
(0.038) 
-0.117** 
(0.056) 
0.027* 
(0.014) 
-0.094** 
(0.037) 
 Family-Control*Tax Publication 
    
-0.059 
(0.693) 
-0.03 
(0.145) 
-0.899** 
(0.456) 
 Tax Publication 
 
2.372*** 
(0.207) 
0.159*** 
(0.069) 
1.037*** 
(0.166) 
2.469*** 
(0.171) 
0.097** 
(0.041) 
1.034*** 
(0.188) 
 Control Variables+ Detection Equation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 σN       0.401 0.110 0.182 0.363 0.063 0.178 
      LogLikelihood 1.972 1.666 0.481 2.019 1.658 0.485 
      Sample Size 574 574 574 574 574 574 
Panel B: Family-Management       
     Const 0.637*** 
(0.062) 
0.109*** 
(0.026) 
-0.027 
(0.055) 
0.673*** 
(0.084) 
0.109*** 
(0.028) 
-0.027 
(0.053) 
      Family-Management -0.196*** 
(0.054) 
0.038** 
(0.018) 
-0.18*** 
(0.038) 
-0.198*** 
(0.062) 
0.038** 
(0.018) 
-0.176*** 
(0.044) 
      Family-Management*Tax Publication 
   
0.3 
(0.878) 
-0.022 
(0.237) 
-0.858* 
(0.438) 
      Tax Publication 2.487*** 
(0.174) 
0.131** 
(0.06) 
0.9*** 
(0.228) 
2.317*** 
(0.203) 
0.132** 
(0.065) 
1.008*** 
(0.266) 
      Control Variables+ Detection Equation YES YES YES YES YES YES 
      σN 0.391 0.081 0.175 0.383 0.081 0.175 
      LogLikelihood 1.963 1.633 0.496 1.962 1.633 0.5 
      Sample Size 574 574 574 574 574 574 
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6.3 Comparison to Tobit 
The above specified detection controlled estimation framework (DCE) offers the opportunity 
to measure the impact of firm characteristics not only on detected but on total (detected and 
undetected) tax planning by explicitly taking into account the auditor’s detection abilities. This 
aspect has been neglected in most previous studies due to the fact that tax privacy laws generally 
prohibit matching of tax audit data with individual information about the auditor. We overcome 
this problem by conducting a survey of tax auditors which enables us to obtain information 
about both, tax audits as well as auditors. In order to show that not controlling for auditor 
characteristics leads to biased results, this section presents estimates based on a model 
refraining from taking into account the detection process (6) and (7). Accordingly, we specify 
a single tobit model measuring the impact of firm characteristics on detected tax planning, i.e., 
tax adjustments.  
Concerning the first and second hypothesis Table 9 shows that we obtain similar results: With 
respect to adjustments from non-conforming tax avoidance activities, the tobit model indicates 
family-controlled as well as -managed firms being less aggressive (H1). The opposite is true 
with respect to conforming tax avoidance strategies (H2). This is what we have hypothesized 
and already found in the detection controlled estimation. However, in the tobit model we cannot 
confirm H3, with neither family firm definition: No significant difference in the total degree of 
tax aggressiveness is found between family firms and non-family firms when we do not account 
for auditors’ detection abilities. With respect to H4 our results are mixed. Family firms that 
have to make non-conforming tax planning information publicly available are not less tax 
aggressive if the family-management definition applies. However, as far as family-control is 
concerned we find weakly significant evidence for less aggressiveness of such firms.17 
The results of the tobit also differ with respect to the control variables. Particularly, most of the 
control variables turn insignificant in some specifications which clearly shows the importance 
of explicitly taking into account the auditors’ abilities to detect noncompliance.   
 
                                                 
17  The results of the tobit model concerning our hypotheses do not change qualitatively when adding the auditor 
characteristics variables to the tobit model. 
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Table 9: Tobit Model 
The table presents the coefficients of the estimation. Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels are indicated by *. ** and ***. Detailed descriptions 
of the variables definitions are presented in Table 11 in the Appendix C.  
 Dependent Variable (1) 
Total Adjustments 
(2) 
Conforming  
(3) 
Non-Conforming  
(4)                  
Total Adjustm. 
with Interaction 
(5)        
Conforming  
with Interaction 
(6)                 
Non-Conforming 
with Interaction 
Panel A: Family-Control    
 Const 
 
0.086      
(0.356) 
-0.021      
(0.015) 
-0.341***      
(0.097) 
0.015      
(0.33) 
-0.023      
(0.015) 
-0.345***     
(0.097) 
 Family-Control      
                                
-0.199      
(0.296) 
0.033**      
(0.013) 
-0.107**      
(0.053) 
-0.137      
(0.272) 
0.034**      
(0.013) 
-0.101**     
(0.051) 
 Family-Control*Tax Publication 
    
-5.863**     
(2.961) 
-0.122      
(0.134) 
-0.419*      
(0.251) 
 Tax Publication 
 
4.951      
(3.127) 
0.038      
(0.055) 
0.368      
(0.305) 
5.214      
(3.241) 
0.046      
(0.053) 
0.389      
(0.316) 
 Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 Detection Equation NO NO NO NO NO NO 
 σN       1.815 0.084 0.252 1.803 0.084 0.251 
      Log Pseudo Likelihood 1.972 -1,345.129 372.143 -159.442 -1,340.701 372.818 
      Sample Size 574 728 728 728 728 728 
Panel B: Family-Management       
     Const 0.159      
(0.338) 
-0.027*      
(0.015) 
-0.304***      
(0.095) 
0.101      
(0.313) 
-0.028*      
(0.015) 
-0.307***     
(0.095) 
      Family-Management -0.281      
(0.276) 
0.039***     
(0.013) 
-0.157***      
(0.06) 
-0.227      
(0.248) 
0.041***     
(0.014) 
-0.152***     
(0.058) 
      Family-Management*Tax Publication 
   
-6.592**      
(2.88) 
-0.201      
(0.131) 
-0.362      
(0.227) 
      Tax Publication 4.966      
(3.141) 
0.036      
(0.054) 
0.375      
(0.305) 
5.2      
(3.218) 
0.046      
(0.051) 
0.389      
(0.313) 
      Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
      Detection Equation NO NO NO NO NO NO 
      σN 1.814 0.084 0.251 1.802 0.084 0.250 
      Log Pseudo Likelihood -1,344.591 374.728 -152.419 -1,340.198 376.160 -151.733 
      Sample Size 728 728 728 728 728 728 
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7 Discussion 
Compared to non-family firms, family firms differ in their awareness, opportunities, 
benefits, and costs of tax avoidance and, therefore, they also differ with respect to their tax 
planning aggressiveness. Using audit adjustments resulting from legal as well as illegal tax 
planning strategies as measure for tax aggressiveness, we empirically investigate the effect 
of family ownership and family management as determinants of tax planning aggressiveness.   
Compared to prior research our study has two major advantages. First, the data is not limited 
to financial accounting data which captures only those tax avoidance activities that are 
treated differently in financial and tax accounting (“non-conforming avoidance”).  Instead 
our survey data accounts for both, conforming and non-conforming tax planning. Since a 
neglect of conforming tax planning may lead to biased estimates, our study provides more 
differentiated insights to tax aggressiveness. Second, prior research on family firms’ tax 
aggressiveness is limited to public firms only. Our data contains mainly private companies 
which allows us to investigate if prior findings are generalizable to private family firms. 
Moreover, our study enriches prior research by explicitly taking into account auditor’s 
ability and effort to detect aggressive tax planning activities. In order to control for 
heterogeneous auditor characteristics we apply a detection controlled estimation technique 
which allows us to decompose the observed tax adjustments into the (unobserved) true tax 
planning amount and (unobserved) rate of detection. The advantage of this methodology is 
twofold: On the one hand this technique avoids distortions which arise when detection is not 
controlled for. On the other hand our results can be used in order to analyze efficiency of 
revenue service and in order to identify variables that increase monitoring success. 
Regarding our hypotheses we expect that family firms differ from non-family firms with 
respect to their tax planning behavior due to better opportunities and higher benefits but also 
higher costs of tax avoidance. Our results provide evidence that family firms are not 
generally less tax aggressive as proposed in prior research (Chen et al. 2010). Only regarding 
non-conforming tax planning, family firms indeed behave less aggressive. If, however, 
conforming tax avoidance is concerned we find family firms are even more tax aggressive 
than non-family firms. The reason lies in the fact that family firms face fewer financial 
accounting constraints: They are less dependent from external investors and are thus less 
concerned about a reduction of their profit shown in financial accounts which results from 
conforming tax avoidance strategies. Both effects work in opposite direction and a 
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significant (negative) overall effect of family firms on tax aggressiveness is only prevalent 
if a firm is not only controlled but also managed by a family. Finally, our results provide 
evidence that family-managed firms that have to publish information about tax expenses and 
are thus more easily revealed as tax planer, apply fewer non-conforming tax planning 
strategies. We conclude that these firms fear potential reputation risks resulting from tax 
avoidance more heavily which is consistent to the argumentation made in prior research.  
Our results should be important for investors and researchers relying on financial statement 
data to study a firm’s tax policy. As we have shown for family firms, investors who focus 
solely on effective tax rates may come to misleading conclusions due to the disregard of 
conforming tax avoidance.  
There are some limitations in the study that we want to address. Due to our survey data we 
are able to match tax audit data with auditor characteristics which is advantageous in 
comparison to prior research. However, auditors file and report only those tax planning 
activities that lead to tax adjustments while legal tax avoidance activities that are accepted 
by tax authorities and do not result in tax adjustments are not captured in our data set. 
Moreover, the tax audit outcome on which our study is based refers to income taxes only, 
but firms may also avoid other taxes, e.g., value added taxes, by applying aggressive tax 
planning strategies. Our study does not account for other than income taxes. Both effects 
may lead to an underestimation of the true extent of tax planning behavior.  
Furthermore, limitations in our study can also result from restrictive assumptions the 
estimation model imposes. First, our framework specifies a tax audit process which controls 
for detection abilities of the auditors being perfect or imperfect. However, we rule out false 
detection, when an auditor wrongfully uncovers tax planning even though the company was 
perfectly compliant and did not conduct any tax avoidance strategies. It is possible to 
incorporate false detection in context of detection controlled estimation, however, we assess 
this issue as being of minor importance and leave it open for further research. Second, we 
assume the firms’ decision to aggressively plan taxes and the detection rates to be 
independent. However, prior research suggests that a relaxation of this assumption by 
explicitly modeling strategic interactions or introducing correlation between tax planning 
and detection process does not lead to substantially different estimation results (Feinstein 
1991; Li 2013). 
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8 Appendix A 
Table 10: Comparison to Total Tax Audits 
The table presents a comparison of the additional tax burden in the sample with those  
of all tax audits completed in Berlin, in the year 2010. 
  
Additional tax burden due to audit adjustments (€) 
All Audits Sample 
N Mean N Mean 
Micro Firms 2,649 13,829 154  12,366 
Small Firms 2,315 15,965 252  15,492 
Medium Firms 2,415   30,952    356  32,948 
Large Firms (L3) 805   96,872 129  119,994 
Large Firms (L2) 320 151,637 83 166,380 
Large Firms (L1) 177   1,435,133 104 1,407,590  
 
9 Appendix B 
Since we assume the evasion equation and the detection equation to be independent we can 
rearrange equation (11) by placing the term 1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷𝜎𝐷 ) outside the integral, which yields 
1 − 𝛷 (𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁 𝜎𝑁 ) + [1 − 𝛷(𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷𝜎𝐷 )]∫ 1𝜎𝑁 𝜙(𝑁 − 𝛽𝑁′𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 )∞0 𝑑𝑁 
Thus, the integral can be simplified to (𝛽𝑁′ 𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) . Rearranging finally results in 
[1 −𝛷(𝛽𝑁′ 𝑥𝑁𝜎𝑁 ) ∙ 𝛷 (𝛽𝐷′𝑥𝐷𝜎𝐷 )], 
which is the expression shown in equation (13). 
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10 Appendix C 
Table 11: Variable Definitions 
Panel A: Dependent 
Variable 
 
Variable Definition 
Adjustments   
 
Additional tax burden in € M divided by tax rate or change in taxable 
loss. The applied tax rate for corporations includes corporate income tax, 
local trade tax, and solidarity surcharge. We use a uniform tax rate of 
35 % for partnerships. In case of sole proprietorships the individual 
marginal income tax rate applies for which a proxy was obtained from 
the German income tax statistics with respect to income category and 
industry classification. 
Conforming Adj. 
 
Adjustments that result from tax planning activities that are treated 
equally in financial and tax accounting.  
Non-Conforming Adj. 
 
Adjustments that result from tax planning activities that are treated 
differently in financial and tax accounting. 
Panel B: Variables in tax planning equation 
Family-Control 
 
Dummy, 1 if one family holds more than 50 % of the shares (majority 
shareholding). 
Family-Management 
 
 
Dummy, 1 if the company is family-controlled and managed by an 
individual entrepreneur or by a controlling shareholder.  If no such 
information was available we assumed no agency conflict=0.  
Tax Publication 
 
 
Dummy, 1 if the company is publicly listed on a stock exchange, or is 
part of a listed group of affiliated companies, or is a 
corporation/GmbH&Co KG and sales exceed 15 billion Euro. In contrast 
to other firms, these firms are required to publish a profit and loss 
account which investors can use to determine the effective tax rate.  
Controlling Company 
 
Dummy, 1 if the firm is the controlling company within the whole group. 
If no such information was available we assumed controlling 
company=0. 
 
Sales Mid-value of the sales interval the firm is classified to, in € M. 
No-Awareness  
 
 
Dummy, 1 if the company neither incorporates a separate tax department 
nor engages tax advisors.  If no such information was available we 
assumed no-awareness=0. 
Multinationality  
 
 
 
Dummy, 1 if the description of the key issues of audit contains the term 
“foreign”, or if the firm is part of a foreign group, or if one or more tax 
auditors are specialized in foreign relations. If no such information was 
available we assumed multinationality=0. 
Loss  Dummy, 1 if the firm experienced financial loss during the audit period.  
Loss Carry Forward Dummy, 1 if the firm has loss carried forward.  
Return on Sales  Profit divided by sales.  
Corporation Dummy, 1 if the legal form is corporation.  
Ind_Construction Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the construction industry.  
Ind_Banking/Insurance Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the banking and insurance 
industry. 
 
Ind_Accomm./Food Service Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the accommodation and food 
service industry. 
 
Ind_Retail Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the retail industry.  
Ind_Wholesale Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the wholesale industry.  
Ind_other Services Dummy, 1 if the company operates in other service industries.  
Ind_Manufactoring Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the manufacturing industry.  
Ind_Information/ 
Communication 
Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the information and 
communication industry. 
Ind_Transport/Food/ 
Beverages/Utility 
Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the transportation industry, in the 
food, beverages and semi-luxury industry or in the public utility industry 
Ind_Freelance Dummy, 1 if the company operates in the freelance industry. 
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Panel C: Variables in detection equation 
Effort  
 
 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor strongly disagrees (on a 5 point Likert scale) 
that he automatically fulfills his audit goal when reaching the de minimis 
threshold. If no such information was available we assumed effort=0. 
Male Dummy, 1 if the auditor is male, zero otherwise. 
Career 
 
 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor is not older than 40 years and works less than 20 
years in the tax administration, but already receives an above average 
salary wage.  If no such information was available we assumed 
Career = 0. 
Trainings 
 
 
Annual average number of trainings the tax auditor participates in. If no 
such information was available, we set the number of trainings to the 
average number.  
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Different Sample Sizes 
The table presents a comparison of the tax adjustments (Panel A), firm characteristics (Panel B) and auditor 
characteristics (Panel C) between the unweighted and weighted sample containing 728 observations and the 
weighted sample with complete covariates (804 observations) but incomplete data on the decomposition of 
adjustments in conforming and non-conforming tax planning. The detailed definitions of the variables are 
presented in Table 11. 
Panel A:  
Dependent Variable 
Unweighted Data 
Sample Size = 728 
Weighted Data 
Sample Size = 728 
Weighted Data 
Sample Size = 804 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Adjustments  in € k 179.00 1,086.62 37.25 207.61 32.52 185.87 
    Conforming 77.34 522.12 12.91 69.81 - - 
    Non-Conforming 101.66 709.25 24.34 183.30 - - 
Adjustments/Sales 0.14 0.68 0.16 0.41 0.15 0.40 
    Conforming/Sales 0.10 0.65 0.11 0.38 - - 
    Non-Conforming/Sales 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.17 - - 
  
Panel B:  
Variables in tax planning 
equation 
Unweighted Data 
Sample Size = 728 
Weighted Data 
Sample Size = 728 
Weighted Data 
Sample Size = 804 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Family-Control 0.62 0.49 0.75 0.43 0.75 0.43 
Family-Management 0.57 0.49 0.72 0.45 0.72 0.45 
Tax Publication 0.14 0.34 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.15 
Controlling Company 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 
Sales in € k 5,218.09 12,108.61 408.86 1,722.34 404.14 1,739.54 
No-Awareness  0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.37 
Multinationality  0.06 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 
Loss  0.13 0.34 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38 
Loss Carry Forward 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 
Return on Sales  0.22 0.45 0.23 0.28 0.23 0.27 
Corporation 0.30 0.46 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 
Ind_Construction 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Ind_Banking/Insurance 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 
Ind_Accommodation/Food 
Service 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Ind_Retail 0.15 0.35 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.26 
Ind_Wholesale 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14 
Ind_other Services 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.36 0.48 
Ind_Manufactoring 0.06 0.24 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
Ind_Information/Communication 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Ind_Transport/Food/Beverages/ 
Utility 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15 
Ind_Freelance 0.19 0.39 0.31 0.46 0.31 0.46 
47 
Table 13: Correlation Matrix – Variables in Tax Planning Equation 
The table presents the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients of the weighted firm data based on a sample 
size of 728 observations. Two-sided p-values are presented in parentheses. Table 11 contains the detailed 
definitions of variables. The last row shows the variance inflation factors (VIF). A correlation matrix including 
the industry dummies is available on request. The maximum absolute correlation with or between industry 
dummies amounts to 0.2125. 
 
Family-
Control 
Tax 
Publi-
cation 
Controll. 
Comp. 
Sales 
in € M 
No-
Awaren 
Multi-
nat. Loss 
Loss 
Carry 
Forw. 
Return 
on 
Sales Corp. 
Tax Public. 
 
-0.259          
(0.038)          
 Controlling   
 Company 
0.025 0.036         
(0.527) (0.435)         
Sales in € M 
 
-0.130 0.417 0.097        
(0.000) (0.000) (0.250)        
No-
Awareness 
0.160 -0.068 -0.030 -0.053       
(0.007) (0.035) (0.333) (0.000)       
Multinat. 
 
-0.033 -0.009 -0.006 0.044 -0.073      
(0.663) (0.438) (0.563) (0.214) (0.030)      
Loss 
 
-0.319 0.244 -0.024 0.017 -0.048 -0.026     
(0.001) (0.092) (0.245) (0.524) (0.435) (0.536)     
Loss Carry 
Forward 
-0.270 0.374 0.198 0.083 -0.064 0.198 0.415    
(0.005) (0.029) (0.266) (0.044) (0.273) (0.250) (0.000)    
Return on 
Sales 
0.224 -0.106 -0.030 -0.078 0.100 -0.039 -0.359 -0.201   
(0.001) (0.099) (0.259) (0.001) (0.338) (0.136) (0.002) (0.004)   
Corporation 
 
-0.421 0.297 0.019 0.196 -0.142 0.064 0.207 0.382 -0.200  
(0.000) (0.049) (0.641) (0.000) (0.000) (0.411) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001)  
VIF 1.660 1.911 1.093 1.294 1.089 1.564 1.529 1.741 1.351 1.464 
Table 14: Pearson Correlation Matrix – Variables in Detection Equation 
The table presents the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients of the weighted auditor data based on a sample 
size of 728 observations. Two-sided p-values are presented in parentheses. Table 11 contains the detailed 
definitions of variables. The last row shows the variance inflation factors (VIF). 
 Effort Male Career Trainings 
Male 0.042      
 (0.527)       
Career 0.144 0.022    
 (0.137) (0.928)     
Trainings -0.084 -0.124 -0.038  
 (0.134) (0.173) (0.872)   
VIF 1.029 1.017 1.022 1.023 
  
  
Panel C:  
Variables in detection equation 
Unweighted Data 
Sample Size = 728 
Weighted Data 
Sample Size = 728 
Weighted Data 
Sample Size = 804 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Effort  0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 
Male  0.52 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.42 0.49 
Career 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.17 
Trainings 2.55 1.24 2.38 1.16 2.42 1.20 
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III  Negotiating with the Tax Auditor: The Effect of Tax Auditors’ 
Negotiation Strategy on Firms’ Tax Adjustments 
1 Introduction 
This study examines which negotiation strategies tax auditors use, how these strategies affect 
audit outcome, and which factors determine the usage of different tax auditor negotiation 
strategies. In financial accounting research it is widely accepted that the financial statements 
are in part a product of negotiations between the auditor and client management 
(Antle/Nalebuff 1991). Prior tax research, however, is almost silent with respect to tax audit 
negotiations. This is in strong contrast to observations from tax audit practice. Hoopes et al. 
(2012), e.g., cite a report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004: 6) on tax risk management 
stating that “in a number of countries the final agreement of a tax return often ends in a 
‘horse trade’ between the taxpayer and the relevant revenue authority”. In line with this, tax 
advisory firms regularly advertise their tax audit support services by highlighting their 
negotiation experience with the tax administration (e.g., Deloitte 2017; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2017). This suggests that negotiations play an important role in the 
assessment of a firm’s final tax burden. In principal, tax auditors should thus be able to affect 
tax adjustments by the choice of their negotiation strategy. However, to which extent the tax 
auditor is in fact able to push through pre-negotiation findings in an audit negotiation, how 
much this depends on the chosen negotiation strategy, and what drives the auditor’s strategy 
choice is currently unknown. 
To investigate these questions, we conduct a survey with 610 experienced tax auditors using 
experiential questionnaires (e.g., Gibbins/Trotman 2002). We ask auditors to report about 
their last two cases they have experienced. Using a survey design comes along with 
advantages as well as disadvantages. In contrast to computer-based experiments, which 
dominate negotiation research in financial auditing studies, experiential questionnaires use 
real cases and thus avoid artificial experimental settings. Moreover, a survey enables us to 
examine more variables than can usually be examined in experiments and allows us to draw 
quantitative conclusions on the effect size of negotiation strategies. However, whereas with 
experiments strong causal inferences can be easily made, this is more complicated using a 
survey study because the observed tax adjustments do not only depend on the chosen 
negotiation strategies, but also on firms’ characteristics that determine the aggressiveness of 
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the used avoidance strategies and auditors’ characteristics that determine the auditors’ 
detection ability. 
In order to separate the effect of tax auditors’ negotiation strategy, we make use of a multi-
stage maximum likelihood estimation that extends the detection controlled model of 
Feinstein (1990, 1991). In the first stage, the firm is attributed a propensity for tax planning 
activities (based on specific observable firm characteristics). At the second stage, we model 
the detection process during the tax audit depending on observable auditor characteristics 
such as professional experience. The third stage models the tax auditors’ ability to negotiate 
based on the applied negotiation strategy. The advantage of the used multi-stage model lies 
in the fact that conclusions can be drawn for each stage separately. In particular, we will be 
able to estimate the effect of different negotiation strategies on the unobserved negotiation 
rate as well as the expected negotiation rate for each case described in our data set. 
Our findings reveal that on average auditors are able to push through about 40 % of the 
detected pre-negotiation audit differences during tax audit negotiations. Regarding the usage 
of negotiation strategies, we rely on prior psychological research (e.g., Pruitt 1981; 
Carnevale/Isen 1986) and elicitate persuasion tactics that are typical for competitive 
negotiation and cooperative negotiations strategies, respectively. We find that in almost one 
third of the sample cases tax auditors use a competitive negotiation strategy. By contrast, in 
only 14 % of all cases tax auditors choose a cooperative strategy. A combination of 
competitive and cooperative tactics (mixed strategy) is used in 26 % of all cases. In another 
28 % of the cases, a neutral strategy which avoids using competitive as well as cooperative 
tactics is employed.  
The usage of a competitive instead of a neutral strategy increases the negotiation rate on 
average by ten percentage points. Particularly, if the negotiation behavior of the tax advisor 
or the advisor/taxpayer team is perceived as competitive, a deviation from a competitive 
auditor strategy can significantly reduce audit adjustments. Thus, if auditors’ objective is 
simply to maximize audit adjustments, it appears that a competitive negotiation approach 
dominates other strategies. Moreover, we find that a mixed strategy also dominates a 
cooperative negotiation strategy. Furthermore, our results indicate that the effect of 
negotiation strategy depends on the time frame of the respective adjustments. If we restrict 
our analysis to non-permanent (i.e., temporary) tax adjustments, we do not find any 
significant effect of auditors’ negotiation strategy. This suggests that the strategy choice is 
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most important if the negotiated issue results in permanent tax revenue (tax burden) for the 
auditor (taxpayer), but may be neglected if additional taxes are only temporary. 
In addition, using a multinomial treatment effects regression model, we demonstrate that tax 
auditors’ strategy choice is not particularly affected by firm and auditor characteristics. One 
exception is that the likelihood of a cooperative strategy increases if the firm is owned by a 
family or the firm is required to publish tax information. However, the most significant 
determinants of tax auditors’ negotiation strategies are the perceived advisors’ strategies. If 
the advisor is perceived as at least partly competitive, the probability of using a non-neutral 
auditor strategy (competitive, cooperative, or mixed) increases significantly. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the 
background, related research and develop our research questions. In section III 3, we present 
the sample selection, estimation method, and variable measurement. The results are 
displayed in section III 4. Section III 5 presents additional analyses, and section III 6 
concludes. 
2 Background and Research Questions 
2.1 Tax Law Ambiguity 
Financial accounting negotiations occur, when GAAP guidance is ambiguous or non-
existent (Perreault/Kida 2011). Similar to financial accounting rules, also the rules that 
determine a firm’s tax income leave much room for discretionary decisions. For example, 
taxpayers must determine transfer prices for transactions between related companies 
according to the arms’ length principle. This principle states that transactions should be 
valued as if they had been carried out between unrelated parties that each act in its own best 
interest. As there is, however, often no comparable market price for intra-group transactions, 
this definition gives both, auditors and firms, much room for interpretation in line with their 
own individual objectives. In line with this, Deloitte (2010) reports that transfer pricing is 
the most important issue in tax audits of multinational firms. While the determination of 
transfer prices is most relevant for multinational firms, comparable rules also apply for 
national corporations if one has to determine whether a payment to a shareholder classifies 
as a constructive dividend. Other examples that might illustrate inherent tax law ambiguity 
include the determination of provisions for uncertain liabilities, asset write-downs to fair 
value, and the differentiation between private and business expenses for sole proprietorships 
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and partnerships, especially in cases where the expenses are related to both, business and 
personal purposes. It is the vagueness of tax law that is on the one hand necessary to cover 
a wide range of cases, but on the other hand makes tax law to some extent always a matter 
of negotiation. 
2.2 Motivation and Incentives of Negotiation Partners 
Negotiation is a process by which at least two subjects make a joint decision concerning an 
issue about which there are initial differences in preference (Carnevale/Isen 1986). In a tax 
audit negotiation the opponents are the taxpayer, usually represented by his or her tax 
advisor, and the tax auditor. The tax audit negotiation is a form of a pre-trial negotiation 
(Antle/Nalebuff 1991). If a firm files a tax return, the tax liability is usually subject to 
verification by a subsequent tax audit. In Germany, as in many other countries such as the 
United States or Canada, the most severe type of audit is a field audit. Similar to financial 
accounting audits by public accountants, in a field audit, the revenue service conducts a 
detailed examination of the taxpayers’ records commonly at the taxpayer’s place of business. 
During the audit process, the auditor usually identifies certain items he or she disagrees with 
the taxpayers’ chosen tax treatment. Items where the respective tax treatment is unclear due 
to tax law ambiguity are discussed with the taxpayer in a final audit meeting. In case of 
German tax audits, if the opponents do not find an agreement during this negotiation, the 
Revenue Agency will issue a tax assessment note based on the auditor’s opinion regarding 
the correct tax treatment. The taxpayer has the right to appeal against this tax assessment by 
filing an objection letter with the Appeals Department, a separate division of the German 
Revenue Agency. If the objection is rejected by the Appeals Department, taxpayers must file 
a lawsuit in Tax Court if they wish to contest the imposition of the additional tax payments.  
However, usually both negotiation parties are interested in reaching an agreement to avoid 
tax court disputes since most tax court disputes tend to be tedious, costly, and the result is 
often not easy to predict especially if there is no relevant case law on the issue and ambiguity 
is high (Blaufus et al. 2016a). For taxpayers, the potential advantages of avoiding this 
litigation risk may be obvious, but this risk also affects tax auditors’ behavior as our pre-
survey interviews have revealed. The reasons are:  
(1) Tax auditors are usually required to conduct a certain number of tax audits in a year. 
Therefore, auditors are motivated to close their audit cases timely, avoiding 
additional effort which is needed in case it comes to an appeal process. 
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(2) In case it comes to litigation and the Revenue Agency loses in Tax Court, the 
auditor’s local tax office is charged with all legal expenses related to the litigation. 
This may harm the auditors’ professional reputation and auditors, thus, fear that it 
could indirectly affect their professional career. 
Therefore, most tax audits close with an agreement between auditors and taxpayers. In the 
current sample, for instance, the agreement rate amounts to 80 %. While both negotiation 
opponents may be interested in reaching an agreement, their individual negotiation 
objectives clearly differ. Taxpayers and their advisors aim at defending their initial tax 
positions to avoid any additional tax burden. On the other hand, tax auditors are legally 
required to ensure the ‘correct’ application of the tax laws irrespective whether this leads to 
positive or negative tax adjustments. In Germany and most other countries, there is no 
incentive-pay for auditors as it is used, e.g., in Brazil where auditors receive bonus payments 
for every dollar of fines collected (Kahn et al. 2001). However, even in the absence of 
explicit bonus payments, if auditors believe that actions consistent with organizational goals 
will improve their chances of promotion, they will respond to these implicit incentives 
(Klassen 2016). In Germany, the local tax offices are evaluated to some extent with respect 
to additional taxes ‘earned’ from tax audits since they must report to the German Revenue 
Agency the ratio of all cases with non-positive tax adjustments and with tax adjustments 
below a de minimis threshold. Thus, auditors may feel they should help to improve the 
performance of their own office to increase the likelihood of promotion and, indeed, our pre-
survey interviews revealed that auditors perceive their performance evaluation and thus their 
potential career opportunities to be correlated with assessed additional taxes during their 
audits. In line with these implicit incentives, the vast majority of audit cases lead to 
additional tax payments. In our sample, only about 12 % of all cases result in non-positive 
tax adjustments.  
Therefore, we assume that auditors are motivated to assess positive tax adjustments so that 
tax audit negotiations are in principal so-called distributive negotiations which are described 
as win-lose or zero-sum games in prior research (e.g., Walton/McKersie 1965; Kersten 
2001). A gain for one party (one additional dollar in tax revenues for the auditor) is a loss 
for the other party (one additional dollar in taxes to pay for the taxpayer). However note that 
gains and losses must not be valued equivalently by both parties. For example, one can 
imagine that taxpayers place lower weight on issues that result in temporary than on 
permanent adjustments. If tax auditors do not differentiate to the same extent between 
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permanent and non-permanent adjustments, because this differentiation is perceived to be 
less relevant for their performance evaluation, logrolling could increase joint negotiation 
outcome. 
2.3 Negotiation Strategies 
Negotiation strategy is the goal-directed behavior that individuals are using to reach 
agreement (Brett/Thompson 2016). Negotiation research often differentiates only between 
two opposing strategies: competitive and cooperative whereby the former is also called 
distributive and the latter integrative (e.g., Brett/Thompson 2016). However, prior research 
shows that a unidimensional “cooperative-competitive” strategy classification is insufficient 
to explain negotiation behavior. Instead, a two-dimensional “dual-concern” model of 
strategy selection that extends Blake and Mouton’s (1964) Managerial Grid to the analysis 
of negotiation (Filley 1975; Ruble/Thomas 1976) is regarded as appropriate. The dual-
concern model distinguishes between “concern about own outcomes” (assertiveness) and 
concern about the other party's outcomes (cooperativeness) as two independent dimensions 
rather than as opposite ends of the same dimension. Thus, the alternative to cooperation is 
not necessarily competition. The model differentiates between five different strategies: (i) 
competitive (high assertiveness / low cooperativeness), also called competing or contending 
(ii) collaborating (high assertiveness / high cooperativeness) which has also been termed 
“problem solving”, (iii) accommodating (low assertiveness / high cooperativeness) also 
called “concession making” or “yielding”, (iv) avoiding (low assertiveness / low 
cooperativeness), and (v) compromising (intermediate in both assertiveness and 
cooperativeness). However, as compromising is often viewed as a weak form of 
collaborating (Pruitt, 1983; Carnevale/Isen 1986), we do not consider this as a separate 
strategy in the current paper, but instead differentiate between the following four strategies 
that are displayed in Figure 2: 
• Competitive Strategy which corresponds to the “high assertiveness / low 
cooperativeness” category in the “dual-concern” model. 
• Cooperative Strategy which corresponds to the “low assertiveness / high 
cooperativeness” category in the “dual-concern” model. 
• Mixed Strategy which corresponds to the “high assertiveness / high cooperativeness” 
category in the “dual-concern” model. 
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• Neutral Strategy which corresponds to the “low assertiveness / low cooperativeness” 
category in the “dual-concern” model.  
The measurement of these strategies will be explained in detail in Section III 3.3.2. 
Figure 2: Negotiation Strategies 
 
2.4 Research Questions 
As we are not aware of any prior research that examines the usage of tax auditors’ 
negotiation strategies, our first research question refers to the distribution of the different 
negotiation strategies used by tax auditors in real audit cases. Prior auditing research reveals 
that auditors of financial accounting statements experience negotiations with their clients 
about ambiguous accounting issues as a normal part of their practice (Gibbins et al. 2001; 
Gibbins et al. 2007) and that they use different negotiations strategies to persuade their 
clients. Therefore, we expect that also tax auditors are experienced negotiators and use a 
variety of negotiation tactics. 
Gibbins et al. (2010) report from an experiment with 140 experienced financial accounting 
auditors that these auditors generally favor the use of cooperative tactics over competitive 
ones when entering negotiations. Moreover, Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007), who surveyed 
33 experienced auditors, find that financial accounting auditors are unlikely to use a tactic 
of threats, e.g., to qualify the opinion or to terminate the relationship. Similarly, Bennett et 
al. (2015), who elicitated data from 49 experienced auditors, report that it is very unlikely 
that these auditors would use threats to terminate the relationship during discussions 
regarding the disposition of audit differences. 
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However, this preference for cooperative negotiation strategies cannot be simply carried 
over to a tax audit setting. First, McCracken et al. (2008) report that financial accounting 
auditors are held accountable for maintaining good relationships with their clients but not 
monitored closely for the client’s financial accounting quality. This does not hold to the 
same extent for tax auditors because tax auditors do not bear a risk comparable to the risk of 
client loss.18 The high importance of relationship management for financial accounting 
auditors can affect their choice of negotiation strategies. In a meta-analysis of 34 negotiation 
studies Hüffmeier et al. (2014) find that competitive strategies lead to higher economic 
outcomes, but cooperative strategies lead to higher socioemotional outcomes, e.g., regarding 
the perception of the relationship between the negotiating parties. As one of the goals of 
cooperative strategies is to build or maintain a good relationship to the client, one might 
expect that financial accounting auditors are motivated to use cooperative strategies more 
frequently than their tax counterparts. In line with this, Wang and Tuttle (2009) demonstrate 
that auditors negotiate less cooperatively if they depend less on client retention when 
mandatory rotation is imposed. Second, the negotiation frames of the opponents differ 
between financial accounting audits and tax audits. While a financial accounting auditor is 
presumed to have a preference for income-decreasing adjustments (Bame-Aldred/Kida 
2007), tax auditors should prefer income-increasing adjustments (Section III 2.2). Similarly, 
the taxpayer is presumed to have a preference for income-increasing adjustments regarding 
financial accounting purposes, but usually prefers income-decreasing adjustments for tax 
purposes. Changing the negotiation frame from losses to gains and vice versa, potentially 
changes the choice of negotiation strategies. Tax auditors (taxpayers) may perceive 
concessions as decrease in their gains (increase in their losses). Due to loss aversion 
(Kahneman/Tversky 1979) taxpayers may make less concessions, but tax auditors should 
make more concessions, i.e., act more cooperatively, compared to a financial accounting 
audit setting (Neale/Bazerman 1985). However, there are also findings that negotiators are 
less cooperative when their opponents have a loss rather than a gain frame (De Dreu et al. 
2004). This would imply a more competitive tax auditor in comparison to the financial 
accounting setting. Thus, the overall effect of the change in the negotiation frame is 
theoretically unclear. Third, whereas financial accounting auditors usually negotiate directly 
                                                 
18  Tax advisors and auditors, plausibly, have also an interest in maintaining a good relationship with each 
other, because negotiations between tax professionals and tax auditors aren’t one-shot games, but repeated 
games where reputation-building may be of importance. Still, the degree to which financial accounting 
auditors depend on a good relationship to their clients is much stronger compared to tax auditors because 
tax auditors do not have direct monetary disadvantages from a bad relationship. In contrast, bad 
relationships increase the risk of client loss for financial accounting auditors. 
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with the firm’s CFO, tax auditors mostly negotiate with an expert intermediary, the firm’s 
tax advisor. Prior research finds that the competitiveness of the interaction can differ 
between direct and representative negotiations (Rubin/Sander 1988; Bazerman et al. 1992). 
The desire to please their clients may lead advisors to make high demands and less willing 
to concede. Research finds, e.g., that representatives are usually less cooperative, take longer 
to reach an agreement, and impasses occur more often (Mosterd/Rutte 2000). This 
competitive behavior may affect auditors’ negotiation style towards either more own 
competitiveness to mirror the behavior of the opponent according to the reciprocation model 
(Osgood 1962) or to more concessions, i.e., a more cooperative behavior according to the 
level of aspiration theory (Siegel/Fouraker 1960). In sum, whether tax auditors use more 
cooperative or competitive strategies is theoretically ambiguous and, thus, an empirical 
question. We, therefore, formulate our first research question as follows:  
RQ1:  Which negotiation strategies do tax auditors use? 
Prior financial auditing research has also examined the effect of different negotiation 
strategies and tactics on audit adjustments. In a study of Hatfield et al. (2008), 44 audit 
managers and partners participate in a computer-based experiment in which they negotiate 
with a competitive client. Auditors were assigned to two treatments: Either they were told 
that preliminary audit findings include only one significant item or they were told that 
preliminary audit findings also include three clearly inconsequential items which should be 
waived at the beginning of the negotiation. The authors find that the reciprocity-based 
waiving strategy increases the auditors’ envisaged amount of adjustments, their minimum 
required adjustment, and their counteroffers to the client. Similarly, Sanchez et al. (2007) 
find in an experiment with 124 controllers and CFOs, that their willingness to post income 
increasing adjustments rises if auditors disclose inconsequential audit differences and 
subsequently waive these adjustments. Perreault and Kida (2011) report on a computer-
based experiment with 147 practicing managers. They find that threatening to qualify the 
audit opinion or simply informing the client that other companies have handled the 
accounting issue in a way consistent with the auditor’s preference both result in significant 
client concessions of approximately the same level. Perreault et al. (2017) examine the 
effectiveness of simultaneous and sequential negotiation strategies in multiple-item 
negotiations. 263 business managers participated in their computer-based experiment. They 
find that a simultaneous strategy leads to significantly greater total concessions from 
managers and that presenting the larger issues first increases concessions, too.  
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Overall, financial auditing research provides convincing evidence that negotiation strategies 
significantly affect audit adjustments. Thus, we expect that negotiation strategies also affect 
tax audit adjustments. However, the effectiveness of negotiation strategies may differ 
between the financial accounting and tax audit setting because the contexts differ in 
important aspects (see the above discussion relating to RQ1). For example, prior negotiation 
research demonstrates that the effectiveness of competitive tactics such as the usage of 
threats depends severely on the credibility of threats and threat capacity (Pruitt 1981: 71, 
85). Tax auditors can choose among a variety of different threat instruments (see Section III 
3.3.2) and their usage is credible because they do not have to fear negative economic 
consequences comparable to the risk of client loss. Thus, we expect that competitive 
strategies could be very effective in a tax audit setting. Moreover, because of the 
experimental nature of previous financial auditing studies, the size of the effect on real audit 
adjustments is unknown. This is what we are particularly interested in, in our study. Our 
second research question is thus as follows: 
RQ2:  To what extent are tax adjustments affected by a tax auditor’s negotiation 
strategy? 
Our last research question concerns the determinants of the negotiation strategy choice by 
tax auditors. Again, we can draw on a number of financial auditing studies as well as general 
negotiation research. First, research suggests that negotiation strategies depend on individual 
characteristics of the opponent. Hatfield et al. (2008) find that auditors are more likely using 
a cooperative strategy when client retention risk is high and Brown and Johnstone (2009) 
add that audit engagement risk increases the willingness to make concessions by low-
experienced auditors. Gibbins et al. (2010) show that auditors who perceive the client to be 
inflexible in the initial accounting position are more likely to use competitive negotiation 
strategies. While company characteristics and circumstances (such as firm size, ownership 
structure, and financial position) are generally considered to be important in theoretical 
models of audit negotiations (e.g., Beattie et al. 2004), we are not aware of any study that 
examines empirically the link between firm characteristics and auditors’ negotiations 
strategies in more detail.  
Besides firm characteristics, the perceived negotiation strategies of the taxpayers and their 
advisors may affect the choice of auditors’ negotiation strategy. On the one hand, 
reciprocation theory (Osgood 1962) suggests that a perceived cooperative negotiation 
strategy of the taxpayer/advisor results in a more cooperative behavior of the auditor. On the 
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other hand, the level of aspiration theory (Siegel/Fouraker 1960) predicts exactly the 
opposite. According to the level of aspiration theory, negotiators enter a negotiation with a 
certain level of aspiration. An initial cooperative behavior (i.e., a large concession) of the 
opponent should increase the negotiator’s level of aspiration, so that he or she responds more 
competitively (Lawler/MacMurray 1980). In an audit context, Hatfield et al. (2008) find that 
auditors are more likely to use a cooperative strategy when the firm’s negotiation style is 
competitive and there is high client retention risk. This would be in line with the level of 
aspiration theory. 
Regarding own individual characteristics of the negotiator, two studies demonstrate that 
audit experience is related to less concession making behavior (Brown/Johnstone 2009; 
Trotman et al. 2009). In addition, general negotiation research suggests that gender (Walters 
et al. 1998) and personality traits (Antonioni 1998) may affect the choice of negotiation 
strategy. However, according to our knowledge, there is no previous accounting study 
investigating empirically these effects of individual auditor characteristics on negotiation 
outcomes.  
Based on the discussion above, tax auditors’ negotiation strategy could be affected by the 
auditor’s gender, professional experience, their attitude towards taxpayers’ tax morale, the 
perceived negotiation strategy of the taxpayer/advisor, and firm size (as proxy for 
compliance risk). We, therefore, investigate: 
RQ3:  Does the tax auditor’s used negotiation strategy depend on firm 
characteristics, auditor characteristics, and the perceived negotiation 
strategies of the opponent? 
3 Sample Selection, Estimation Method, and Variable Measurement 
3.1 Sample Selection 
We used an advanced tax law training course for tax auditors to conduct our survey. The 
course was obligatory for all tax auditors working in Berlin, which is the capital and largest 
city in Germany. One of the authors taught this course and handed out the questionnaires to 
participants. The course took place between October 2010 and February 2011. In sum, 646 
tax auditors attended the course from which 610 participated in our survey. Thus, we 
achieved a high response rate of 94%.  
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To gain relevant information about audit cases, we use “experiential questionnaires” (e.g., 
Gibbins/Trotman 2002). We ask auditors to report about their last two cases they have 
experienced and are able to describe in detail. Before developing the questionnaire, we 
conducted several pre-survey interviews to gain information about firm characteristics 
auditors are usually aware of after having completed a case. Thereby, it turns out that 
auditors generally remember central key characteristics of a case, e.g., the audit result 
(additional tax burden), the firm’s size (profit and sales), audited tax years, and industry. 
One reason why the audit result and the mentioned firm characteristics are in general well 
remembered is simply that auditors have to fill out several forms after completing a case in 
which they have to report this data to the revenue agency. Another reason is that audit results 
may (at least indirectly) affect the personal performance evaluation of the auditor. In 
particular, the last point makes it important that we assure auditors’ anonymity. Therefore, 
we did not collect any identifying information and committed us officially to not hand over 
non-aggregated data to the revenue service. 
Our questionnaire consists of two parts. In the first part auditors report on their last two audit 
cases, in the second part they have to answer several socio-demographic questions. In Berlin, 
each audit case is assigned to only one tax auditor. Thus, our sample should be free off 
double reported cases. The survey questionnaire is attached in Appendix I. The questionnaire 
was pre-tested by two auditors who did not participate in the final survey and one head of a 
local tax audit department to ensure that all questions are understandable and the 
questionnaire is feasible. On average, participants needed about thirty minutes to complete 
the questionnaire. 
Altogether, we receive information about 1,244 unique audit cases, i.e., the data set is free 
of duplicate entries.19 From these cases we eliminate those that differ in their tax treatment 
from “normal” business income (e.g., nonprofit associations, charitable trust, agriculture and 
non-business income). Thus, we obtain 1,059 cases. We drop 128 cases with missing data in 
all negotiation variables, 52 cases without information about adjustments, and 278 cases 
without final audit meetings (meetings in which the examination report is negotiated face-
to-face). Moreover, due to some outliers in the dependent variable we truncated our data set 
                                                 
19  Some auditors voluntarily reported information about further cases in an additional questionnaire which 
was provided on request by the author who taught the training course. Thus, we received slightly more than 
the expected 1,220 (= 610 × 2) cases. 
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at 98 % in each size category. The final sample amounts to 575. Table 15 displays the sample 
selection for our analyses. 
Table 15: Sample Selection (Chapter III) 
Sample Selection Step Remaining Number of Cases 
Original sample 1244 
Less “non-business-cases” 1059 
Less cases with missing data in all negotiation variables 931 
Less cases without information on adjustments 879 
Less cases without audit meeting 590 
Less outliers (98 % truncation)  575  
3.2 Detection and Negotiation Controlled Estimation 
The observed tax audit adjustments (ADJUSTMENTS) can be expressed as the product of a 
firm’s tax planning amount T, the auditor’s detection rate D, and the auditor’s negotiation 
rate N: 
ADJUSTMENTS =  
TAX PLANNING AMOUNT × DETECTION RATE × NEGOTIATION RATE.  
(1) 
In order to separate the effect of tax auditors’ negotiation strategy on the unobserved 
negotiation rate N, we make use of a multi-stage maximum likelihood estimation (see 
Feinstein 1990, 1991). 
Figure  
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Figure 3: Multi-Stage Model 
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Figure 3 illustrates the estimation strategy. In the first stage, based on its characteristics XT 
the firm is attributed a propensity for tax planning activities 𝑇∗ that results in a positive or 
zero tax planning amount T which we model as a Tobit specification as follows20: 
ln(𝑇∗ +  ℎ)=XT βT + εT ,    with   εT~N(0,σ2T). (2) 
 
T={  𝑇∗     if    𝑇∗ ≥ 0        with   𝑃(𝑇 =  𝑇∗) = 1𝜎𝑇(𝑇+ℎ)𝜙(ln(𝑇+ℎ)− 𝑋𝑇𝛽𝑇σN )      0       if    𝑇∗ < 0        with   𝑃(𝑇 = 0) = 1 −Ф(𝑋𝑇𝛽𝑇−ln(ℎ)σN ) .                 (3) 
 𝜙 and Φ are the standard normal density function and standard normal cumulative 
distribution, respectively. The modeled log-normal specification allows skewed distribution 
that “capture the empirical fact that there is small proportion of taxpayers with very high 
levels of non-compliance” (Erard/Feinstein 2010: 8). 
Next, at stage two, we model the detection process during the tax audit. We assume the 
auditor assignment to be exogenous and random.21 Based on their abilities and effort XD tax 
auditors are either able to detect (D=1) or fail to uncover (D=0) firms’ tax planning 
behavior.22 Therefore, based on tax auditors’ propensity to detect 𝐷∗ a Probit model is 
specified. 
D*=XD  βD + εD     with       εD~N(0,1) (4) 
 
D={       1       if    𝐷∗ ≥ 0            with   𝑃(𝐷 = 1) =   Ф(𝑋𝐷𝛽𝐷)        0       if    𝐷∗ < 0            with   𝑃(𝐷 = 0) = 1 − Ф(𝑋𝐷𝛽𝐷)  (5) 
 
Finally, the third stage models the tax auditors’ ability to negotiate 𝑁∗. Based on the applied 
negotiation strategy XN tax auditors might be able to assert their objections to the firms’ tax 
accounts in full (N=1), to some extent (0<N<1) or they fail to do so (N=0). Thus, N∊[0,1]  
represents the percentage of detected tax planning amount that the tax auditor is able to push 
through in the negotiation process between the firm’s tax advisor and the tax auditor. In line 
                                                 
20  In order to extend the distribution of T* below zero we use h as a displacement parameter, see Erard and 
Feinstein (2010: 9). In context of our estimation h=1 applies which prevents cases with zero tax planning 
propensity to be dropped when logarithmising.  
21  Our data supports this assumption as there is no high correlation between auditor and firm characteristics. 
Most bivariate correlations do not exceed 0.25. The two exceptions concern a correlation between auditor’s 
SALARY and firm size (correlation with Log(SALES): 0.43 and GROUP: 0.3). We, therefore, repeated our 
analyses excluding SALARY. Results reported in this paper remain unchanged. 
22  Note, that we do not allow for fractional detection as modeled in Feinstein (1991). This simplification is 
needed for the convergence of our estimation method. Thus, tax auditors are assumed to detect either all of 
nothing. 
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with Maddala (1999: 160) we use the following two-limit Tobit specification to model this 
stage. 
N*=XN  βN + εN     with  εN~N(0,σ2N) (6) 
 
N={  
     1     if    𝑁∗ ≥ 1              with   𝑃(𝑁 = 1) =          Ф(𝑋𝑁𝛽𝑁−1σ𝑁 )𝑁∗   if    0 < 𝑁∗ < 1      with   𝑃(𝑁 = 𝑁∗) =  1σ𝑁𝜙(𝑁−𝑋𝑁𝛽𝑁σ𝑁 ) 0     if    𝑁∗ ≤ 0               with   𝑃(𝑁 = 0) =       1 −  Ф(𝑋𝑁𝛽𝑁σ𝑁 )  (7) 
 
Note, that we are able to measure the variables XT, XD, XN that might have an impact on the 
outcome of each stage (see section III 3.3), however we observe neither the latent variables 𝑇∗, 𝐷∗, 𝑁∗, nor the variables T, D, N. What we observe is the detected tax planning amount 
that the tax auditor is able to assert, namely the tax adjustments A that can mathematically 
be expressed as the product T×D×N according to equation (1). The advantage of our multi-
stage maximum likelihood estimation lies in the fact that conclusions can nevertheless be 
drawn for each stage separately. In particular, we will be able to estimate the effect of 
different negotiation strategies on the unobserved negotiation rate N as well as the expected 
negotiation rate for each case described in our data set. To illustrate how disentanglement of 
observed tax adjustments A=T×D×N to information on unobserved T, D, N is possible, 
consider two firms with resembling firm characteristics and equally competent auditors with 
respect to the detection of firms’ tax planning, then differences in tax adjustments can only 
result from different negotiation strategies applied by the two tax auditors. 
According to Figure 3, the log likelihood function consists of cases with positive adjustments 
and those with zero adjustments. Positive adjustments occur whenever the company takes 
actions of tax planning that are detected during the tax audit and that the tax auditor is able 
to assert in the negotiation process, either fully or partly. In contrast, we observe zero 
adjustments when either the firm is fully compliant, or the tax auditor fails to detect non-
compliance, or she is unable to push through her objections in the subsequent negotiation 
process.  𝐿𝐿 = ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑃(𝑇 > 0) · 𝑃(𝐷 = 1) · 𝑃(𝑁 = 1) + (𝑇 > 0) · 𝑃(𝐷 = 1)  𝐴>0 ·  𝑃(0 < 𝑁 < 1)] (8) 
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    +       ∑𝑙𝑜𝑔[𝑃(𝑇 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑇 > 0) · 𝑃(𝐷 = 0) + 𝑃(𝑇 > 0)      𝐴=0 · 𝑃(𝐷 = 1) · 𝑃(𝑁 = 0) ] 
 
Under the assumption that the three stages are independent from each other, i.e., the error 
terms do not correlate,23 plugging in the path likelihoods yields the following log likelihood 
function that allows estimation of the parameters 𝛽𝑇 , 𝛽𝐷 , 𝛽𝑁 as well as 𝜎𝑇 and 𝜎𝑁.   
𝐿𝐿 =∑ log [ 1𝜎𝑇(𝐴 + ℎ)𝜙 (ln(𝐴 + ℎ) − 𝑥𝑇𝛽𝑇𝜎𝑇 )  ∙ 𝛷(𝑋𝐷𝛽𝐷) ∙  𝛷 (𝑋𝑁𝛽𝑁 − 1𝜎𝑁 )𝐴>0       +∫ 1𝑁 1𝜎𝑇 (𝐴𝑁 + ℎ)𝜙(ln (
𝐴𝑁 + ℎ) − 𝑥𝑇𝛽𝑇𝜎𝑇 )10 ∙ 𝛷(𝑋𝐷𝛽𝐷) ∙ 1𝜎𝑁 𝜙 (𝑉 − 𝑋𝑁𝛽𝑁 𝜎𝑁 )  𝑑𝑁] +∑log [1 − 𝛷 (𝑥𝑇𝛽𝑇 − ln (ℎ)𝜎𝑇 ) ∙ 𝛷(𝑋𝐷𝛽𝐷) ∙ 𝛷 (𝑋𝑁𝛽𝑁𝜎𝑁 )]𝐴=0  
(9) 
 
However, before describing the data in the next section, we want to address important issues 
associated with the above model specification. First, according to Figure 3 we rule out false 
detection, i.e., in our specification auditors never falsely uncover some noncompliance when 
no ambiguous tax planning activities actually took place. Second, another important 
statistical issue is the identification problem which arises whenever the explanatory variables 
in three stages vary identically. In this case the decomposition of observable tax adjustments 
A=T×D×N into the components T, D and N is not unique and thus, identification fails.24 
However, this is not a problem in our data set, because XT, XD and XN contain disjoint 
variables which allows unique identification of the parameters. 
3.3 Variable Measurement 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Audit Adjustments 
As dependent variable we use log(ADJUSTMENTS) which is the logarithm of the tax base 
adjustments assessed in the audit. For bivariate analyses (Section III 4.1), we alternatively 
use scaled adjustments, i.e., tax base adjustments divided by a firm’s sales 
(ADJUSTMENTS/SALES). From our pre-tests, we know that auditors do better memorize 
the additional tax burden than the adjustments to the tax base because after closing each 
                                                 
23  Feinstein (1991) and Li (2013) also estimated similar models with an arbitrary correlation in a two stage 
setting. However, the estimation results were similar to those without correlation. 
24  See Feinstein (1990) for a formal proof. 
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audit case auditors are required to separately document the additional tax burden for 
statistical analyses of the tax administration. Thus, we elicitated the additional tax burden 
(in Euro) and, in case of loss firms, the adjustments to the taxable loss. Tax base adjustments 
are calculated as the sum of the change in taxable loss and the quotient of the additional tax 
burden and the tax rate.25 
3.3.2 Independent Variables: Tax Auditor Negotiation Strategies 
To measure auditors’ negotiation strategies, we decided not to ask for any self-assessments 
regarding their negotiation strategy. Rather, we assume that negotiators choose their tactics 
consistent with their overall negotiation strategy and asked whether they have used specific 
persuasion tactics. This method should reduce distortions linked with subjective self-
assessments.  
Persuasion tactics rely on the use of psychological effects in order to convince or to compel 
someone to accept the negotiator’s position (Perreault/Kida 2011). In line with psychological 
research (e.g., Pruitt 1981; Carnevale/Isen 1986), the following tactics are characteristic of 
competitive negotiation strategies: imposing time pressure on the other negotiator (e.g., by 
setting deadlines), making it seem that negotiation is likely to break down without 
agreement, minimizing concessions to the other negotiator to appear “tough”, and using 
threats. In a negotiation setting, a threat means a communication of intent to punish the other 
if the other does not concede (Pruitt 1981: 77; Sinaceur et al. 2011). Sanctions are a key 
component of threat (Sinaceur/Neale 2005). Within the context of a tax auditor/taxpayer 
negotiation, an auditor can use different sanctions. Most countries differentiate between 
administrative fines, coercive penalties, and other sanctions (van der Hel 2011). In Germany, 
auditors can use their coercive power to compel action by threatening taxpayers to impose 
coercive fines or other coercive measures (substitutive execution, direct enforcement) 
according to sections 328-335 GFC26 if taxpayers do not comply within a specific deadline. 
Moreover, auditors can impose penalties if taxpayers do not comply with information and 
documentation requests during tax audits in due time (fine for delay, section 146(2b) GFC). 
In addition, if taxpayers do not cooperate, auditors are allowed to estimate the basis of 
taxation (section 162 GFC) and the estimated tax base may exceed the declared income. 
                                                 
25  In Germany, the applied tax rate for corporations includes corporate income tax, local trade tax, and 
solidarity surcharge. We use a uniform tax rate of 35% for partnerships which mirrors tax auditors’ practice. 
In case of sole proprietorships, the individual marginal income tax rate applies for which a proxy was 
obtained from the German income tax statistics with respect to income category and industry classification. 
26  The GFC is the German Fiscal Code. 
65 
Finally, tax auditors can threat to break off negotiations. If the negotiation discontinues 
without agreement, the tax administration would issue a tax assessment notice on the basis 
of the auditor’s tax adjustments which implies the risk of litigation for both parties. Other 
instruments the auditor may use to increase the time pressure on the taxpayer include 
imposing short deadlines or raising the frequency of reminders and requests.  
To elicitate the usage of competitive tactics, we ask auditors, whether they have carried out 
one of the following actions to speed up the audit process (multiple answers possible): 
• Imposing short deadlines, 
• Threat of imposing a fine for delay, 
• Threat of coercive measures (coercive fine, substitutive execution, direct 
enforcement), 
• Threat of discontinuing negotiations without agreement, 
• Other actions:__________. 
In contrast to the above described tactics which aim at forcing one’s own will on the other 
party, in a cooperative negotiation strategy the effects on the welfare of the other party is 
also considered. A cooperative negotiation strategy includes tactics such as the exchange of 
truthful information about needs and priorities, seeking the other’s reaction to each offer and 
making larger concessions on items of lower priority (e.g., Carnevale/Isen 1986; 
Carnevale/Pruitt 1992). Within the context of a tax auditor/taxpayer negotiation, the tax 
auditor may, e.g., offer to waive small audit adjustments or adjustments with high litigation 
risk in order to promote a cooperative environment that encourages the taxpayer to accept a 
larger audit adjustment. Such a concession tactic is based on the assumption of reciprocity 
as a general societal norm (Sanchez et al. 2007; Hatfield et al. 2008). Moreover, tax auditors 
could consider the taxpayer’s welfare and waive adjustments that would result in an 
excessive additional tax burden on the firm. Alternatively, auditors could concede that the 
taxpayers’ legal argumentation is superior to their own arguments and waive the 
corresponding adjustments. 
To elicitate the usage of cooperative tactics, we ask subjects how they found an agreement 
on the proposed audit adjustments. Possible answers were given as follows (multiple 
answers possible):  
• I waived small adjustments in favor of one large adjustment, 
• I waived adjustments because the firm’s “pain threshold” was reached, 
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• I waived uncertain adjustments to avoid the risk of litigation, 
• I waived adjustments because the other side has convinced me. 
As explained in Section III 2.3, we differentiate between the following four strategies that 
are displayed in Figure 2. 
• Competitive Strategy measured by the binary variable COMP, which is one if the 
auditor uses at least one of the above mentioned competitive tactics and does not use 
any cooperative tactic.  
• Cooperative Strategy measured by the binary variable COOP, which is one if the 
auditor uses at least one of the above mentioned cooperative tactics and does not use 
any competitive tactic.  
• Mixed Strategy measured by the binary variable MIX, which is one if the auditor uses 
at least one of the above mentioned cooperative tactics and does also use at least one 
competitive tactic.  
Neutral Strategy measured by the binary variable NEUTRAL, which is one if the auditor 
avoids using cooperative as well as competitive tactics. 
3.3.3 Control Variables 
3.3.3.1 Tax Planning Stage 
Prior research shows a large cross-sectional variation in firms’ tax avoidance 
(Hanlon/Heitzman 2010). Thus, our first set of control variables consists of firm 
characteristics which may explain the extent of a firm’s tax planning activity. Firms differ 
in their tax planning opportunities, tax planning benefits, and costs of tax planning which 
include tax- and non-tax costs. Regarding non-tax costs, public firms may place more 
emphasis on financial reporting outcomes than do private firms and thus have higher non-
tax costs which should lead to less conforming tax avoidance, i.e., avoidance which reduces 
tax as well as book income (Mills 1998; Mills/Newberry 2001). Therefore, we include a 
control variable PUBLIC which equals one, if the firm is required to publish a profit and loss 
account. We also control for family firms, because there is evidence that family firms engage 
in less non-conforming tax avoidance (reduction of tax, but not book income) due to higher 
reputation costs which could result from aggressive tax strategies (Chen et al. 2010). The 
variable FAMILY takes on the value of one if a family holds more than 50 % of the shares, 
otherwise it is zero. Tax planning opportunities should increase and average tax planning 
costs should decrease with increasing firm size. Thus, we included log(SALES) as further 
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control variable which is the natural logarithm of a firm’s sales. Tax planning opportunities 
also rise with increasing foreign operations, because multinational firms can engage in cross-
country profit shifting. The variable FOREIGN equals one if the key audit areas include the 
term “foreign”, the firm is a member of a foreign group, or the involved tax auditor is 
specialized in foreign relations, otherwise it is zero. Furthermore, there is some evidence 
that tax avoidance opportunities and benefits vary with the legal form (Tedds 2010). Hence, 
we include an indicator variable for corporations (CORPORATION). In addition, we include 
an indicator variable GROUP because tax planning opportunities should also increase if the 
firm belongs to a group. Tax planning benefits may vary across firms due to differences in 
profitability. We, therefore, control for a firm’s financial status (LOSS), which is one for 
firms that suffered losses during the audit period. Finally, we include an indicator variable 
EVASION which is one for firms that are suspected of tax evasion, since we assume that 
firms engage in more aggressive tax planning if they use legal and illegal tax minimization 
to decrease the tax burden.27 
3.3.3.2 Detection Stage 
In the second stage of our estimation model, we aim at explaining the auditor’s ability of 
successfully detecting necessary tax base adjustments. First, we control for auditor’s 
expertise by including auditor’s wage (SALARY), years of experience (EXPERIENCE), i.e., 
auditor years at the tax administration, academic degree (SCHOOL), and the number of 
advanced training courses the auditor has attended on average per year (TRAINING). 
Second, to take into account that auditors differ in their attitude towards taxpayers and their 
intrinsic motivation, we include the variables ATTITUDE and MOTIVATION. To measure 
ATTITUDE, tax auditors were asked if they agree or disagree to the following question on a 
five-point scale: “Taxpayers seek to minimize their tax burden by all permitted means.” 
ATTITUDE equals one if the auditor fully agrees (5 out of 5), otherwise it is zero. To elicitate 
MOTIVATION auditors were asked if they agree or disagree to the following question on a 
five-point scale: “Due to the statistical pressure I consider the audit objective to be achieved 
by reaching the de minimis treshold.” MOTIVATION is one for auditors who fully disagree 
(1 out of 5), otherwise it is 0. Finally, we control for audits in which a section head 
participated actively in the final audit meeting (HEAD). 
                                                 
27  We checked the variables for collinearity problems for each stage by means of Variance Inflation Factors 
and could not detect any problems. All VIFs are below 2.5, which is far below the threshold of 10 suggested 
by Hair et al. (2013). 
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3.3.3.3 Negotiation Stage 
Our main interest is directed to the negotiation stage of our estimation model. Besides our 
independent variables that measure the tax auditors’ negotiation strategies, we include 
variables that control for the perceived negotiation strategy of the tax advisor and (in 
additional tests) the taxpayer.  
Similar to our measurement of auditors’ negotiation strategy, we do not directly ask for the 
used strategy, but asked for specific tactics, the advisors and taxpayers have used. Our 
questionnaire contains items, which characterize competitive or cooperative negotiation 
tactics and could be answered with “yes”, “no”, or left unanswered. To determine the 
perceived tax advisors’ negotiation strategies, we use a binary full-information factor 
analysis (Reckase 2009).  
We use a factor analysis for advisor strategies for two reasons. First, items used for tax 
advisors’ strategies are in contrast to those used for auditors’ strategies determination not 
mutually exclusive; hence the computation of common factors is feasible. Second, we are 
not interested in the distribution of tax advisor strategies. Thus, we can simply use a median 
split of factor scores to divide advisors into the four negotiation styles. 
We observe factor loadings that are at least .5 for one factor and not higher than .25 for the 
other. Furthermore, the items load as expected on a competitive and a cooperative factor, 
e.g., “Information was withheld/filtered” or “Threatened with Tax court, disciplinary 
complaint, etc.” load on the competitive factor, whereas “Offered agreement on major 
assessments” is loading on the cooperate factor (see Table 16 for results). 
Based on these factor loadings, we use an oblimin rotation to obtain factor scores. To 
distinguish between high and low assertiveness as well as high and low cooperativeness, we 
use median splits for both factor scores. Corresponding to the differentiation of the four 
auditor negotiation strategies, a competitive strategy means high assertiveness but low 
cooperativeness. Thus, the indicator variable ADV.COMP equals one if the competitive 
factor score is above the sample median value and the cooperative factor is below sample 
median value. Cooperative strategies (ADV.COMP) are defined vice versa (i.e., high 
cooperative factor scores and low competitive factors scores). Mixed strategies (ADV.MIX) 
have factors scores above the sample median value for both factors, while neutral strategies’ 
(ADV.NEUTRAL) factors scores are below the sample median for both factors.  
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Similarly, we obtain the auditor’s perception of taxpayers’ negotiation strategies. Again we 
identify four different strategies. Table 29 in the Appendix displays the results of the factor 
analysis regarding taxpayers’ negotiation strategy; all items load as expected.  
Table 16: Results of Binary Factor Analysis 
Type Statement F.ADV.COOP F.ADV.COMP 
Comp Set deadlines, but did not adhere to them. -0.082 0.598 
Comp Threatened with Tax court, 
disciplinary complaint, etc. 
-0.241 0.503 
Comp Kept you waiting or disrupted meetings -0.055 0.726 
Comp Imposed time pressure 0.119 0.599 
Comp Was authoritarian 0.100 0.694 
Comp Information was withheld/filtered -0.030 0.889 
Comp Information was manipulated/extenuated -0.006 0.787 
Comp Permanently interrupted you 0.076 0.738 
Coop Offered agreement on minor assessments 0.593 0.115 
Coop Offered agreement on major assessments 0.983 -0.022 
Note: Factor loadings on cooperative factor (F.ADV.COOP) and competitive factor (F.ADV.COMP). 
4 Results 
4.1 Tax Auditors’ Negotiation Strategies 
In Table 17, the used auditor negotiation tactics are displayed. The most used tactic is to 
impose time pressure, e.g., by setting short deadlines. In 40 % of all audit cases, the tax 
auditor imposed time pressure on the taxpayer. The second most used tactic (20 % of all 
cases) consists of concession making such that the auditor waved immaterial adjustment in 
order to agree on one large adjustment. Moreover, in about 12 % of all cases auditors 
threatened taxpayers with breaking up negotiations and in another 12% auditors waived 
uncertain adjustments to avoid the risk of litigation. As explained in section III 3.3.2, we use 
these tactics to measure auditors’ negotiations strategies. The distribution of negotiation 
strategies and realized adjustments are displayed in Figure 4. 
We find that in almost one third of all audit cases tax auditors use a competitive negotiation 
strategy. By contrast, in only 14 % of all cases tax auditors preferred a cooperative strategy. 
A combination of competitive and cooperative tactics (mixed strategy) is used in 25 % of all 
cases. In another 29 % of the cases, a neutral strategy which avoids using competitive as 
well as cooperative tactics is employed. Thus, the most preferred strategy is negotiating in a 
competitive manner and a pure cooperative concession-making approach to negotiation is 
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seldomly used. This is partly in contrast to the results obtained for financial accounting 
audits. Gibbins et al. (2010) find that competitive strategies and more cooperative problem-
solving approaches are equally likely to be used by financial accounting auditors. Moreover, 
Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) and Bennett et al. (2015) report that financial accounting 
auditors would not likely use a tactic of threats, e.g., to qualify the opinion or to terminate 
the relationship. One potential reason for the observed difference between financial 
accounting and tax might be that maintaining good relationships with the firm might be more 
important to financial accounting auditors than to tax auditors. For example, McCracken et 
al. (2008) report that financial accounting auditors are always ‘relationship managers’ whose 
task it is to ensure that clients remain happy.  
Table 17: Negotiation Tactics 
Competitive Percentage (N) 
Imposing time pressure 40.06% (276) 
Threat of discontinuing negotiations without agreement 12.48% (86) 
Imposing sanctions / Threatening with sanctions 5.95% (41) 
Cooperative  
I waived small adjustments in favor of one large adjustment 19.88% (137) 
I waived adjustments because the firm’s “pain threshold” was reached 4.79% (33) 
I waived uncertain adjustments to avoid the risk of litigation 12.48% (86) 
I waived adjustments because the other side has convinced me 4.35% (30) 
 
Figure 4: Tax Auditors’ Usage of Negotiation Strategies (in Percent) and Median Scaled Adjustments 
by Strategy 
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4.2 The Effect of Tax Auditors’ Negotiation Strategies on Tax Adjustments 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Analysis 
Table 18 gives an overview of descriptive sample statistics. The median audit adjustments 
amount to € 20,061. About 72 % of the audited firms are family firms, 16.7 % of firms have 
to publish profit and loss accounts such that tax information is observable to the public, and 
about 7 % have foreign activities. 36 % of firms are corporations and 25 % are members of 
a group. 11 % of firms are suspected of tax evasion. The median sales amount to € 625.000 
and 12.87 % of firms have losses. Thus, the audit sample is dominated by small and median 
family firms.  
Table 18: Descriptive Statistics 
 n=575  Percentiles 
 Variable Mean SD 25th 50th 75th 
 Log(ADJUSTMENTS) 9.9092 2.2940 8.9980 9.9066 11.0061 
T
A
X
 P
L
A
N
N
IN
G
 
 S
T
A
G
E
 
PUBLIC 0.1670 0.3733 0 0 0 
FAMILY 0.7115 0.4312 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
LN(SALES) 13.7665 1.9392 12.6115 13.3455 14.8271 
CORPORATION 0.3617 0.4809 0 0 1 
GROUP 0.2487 0.4326 0 0 0 
FOREIGN 0.0748 0.2633 0 0 0 
LOSS 0.1287 0.3352 0 0 0 
EVASION 0.1057 0.3032 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D
E
T
E
C
T
IO
N
 
S
T
A
G
E
 
TRAINING 2.6228 1.2246 2.0000 2.6228 3.0000 
SCHOOL 0.7792 0.4053 0.7792 1.0000 1.0000 
SALARY 5.7748 1.4772 5.7748 5.7748 6.0000 
EXPERIENCE 18.370 4.3670 17.500 18.370 22.500 
MOTIVATION 0.5029 0.4763 0.0000 0.5029 1.0000 
ATTITUDE 0.4833 0.4838 0.0000 0.4833 1.0000 
HEAD 0.2570 0.4362 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
N
E
G
O
T
IA
T
IO
N
 
S
T
A
G
E
 
COMP 0.3183 0.4662 0 0 1 
COOP 0.1443 0.3517 0 0 0 
MIX 0.2504 0.4336 0 0 0.5 
NEUTRAL 0.2870 0.4527 0 0 1 
ADV.COMP 0.2661 0.4423 0 0 1 
ADV.COOP 0.2643 0.4414 0 0 1 
ADV.MIX 0.2330 0.4231 0 0 0 
ADV.NEUTRAL 0.2365 0.4253 0 0 0 
Note: For variable definitions see Table 28 of Appendix D. 
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Regarding auditor characteristics, the median auditor has a university degree, takes 2.6228 
advanced training courses a year and has 18.37 years of experience at the tax administration. 
50 % of auditors are intrinsically motivated, and 48 % of auditors fully agree that taxpayers 
are trying to minimize their tax burden by all permitted means.  
The percentage of negotiation strategies chosen by tax auditors is already discussed in the 
previous subsection. With respect to the perceived tax advisors’ strategies, auditors observe 
neither competitive nor cooperative advisor tactics (classified as NEUTRAL) in 23 % of all 
cases, in another 23 % of cases auditors’ perception is that advisors mix competitive and 
cooperative tactics (classified as MIXED). In the remaining cases, auditors perceive the 
advisor as negotiating either competitively or cooperatively (each 27 %). Thus, the 
percentage of “pure” strategies (high cooperativeness and high competitiveness / low 
cooperativeness and low competitiveness) is slightly higher than the percentage of strategies 
that combine high with low values of competitiveness and cooperativeness.28  
Table 19: Scaled Adjustments (ADJUSTMENTS/SALES) by Negotiation Strategy 
Panel A:      Auditor         Advisor 
Descriptive statistics N Median   N Median 
COMP 183 0.0357   153 0.0298 
COOP 83 0.0129   152 0.0303 
MIX 144 0.0284   134 0.0244 
NEUTRAL 165 0.0172   136 0.0156 
Panel B:           Auditor   Advisor 
Statistical tests Wilcoxon   Wilcoxon 
COMP vs. NEUTRAL 0.0001   0.0010 
COMP vs. COOP 0.0000   0.8192 
COMP vs. MIX 0.2892   0.4019 
COOP vs. NEUTRAL 0.2833   0.0026 
COOP vs. MIX 0.0006   0.6440 
MIX    vs. NEUTRAL 0.0039   0.0095 
The table presents the number of negotiation strategies and means in scaled adjustments (Panel A). Differences 
in means are tested (non-)parametrically (Panel B). We report the corresponding p-values for the significance 
test. In an unreported robustness check, we use a t-test as statistical test. The results remain qualitatively 
unchanged. 
 
Regarding the effect of auditors’ negotiation strategies on firms’ tax adjustment, a bivariate 
analysis provides first evidence. Since ADJUSTMENTS/SALES are not normally distributed, 
we use a non-parametric test to test for differences between groups and report median values 
by strategy. Figure 4 and Table 19 display the results. We find that competitive or mixed 
                                                 
28  From the median split of the two factors used in defining the perceived advisor strategies (see section III 
3.3.3.3), it follows that the percentage of competitive and cooperative (mixed and neutral) must be identical. 
Thus, we abstain from further interpreting the distribution of perceived advisor strategies.  
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strategies yield statistically higher scaled adjustments than neutral or cooperative strategies. 
The effect is economically significant: scaled adjustments are doubled if auditors use 
competitive tactics only or mix them with cooperative tactics. Table 19 additionally reveals 
that scaled adjustments are significantly lower if auditors perceive the advisor’s strategy as 
neutral. Thus, whereas competitive auditor tactics increase tax audit adjustments, the same 
does not apply for advisors. 
4.2.2 Detection and Negotiation Controlled Estimation 
4.2.2.1 Baseline Estimation 
The above bivariate analysis neither controls for firm nor for auditor characteristics which 
presumably also affect observed tax adjustments. In this section, we address this limitation 
by using a detection and negotiation-controlled estimation. Table 20 presents the results.  
The results demonstrate that considering a separate negotiate stage is economically 
important. On average only 41.18 % of the detected pre-negotiation audit differences are 
assessed after tax audit negotiation.29 Regarding the effect of auditors’ competitive 
negotiation behavior, the finding of the bivariate analysis is confirmed. Auditors that use a 
competitive strategy instead of a neutral strategy achieve significantly higher audit 
adjustments. The average marginal effect amounts to 0.1035, i.e., using a competitive instead 
of a neutral strategy increases the negotiation rate by 10.35 percentage points.30 In line with 
bivariate analyses, we find that mixed strategies obtain significantly higher adjustments than 
neutral strategies. For further insights, we conduct Wald tests between negotiation style 
regression coefficients. We find that competitive (mixed) strategies significantly dominate 
cooperative strategies with a Wald test p-value of 0.001 (0.016). Moreover, we find that 
competitive strategies do not dominate mixed strategies (Wald test p-value: 0.3491).   
In line with our expectations, the control variables in stage 1 reveal significant positive 
effects of firms’ size, foreign activities, and membership of a group on firms’ tax planning. 
We do not find a significant difference between family and non-family firms. A potential 
reason is that we measure overall tax avoidance whereas prior research (Chen et al. 2010) 
relies on financial accounting proxies that measure non-conforming avoidance activities 
                                                 
29  In order to obtain this number, we average over all cases’ unconditional expected detection rate  𝐸(𝑁) = 𝑃(𝑁 = 0) × 0 + 𝑃(0 < 𝑁∗ < 1) × 𝐸(𝑁|0 < 𝑁∗ < 1)  +  𝑃(𝑁 = 1) × 1. For details, see 
Maddala (1999: 160). 
30  This average marginal effect is the difference in expected detection rates E(N| COMP=1) - E(N| COMP=0) 
with all other dummy variables in the negotiation equation being zero. 
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only (Hanlon/Heitzman 2010). If non-conforming and conforming avoidance are partly 
substitutive strategies, it could be that there is no overall difference in tax avoidance. For 
example, if family firms place less emphasis on financial accounting outcomes, they may 
use more conforming avoidance strategies while at the same time they reduce non-
conforming strategies to decrease reputational risks. In contrast to our expectation, loss firms 
avoid more taxes although they have a lower tax benefit from avoidance. One potential 
explanation is that the loss variable also measures financial constraints. Prior research finds 
that increasing financial constraints increase tax aggressiveness (e.g., Edwards et al. 2015; 
Law/Mills 2015). Moreover, although we expected that firms with an obligation to publish 
a profit and loss account have higher non-tax costs and thus conduct less conforming tax 
avoidance, our results indicate that these firms avoid more taxes. Again, this could be due to 
a substitutive relation between conforming and non-conforming avoidance. Finally, firms 
that are suspected of tax evasion (corporations) are more (less) tax aggressive.  
Table 20: Detection and Negotiation Controlled Estimation - Regression Results 
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage 
Constant 5.9950*** Constant 0.1507*** Constant 0.2680*** 
 (0.5225)  (0.0144)  (0.0327) 
FAMILY -0.0069  EXPERIENCE 0.6218*** AUD.COMP 0.1091*** 
 (0.1206)  (0.022)  (0.0372) 
PUBLIC 0.6242*** SALARAY 0.4205*** AUD.COOP -0.0317  
 (0.1716)  (0.0237)  (0.0411) 
LOG(SALES) 0.3543*** TRAINING 0.4408*** AUD.MIX 0.0726* 
 (0.0393)  (0.0275)  (0.04) 
LOSS 0.7459*** SCHOOL 0.1229*** ADV.COMP 0.1247*** 
 (0.1496)  (0.0136)  (0.0389) 
FOREIGN 0.8141*** ATTITUDE 0.0812*** ADV.COOP 0.1212*** 
 (0.2129)  (0.0128)  (0.0361) 
GROUP 0.6147*** MOTIVATION 0.0459*** ADV.MIX 0.1402*** 
 (0.0808)  (0.0119)  (0.0426) 
CORPORATION -0.5916*** HEAD 0.0727***   
 (0.1219)  (0.0125)   
EVASION 0.9722***     
 (0.1545)     
N 575 SIG1 1.0929*** SIG3 0.1951*** 
MEAN.LOG  -11.6263  (0.0444)  (0.0146) 
Note: Dependent variable is log(ADJUSTMENTS). For control variable definitions see Table 28 in Appendix 
D. Variables’ standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** Indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
 
75 
The detection stage takes into account different auditor abilities, motivation, and attitudes 
which could have an impact on the detection probability. We find that detection probability 
increases with an auditor’s experience, salary and number of training courses. In addition, 
tax planning is more likely to be detected if a section head participates (HEAD), the auditor 
is intrinsically motivated (MOTIVATION) and is convinced that a taxpayer does everything 
to reduce his or her tax burden (ATTITUDE). These results underline the importance of 
detection controlled estimation (Feinstein 1990) in tax compliance research and highlight 
potential variables that governments can use to improve tax enforcement. 
4.2.2.2 Auditor/Advisor Negotiation Pairs 
In the baseline model, we observe a significant positive effect of the auditor’s competitive 
strategy, which means that this strategy yields on average a higher return than a neutral 
strategy. In this section, we examine if an auditor’s competitive strategy is always the best 
choice. To this aim, we define variables in form of auditor/advisor negotiation pairs. 
Considering the four negotiation strategies for each party leads to 16 possible strategy 
combinations. Table 21 displays the distribution of the strategy combinations in the sample.  
Table 21: Combinations of Tax Auditors and Advisors Negotiation Strategies 
 Auditor’s Strategy  
 COMP 
(Reference) 
COOP MIX NEUTRAL 
 
∑ 
ADV.COMP 
COMP/COMP 
n=67 
(11.65%) 
COMP/COOP 
n=21 
(3.65%) 
COMP/MIX 
n=42 
(7.3%) 
COMP/NEUTRAL 
n=23 
(4%) 
153 
ADV.COOP 
COOP/COMP 
n=40 
(6.96%) 
COOP/COOP 
n=29 
(5.04%) 
COOP/MIX 
n=35 
(6.09%) 
COOP/NEUTRAL 
n=48 
(8.35%) 
152 
ADV.MIX 
MIX/COMP 
n= 41 
(7.13%) 
MIX/COOP 
n=18 
(3.13%) 
MIX/MIX 
n=5 
(8.87%) 
MIX/NEUTRAL 
n=2 
(4.17%) 
134 
ADV.NEUTRAL 
NEUTRAL/ 
COMP 
n=35 
(6.09%) 
NEUTRAL/ 
COOP 
n=15 
(2.61%) 
NEUTRAL/ 
MIX 
n=16 
(2.78%) 
NEUTRAL/ 
NEUTRAL 
n=70 
(12.17%) 
136 
∑ 183 83 144 165 575 
 
We use the competitive auditor strategy (COMP) as reference category and examine if a 
deviation of an auditor’s strategy affects the outcome. For example, consider the first case, 
when an auditor deviates from a competitive strategy given that an advisor employs a 
competitive strategy (first row in Table 21). In this case, ADV.COMP/COMP is our reference 
category. We include ADV.COMP/COOP, ADV.COMP/MIX, and ADV.COMP/NEUTRAL 
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as dummy variables and measure the effect when an auditor is using a cooperative, a mixed 
or a neutral strategy compared to a competitive strategy. ADV.COOP, ADV.MIX and 
ADV.NEUTRAL are included as control variables to set our reference category to 
ADV.COMP/COMP. This allows us to measure the deviation effect when the tax advisor is 
choosing a competitive negotiation strategy. This procedure is done for the remaining three 
advisor strategies in the same manner.  
Table 22 displays the regression results. In model (1), (2), (3), and (4), we study a deviation 
from the competitive strategy given that the advisor uses a competitive, cooperative, mixed, 
and neutral strategy. If the tax advisor negotiates in a competitive manner, model (1) 
demonstrates that deviating from competitive to cooperative or neutral behavior reduces tax 
adjustments (because the coefficients of ADV.COMP/COOP, and ADV.COMP/NEUTRAL 
are significantly negative). Hence, a competitive auditor strategy is superior with respect to 
adjustments if the tax advisor negotiates competitively. In addition, model (4) reveals that a 
deviation from a competitive to a neutral negotiation strategy also reduces adjustments if the 
tax advisor employs a neutral strategy. For models (2) and (3) we get a different picture. 
Deviations from a competitive negotiation style do not significantly affect the adjustments, 
when advisors use cooperative or mixed strategies.31  
Summing up, if auditors’ objective is simply to maximize audit adjustments, it appears that 
a competitive negotiation approach dominates other strategies. Moreover, a mixed strategy 
also dominates a cooperative strategy, when the tax advisor deploys a competitive strategy 
(Wald test p-value: 0.088). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31  Note that ADV.NEUTRAL, ADV.COMP, ADV.COOP and ADV.MIX cannot be interpreted in the same 
manner as in the baseline model, since the reference group is no longer ADV.NEUTRAL. The reference 
group change for model (1) to ADV.COMP/COMP, for model (2) to ADV.COOP/COMP, for model (3) to 
ADV.MIX/COMP and for model (4) to ADV.NEUTRAL/COMP respectively. 
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Table 22: Regression Results on Auditor's Strategy Deviation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ADV.STRAT  = ADV.COMP ADV.COOP ADV.MIX ADV.NEUTRAL 
ADV.STRAT/COOP -0.3242*** -0.0690  0.0019  -0.1067  
 (0.0797) (0.0708) (0.0863) (0.0755) 
ADV.STRAT/MIX -0.1898** -0.0124  0.0375  0.1264  
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.0677) (0.103) 
ADV.STRAT/NEUTRAL -0.2336*** -0.0565  0.0460  -0.0999* 
 (0.083) (0.0643) (0.0786) (0.0534) 
ADV.COMP  -0.0088  0.0089  0.0917* 
  (0.0549) (0.0428) (0.0518) 
ADV.COOP -0.1920***  -0.0184  0.0644  
 (0.0599)  (0.0408) (0.0506) 
ADV.MIX -0.1567** 0.0032   0.1026* 
 (0.0655) (0.0584)  (0.0558) 
ADV.NEUTRAL -0.3145*** -0.1604*** -0.1428***  
 (0.0609) (0.0524) (0.0401)  
Constant 0.5989*** 0.4541*** 0.4379*** 0.3539*** 
 (0.0596) (0.0662) (0.051) (0.0552) 
SIG1 1.0902*** 1.1068*** 1.1065*** 1.1039*** 
 (0.0473) (0.046) (0.0464) (0.0475) 
SIG3 0.1877*** 0.1955*** 0.1965*** 0.1946*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0226) (0.0188) (0.0191) 
N 575 575 575 575 
MEAN.LOG -11.6239 -11.6357 -11.6362 -11.6305 
Note: For reasons of clarity, we do not report first and second stage results which remain qualitatively 
unchanged. Dependent variable is log(ADJUSTMENTS). For control variable definitions see Table 28 in 
Appendix D. Variables’ standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** Indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
4.2.2.3 Taxpayer/Advisor Team Strategies 
So far, we studied the effect of auditors’ negotiation strategy without considering the 
negotiation behavior of the taxpayer because we assumed that it is the tax advisor as the 
expert who actively negotiates with the auditor. However, prior negotiation research 
suggests, that negotiation teams may influence negotiation outcomes because unlike solo 
negotiators, team members can strategically choose to play different roles during the 
negotiation (e.g., Hilty/Carnevale 1993; Brodt/Tuchinsky 2000).  
Table 23 presents the distribution of the different team strategies (as perceived by the 
auditor).32 It becomes obvious that strategical differentiation is not the prevalent choice, 
because in 57 % of the 495 team observations, the team strategy is perceived as homogenous. 
                                                 
32  Due to missing data regarding taxpayers’ negotiation tactics, the sample size decreases to 495 observations. 
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Moreover, a “good cop/bad cop” strategy where one team member uses a cooperative and 
the other a competitive strategy is used only in 4.5 % of all team observations.  
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics - Negotiation Teams 
 ADV.COMP ADV.COOP ADV.MIX ADV.NEUTRAL ∑ 
TAX.COMP 72 
(COMP.TEAM) 
 
9 
 
 
24 
 
 
27 
 
 
132 
TAX.COOP 13 
 
 
81  
(COOP.TEAM) 
 
20 
 
 
19 
 
 
133 
TAX.MIX 26 
 
 
19 
 
 
63 
(MIX.TEAM) 
 
6 
 
 
114 
TAX.NEUTRAL 18 
 
20 
 
11 
 
67  
(NEUTRAL.TEAM) 
116 
∑ 129 129 118 119 495 
 
To test whether the competitive auditor strategy remains the dominant choice with respect 
to achieved adjustments if we consider taxpayer/advisor team strategies, we include 
variables in the baseline model that control for the combinations of competitive auditor 
strategy and the four homogenous strategies33 of the taxpayer/advisor team. Table 24 
displays the results. In model (1), the variable COMP.TEAM/AUD.COMP measures the 
effect of the combination of a competitive auditor and a competitive taxpayer/advisor team 
compared to all other auditor negotiation strategies facing a competitive taxpayer/advisor 
team. The effect is significantly positive and large. Given that the taxpayer/advisor team is 
competitive, the usage of a competitive auditor strategy increases the negotiation rate by 
32.28 percentage points. From model (3), one also learns that the auditor’s competitive 
strategy increases negotiation rate (and thus audit adjustments) if the taxpayer/advisor team 
uses a mixed strategy. However, if the taxpayer/advisor team employs a cooperative or 
neutral strategy (see models (2) and (4)), a competitive auditor strategy does not rise 
adjustments. Thus, in line with the results obtained in subsection 4.2.2.2, the positive effect 
of the auditor’s competitive negotiation strategy stems from constellations in which the 
taxpayer/advisor team uses competitive negotiation tactics only. Furthermore, we find a 
significant positive effect of competitive auditor strategies, when the auditor is facing a team 
with mixed strategies. 
                                                 
33  We only investigate homogenous teams, because the sample size of other teams is too small for a proper 
analysis. 
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Table 24: Regression Results on Auditor's Strategy Deviation - Negotiation Teams 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COMP.TEAM/AUD.COMP 0.3308***    
 (0.1117)    
COOP.TEAM/AUD.COMP  0.0801    
  (0.0916)   
MIX.TEAM/AUD.COMP   0.3345***  
   (0.1152)  
NEUTRAL.TEAM/AUD.COMP    0.0612  
    (0.0767) 
SIG1 1.0863*** 1.0944*** 1.0644*** 1.0926*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0506) (0.0524) (0.0508) 
SIG3 0.1768*** 0.2031*** 0.1849*** 0.2029*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0178) 
N 495 495 495 495 
MEAN.LOG -11.6205 -11.6316 -11.6235 -11.6292 
Note: The table displays only the coefficients for the relevant team variables. Dependent variable is 
log(ADJUSTMENTS). For control variable definitions see Table 28 in Appendix D. Variables’ standard errors 
in brackets. *, **, *** Indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
4.2.2.4 Permanent and Temporary Adjustments 
To test whether the effect of auditors’ negotiation strategy depends on the kind of audit 
adjustments, we differentiate between temporary and permanent audit adjustment. To this 
aim, auditors were asked to estimate the share of the audit adjustments that merely result in 
temporary income shifting. Over all cases, the average percentage of temporary adjustments 
amounts to only 15.73 % indicating that tax auditors focus on permanent rather than on 
temporary adjustments. We present baseline regression results for permanent adjustments in 
Table 25 and for temporary adjustments in Table 26. For permanent adjustments we get 
similar results as before and cannot observe any qualitative differences to our baseline 
model. Note that because of incomplete information with respect to the percentage of 
temporary adjustments, our sample drops to 503 observations. 
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Table 25: Regression Results - Permanent Adjustments 
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage 
Constant 6.5732*** Constant 0.1704*** Constant 0.2652*** 
 (0.5619)  (0.0134)  (0.0346) 
FAMILY 0.0145  EXPERIENCE 0.5650*** AUD.COMP 0.1050*** 
 (0.1113)  (0.014)  (0.0379) 
PUBLIC 0.6306*** SALARAY 0.4306*** AUD.COOP 0.0178  
 (0.1477)  (0.0137)  (0.0445) 
LOG(SALES) 0.2998*** TRAINING 0.5226*** AUD.MIX 0.0765* 
 (0.0411)  (0.0138)  (0.0417) 
LOSS 0.8336*** SCHOOL 0.0582*** ADV.COMP 0.1242*** 
 (0.1162)  (0.0134)  (0.0429) 
FOREIGN 0.8827*** ATTITUDE 0.0841*** ADV.COOP 0.0819** 
 (0.2228)  (0.0134)  (0.0385) 
GROUP 0.6223*** MOTIVATION 0.0790*** ADV.MIX 0.1079** 
 (0.1399)  (0.0133)  (0.0433) 
CORPORATION -0.7494*** HEAD 0.1941***   
 (0.114)  (0.0134)   
EVASION 1.2075***     
 (0.146)     
N 503 SIG1 1.0235*** SIG3 0.2124*** 
MEAN.LOG  -11.3184  (0.0435)  (0.0161) 
Note: Dependent variable is log(ADJUSTMENTSpermanent). For control variable definitions see Table 28 in 
Appendix D. Variables’ standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** Indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
For temporary adjustments, however, results differ. In particular, we do not find any 
significant effect of auditors’ negotiation strategy. This suggests that our prior results are 
especially driven by the permanent proportion of adjustments. Note, however, that 
adjustments in our sample are mostly of permanent nature with only 207 cases with positive 
temporary adjustments. Thus, the results regarding temporary adjustments should be 
interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, we would like to mention some differences with respect 
to the effect of firm and auditor characteristics. The impact of first stage variables remains 
similar, except for PUBLIC which is no longer significant. For the second stage, we find 
mostly insignificant results except for positive effects of SALARY and TRAINING.  
 
 
81 
Table 26: Regression Results - Temporary Adjustments 
1st stage 2nd stage 3rd stage 
Constant 5.6682*** Constant -1.7361* Constant -0.0007  
 (1.1544)  (0.984)  (0.0013) 
FAMILY -0.2412  EXPERIENCE -0.0466  AUD.COMP -0.0014  
 (0.2459)  (0.0442)  (0.0012) 
PUBLIC -0.0388  SALARAY 0.4316*** AUD.COOP 0.0000  
 (0.3009)  (0.1412)  (0.0014) 
LOG(SALES) 0.6267*** TRAINING 0.4679* AUD.MIX -0.0004  
 (0.0739)  (0.2798)  (0.0012) 
LOSS 1.0323*** SCHOOL -0.1883  ADV.COMP 0.0025  
 (0.3136)  (0.3926)  (0.0016) 
FOREIGN 1.1118*** ATTITUDE 0.1453  ADV.COOP 0.0022  
 (0.2896)  (0.3503)  (0.0014) 
GROUP 0.6314** NOSTOP -0.3480  ADV.MIX 0.0024  
 (0.2635)  (0.3551)  (0.0015) 
CORPORATION -0.3689* HEAD 0.1105    
 (0.2121)  (0.3985)   
EVASION 0.6762*     
 (0.409)     
N 503 SIG1 1.1846*** SIG3 0.0061*** 
MEAN.LOG  -5.25803  (0.0865)  (0.002) 
Note: Dependent variable is log(ADJUSTMENTStemporary). For control variable definitions see Table 28 in 
Appendix D. Variables’ standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** Indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
 
4.3 Determinants of Tax Auditors’ Negotiation Strategies 
In this section, we address out third research question and examine whether firm and auditor 
characteristics as well as the perceived strategy of the tax advisor, affect the choice of 
auditors’ negotiation strategy. Moreover, we test whether an endogeneity of auditor 
negotiation strategies affects our previously presented results. To this aim, we conduct the 
following multinomial treatment effects regression: 
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Selection Equation:  𝐴𝑈𝐷. 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖  + 𝛼3𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖)+ 𝛼4𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖  +  𝛼5𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁𝑖  + 𝛼6𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝑖  +  𝛼7𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  +  𝛼8𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  +  𝛼9𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖  +  𝛼10𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑌𝑖  + 𝛼11𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖  +  𝛼12𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿𝑖  + 𝛼13𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼14𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  +  𝛼15𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖  +  𝛼16𝐴𝐷𝑉. 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖  +  𝛼17𝐴𝐷𝑉. 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖  +  𝛼18𝐴𝐷𝑉.𝑀𝐼𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖, 
(10) 
where 𝐴𝑈𝐷. 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖 is the tax auditor’s strategy choice with AUD.COMP, AUD.COOP, 
AUD.MIX and AUD.NEUTRAL as baseline category respectively. The selection equation is 
estimated by a mixed multinomial logit model. 
Outcome Equation: ln(Adjustments𝑖)=  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑈𝐷. 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑈𝐷. 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑈𝐷.𝑀𝐼𝑋𝑖+ 𝛽4𝐹𝐴𝑀𝐼𝐿𝑌𝑖  + 𝛽5𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖  + 𝛽6og(𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆𝑖) + 𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖  + 𝛽8𝐹𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐼𝐺𝑁 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑂𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  + 𝛽11𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  +  𝛽12𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐸𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖  +  𝛽13𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐴𝑌𝑖  + 𝛽14𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑁𝐺𝑖  + 𝛽15𝑆𝐶𝐻𝑂𝑂𝐿𝑖  + 𝛽16𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖  + 𝛽17𝑀𝑂𝑇𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖  + 𝛽18𝐻𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖  +  𝛽19𝐴𝐷𝑉. 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃𝑖  + 𝛽20𝐴𝐷𝑉. 𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑖  + 𝛽21𝐴𝐷𝑉.𝑀𝐼𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
(11) 
Table 27 displays the results. We find that tax auditors’ strategies are not very much affected 
by firm characteristics. One exception is that the likelihood of a cooperative strategy 
increases if the firm is owned by a family or the firm is required to publish tax information. 
Regarding auditor characteristics, we observe that auditors who perceive taxpayers as 
subjects who seek to save taxes by all permitted means (ATTITUDE), are more likely to use 
a competitive instead of a neutral negotiation strategy. Moreover, the participation in 
advanced training courses (high intrinsic motivation) increases (decreases) the probability 
of a mixed negotiation strategy. However, the most significant determinants of tax auditors’ 
negotiation strategies are the perceived strategies of their opponents. Whenever the advisor 
is perceived as competitive or at least partly competitive (mixed strategy), this significantly 
decreases the usage of a neutral auditor strategy. Note that the results are neither clear in 
favor of reciprocity theory nor in favor of level-of aspiration theory. On the one hand, we 
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observe that a perceived competitive (cooperative, mixed) advisor behavior increases the 
probability of a competitive (cooperative, mixed) auditor strategy which is in line with the 
predictions of reciprocity theory. On the other hand, we find that a perceived competitive 
advisor strategy also increases the probability of a cooperative auditor negotiation strategy 
which would be predicted by the level-of-aspiration theory. 
Finally, the results on the outcome equation presented in Table 27 demonstrate that the 
endogeneity of auditors’ negotiation strategies does not affect our result from the previous 
sections. Again we find that only a competitive auditor strategy leads on average to higher 
audit adjustments. 
5 Subsample Analyses 
We subject our analyses to several robustness tests by conducting the following subsample 
analyses: 
• First, to investigate if the effect of negotiation strategies is affected by the legality of 
firms’ tax planning activities, we exclude observations of firms that are suspected of 
tax evasion.  
• Second, the impact of auditor strategies could differ between cases without and with 
a final agreement of both parties. Thus, in another subsample analysis, we excluded 
all cases without final agreement.  
• Third, the auditor strategies’ influence on audit adjustments could differ between 
small and large firms because only in large firms each tax year is subject to a field 
audit. We thus repeat all estimations for two subsamples of firms: (i) firms that the 
tax administration has assigned to the largest size category and (ii) all other firms.  
• Fourth, our final sample includes 575 cases from 399 unique auditors. To test 
whether our results are affected by auditors with more than a single case, we use a 
random subsample of 399 unique auditor-cases observations. 
In all these subsample analyses, we find no significant changes to the previously reported 
results. Moreover, in our analyses we excluded all cases without final audit meeting (see 
Section III 3.1) to ensure that face-to-face negotiations between tax auditors and 
taxpayers/advisors actually occurred. In an additional test, we repeat our analysis with an 
extended sample including the cases without final audit meeting. We obtain qualitatively 
unchanged results.   
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Table 27: Multinomial Treatment Effects Regression 
Variables   Selection equation   Outcome equation   
AUD.COMP AUD.COOP AUD.MIX 
 
log(Adjustments) 
AUD.COMP        1.2427*** 
        (0.3219) 
AUD.COOP        0.2129 
        (0.3345) 
AUD.MIX        -0.0614 
        (0.4158) 
FAMILY   0.4255 1.0107** 0.3669   0.3779* 
   (0.3369) (0.4243) (0.3613)   (0.2256) 
PUBLIC   0.5986 1.2871** 0.3224   -0.0422 
   (0.5371) (0.5922) (0.5516)   (0.3351) 
log(SALES)   -0.0741 0.1114 -0.0974   0.3495*** 
   (0.1083) (0.1300) (0.1135)   (0.0695) 
LOSS   -0.4028 -0.8370 -0.8687**   0.2969 
   (0.3892) (0.5284) (0.4275)   (0.2592) 
FOREIGN   0.0930 -0.2336 -0.1460   1.2380*** 
   (0.5915) (0.6441) (0.6015)   (0.3643) 
GROUP   -0.8021* -0.6941 -0.0466   0.7471*** 
   (0.4301) (0.4973) (0.4328)   (0.2704) 
CORPORATION   -0.7134** -0.1494 -0.2862   -0.6499*** 
   (0.3515) (0.4071) (0.3613)   (0.2220) 
EVASION   0.5465 -1.0076 0.4467   0.5921** 
   (0.4752) (0.7604) (0.5018)   (0.2959) 
EXPERIENCE   -0.0659* -0.0312 -0.0369   -0.0276 
   (0.0370) (0.0462) (0.0387)   (0.0234) 
SALARAY   0.1030 0.1553 0.0471   0.1648** 
   (0.1138) (0.1465) (0.1185)   (0.0738) 
TRAINING   0.0778 0.1448 0.3216***   0.1303* 
   (0.1201) (0.1376) (0.1192)   (0.0728) 
SCHOOL   -0.1858 0.2186 -0.4564   -0.5773** 
   (0.3583) (0.4517) (0.3739)   (0.2306) 
ATTITUDE   0.5418** 0.1164 0.1481   -0.0508 
   (0.2731) (0.3313) (0.2922)   (0.1770) 
MOTIVATION   0.2064 -0.2079 -0.5772*   0.3281* 
   (0.2877) (0.3454) (0.3090)   (0.1881) 
HEAD   -0.0448 -0.7037 0.0279   0.6329*** 
   (0.3329) (0.4286) (0.3446)   (0.2101) 
ADV.COMP   2.0062*** 1.7737*** 2.3777***   0.4493* 
   (0.3939) (0.4952) (0.4505)   (0.2653) 
ADV.COOP   0.4233 1.1787*** 1.4054***   0.7496*** 
   (0.3575) (0.4319) (0.4143)   (0.2461) 
ADV.MIX   1.4567*** 1.6137*** 2.7278***   0.6584** 
   (0.4087) (0.5028) (0.4487)   (0.2709) 
Constant   0.3459 -4.8245** -0.5833   3.1703*** 
   (1.5218) (1.8627) (1.6121)   (1.0076) 
n   575      
Log likelihood   -1900.0112      
Note: Dependent variables are displayed in the 2nd row. For control variable definitions see Table 28 in 
Appendix D. Variables’ standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** Indicate significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, 
respectively. 
85 
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Similar to financial accounting, income tax law is often vague and ambiguous in order to 
cover a wide range of cases. This, however, makes tax law to some extent always a matter 
of negotiation between taxpayers and revenue agents. In this paper, we focus on this 
negotiation process and empirically investigate three related research questions based on 
data raised in a survey among 610 tax auditors.  
First, we examine which negotiation strategies tax auditors usually apply. Our results 
indicate that the majority of tax auditors prefer competitive negotiation tactics, either purely 
or mixed with cooperative elements, whereas pure cooperative or neutral negotiation 
strategies are rarely used. Second, we assess if and to what extent the chosen negotiation 
strategy affects tax adjustments. We are able to demonstrate that the negotiation outcome 
and thus the resulting tax liability for firms depend significantly on the auditor’s choice of a 
negotiation strategy. In particular, we find that a competitive negotiation strategy dominates 
other strategies and increases auditors’ negotiation rate by ten percentage points. Third, we 
investigate which factors drive the tax auditors’ choice of negotiation strategy. Our analyses 
reveal that this choice is not very much affected by firm or auditor characteristics, but is 
rather determined by the opponents’ negotiation strategy as perceived by the tax auditor. If 
the opponent is perceived as (at least partly) competitive, the probability of using a neutral 
auditor strategy decreases. 
The effectiveness of the competitive strategy on adjustments is in line with general 
negotiation research (Hüffmeier et al. 2014). However, the frequent usage and effectiveness 
of the competitive strategy contrasts previous results of financial auditing research which 
shows a preference for cooperative tactics among auditors (Gibbins et al. 2010). This points 
towards an important difference between tax and financial accounting audits. Due to risk of 
client loss, financial accounting auditors are always ‘relationship managers’ (McCracken et 
al. 2008). One objective of cooperative strategies is to build or maintain a good relationship 
between the negotiating parties. Thus, it seems reasonable that financial accounting auditors 
rely more on cooperative negotiations than tax auditors. While on the one hand, this may 
question the independency of financial accounting auditors, on the other hand, our results 
pose a challenge for governments that aim at introducing enhanced relationship programs. 
Enhanced relationship programs are based on the idea that trustful, cooperative relationships 
between taxpayers and revenue agencies help increase tax compliance (De Simone et al. 
2013; OECD 2013). Prior research demonstrates that socioemotional outcomes can have a 
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stronger impact on future relationships among negotiators than economic results (Curhan et 
al., 2006; Curhan et al., 2010). Thus, our study reveals that an effective implementation of 
enhanced relationship programs would also require changing the implicit negotiation 
incentives of tax auditors towards more cooperative negotiation behavior.  
Our study provides a first attempt towards an understanding of tax audit negotiations. There 
remain several open questions for future research. We would like to name some examples: 
First, one could extent the number of possible auditor negotiation tactics. The study of 
Perreault et al. (2017), for instance, suggests that a simultaneous negotiation strategy may 
be more effective than a sequential strategy. Second, also the effects of communication style 
(Perreault/Kida 2011) and emotions (Van Kleef et al. 2004) may affect tax audit 
negotiations. Third, one could examine the effects of taxpayers’ negotiation strategies on 
audit outcome. Fourth, countries differ in their tax audit environment (Van der Hel 2011). 
Future cross-country studies that examine the effect of audit environment on tax audit 
negotiations may thus shed light on the effect of different incentives on tax audit 
negotiations. 
7 Appendix D 
Table 28: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variable 
ADJUSTMENTS Additional tax burden in € divided by tax rate or in case of 
loss firms change in taxable loss. The tax rate is taking into 
account income taxes, local trade taxes and solidarity 
surcharge. We use a uniform tax rate of 35% for 
partnerships which mirrors tax auditors’ practice. For sole 
proprietorships we use a marginal tax rate with respect to 
an individual’s income class and category, the information 
is obtained from German income tax statistics. 
 Control Variables: Tax Planning Stage 
PUBLIC Equals one if the firm is required to publish a profit and 
loss account, i.e., tax information.  
FAMILY Equals one for firms that are held by at least 50 % by one 
family, otherwise zero.  
SALES mid-value of the interval a firm was classified to, in €. The 
value for the last (open interval) is 48 € M. 
Log(SALES) The natural logarithm of SALES. 
FOREIGN Equals one if at least one of the following items applies: 
1. the key issues’ description of audit entails the term 
„foreign“ 
2. the firm is a member of a foreign group,  
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3. At least one tax auditor is specialized in foreign 
relations. 
Otherwise zero. 
CORPORATION Equals one for corporations, otherwise zero. 
GROUP Equals one if the company is member of a group, otherwise 
zero. 
LOSS Equals one if the firm suffers financial losses in the audit 
period, otherwise zero. 
EVASION Equals one for firms which are suspected of tax evasion, 
otherwise zero. 
Control Variables: Detection Stage 
SALARY Number of pay bracket. 
EXPERIENCE Auditor years at the revenue agency. Values are set to mid-
values of intervals. Last (open) interval is set to 22.5 years.  
SCHOOL Equals one for auditors with a university degree, otherwise 
zero. 
TRAINING Number of advanced training courses per year. 
ATTITUDE Tax auditors were asked if they agree or disagree to the 
following question on a five-point scale: “Taxpayers seek 
to minimize their tax burden by all permitted means.” 
ATTITUDE equals one if the auditor fully agrees (5 out 
of 5), otherwise zero. 
MOTIVATION Tax auditors were asked if they agree or disagree to the 
following question on a five-point scale: “Due to the 
statistical pressure I consider the audit objective to be 
achieved by reaching the de minimis treshold.” 
MOTIVATION is one for auditors who fully disagree (1 out 
of 5), otherwise zero. 
HEAD Equals one if a section head of the revenue agency 
participated in the final audit meeting, otherwise zero. 
Control Variables: Negotiation Stage 
F.ADV.COMP Tax advisors factor score of the competitive component.  
F.ADV.COOP Tax advisors factor score of the cooperative component. 
ADV.COMP Equals one if F.ADV.COMP exceeds/equals sample 
median value and F.ADV.COOP is below sample median 
value, otherwise zero. 
ADV.COOP Equals one if F.ADV.COMP is below sample median value 
and F.ADV.COOP exceeds/equals sample median value, 
otherwise zero. 
ADV.MIX Equals one if F.ADV.COMP and F.ADV.COOP each 
exceeds/equals the sample median value, otherwise zero. 
ADV.NEUTRAL Equals one if F.ADV.COMP and F.ADV.COOP each is 
below the sample median value, otherwise zero. 
S.AUD.COMP Equals one if the auditor carried out one of the following 
actions (multiple answers possible): 
• Imposing short deadlines, 
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• Threat of imposing a fine for delay, 
• Threat of coercive measures (coercive fine, 
substitutive execution, direct enforcement), 
• Threat of discontinuing negotiations without 
agreement, 
• Other actions:___________, 
otherwise zero. 
S.AUD.COOP Equals one if they found an agreement on the proposed 
audit adjustments. Possible answers were given as follows 
(multiple answers possible):  
• I waived small adjustments in favor of one large 
adjustment, 
• I waived adjustments because the firm’s “pain 
threshold” was reached, 
• I waived uncertain adjustments to avoid the risk of 
litigation, 
• I waived adjustments because the other side has 
convinced me, 
otherwise zero. 
AUD.COMP Equals one if S.AUD.COMP equals one and S.AUD.COOP 
equals zero, otherwise zero. 
AUD.COOP Equals one if S.AUD.COMP equals zero and 
S.AUD.COOP equals one, otherwise zero. 
AUD.MIX Equals one if S.AUD.COMP equals one and S.AUD.COOP 
equals one, otherwise zero. 
AUD.NEUTRAL Equals one if S.AUD.COMP equals zero and 
S.AUD.COOP equals zero, otherwise zero. 
Pairwise Analysis  
ADV.COMP/COOP Is the product of AUD.COMP and ADV.COOP. 
ADV.COMP/MIX Is the product of AUD.COMP and ADV.MIX. 
ADV.COMP/NEUTRAL Is the product of AUD.COMP and ADV.NEUTRAL. 
ADV.COOP/COOP Is the product of AUD.COOP and ADV.COOP. 
ADV.COOP/MIX  Is the product of AUD.COOP and ADV.MIX. 
ADV.COOP/NEUTRAL Is the product of AUD.COOP and ADV.NEUTRAL. 
ADV.MIX/COOP Is the product of AUD.MIX and ADV.COOP. 
ADV.MIX/MIX Is the product of AUD.MIX and ADV.MIX. 
ADV.MIX/NEUTRAL Is the product of AUD.MIX and ADV.NEUTRAL. 
ADV.NEUTRAL/COOP Is the product of AUD.NEUTRAL and ADV.COOP. 
ADV.NEUTRAL/MIX Is the product of AUD.NEUTRAL and ADV.MIX. 
ADV.NEUTRAL/NEUTRAL Is the product of AUD.NEUTRAL and ADV.NEUTRAL. 
Negotiation Teams 
F.TAX.COMP Taxpayers factor score of the competitive component.  
F.TAX.COOP Taxpayers factor score of the cooperative component. 
TAX.COMP Equals one if F.TAX.COMP exceeds/equals sample 
median value and F.TAX.COOP is below sample median 
value, otherwise zero. 
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TAX.COOP Equals one if F.TAX.COMP is below sample median value 
and F.TAX.COOP exceeds/equals sample median value, 
otherwise zero. 
TAX.MIX Equals one if F.TAX.COMP and F.TAX.COOP each 
exceeds/equals the sample median value, otherwise zero. 
ADV.NEUTRAL Equals one if F.TAX.COMP and F.TAX.COOP each is 
below the sample median value, otherwise zero. 
COMP.TEAM/AUD.COMP Is the product of ADV.COMP, TAX.COMP and 
AUD.COMP. 
COOP.TEAM/AUD.COMP Is the product of ADV.COOP, TAX.COOP and 
AUD.COMP. 
MIX.TEAM/AUD.COMP Is the product of ADV.MIX, TAX.MIX and AUD.COMP. 
NEUTRAL.TEAM/AUD.COMP Is the product of ADV.NEUTRAL, TAX.NEUTRAL and 
AUD.NEUTRAL. 
Permant and Temporary Adjustments 
ADJUSTMENTSpermanent ADJUSTMENTS * (1 – percentage of temporary 
Adjustments) 
ADJUSTMENTStemporary ADJUSTMENTS * (percentage of temporary Adjustments) 
Table 29: Factor Analysis for Taxpayers 
Type Statement F.PAY.COOP F.PAY.COMP 
Comp Did not adhere to deadlines. 0.211 0.699 
Comp Announce consequences (Finance court 
process, Disciplinary complaint, etc.) 
-0.196 0.598 
Comp Kept you waiting or disrupted meetings 0.067 0.698 
Comp Applied time pressure -0.011 0.446 
Comp Was authoritarian -0.150 0.683 
Comp Information were withheld/filtered 0.084 0.916 
Comp Information were manipulated/beautified 0.049 0.779 
Comp Permanently interrupted you -0.327 0.681 
Coop Offered agreement on minor assessments 0.778 0.084 
Coop Offered agreement on major assessments 0.991 -0.029 
Note: Factor loadings on cooperative factor (F.PAY.COOP) and competitive factor 
(F.PAY.COMP). 
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IV  Determining Factors of Tax Auditors’ Time Consumption 
1 Introduction 
External tax audits are the most suitable tax authorities’ instrument for state interference in 
order to detect tax noncompliance—in terms of discrepancies, unlawful tax avoidance, tax 
fraud, or tax evasion (see e.g., Alm 2014)—and, of course, as a prevention measure for better 
compliance due to direct and indirect effects of the audit (e.g., Alm et al. 2009; Ratto et al. 
2013). However, during the conduct of an audit, the taxpayer will be impacted by a great 
uncertainty34 relating to additional tax payments (Scotchmer 1989a), penalties, and by the 
costs (e.g., Franzoni 2008) of the mentoring of the audit itself. Therefore, it is favorable for 
the taxpayer to know how long the audit will last. On the other hand, the tax authorities 
require such information too, since they have to employ their human recourses in the best 
possible way to realize specified goals (Welch 1954; Goode 1981; Biber 2010; 
Ravikumar/Zhang 2012). This information includes primarily the knowledge about revenue 
agents’ time consumption35 before, during and after the audit as well as the residence time 
of audit cases in audit departments. Time consumption is an important factor for proactive 
staff planning and for reviewing the work performance of fielded revenue agents. Residence 
time is a factor that greatly influences the calculation of the average last audit fiscal year in 
a planned calendar year. Therefore it is important for both parties, taxpayers—also referred 
to as auditees—and tax authorities, to know the duration of tax audits and the effective time 
consumption (see also Bright et al. 1988: 318). To what extent this conception is biased will 
be examined in the following monograph based on the results of survey data from German 
field audits. 
The German tax system is mainly based on assessment procedures, whereby the everyday 
practical implementation of the tax assessment allows merely a cursory examination of tax 
returns at best. Given this fact tax audits play an important role for enforcement of the tax 
laws (e.g., Hoopes et al. 2012),36 as well as in other countries (OECD 2006). More recently, 
tax audits have been considered as part of a service paradigm (see also Alm et al. 2010), but 
also as a management tool for state government decision making (see, e.g., in cases of fiscal 
equalization mechanisms, Bönke et al. 2015, Ulbricht 2008; Stöwhase/Traxler 2005; 
                                                 
34  Tax uncertainties stem in general from various reasons (e.g., Alm et al. 1992; Scotchmer/Slemrod 1989). 
35  Some researchers use instead the term time-on-task. Both terms are used interchangeably. 
36  In addition tax audits also promote a reduction in cost of capital (Guedhami/Pittman 2008; El Ghoul et al. 
2011) and an increase in quality of financial reporting (Hanlon et al. 2014). 
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Spahn/Föttinger 1997). Above all, field audits generate the possibility of identifying the 
taxable amount (Scotchmer/Slemrod 1989). At the same time, it should be emphasized that 
the limitation to essential elements is the most important auditing standard in German tax 
law.37 This means on the one hand that an audit has to be reduced to key audit issues,38 and 
on the other hand that the duration of an audit should be restricted to levels that are necessary 
(see also Rhines et al. 2003: 1000). The principle of proportionality dictates these restrictions 
(Mösbauer 2005: 230). According to German tax law the duration of audits is unpredictable, 
which has led to the author of this monograph restricting the parameters of the investigation 
in the following way. 
A field audit can be divided into four phases of auditing by abstracting the pre-audit phases 
of case selection and the post-audit phase for appeal.39 First, the revenue agent carries out a 
thorough preparation. The auditing of records and finding of supporting evidence in the field 
follow, and after that the phase of negotiation. Finally, the agent draws up a report. Note that 
between these phases varying time intervals may exist, and often the borders between the 
second to the third phase are fluent. Therefore, the auditee directly experiences only the two 
middle phases, even though the audit can also be divided into four phases for the auditees, 
if pre-audit and post-audit phases are taken into account (see Roginske/Collins 1982). The 
tax authority requests the recording of the actual time consumption, that is the effective time 
per case measured in working days, whereas the period of time between the first and the 
final activity of the revenue agent denotes the entire duration of an audit, measured in months 
or years. From the point of the tax-reviewing authority, the duration begins with the 
preparation, and for the auditee with the announcement of the procedure. The difference 
between both perspectives might be negligible, but in cases needing intensive preparation—
large and affiliated auditees—the time specifications fall widely apart. 
So far audit time duration has been studied from different viewpoints, but not under the 
aspect of tax audits. With regard to government reporting Modlin (2012) examined the effect 
of an audit timeframe on county government financial reporting problems. Leventis and 
Caramanis (2005) investigated determinants of audit time, measured in hours, as a proxy of 
audit quality. In the same context, several studies are dedicated to the problem of time 
                                                 
37 See section 7 of the General Administrative Regulation for Tax Audits from the year 2000 
(Betriebsprüfungsordnung, BpO 2000). 
38  In German tax law these emphases are not legally binding. The local tax office determines the extent of an 
audit and the taxpayer cannot raise a claim to find out which particular issues will be examined. 
39  The tax audit phases differ from internal or financial audit phases (e.g., Felix/Kinney 1982; 
Abdolmohammadi 1999). 
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pressure and the resulting impact of earnings quality (e.g., McDaniel 1990; Glover 1997; 
Caramanis/Lennox 2008; Lambert et al. 2016 with further references). Sinha used audit 
hours as a parameter of audit effort, in the first instance computed as tax deficiency per hour 
of audit (2007) and later as a normalized explanatory variable (2010). Beyond that, insofar 
as tax audit duration is described (e.g., Lai et al. 2013) the tax audit time consumption has 
not been studied systematically. Hauptman et al. (2014) found in their survey of Slovenian 
taxpayers that the majority of corporate companies surveyed report that their experienced 
audit duration is adequate. In Germany there were lively exchanges going on relating to a 
perceived lengthy duration of tax audits. In order to address this problem the timely tax audit 
was introduced into German legislation as of 1 July 2011,40 which was intended to enable 
audit departments to start an audit earlier and with shorter audit periods in individual cases. 
But there was no accompanying investigation into further causes, with the exception of the 
delayed start of an audit as a result of all tax returns of a given audit period needing to be 
assessed beforehand. The time delay can frequently amount to a period of up to five years 
between the first audited year and the audit itself. In addition, in this context it should not be 
overlooked that such lengthy and also invasive auditing could be used as an administrative 
lever (Franzoni 2008). 
I will examine the determinants of audit time in the form of revenue agents’ time 
consumption. In this process the observed time is not a proxy for another parameter, but 
rather a measurement unit for the transition from one state to another, in other words, the 
audit time is the transition period from the beginning to the finalization of an audit. Such an 
approach has its basis in survival analysis. For this I will use the flexible parametric model 
by Royston and Parmar (2002) where the auditee ‘survives’ the field audit. Surviving covers 
the entire duration of the audit until the submission of the audit report regardless of the 
respective outcome. Due to surmised non-binding timeframes, my model includes a 
restricted cubic spline function (Herndon/Harrell 1990, 1995; Royston/Parmar 2002; 
Lambert/Royston 2009) so that the observed survey data produce an expected bell-shaped 
transition rate (Allison 2014) in the best possible manner.  
For this study I conducted a written survey with the participants of an obligatory advanced 
training course in Berlin, a federal state in Germany. I collected data relating to three main 
determinants which are expected to impact audit time, namely: the characteristics of the 
auditee, the audit itself, and the executing revenue agent. Since the rules for research of real 
                                                 
40  See section 4a of the BpO 2000. 
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German tax and agent data are very restricted, my selection is limited to objective 
explanatory variables. Nevertheless, my study will join in with a series of studies based on 
real tax audit cases (e.g., Alissa et al. 2014; Alm et al. 1996; Chan et al. 2013; Chan/Mo 
2000; Cho et al. 2006; Hite/Hasseldine 2003; Mills 1998). In contrast to prior research, in 
which firm size is manifested mainly as a control or an explanatory variable, I will examine 
each size category separately, because the above-mentioned timeframes differ with the size 
of businesses. Thus it is possible to investigate size-specifically whether and to what extent 
time consumption is affected by the observed parameters.  
My most important findings are the following: first, characteristics of auditees affect revenue 
agents’ time consumption. Results indicate that the time needed increases with increase of 
task complexity. Therefore time-on-task depends primarily on the type of determination of 
income, whether a group affiliation exists,41 and on the group of sectors as well as 
occasionally on the legal form. In detail, audit and/or report time consumption increases if 
book-tax conformity decreases and disparities are difficult to control, if the auditee is an 
affiliate—not with medium firms with routine audit work—or if the auditee is a 
manufacturing-oriented firm, respectively. Furthermore, audits of medium corporations 
consume more time than that of other legal forms in the medium size category, unless the 
corporation is a member of an affiliated group. Moreover, my findings disclose that agents 
adapt their working methods to the specific condition relating to the legal form of auditees. 
Therefore, a differentiation according to the degree of complexity by means of the legal form 
is not possible in principle. Only for audited partnerships in the smallest size category 
revenue agents anticipate increased complexity. So they decrease their audit effort slightly 
to compensate for their expected increased consumption of report time, only in the presence 
of high time pressure such as occurs in the smallest size category. Such an approach harbors 
the risk of a reduction of the number of focal points for audit and/or an increased likelihood 
of auditors’ avoidance of more complex focal points in the case of micro-sized auditees.  
Second, time consumption is influenced by characteristics of the audit itself. So it will be 
presented that time consumption increases generally if the revenue agents have a suspicion 
of tax evasion. However, relating to small businesses the increase is limited, because agents 
are probably more familiar with focal points which tend to support previous suspicion so 
that they do not need more time-on-task in such cases. Furthermore, time consumption is 
                                                 
41  No distinction is made between corporate companies and affiliated companies relating to the investigated 
time consumption.  
94 
influenced by the actual place of work during the audit phase. As a general rule, field audits 
take place at the auditee’s office or at home. If agents leave the premises, their time-on-task 
increases in special cases and decreases in one case only. In principle, a field audit 
encompasses three concluded fiscal years, but exceptions are possible. Hence, if revenue 
agents audit fewer years in micro-sized firms, their time consumption decreases. And for 
large-sized firms, if more years are audited time consumption increases.  
In addition, for follow-up audits the time consumption increases only if they are unusual for 
the firms audited. But, if additional specialized auditors are called in, revenue agents’ time 
consumption is unaffected. Moreover, it may seem surprising that it is not important whether 
the parties reach a consensus on agents’ findings or not. Although, revenue agents’ time 
consumption decreases when agents are open-minded and prepared to compromise during 
lengthy audits—normally of large businesses—or use the threat of non-agreement in cases 
of audit delay due to unexperienced auditees—mostly in the case of smaller businesses. 
Other measures of agents to accelerate the audit are associated with increased time 
consumption. Whereas, concerning the audit duration itself, it is not surprising that an 
increasing (decreasing) of duration results in an increasing (decreasing) of time consumption 
and vice versa. In contrast, an outcome leading to increased field audits affects only the 
report time, whereas the audit time is mainly unaffected. 
Third, special characteristics of revenue agents influence time consumption. The most 
influential factor is the agents’ experience, which is composed of life experience expressed 
by age and work experience measured in years as an agent and by salary grades as well as 
the agent’s main field of work. My results will reveal different and in part surprising effects 
on revenue agents’ time consumption. As expected, the time-on-task decreases with an 
increase in experience. But this effect is limited: it reverses if the references basis is 
transgressed and also occurs only in one of the four studied firm size categories. Rather, it 
appears that older agents with great experience consume significantly more time than agents 
of the same age with lesser experience. In addition, in two firm size categories, younger 
and/or unexperienced agents consume less time than the control group.  
Moreover, the results of the interdependent impact of salary grades and the agents’ main 
field of work indicate that more experienced agents save report time for audits with lesser 
task complexity. But only a few agents are capable of fitting their method of work so that 
audit time increases in such cases. Finally, concerning gender, my study will disclose that 
under time pressure female and male auditors use the same information processing strategies 
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so that their time consumption does not differ. However, as soon as time pressure is lessened 
female auditors spent less time on complex tasks. These findings concur with recent research 
and prove to be valid according to laboratory results (Breesch/Branson 2009; Chung/Monroe 
2001; O’Donnell/Johnson 2001). Besides, a control estimation shows that auditors’ 
subjective perceptions of time pressure do not have any influence on the actual time 
consumption and duration of an audit. Hence it can be assumed that the selection of the 
correct applicable information processing strategy is unconscious. 
Everything taken into consideration, I will show that the characteristics of a revenue agent 
along with the characteristics of the audit exert the greatest influence on agents’ time 
consumption, whereas the characteristics of the auditee affect the time only occasionally. 
This monograph is organized as follows. Section IV 2 describes the institutional background 
of my survey. Section IV 3 reviews prior literature to develop my research questions. Section 
IV 4 outlines my empirical design, and section IV 5 describes the data. Section IV 6 reports 
the results. Section IV 7 concludes. 
2 Institutional Background 
In Germany the financial administration competence is split between the Federal Ministry 
of Finance as the supreme authority of the Federal Revenue Administration and sixteen state 
tax authorities (Spahn/Föttinger 1997: 239-241; Ulbricht 2008: 197-199; Brown 2012: 160). 
Thereby, the federal supreme authority shall ensure, amongst other objectives and 
responsibilities, that taxation in the states is handled as evenly as possible. This also includes 
the commitment to a broadly similar audit frequency in all states (but see Spahn/Föttinger 
1997: 246; Stöwhase/Traxler 2005; Ulbricht 2008: 205-206; Bönke et al. 2015). The federal 
authority sets out a framework and the state authorities report several indicators (e.g., 
number of registered firms, number of audit staff, number of finished audits, and 
accumulated audit results)42 for purposes of country-wide comparison. In light of this all 
registered firms are classified by the revenue service into four main classes according to 
their size. This classification is usually valid for three years. Size is measured using industry‐
specific annual profit and sales thresholds. The category ‘large’ is further divided into three 
subclasses. An overview of the thresholds is given in Appendix H Table 72. In the field audit 
                                                 
42  Further (unpublished) indicators could be the proportion of audits without result, or only with a small 
deviation, the averaged last year of the audit period, and the averaged number of finished tax audits per 
revenue agent and year. 
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departments of the sixteen state tax authorities there worked a full-time-equivalent of 13,210 
revenue agents altogether in 2010. They completed during this year 203,903 tax audits in 
total.43 Table 30 shows the distribution by size categories for all 8,571,515 registered firms 
and completed tax audits.  
Table 30: Registered Firms and Completed Tax Audits in Germany by Size Categories (Year 2010) 
 Registered Audits 
Micro firms 6,391,015 
108,086 
Small firms 1,189,727 
Medium firms 799,135 55,315 
Large firms 191,638 40,502 
 
The German tax system currently provides that the main relevant taxes (e.g., income tax, 
business tax, value-added tax) are to be assessed every fiscal year. For this purpose, 
taxpayers are legally required to declare their taxable amount (Brown 2012: 160-161). In 
any case the assessment service checks the tax returns to a greater or lesser extent for 
completeness and conclusiveness, and prepares all formal tax assessment notes. In the event 
that the tax officer uncovers discrepancies that he or she does not clarify or decide, then the 
back office can register the case as basically possible for an audit. This non-automated 
practice for the proposal to conduct an audit is typical for all cases that should not be 
examined continuously. According to German tax law a field audit shall be conducted in 
principle without unaudited fiscal years only for large enterprises and affiliated companies. 
For all other, unaffiliated firms which are classified in the micro, small, or medium size 
category (so-called small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), the law stipulates merely 
that an audit includes no more than three consecutive taxable periods, but audits do not have 
to be consecutive. In addition to the personal notification of a need for an audit, cases can 
also potentially be selected randomly—including for verification of standard rates—due to 
information from third parties, other audits, and from a prior audit, respectively, and recently 
via a risk analysis process. All forms of case selection follow on from the Rationalization 
Edict from 1995, in which the state tax authorities contracted updated instructions for the 
process of tax audits. In addition to that, currently the federal and the state tax authorities are 
developing a risk management system which also improves the audit case selection process; 
                                                 
43  Not included are special audits of value-added tax, wage tax, investment grant, and tax fraud investigations. 
97 
already publicly requested by, among others, Engels (2006) and is defined legally in the Act 
on the Modernization of the Taxation Process of 18 July 2016.  
From the cluster of potential audit cases (P)44 the head of the relevant department narrows 
down the choice, and spreads the selected cases among several revenue agents. This 
distribution is determined by the urgency, the affiliation of the corporation to a group, the 
annual target agreement between the tax office and the state tax authority,45 the personal 
expectations of agent experiences usually, and by the anticipated expenditure for an audit in 
particular. In the end the selected agents decide together with their direct superiors which 
taxpayer is actually examined. Therefore the revenue agent shall carry out an audit 
preparation in the first instance. As a result of this the revenue agent concludes that the case 
will need to be examined—whereby the largest firms (L1)46 are non-auditing only in 
exceptional cases—and shall define key auditing areas. This focus on a few chosen key 
topics is a defining feature of the rationalism of tax audit.  
The average procedure of a field audit is the following: the revenue agent announces the 
audit to the auditee in writing. Thereby the taxpayer must be informed of when the audit will 
start, the revenue agent’s name, and the scope of the audit—typically three assessment 
periods. Usually, field audits take place in the firm’s office. If a suitable bureau is not 
available, the agent can conduct the audit at the auditee’s home, or in the agent’s office. Only 
in exceptional cases shall the field audit be conducted in the tax adviser’s office. The revenue 
agent examines the firm’s books and records in order to investigate whether tax law has been 
correctly applied, in favor of the auditee or not. Thereby the audit shall extend only to 
permanent tax shortfalls or refunds and not to slight profit shifts.47 On completion of the 
field audit the revenue agent will offer a final discussion which may be attended by the 
agent’s direct superior, if desired. An audit ends with a written report of all findings 
regardless of possible legal steps against the results. 
There are only loose time constraints for the conduct of field audits. Procedural law requests 
solely that the field audit begins before the limitation period has elapsed. This period is four 
years—ten years in the case of tax evasion—and normally begins with the expiry of the year 
in which the tax return arrived at the tax office responsible, but not later than three years 
after the relevant fiscal year has ended. The audit delay can amount to up to seven years. If 
                                                 
44  See below Figure 6. 
45  Section 21a of the Financial Administration Act (Finanzverwaltungsgesetz, FVG) 
46  See Table 72 in Appendix H. 
47  The third sentence of section 7 of the BpO 2000. 
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the audit begins on time, or, on the auditee’s request, later, the limitation period does not end 
before the amended tax assessment notice becomes final. However, the duration of the audit 
itself shall be limited to the extent necessary. There are no legal requirement concerning 
length.48 Taking into account allowing periods for the announcement of an audit as well as 
for the final discussion, the field audit (preparation, auditing, and writing a report) will last 
anything from several weeks and a few years in total (Ränsch 2002: 60). In practice most 
revenue agents work on different cases at the same time. So the actual working time must 
be defined for each case separately. It can be expected that an internal time guideline exists 
for the time consumption per case which is very likely derived from the size categories and 
the average number of audited cases per year by a full-time-equivalent agent.49  
Usually, the career of a revenue agents starts in the position of a tax officer after graduating 
from a federal university of applied sciences (see at a glance Ulbricht 2008: 201-202). After 
about six to eight years (Senate Report 2013) a few of them are transferred into field audit 
departments and begin another training on top to qualify as an agent. Presently, this lasts 
five years in total in Berlin, and takes the form of training on the job. Tax advisers, often the 
counterparts of revenue agents, have to pass a national exam to perform their job in principle. 
In order to be admitted to this exam they need either, likewise, a degree from university or 
a college with a standard period of study more than four years and two years on the job or 
less than four years at the university and three years on the job or a completed vocational 
training and practical experience for ten years.50 According to the law, tax officers and agents 
are considered as equal to advisers fifteen years after graduating. So, they can switch career 
paths without the obligation to take an adviser exam,51 but without differentiation between 
previous fields of work—comparable with Dubin (2012: 54)—and qualifications in terms of 
tax officers or revenue agents. 
3 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Everybody will agree that tax audits play a prominent role in tax enforcement. Therefore a 
lot of studies exist around this topic. The rules of selection for audit cases have been the 
subject of several studies (e.g., Alm et al. 1993; Murray 1995; Macho-Stadler/Pérez-
                                                 
48  If the audit duration is moderate the strain on the auditee is not excessive and the ratio between outcome 
and effort is more balanced (Mösbauer 2005: 230). 
49  Strangmeier (2000: 273) refers, e.g., to an instruction from the Oberfinanzdirektion Hamburg, an 
intermediate authority, from 1996 which specifies 21 working days to audit three fiscal years for a large 
enterprise. 
50  The first and second paragraph of section 36 of the Tax Consulting Act (Steuerberatungsgesetz, StBerG). 
51  The first paragraph no. 4 and the second paragraph of section 38 of the StBerG. 
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Castrillo 2002; Santoro/Fiorio 2011; Scotchmer 1987). Audit probability has been looked at 
by Andreoni et al. (1998) and many more (e.g., Hoopes et al. 2012; Slemrod et al. 2001; 
Tan/Yim 2012). The rate of detection of noncompliance was of great interest (e.g., 
Allingham/Sandmo 1972; Graetz et al. 1986; Erard 1997; Feinstein 1991), as well as direct 
and indirect effects of auditing on compliance (e.g., Alm et al. 2009; Blaufus et al. 2016b; 
DeBacker et al. 2015b; Kirchler et al. 2014; Ratto et al. 2013) and on other aspects (e.g., El 
Ghoul et al. 2011; Guedhami/Pittman 2008; Hanlon et al. 2014). The role of tax advisers on 
tax compliance has been widely researched (Andreoni et al. 1998; e.g., Beck/Jung 1989; 
Beck et al. 1996; Erard 1993; Hite/Hasseldine 2003; Klepper et al. 1991; Reinganum/Wilde 
1991; Scotchmer 1989a, 1989b) and tax evasion was focused (e.g., Pickhardt/Prinz 2014). 
The changes in compliance under influence of specific communication were an aspect (eg., 
Hasseldine et al. 2007; Kleven et al. 2011; Slemrod et al. 2001), and the consequences of 
audit delay on taxpayers’ compliance another (e.g., Andreoni 1992; Muehlbacher et al. 
2012). The most expedient administration structure of audit departments and the efficient 
deployment of auditors has been explored (Welch 1954; Goode 1981; Biber 2010; 
Ravikumar/Zhang 2012; Wertz 1979),52 and means of measurement of audit/auditors’ 
performance (e.g., Alissa et al. 2014; Sinha 2007, 2010). In addition to that, the choice of 
audit areas, e.g., book-tax differences (e.g., Mills 1998; Cho et al. 2006), or transfer pricing 
(e.g., Chan et al. 2006; Klassen et al. 2017) have been researched.53 
However, in respect of tax audit time aspects the research findings are slim. Among other 
researchers, Sinha (2007, 2010) and Alissa et al. (2014) apply audit time as a measure to 
estimate audit effort, while Biber (2010) describes the development of effective plans for tax 
audits and also the expected time consumption (in staff days) and the changes in duration 
depending on the size of the audited firm. An in-depth review of factors influencing time 
duration and consumption is not enclosed. Franzoni (2008) indicates that lengthening audits 
could be used to generate income from the auditee. Because the willingness to come to an 
agreement on auditors’ findings could rise with increasing duration if the auditing procedure 
becomes cumbersome, and if additional tax payments will lead to costly interest. The 
German Tax Code dictates that after the fifteenth month after the fiscal year ended .5 % 
                                                 
52  It is important to highlight the different opinions about the measurement of detected overassessment and 
underassessment. Welch (1954) prefers an equal treatment of both, whereas Goode (1981) proposes to take 
positive adjustment with greater numerical weight into account than the negative. 
53  Also an outright issue is the negotiation between revenue agents and their counterparts due to the as far as 
possible unavoidable information asymmetry between them, tax law complexity and ambiguity, and their 
personal attitude, moral as well as ethical. In relation to taxpayers’ compliance some of them are examined, 
but with a view to negotiation in tax audits further research is needed (see above Chapter III ). 
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interest to be raised per commenced month. I believe, since this also works the other way 
round, the audition becomes cumbersome for the agent and the state has to pay interests on 
tax refunds, it can be presumed that both parties should have a strong interest in minimizing 
audit duration (Bright et al. 1988: 318). Insofar as audit duration is discussed in the literature 
(Lai et al. 2013), research examines the extent to which auditors follow the rules of 
termination of audits and how long the average duration of observed cases lasts. Lai et al. 
(2013) presume that the significant overrunning of the timeframe—most cases took between 
6 and 18 months instead of 3 months—is related to firm size, complexity, type of records, 
and taxpayers’ cooperation, but a more precise examination of exact causes has not been 
carried out. 
The relevant German literature provides merely rough estimations of the duration of tax 
audits—which can be, depending on the firm’s size, anything from several weeks or months 
and sometimes up to several years (representatively Ränsch 2002: 60)—and nothing about 
actual time consumption, relating to average time at the place of work in papers for 
practitioners at best. A hindering circumstance is that tax administrations have refrained 
from disclosing any such information. This may be due to the fact that the government aims 
to avoid situations where revenue agents are exposed to additional time pressure, and to keep 
their counterparts from adapting their tactics and behavior—according to Mikesell/Birskyte 
(2007: 1066), “[b]ecause the tax authority and the taxpayers interact strategically”. Fixed 
timelines are not set, because they may be used against the agent. But this is no argument 
against more transparency: auditees and tax advisers doubtlessly discuss experiences of field 
audits, this being an indirect effect of tax audits (e.g., Alm et al. 2009). Furthermore, through 
the Act of 19 December 2008, German legislature has created with the legal requirement for 
penalties on time lags in order to increase cooperation on the part of taxpayers.54 So the agent 
can counteract, if an auditee tries to delay the audit to enforce revenue agent’s willingness 
to reach agreement by the means of an increase in time pressure. However, the auditee’s 
uncertainty might increase beyond the inherent part of an audit as a result of published time 
specifications if his or her audit lasts longer than expected. Nevertheless, I suppose, 
following Alm and Torgler (2011), that cooperative behavior on the side of government 
and/or revenue agents, such as friendly treatment during the auditing processes itself 
(Feld/Frey 2007), represents an argument for transparency, because transparency promotes 
compliance more than an approach of deterrence and of intentionally keeping things vague 
                                                 
54  See section 146 paragraph 2b of the German Tax Code (Abgabenordnung, AO).  
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(see for non-deterrence policies Slemrod 2016: 43-48). This is in line with Muehlbacher et 
al. (2011: 95) assessment that “[i]ncreasing transparency in governmental decisions and 
expenditures, for instance, may be a way to increase taxpayers’ trust in authorities.” 
The ongoing lively and at times intense exchange of positions in Germany about the duration 
of tax audits perceived as prolonged is another aspect of the literature. As a consequence of 
this debate, the legislator introduced a so-called timely tax audit as of 1 July 2011. This 
should enable to an audit to start earlier and with shorter audit periods in individual cases. 
But the accompanying investigation into criteria influencing audit duration did not examine 
further factors other than the delay in beginning an audit, due to the fact that all tax returns 
of all audit periods must be assessed prior to the audit’s start. This rule, which will 
occasionally be applied, came into effect shortly after my survey and so lies beyond the 
scope of the current investigation. 
Studies about audit time in accounting issues have taken different viewpoints. One area of 
research is focused on how audit performance is affected by time pressure (e.g., McDaniel 
1990; Glover 1997), whereby pressure may rise as a result of time limitation (e.g., 
Sweeney/Pierce 2004; Lambert et. al. 2016 with further references). Caramanis and Lennox 
(2008) have shown that less audit time, measured in hours, is associated with lower earning 
quality. The earlier investigation from Leventis and Caramanis (2005), on the other hand, 
investigated determinants of audit time as a proxy of audit quality. Audit quality is defined 
by DeAngelo (1981) as the probability that an auditor will discover and report an accounting 
breach, here the probability of detection depends on the auditor’s competence, and the 
probability of reporting on the auditor’s independence. The relationship of both probabilities 
constitutes audit quality (Richard 2006).  
For tax audits the situation is quite different because conflicts of interest are not congruent. 
The tax auditor, as an employee of a tax authority, conducts tax audits without a contractual 
basis, no audit fees have to be paid, and non-auditing services are forbidden, so that a revenue 
agent is fundamentally more independent than any other auditor. Even though with regard 
to an auditor’s attitude, impartiality and objectivity (ibid.) ought to be only marginally 
different, it is in their perception by auditees where the essential mismatch occurs. That 
means that tax auditors can suggest (possible) audit adjustments (e.g., Wright/Wright 1997; 
Joe et al. 2011) in order to reach an agreement,55 for instance, based on the societal rule of 
                                                 
55  See Chapter III . 
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reciprocation (e.g., Sanchez et al. 2007; Hatfield et al. 2008). But the consequences differ 
relating to a loss of auditor’s reputation and chance of litigation, because neither bear the 
same importance in this eventuality. For further consideration of tax audit time, the auditor’s 
competence will be a crucial issue (see also Quick/Wolz 1999: 176), hence the influence of 
several objective variables pertaining to competence will be examined below. 
Another aspect is the ambiguity and complexity of audit adjustments (e.g., Krause 2000).  It 
can be assumed that these issues affect audit time. Extensive rules, legislative changes, 
instructions, or jurisdiction (e.g., Slemrod 2005) might influence the auditing process. Then 
again, if timelines are predetermined auditors might not even audit specific issues due to 
their expected complexity and therefore excessive expenditure of time. In this context 
Modlin (2012) states that a timeframe of completion—here on county government financial 
reporting—is significant in limiting the number and in determining the type of reporting 
issues. But to what extent time consumption is affected by focal points which are to be 
audited and by waived or reported adjustments will not be subject of this study. Indeed, the 
focal points and findings have been surveyed but their respective necessary expenditure of 
time has not yet been recorded in the investigated area and hence stays unobserved.56 In 
addition, due to legal requirements which prescribe a special auditing of permanent and only 
substantially shifted adjustments, a diminishing marginal utility of time required to discover 
further prospective findings can be expected, so that the auditor must weigh the expected 
additional tax and cost of auditing (Mösbauer 2005: 230) with a potential increase in time 
consumption and/or duration as a result of the extra effort. In case of doubt, the auditor ought 
to waive further auditing (Streck 1993: 91). At present in the area investigated, the order in 
which focal points are audited stay unrecorded, as well as how much time is spent in each 
case, and what amount of total outcome these constitute in detail. Consequently, it is not 
possible to predict certain likely effects of these points on revenue agents’ time consumption 
and/or on audit duration. Thus the relationship between audit time and points of examination 
must be reserved to further research into audit complexity and quality. 
It can be expected that the influence of multiple variables affects the time consumption as 
well as the duration of each field audit in varying intensity in the absence of an absolute time 
limitation as in German tax law. Hence, it is advisable to study the driving factors of revenue 
agents’ time consumption and of audit duration. Assessing variables that affect time 
                                                 
56  The conducted aggregation of all focal points and findings (Appendix F Table 61) may not remove this 
shortcoming. 
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consumption is the subject of this paper, while research on variables in relation to time 
duration will be left to future research.  
Figure 5: Influencing Parameter Groups of the Audit Time Relationship Graph 
 
Figure 5 charts the relationship between four different interacting groups. The auditee group 
represents the characteristics of audited taxpayers, the auditor group the characteristics of 
revenue agents,57 the agency group represents state tax authorities,58 and the audit group 
shows characteristics of the audit process. Each group contains many parameters which may 
interact with each other within or with parameters of other groups. All influence the audit 
time according to revenue agents’ time consumption and audit duration.59 A good means to 
plot a network of relationships is an analogous sociogram following the concept of Moreno 
(1953), under the condition that the characteristics of an audit are detached from a specific 
responsible person. Nevertheless, task characteristics are elements of task complexity 
(Bonner 1994) and hence have a relationship with expected and separable influences on audit 
time. For the following consideration I will abstract from an investigation of effects of 
agency interactions because all participants in my study were subject to the same state tax 
authority, so I will assume that the same guidelines and performance evaluations apply to all 
auditors and audit cases. Thus, described below will be the characteristics of auditee 
(Section IV 3.1), audit (Section IV 3.2), and auditor (Section IV 3.3).  
Firm size is a primary feature of the auditee, determined by economic indicators such as 
assets (e.g., Anderson/Zéghal 1994), turnover (e.g., Quick/Wolz 1999), profit, and/or staff 
                                                 
57  In the following, the terms revenue agent and auditor are used as synonyms. In particular, a functional 
distinction is not preexisting in the German staff definition of income tax audit, in contrast to other countries 
(e.g., Dubin 2012: 15). 
58  Where necessary, it is also possible to refer to the smallest common administrative unit (mostly the local 
tax office). 
59  According to Feinstein (1990) my analysis includes possible variations from different views of firms’ 
characteristics and agents. 
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indicators, such as number of employees. It is an established fact that size has a decisive 
influence on the probability of audit to be held, the intensity of audit (Hanlon et al. 2005), 
and so also on the expected time consumption as well as the expected duration 
(Anderson/Zéghal 1994; Caramanis/Lennox 2008). Beneficially the German Federal 
Ministry of Finance divides all firms regular into four categories of firm size for the purpose 
of auditing.60 This classification provides the general number of fiscal years under review 
and the audit probability (for the latter see e.g., Hanlon et al. 2014). Furthermore, it would 
be more likely to be decisive for the (assumed) recommended time consumption and the 
auditor choice.61 For this reason, it is expedient to conduct separate investigations for each 
firm size category. Another supporting fact is that according to the political assumption 
larger businesses need to be audited more closely than smaller firms because noncompliance 
increases with size (Hanlon et al. 2005) or, in the words of Zimmermann (1983), “large firms 
choose income reducing accounting procedures [sector-specific] more frequently than small 
firms”, and a greater leverage effect of errors detected on the tax due can also be assumed.62 
Hence, the audit probability increases gradually with raising assignment; however, the 
probabilities correspond to each other within the size categories. Restrictively, in respect of 
absent records on the respective audit selection rule (e.g., Alm et al. 1993) it is unfeasible to 
examine their actual impact on revenue agents’ time consumption. 
The following development of hypotheses will principally apply to all categories of auditee 
size. Only in cases where size-specific differences can be expected the hypothesizing will 
be more nuanced. 
3.1 Characteristics of the Auditee 
The first group of characteristics are the auditee-specific parameters, also called client-
specific in financial audit research (Quick/Wolz 1999). Overall, this group involves all 
objectively measurable indicators and also the subjective behavior and all attitude features 
of a taxpayer. For this investigation the most relevant objective parameters have been 
chosen: legal form of the auditee, determination of income, sector groups, and affiliation to 
a group. Those parameters are representatives of firm complexity and, due to statutory 
requirements, in part require one another. However, as already stated, firm size variables 
                                                 
60  The criteria are constituted in Appendix H Table 72. Hanlon et al. (2005) use seven categories in their 
study.  
61  Further features for a distinction of audit criteria may be degree of diversification, complexity of corporate 
structure (Anderson/Zéghal 1994), position in an affiliates group, and market position or sector. 
62  This is also evident from increasing de minimis limits over the size categories. 
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cannot be included here. Within the bounds of each size category it is expected that the 
chosen characteristics—subsequently described in detail—affect the time consumption. It 
can be expected that, with an increase in the auditee’s complexity, the revenue agent’s time 
consumption also increases (Anderson/Zéghal 1994). 
So the first hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
H1: The characteristics of the auditee influence the revenue agent’s time 
consumption. 
3.1.1 Legal Form 
Taxpayers can choose different legal forms for their businesses. Those legal forms can be 
classified in three main groups: individual entrepreneurs, partnerships, and corporations 
(Sinha 2010). The particular choice is usually determined by several influencing factors as 
where suitable individually or jointly with others, by differences in taxation and liability 
(e.g., Blaufus/Mantei 2014), by separation of management and control, risk attitude, 
financing, available assets and so on.63 In general—and abstracted from research made into 
noncompliance which is split up according to legal forms (e.g., Tedds 2006)—the legal form 
defines the regulatory framework of the audited business. Thus, constant influence on the 
revenue agent’s time consumption is not to be expected, rather, that auditors adapt their 
working methods to specific conditions.  
Following the findings of Cole and Sokolyk (2015), it is furthermore conceivable that 
auditees chose their legal form depending on the complexity of their business. The 
researchers found that firms choose a more complex legal form of organization if the firm is 
more complex. The consequence would be an increase in revenue agents’ time consumption 
the more complex the legal form.  
I assume that an impact of time results only for the auditing of more complex legal forms, 
where the degree of complexity is so high that a normal adaption of working methods is not 
sufficient to counteract the expected negative time effects. This is particularly important in 
the medium firm size category as this category is the highest class of SMEs and thus below 
the threshold of large business. So I conjecture a concentration of more complex businesses 
in the specific legal form of the corporation and a variety of less complex businesses in all 
                                                 
63  Herzig (2008) gives a short overview of ownership and control in Germany compared to the United 
Kingdom as well as the United States. Harhoff et al. (1998) describe the reasons for growth of the non-
public corporate legal form in Germany. 
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other legal forms in the medium size category. In addition, with regard to the specific 
German tax law that requires, in the case of partnerships, a split of tax bases over a lot of 
(usually heterogeneous) members, it can be expected that report writing is more time-
consuming than in the case of other legal forms. During audit preparation the auditor will 
take precautions, contributing toward adapting the pure audit time consumption so that the 
total time consumption does not exceed the recommended timeline. This is more likely under 
time pressure. 
So the first hypothesis is extended by: 
H1-1: The legal form does not influence revenue agents’ time consumption in total; 
however, a complex legal form provokes a task complexity which the agents cannot 
compensate by adapting their working methods. 
Moreover, since the choice of a specific legal form also defines other characteristics of an 
auditee, I will control this, not least because legal forms are also a means to take advantage 
of loopholes and other gaps in the law (Slemrod 2004: 9) so that they may indirectly 
influence auditors’ time consumption. 
3.1.2 Determination of Income 
First and foremost, the law dictates that the type of determination of income is stipulated in 
the investigation area. With no exception, corporations must prepare balance sheets,64 
partnerships and individual entrepreneurs only if the auditee engages in commercial 
business, or is legally required by the tax law, or prepares balance sheets on a voluntary 
basis. In all other cases auditees determine their taxable profit by means of accounting of 
income and expenditure. In addition, in accounting there are three types of profit 
determination: the tax balance sheet in accordance with or separately from the trade balance 
sheet; or a trade balance sheet with an annual offsetting and reconciliation to the taxable 
income. Given this complexity, it is obvious that occurrence and treatment of possible book-
tax differences (Atwood et al. 2010; Cho et al. 2006) influence revenue agents’ time 
consumption. If book-tax conformity increasingly diminishes, I assume that the level of 
complexity increases. This is supported by the fact that according to Mills (1996, 1998) audit 
adjustments increase as the extent of book-tax differences increase. Thus it can expected that 
the time required to identify these also will increase. Furthermore, if the disclosure of 
                                                 
64  Current simplifications from this obligation were introduced only after the investigation period. 
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differences within the auditee’s documents becomes more complicated, an audit of them will 
be even more time-consuming. In accordance with previous research on book-tax conformity 
and managers’ behavior (see e.g., Tang 2014) these effects arise even stronger in those 
members of the group classified as corporations, because it is this legal form favors this 
effect with its structural.65 In the case of small businesses, the relation between simplified 
methods of tax accounting and the choice of legal forms has been studied 
(Bergner/Heckemeyer 2017). Hence this analysis will control for possible interaction effects 
between the various legal forms and the types of determination of income. So the first 
hypothesis is further extended by: 
H1-2: The type of determination of income influences revenue agents’ time 
consumption. If book-tax conformity decreases, the time consumption increases.  
3.1.3 Group of Sectors 
As already stated, Zimmermann (1983) states that larger firms reduce their income with the 
help of accounting procedures more frequently than smaller firms, but such conduct depends 
on the current sector of auditee. Hanlon et al. (2005) have shown that medium-sized 
businesses have the lowest rate of noncompliance following a U-shaped trajectory, whereby 
noncompliance, in turn, is related to auditees’ sector, among other factors, because some 
“industries have a higher proposed deficiency rate and a lower proportion of deficiency 
agreed to upon exam relative to the other groups.” Since it can be assumed that each sector 
affects revenue agents’ time consumption in various ways and that, moreover, no sector 
exclusively polls noncompliant behavior, it follows that different sectors need to be included.  
In the present study it is helpful to cluster the observed sectors with regard to the findings of 
researchers cited above and to the specific similarities under the aspect of the audit process 
itself. Accordingly, the groups are to be split up in: manufacturing/production, trading 
(wholesale and retail), utilities, and service. The latter includes all service companies and 
will be the basis for the comparison. Furthermore, the group of utilities is separated as it is 
subject to state control to a greater or lesser extent.66 
Chan and Mo (2000), e.g., have distinguished in their study between manufacturing-oriented 
and service-oriented firms. They assume that detecting inconsistencies in production cost 
only on the basis of a firm’s documents and ledgers will create obstacles. Analytical 
                                                 
65  For an overview about ownership and control in Germany, see, e.g., Herzig (2008). 
66  In accordance with Lennox et al. (2013), utilities have only a low frequency of occurrences of fraud.  
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procedures are required to test reasonablety. Hence it can be expected that auditing will take 
more time in the manufacturing-oriented than in the service-oriented firms. A corresponding 
difference between the trading-oriented and the service-oriented sector cannot be expected. 
The provision of services and goods resemble each other strongly. So the first hypothesis is 
further extended by:  
H1-3: The group of sectors influences revenue agents’ time consumption. If the 
auditee conducts a manufacturing-oriented business, time consumption increases 
compared to the other groups of sectors. 
It has to be emphasized here that due to the above-named interdependent relationship 
between sector and noncompliance, it is conceivable that, if the auditor suspects tax evasion, 
his or her assumption is influenced by the specific sector of the auditee. Consequently, 
possible interaction effects should be taken into consideration. 
3.1.4 Corporate Company 
If the auditee belongs to an affiliated group, it can be expected that the degree of complexity 
(Carney et al. 2011) and hence the audit time required increases (Anderson/Zéghal 1994). 
There are many reasons for this: the build of grown or consolidated structures within a group, 
a wider range of tax planning opportunities (see e.g., Beuselinck/Deloof 2014),67 revenue 
agents’ difficulties in dissolving the information asymmetry relating to define the relevant 
facts—the probability of detection of noncompliance depends on the interdependent agents’ 
competence (Feinstein 1991) and task complexity—and the potentially highly time-
consuming coordination process between what might be a number of agents from different 
state and/or tax audit departments. However, it can be assumed that only a few executive 
agents have to bear the majority of the additional work within a coordinated tax audit. The 
other benefit from the audit guidelines of these executive agents.68 These guidelines can 
state, e.g., limitation of topics to be audited, unification of exchange of information and legal 
assessments, or even offer support in person. Furthermore, agents often perform repetitive 
tasks when they audit a number of comparable affiliates from the same corporate company. 
Consequently, routine audits of smaller dependent firms typically take less time than 
individual audits, with one exception: the amount of report work increases if dependent 
                                                 
67  This includes above all income shifting between countries (e.g., Klassen et al. 2017) or states (e.g., 
Gupta/Mills 2002). 
68  According to German law guidelines in principal have to be provided, see sections 14, 16, 17 of the BpO 
2000. 
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auditors need to communicate additional data to the executive agent. So the first hypothesis 
is further extended by: 
H1-4: The time consumption increases if the auditee is an affiliated company. But, if 
the agent can conduct a routine audit of a smaller dependent firm, in contrast, audit 
(report) time consumption decreases (increases). 
3.2 Characteristics of the Audit 
The group encompassing characteristics of any particular audit result from different 
combinations of several independent variables. Some variables may be influenced by 
characteristics groups of auditee or auditor, others are subject to the presence of obvious 
control parameters. In detail, the time effects of 1) auditor’s suspicion of tax evasion, 2) 
place of work during the field audit, 3) the number of fiscal years audited, specialist auditors 
consulted and follow-up audits, 4) consensus about auditor’s findings and final discussion 
conducted between conflicting parties, 5) measures to accelerate the audit and audit duration 
itself as well as 6) outcome are of particular interest. It is to be expected that most of them 
have varying degrees of influence on revenue agents’ time consumption. So the second 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
 H2: The characteristics of an audit influence the revenue agent’s time consumption. 
The ways in which these characteristics can manifest themselves will be described below. 
However, first it is necessary to point out that an essential topic in this group of 
characteristics must remain unconsidered. Indeed, revenue agents’ focal points and findings 
are known, but the individual period of time they need stays unobserved. The focal points of 
the audit and the agent’s findings cannot be used as a distinct group with different properties, 
e.g., relating to tax complexity and ambiguity (see e.g., Krause 2000; Slemrod 2005), but 
has to be left to further research. 
3.2.1 Suspected Tax Evasion 
The analysis of tax evasion encompasses a variety of research in economics, based on the 
seminal contributions of Allingham and Sandmo (1972)—by applying Becker’s (1968) 
neoclassical model on criminal activity to tax evasion—as well as Srinivasan (1973) and 
Yitzhaki (1974), psychology and sociology (Pickhardt/Prinz 2014 with further references). 
A large body of research results has subsequently emerged from interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary studies (see for an overview e.g., ibid.; Alm 2012; Andreoni et al. 1998; 
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Slemrod/Yitzhaki 2002; Slemrod 2016). In connection to the present study, it should be 
stressed that according to Feinstein (1990, 1991) the detection of tax evasion is imperfect 
and varies from case to case. The probability of detection as well as the extent of 
determination of tax evasion depends particularly on revenue agents’ individual properties. 
These include characteristics of competence—which will be reviewed below—as well as 
revenue agents’ attitude and conscientiousness, which might be affected by the time 
consumption, if a suspicion increases the revenue agent’s time-on-task. 
According to German tax law a distinction must be made between field/tax audits and tax 
investigation audits. Revenue agents conduct field audits, examine both, in favor and to the 
detriment of auditees, but with the presumption of innocence. However, as soon as the agent 
has a suspicion of tax evasion, he or she has to interrupt the audit to inform the tax 
investigation department and, if appropriate, to initiate criminal proceedings. After that, tax 
proceedings and/or criminal proceedings take place simultaneously. As a result, efforts on 
the coordination have to be undertaken and determining the facts will become more difficult 
as suspects have the right not to testify, though they are obliged to cooperate in tax 
proceedings is still valid, hence the relationship between auditor and auditee is disrupted. 
The result is an increase in revenue agents’ effort and hence his or her time consumption and 
therefore in audit duration. 
If the suspicion of tax evasion emerges at the end of a field audit, the revenue agent may 
finish the audit and must send the audit report to the tax investigation department for further 
(criminal) investigation. The result is that the revenue agent has to present a more thorough 
explanation of all salient facts so that the follow-up process has a greater chance of success 
(see Slemrod/Yitzhaki 2002: 1448). Thus time consumption increases again, but not the 
audit duration.69 
The findings of Chan and Mo (2000) and Hanlon et al. (2005) show that noncompliance is 
also dependent on an auditee’s industry sector. Therefore it is necessary to control for 
possible interaction effects between suspected evasion and sector groups. 
So the second hypothesis is further extended by: 
                                                 
69  The result of a control estimation shows that a suspicion does not affect audit duration in this study (see 
Appendix F Table 63). In line with this it can be expected that suspicion arises in most cases at the end of 
an audit. 
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H2-1: If the revenue agent has a suspicion of tax evasion, his or her time consumption 
increases. 
Whether this assumption holds true regardless of a firm’s size, has to be seen. Hanlon et al. 
(2005) find that generally noncompliance increases with firm size. The combination with 
other information suggests that: “the noncompliance rate for corporations relative to their 
size is ‘U-shaped’, with medium-sized businesses among the set of large companies having 
the lowest rate of noncompliance” (Slemrod 2007). Whereas Rice (1992) makes clear in his 
study of much smaller firms that firm size is indeed positively associated with the absolute 
level of noncompliance, but he did not deduce a similar correlation between tax compliance 
and firm size. Given that tax evasion is not synonymous with tax noncompliance, it is to be 
expected that the association between firm size and suspected tax evasion differs from the 
relationship with noncompliance which is the more comprehensive issue. This is supported 
by the facts that a) the type of findings which justify the suspicion vary across the different 
size categories, because incentives and opportunities are different,70 and b) due to a higher 
frequency of focal points, which are often found with suspected tax evasion, agents might 
be more familiar with processing such cases in special size categories. For example, Slemrod 
(2016) points out in his description of tax authorities’ investigations that “[s]mall and 
medium-sized enterprises account for over half of the overall tax gap.” If one accepts the 
assumption that with larger firms using income reducing accounting procedures, detected 
errors have a greater leverage effect on the tax due (see above), this can only imply that the 
number of evasion cases increases in general with reduction in firm size.71 Revenue agents 
who mostly conduct audits of SMEs thus would be more familiar with processing individual 
evasion findings here, so that their time consumption could be less affected by suspected 
evasion than elsewhere. 
To complement this, intrinsic factors (attitude and conscientiousness) will gain greater 
significance in handling of suspicions if the revenue agent’s time-on-task increases. And the 
                                                 
70  In detail, influencing factors are inter alia the behavior of individuals and corporations, the latter within a 
principal-agent framework, profit performance, competitive pressure, owner structure, lack of control, and 
so on. 
71  The German Federal Government publishes only heavily summarized statistical key figures with regard to 
tax evasion detected. There is no breakdown according to size categories, legal forms, findings, 
determination time, or effort. 
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agent may fail to examine suspicious incidents with the necessary intensity as time pressure 
builds up.72  
Further research should investigate this. 
3.2.2 Place of Work 
German law prescribes that a field audit has to take place in a business or residence office. 
Just if the auditee has no suitable premises for the revenue agent during the field audit, 
usually the audit is held at the local tax office;73 but a visit to the company’s premises cannot 
be refused. The nature of the field audit is not changed in this respect. This can be contrasted 
with taxation systems of other countries, which know discrepancies between audits in the 
field and in the tax office—e.g., relating to the complexity of an audit or the income and 
expense levels (e.g., Dubin 2012: 50); or countries where more detailed auditing normally 
takes place in the tax office (e.g., Ho/Lau 1999: 65; Chan et al. 2013: 39). Furthermore in 
Germany, in exceptional cases the auditee can apply for the agent to conduct the audit 
elsewhere,74 and in this case the tax adviser’s office is generally used as the investigative 
base.  
As a general principle, the place of work should not influence the revenue agent’s time 
consumption. If the audit takes place on the company’s premises or in tax adviser’s office, 
the revenue agent will expect that requests can be made directly in situ and queries get a 
prompt reply. However, given the general advice to control the flow of information (e.g., 
Rhines et al. 2003: 1007), the time advantages against an audit in the tax office is not reliable. 
At the auditee’s premises unoccupied time goes wasted, whereas in the tax office the agent 
can use the spare time for other work, so that the time consumption for this audit is not 
burdened. Another related issue is that auditees are to minimize (uncontrolled) potential 
contact between the revenue agent and the firm’s employees upon the recommendation of 
tax advisers (ibid.; Ränsch 2002: 56; Roginske/Collins 1982: 145). There are tax advisers 
who want the audit to take place in his or her office using their expertise as a reason, or in 
order to be able to generate additional cost for his or her support. The auditee will be more 
likely to agree to pay the cost involved if he or she is in doubt about their own tax position, 
maybe because he or she feels overtaxed due to tax complexity and ambiguity or because he 
                                                 
72  Also, it should be taken into consideration that it cannot be ruled out that agents may use a possible criminal 
proceeding in an improper way as a lever in the framework of negotiation. 
73  The second paragraph of section 200 of the AO. 
74  The third sentence of section 6 of the BpO 2000. 
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or she is simply inexperienced. So he or she thinks that the audit cost and tax liability would 
be even higher otherwise. The auditee also might have used aggressive tax planning and 
hence believe that the detection or adjustment risk is smaller in a tax adviser’s office than if 
the investigation takes place elsewhere. For these reasons the auditee or his or her adviser 
will attempt to impact the decision about the place of work, in the best interest of the auditee 
(see also Jones 2013). Whether and to what extent revenue agents’ time consumption will 
be affected by this is unobserved until now.  
From another perspective, the revenue agent will not become an excessive burden for the 
auditee if he or she conducts the audit in the tax office. Moreover, the revenue agent has a 
better chance to conduct a comprehensive audit, especially, if the number of documents and 
business transactions is relatively small and all of them have to be transported to the tax 
office. Apart from this, an agent can also switch between different places in order to prevent 
work delays.75 Both, in-depth audits and work delays increase revenue agents’ time 
consumption. In practice some auditors and their superiors suppose that audits in the tax 
office last longer than in other places of work. It might well be they mean the residence time 
of a case in the department and not to the time consumption itself.76 However, it can be 
assumed that the revenue agent’s time consumption for audits in a tax office increases if the 
duration increases due to long interruptions or a lot of breaks. After every interruption agents 
have to get reacquainted with the case. In contrast, audits of smaller cases outside the local 
tax office usually are conducted in one go. So the second hypothesis is further extended by:  
H2-2: Revenue agents’ time consumption is affected by the place of work. If agents 
conduct audits of small (large) firms in the tax office, audit time consumption 
increases (decreases). In the case of alternating places, audit time consumption 
regularly increases. 
3.2.3 Fiscal Year, Follow-up Audits, Additional Specialized Agent 
As stated above, the usual scrutiny period comprises three concluded fiscal years. Auditing 
SMEs, fewer years are also permissible and for large businesses, which are subject to audit 
follow-up anyway, even more years can be audited. If the agent conducts audits with more 
(fewer) than three years, it can be expected that the time consumption increases (decreases). 
                                                 
75  Agents may use multiple offices in order to minimize audit duration (see so Appendix F Table 63). 
76  However, this assumption cannot be proven. The results of a control estimation do not show any significant 
effect of audits conducted in local tax offices on audit duration (Appendix F Table 63). 
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The time effects stem from work steps which arise for every individual year audited and not 
in general.  
In the context of follow-up audits research results relating to the auditees’ behavior after 
field audits (see e.g., Snow/Warren 2007) has to be reviewed. So Andreoni et al. (1998) have 
come to the conclusion that audits may cause different effects on auditees’ behavior after an 
audit. If audits fail to detect an existing noncompliance, auditees could assume that unlawful 
demeanor pays off. Otherwise, if their experiences are negative, auditees may evade taxes 
to gain ‘repayments’. The authors refer to Erard (1992) who found only a weaker effect of 
auditees’ experience on their future behavior. A more recent study from DeBacker et al. 
(2015b) shows that auditees changed their behavior after an audit. Their strategic responses 
give rise to a negative and U-shaped impact on subsequent tax payments. In other words, 
auditees show higher tax aggressiveness for a few years after audit and this behavior reduces 
gradually until they fear to be audited again. Firms which have to pay a penalty react more 
aggressively after audits than firms which go without punishment. On the other hand, Sinha 
(2010) finds that the potential outcome from previously unaudited firms amounts to 
approximately 70 % of the potential outcome from auditees with prior audits. Kleven et al. 
(2011) also find that prior audits have significant effects on self-reported income. 
In the case of follow-up audits revenue agents conduct audits which, in general, connect to 
the period of the prior audit. So that unaudited fiscal years do not occur between the prior 
and the following audit. Furthermore, most of the audits take place after a long time delay 
so that a change in the auditee’s behavior is shown in the audit after next at the earliest, 
unless the auditee has corrected his or her already reported income on his or her own 
initiative.77 But on the other hand, revenue agents examine during the follow-up audit 
whether the findings of prior audits are continued or have changed. Thus, a decrease in time 
consumption cannot be assumed. Moreover, from the point of view of the agent additional 
time-on-task has to be spent, but this is the rule for audits of large businesses and is priced 
in, and the revenue agent’s time consumption is unaffected in the large size category. This 
is no contradiction to the assumption relating to the large auditee’s attitude. Auditees with a 
permanently high audit probability continuously adapt their tax planning strategy with more 
or less clear tax positions,78 hoping that revenue agents do not take up and/or query all of 
                                                 
77  It is also conceivable that auditees do not adapt their positions as long as a definite (court) decision has not 
yet been taken. 
78  Such activities may take place without committing tax evasion at once (see e.g., Alm 2014). This is in line 
with research findings that larger firms are more noncompliant (Hanlon et al. 2005; Zimmermann 1983), 
but the tax evasion rate decreases due to an increase in audit probability (DeBacker et al. 2015b) or in the 
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them.79 Overall, it can be assumed that time consumption is affected in the case of smaller 
firms. 
Consultation of an additional specialized auditor is another interesting issue. In this case, the 
specialized person takes over individual focal points from the proper revenue agent and 
supports him or her up to the final decision. Modlin (2012: 572), e.g., points out “that more 
people assigned to the audit process decreases the number of specific problem findings”. 
However, in this special case the situation is different. It is not a team audit from the 
beginning. The additional auditor does not provide support until a specific request is made 
and the auditor already perceived problems. Therefore, the initial revenue agent does not 
audit unfamiliar and highly complex issues, enabling him or her to use their time-on-task for 
other purposes.80 Hence it can be expected that revenue agents’ time consumption stays 
unaffected. So the second hypothesis is further extended by: 
H2-3: Revenue agents’ time consumption increases (decreases) if they audit more 
(less) than three fiscal years. Furthermore, the time consumption increases for 
follow-up audits if auditees are not usually subject to this. An additional involvement 
of specialized agents does not affect time consumption. 
3.2.4 Final Discussion and Consensus 
Practitioners point out that in their experience the auditor’s willingness to compromise 
generally grows with an increase in duration of the negotiation. To validate this thesis 
findings from the psychology literature are appropriate. Pruitt and Drews (1969) emphasize, 
e.g., that time pressure affects the minimum of goals, the level of demand (see also De Dreu 
2003), and the extent of bluffing. In addition, time elapsed has an effect on the last two 
issues, which seems at first to provide support for this thesis. However, why not all auditees 
are affected in the same manner is not obvious. The principal aim of a tax audit is to reach a 
consensus. By consensus legal certainty is obtained, particularly in order to avoid an appeal 
in the post-audit phase, because that leads to an increase in uncertainty regarding completion 
time, tax burden/relief, and additional costs (primarily see Blaufus et al. 2016a). Normally 
                                                 
number of prior audits (Spicer/Hero 1985). However, it cannot be ruled out that taxpayers ultimately use 
rules of thumb in making tax evasion decisions (Spicer/Thomas 1982). 
79  Possible reasons are, e.g., that agents do not recognize all positions or make concessions during the 
negotiation. 
80  The specialized agent’s time consumption will be disregarded with respect to revenue agents’ time-on-task. 
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these effects occur on both sides, but the individual consequences of non-agreement burden 
people involved to a varying extent. 
The consensus building can take place during the audit and/or in the final discussion between 
representatives of the auditee—the decision-maker and tax adviser—and the audit 
department—their revenue agents and superiors (see also Rhines et al. 2003: 1001). For the 
auditee, a non-agreement leads to an undesirable result in the first step. The risk that this (or 
even a worse) result may become final exists, and the time until the final decision is reached 
is marked by great insecurity (see also Ränsch 2002: 60-61) and incurs additional costs: for 
legal advice and/or court costs as well as interest payments. Moreover, auditees may want 
to close the books on past years one at a time. Thus the decision-making process of the 
auditee is ruled by a comparison of costs either way and partly by time pressure.81 It can be 
expected that these issues become more important with increasing firm size because the 
absolute height of possible adjustments and the exculpation pressure of the decision-makers 
also increase. Nevertheless, an effect on agent’s time consumption can only be expected if 
he or she informs the auditee about findings immediately during the audit and discusses them 
and then completes the audit as soon as the sum of the agreement justifies premature 
termination.82 Both can be expected mostly for lengthy audits, hence for audits in the large 
firm size category. 
For the revenue agent a non-agreement will lead especially to additional time-on-task 
preparing other comments and even helping in redress procedures. This working time is lost 
to other audits so it is a burden, and hence leads to time pressure for other cases. Furthermore, 
agents do not have to worry about further direct consequences; in particular with regard to 
possible court costs.83 As a result, whether a revenue agent accepts an agreement or not is 
irrelevant for his or her time consumption as defined in the present study (not counting post-
audit time). 
For the report time consumption it is fundamentally irrelevant whether the parties reach an 
agreement because it is not legally binding. So the report must include all essential issues to 
enhance the chances of success in post-audit conflicts. On the other hand, the agent may tend 
                                                 
81  A dispute about principles is also possible, but it will be unobserved in this context. 
82  In German tax law, auditors are obliged to provide information as long as the purpose of the audit is not 
jeopardized (see the second paragraph of section 199 of the AO). The auditor can terminate an audit 
premature if he or she examines all essential topics in accordance with the limitation of section 7 of the 
BpO 2000 (see also Mösbauer 2005: 230). 
83  However, a reputational damage can occur, see above outline number (2) in Chapter III 2.2, p. 65. 
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to describe his or her findings less accurately if he or she has found an agreement with the 
auditee. So the second hypothesis is further extended by: 
H2-4: The revenue agent’s time consumption is generally not affected by the 
consensus building with the decision-makers of auditees, unless it occurs already 
during the audit phases and the agent terminates his or her audit prematurely. 
Moreover, for non-agreements the report time consumption is also unaffected 
whether or not a final discussion is conducted. 
3.2.5 Accelerating Issues, Duration in Total 
In accordance with German tax law, auditees have to cooperate during field audits.84 This 
especially includes establishing facts pertinent to the investigation. It is generally true that 
auditees or their tax advisers usually enjoy an information advantage due to the asymmetrical 
distribution of information. Practitioners recommend to take control of the flow of 
information (e.g., Rhines et al. 2003: 1007). This boils down to tactical considerations. If 
the revenue agent has the suspicion that the auditee or his or her advisers are delaying, 
refusing cooperation or are misleading the agents, they are invested with different means to 
put pressure on the auditee or his or her advisers to fulfill their obligations sufficiently. 
For the present study, participants could choose which of three different measures were used. 
Initially, it has been common practice to shorten the auditee’s time limit for replying to a 
request. The second means is imposing penalty payments or third, the threat of non-
agreement. 
In order to assess the likely impact of these measures it is advisable to scrutinize the auditees’ 
perception and their possible responses to these steps. First, these measures are intended to 
create time pressure, which is principally experienced subjectively. Time pressure increases 
according to Stuhlmacher and Champagne (2000) as deadlines approach but may have little 
influence at the beginning of a task. Therefore the auditee is more likely to change his or her 
strategy towards the end of an audit. Consequently, it must be assumed that auditors will use 
preferred types of pressure if they perceive major delays. However, this also means that 
auditor’s use of these measures increases in direct proportion to an increase in audit duration 
rather than to an increase in time consumption.85 As a result it can be expected that 
                                                 
84  See the first paragraph of section 200 of the AO. 
85  The results of a control estimation suggest that agents use a threat of non-agreement in part in the case of 
audit delay (Appendix F Table 63). 
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consumption increases due to additional effort applying pressure—this implies above all to 
the elaborate procedure of imposing penalty payments and affects particularly audits with 
already short time windows, as is usually the case with SMEs—and the audit duration itself 
increases in the case of large firms because work processes are usually prolonged and more 
sensitive to great delays. So the second hypothesis is further extended by: 
H2-5: Measures to accelerate the process are applied if the revenue agent perceives 
a delay. His or her time consumption is indirectly affected and increases with short 
time limits for reply in the large firm size category and with penalty payments in the 
size categories of SMEs. 
In this context, it should be highlighted that the measure of threat of non-agreement is chosen 
not only as a way of reducing audit duration. Stuhlmacher and Champagne (2000) show that 
decisions taken under time pressure are characterized by more concessions and less 
exploration than those taken under low time pressure. If these findings are taken into account 
it can be assumed that agents may use such threats to accelerate their audit in order to come 
to a fast consensus. But, for this measure to work, it is necessary that auditees are intimidated 
by this. However, this is less likely as soon as the auditee is more experienced in tax auditing, 
which is true for large firms as they ought to be audited regularly.86 In contrast, smaller 
businesses are merely subject to a slight audit probability. So the second hypothesis is further 
extended by: 
H2-6: The revenue agent’s time consumption decreases in the smaller size 
categories, if the agent uses a threat of non-agreement to accelerate the audit. 
This hypothesis expands the previously deduced hypothesis H2-4: in summary, it can be said 
that the revenue agent’s time consumption decreases if the agent is open-minded and 
prepared to agree during lengthy audits or uses the threat of non-agreement in cases of audit 
delay with inexperienced auditees. Besides, the latter assumption holds also true if a non-
agreement is actually kept up and agents take action. 
Furthermore it can be assumed that, generally, the audit duration itself affects revenue 
agents’ time consumption and vice versa:87 an increase (decrease) in duration results in an 
                                                 
86  See above in section IV 2. 
87  See also above in subsection 3.2.2) for explanations of long time interruptions and their consequences. 
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increase (decrease) in time consumption and the other way round. So the second hypothesis 
is further extended by: 
H2-7: If audit duration increases (decreases) beyond expectation, the revenue 
agent’s time consumption also increases (decreases). 
3.2.6 Outcome of the Audit 
Finally, it is important to analyze, whether and to what extend the outcome of the audit 
impacts the revenue agent’s time consumption. This outcome comprises two parts. For one, 
additional taxes and tax refunds after audit88 are netted, in line with Welch (1954), and 
changes of loss carried forward. In accordance with German tax authorities, a conceivable 
balancing according to Goode (1981) and in favor of additional taxes (loss reduction) toward 
tax refunds (loss increased) is not done. This procedure is logical as field audits must be 
conducted according to German tax law equally to the advantage and to the disadvantage of 
the auditee.89 Furthermore, in contrast to other countries (e.g., Alissa et al. 2014), German 
tax authorities do not use outcome as direct performance measure. Only the ratio of cases 
without outcome and the ratio with outcome below the de minimis limits are compared, but 
not the amount of additional taxes. Indeed, the revenue agent shall investigate closely only 
those focal points that will lead to final tax losses or tax refunds and significant profit 
shifting,90 but agents are not officially instructed to preferably generate high additional taxes. 
This may seem contrary to the central role of tax administrations as they are, in the words of 
Bright et al. (1988: 318), “responsible for collecting the maximum amount of taxes legally 
due as equitably and efficiently as possible.” 
What is the consequence of this in relation to revenue agents’ time consumption? For cases 
of minor importance two main directions are conceivable: a) If agents are subject to pressure 
due to a personal or department-wide high ratio of unimportant cases, they may increase 
their effort and hence time-on-task in order to avoid an outcome below the de minimis limits. 
b) In accordance with German tax law an audit case is to be terminated if the auditee’s 
income is stated correctly. Here, the time consumption would decrease. Both options are in 
general as likely so that, within a sufficiently representative sample, the revenue agent’s time 
                                                 
88  Subsequent changes after audit end are disregarded just as in the post-audit time consumption. 
89  Such an approach is not applicable to each tax system (e.g., due to unrecorded negative adjustments, see 
Alissa et al. 2014). 
90  See the second sentence of section 7 of the BpO 2000. 
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consumption is unaffected by cases of minor importance. So the second hypothesis is further 
extended by: 
H2-8: From the view of revenue agents’ time consumption there is no difference 
whether the outcome of field audits is below the de minimis limits or not.  
Furthermore, the relationship between auditors’ effort and performance has to be 
investigated. Psychologic literature provides arguments and evidence in support of a positive 
relationship between both (Alissa et al. 2014; Yoe/Neal 2004). This is based on reasonable 
arguments since performance consists of effort and ability (Christen et al. 2006). According 
to Weingart (2006) effort, in turn, consists of intensity and duration (see also Christen et al. 
2006), whereby the latter is measured by total time consumption and the intensity by rate of 
work. An increase in either is an increase in effort. Since intensity will stay unobserved in 
this study, only time consumption is relevant. Thus, if revenue agents’ time consumption 
increases, their performance likewise increases and hence, due to the suggested positive 
relationship ceteris paribus, also vice versa.  
However, there is a limitation resulting from legal requirement: agents have to restrict the 
time spent—this means the time-on-task and the duration equally—to the level that is 
necessary. Consequently, their time consumption is not only finite but also stringently 
limited.91 Furthermore, performance matters; it can be abstracted from a determination of 
how well a particular task has been performed in relation to a specific criterion (Cloyd 1997). 
With regard tax audits, such a criterion is a mixture of several components, above all of 
supreme goals, and is not merely reduced to a maximum of additional tax payments.92 Hence 
it can be concluded that an increase in performance is not a consequence of an increase in 
outcome. Finally, it seems questionable that effort, in terms of time consumption, and 
outcome, as a measure of (a task-specific) performance, stand in a constant linear 
relationship to one another. Streck (1993: 91) points out that the auditor’s effort and 
adjustments are not related to each other linearly. Rather, auditors should take into account 
the fact that most of their outcome will be generated during the initial days and weeks. The 
longer the audit lasts, the more time-on-task has to be spent for less and less outcome. The 
author does not prove his statement, but he is in line with the assumptions from Sinha (2007, 
2010). In accordance with the central principal of diminishing marginal utility, the agent has 
                                                 
91  In accordance to German tax law, revenue agents’ superiors are obliged control agents’ compliance with 
this guideline (see the rationalization edict from 1995). 
92  Border and Sobel (1987) have already pointed out the importance of the ability of tax authorities to make 
commitments, because a solely net revenue maximizing orientation is not a viable option. 
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to terminate his or her audit in a timely manner, due to their obligation to weight costs and 
benefits against each other. Consequently, it cannot be expected that an increase (decrease) 
in outcome increases (decreases) the audit time consumption.  
Another point is to verify the consequences for the report time consumption in relation to an 
increase in outcome. With an increase in additional taxes, auditees’ burden increases so that 
the risk of an appeal also increases. The agent is therefore well-advised to justify his or her 
findings in a more detail, so that his or her adjustments hold in a potential dispute. Hence, it 
can be expected that an increase in outcome increases the report time consumption. So the 
second hypothesis is further extended by: 
H2-9: If the outcome of field audits increases, report time consumption also 
increases; in contrast, the audit time consumption stays unaffected. 
3.3 Characteristics of the Auditor 
As stated earlier, auditor’s competence is a crucial issue for an investigation of potential 
impacting factors on revenue agents’ time consumption (see also Quick/Wolz 1999: 176). 
The concept of competence takes a prominent role in literature on audit quality (e.g., Richard 
2006; for an overview see Watkins et al. 2004). Competence means primarily the auditor’s 
ability to detect a breach (DeAngelo 1981). In accordance with Libby and Luft (1993), 
building on the results of Bonner and Lewis (1990), a finer gradation is determined by 
experience (e.g., Libby/Frederick 1990) and ability. In combination with effort, both 
generate task-specific knowledge, related to technical aspects and individual know-how 
rather than personal aspects (ibid; Richard 2006); and, continuing this, (individual-specific) 
performance (see also Christen 2006). Performance includes in line with Yeo and Neal 
(2004) cognitive ability, conscientiousness, goal orientation, and motivation. Environment 
complements the schematic subdivision.  
For the present study it has not proven possible to observe all components and corresponding 
variables, so that a limitation was unavoidable. First, it is unnecessary to distinguish between 
impacts of engagement of several revenue authorities, as all participants in the study serve 
in the same state tax authority. Additionally, the level of education is not appropriate as a 
measure of differentiation, since all auditors on an identical career path have identical 
degrees and have completed the similar training on the job in the beginning of their 
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deployment as revenue agents.93 However, additional training may influence the time 
consumption. More training on the job undergone by already introduced revenue agents—
regardless of the existing level of experience acquired—is helpful to sensitize them to new 
legal rules and unfamiliar topics. Their competence and hence the audit quality may increase 
if the frequency of auditors’ participation in training courses grows. Frederick (1991) 
investigates the nature of internal knowledge, differentiated according to different levels of 
expertise and whether this affects information retrieval, comes to the conclusion that an 
increased training rate is neither decisive for time-saving nor time-consuming. More 
experienced auditors tend to process new information in a different way from inexperienced 
auditors so that the recall of information differs during actual audits at a later time (Frederick 
1991).94 Because experience will be explicitly considered below, the amount of training does 
not need further remark, apart from the acknowledgement that there may be impacts due to 
potentially broad differences between knowledge and performance between both auditor 
types (Libby/Frederick 1990). 
Furthermore, it can be expected that, first and foremost, high learning-oriented auditors 
frequently visit trainings. According to Fisher and Ford (1998) such individuals spend more 
effort on a task, so their time consumption does not necessarily decrease as a result of 
possibly increased competence.95 On the other hand, this study is vague in relation to time 
consumption of performance-oriented auditors (Performers). Performers strive to minimize 
their amount of effort required (ibid.), but this effect cannot be studied with the aid of the 
retrieved objective information. Moreover, these statements are also influenced by the 
auditor’s conscientiousness (Yeo/Neal 2004) and motivation—particularly with regard to 
time pressure combined with a high level of audit structure (McDaniel 1990)—so that 
several other (in part unobserved) subjective variables would be needed to investigate this 
phenomenon. In addition, in this context, time consumption rather would be a proxy for audit 
quality (e.g., Leventis/Caramanis 2005) and auditors’ effort (e.g., Sinha 2007, 2010), further 
consideration of these reciprocal effects must be reserved for future research. 
In order to determine an auditor’s level of experience, several objective variables are clearly 
suitable: 1) years of work experience as an auditor (e.g., Cahan/Sun 2015), 2) the main field 
of work, 3) age as a proxy for life experience (e.g., Johnson 1995) and deprivation of 
                                                 
93  These circumstances differ from many other countries (OECD 2006: 18-19) 
94  Besides, different auditors interpret and use ambiguous accounting and tax rules in different ways 
(Abdolmohammadi 1987). 
95  Indeed, the frequency of participation in training courses does not have a significant effect on time 
consumption in each size category. 
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cognitive abilities over time (Kubeck et al. 1996). However, it is difficult to include 
objectively evaluated features of auditors’ abilities, the second constituent of knowledge, 
because these are the base of professional, analytical, personal, special, and communication 
skills in particular. With this consideration, all these factors have to be an integral part of 
assessment criteria for promotion in the public service—just like performance, knowledge, 
experience, and hence ability—so that the set grades of salary are appropriately 
representative of experience (Libby/Frederick 1990), acquired knowledge, and level of 
familiarity with task complexity (Abdolmohammadi/Wright 1987). The latter will be 
controlled by the auditor’s main field of work. 
In line with Alissa et al. (2014) it can be expected that with an increasing competence of the 
auditor the processing of an audit task should be less time-consuming. So the third 
hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is: 
H3: The characteristics of the auditor influence his or her time consumption. If his 
or her competence increases the time consumption decreases. 
In addition, gender is included, as is usual in socio-economic analysis. 
3.3.1 Auditor’s Experience 
The Revenue agents’ “experience is limited but expanding over a long period” 
(Abdolmohammadi 1987) because they conduct a limited number of audits per year. During 
the course of time, the auditor gains task-specific knowledge and gains the ability to process 
more complex tasks gradually (Abdolmohammadi/Wright 1987).96 However, with regard to 
increased complexity performance decreases, because the higher level of skill is necessary 
(Bonner 1994) and that decreases the impact of auditor effort on performance (Alissa et al. 
2014). This means that a more experienced auditor—with prior experience (see e.g., Roberts 
1995)—will handle a complex task in a less time-consuming manner than a less experienced 
auditor ceteris paribus. Moreover, the experienced auditor knows what information to look 
for, so that he or she usually needs less time-on-task due to their advantage in information 
selection (Simnett 1996 with further references). So the third hypothesis is further extended 
as follows: 
                                                 
96  In this sense, the initial training plan lasts five years in the investigation area and combines initial instruction 
with elements of practice (Bonner/Pennington 1991). 
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H3-1: The revenue agent’s time consumption decreases if his or her experience 
increases. 
3.3.2 Auditor’s Age 
Revenue agents are a tax authority’s ‘public face’ (OECD 2006). They combine the roles of 
investigator, denouncer, and decision maker, as well as they exercise control on the audit 
itself (see also Roberts 1995). First, the agent is the sole decision maker. Although he or she 
is supervised him- or herself and bound to the law. Especially with regard to balancing the 
high requirements of the law and the consequences of their decisions, it can be expected that 
more life experience will have a positive effect on the conduct of an audit and hence on the 
auditor’s time consumption. 
Here age represents life experience, regardless of seniority and specific job tenure (Johnson 
1995), and on the other hand, is a measure for cognitive abilities volatilized through the years 
(Kubeck et al. 1996). Some researchers have studied possible results. Gul (1983), e.g., 
investigated the relationship between age, experience, cognitive style and decision 
confidence, and found that age is not related to the auditor’s confidence in his or her 
decisions, but unexpectedly negatively correlated with experience, which is in line with 
Taylor (1975). Other studies have investigated the relationship between age and job 
performance, though without finding a connection between the two (Kubeck et al. 1996 with 
further references). However, these findings do not hold following Murphy (1989), who 
divided performance conditions. He distinguishes between the transition stage and the 
maintenance stage, and it can be expected that during the transition stage the auditor’s job 
performance will decrease as a result of older age, and hence time consumption increases. 
The transition stage occurs when the auditor is new to a job or subject to changes in his or 
her job environment, so that the auditor “must learn new skills and tasks and make decisions 
about unfamiliar topics” (Murphy 1989). In these situations, cognitive ability strongly 
affects the auditor’s performance. According to Kubeck et al. (1996) older adults take more 
time to complete a post-training task than younger adults and need more time for computer 
training. In particular, the deficit in computer skills influences time consumption negatively 
during the report-writing period. As auditors were exposed to frequent changes in previous 
years, older auditors are less familiar with computer programs than the younger. The effect 
on time consumption is enhanced by the fact that older auditors do not invest the amount of 
time it would take to properly consolidate their learning of new computer standards. Since 
all auditors have computer training together, the older auditors gain a less sustainable 
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increase in knowledge.97 With this in mind, e.g., Sundgren et al. (2014) state that older 
auditors are less likely to learn a new standard. But, older auditors maintain their competence 
through the development of compensatory mechanisms and expertise (Charness/Bosman 
1990; Salthouse 1990) so that in the audit phase the impact of older age on time cannot be 
expected. 
Conversely, between periods of transition, audits “can be performed with minimal effort” so 
that “job performance [is] not affected by differences in cognitive ability” (Murphy 1989: 
190) and hence personality and motivation become relevant. Thus an impact of age on time 
consumption cannot be expected, but following Murphy (1989) experience in the job is 
correlated with age, so that the interaction effect should be controlled. Moreover, it is 
possible to examine whether a change of occupation of a younger auditor impacts subsequent 
time consumption. So the third hypothesis is further extended by: 
H3-2: If the revenue agent is older, the time consumption increases if he or she is 
exposed to unfamiliar tasks, in the report phase predominantly, or if the auditor was 
young when he or she began his or her career. 
3.3.3 Grade of Salary and Auditor’s Main Field of Work 
Auditors only gradually acquire task-specific knowledge and certainty. In a homogenous 
career path, it is to be expected that the attainable knowledge and the knowledge needed 
differ, depending on different career stages (Abdolmohammadi/Wright 1987; Libby/Luft 
1993) and due to the plurality of audit tasks fulfilled (Abdolmohammadi 1987). These 
differences become obvious when comparing, e.g., IRS tax auditors and revenue agents 
(Dubin 2012: 50). In Germany the situation is different as the starting point of acquiring tax 
knowledge is the same for all employees following the same career path. However, the 
acquisition of additional knowledge and hence job experience occurs at varying rates before 
and after employees transfer to the audit department. In order to address this problem, the 
grade of salary will be taken as an indicator of the particular stage of a career. 
In general, auditors will be promoted if they command more knowledge and experience than 
others. As a consequence, it seems obvious that better paid auditors perform their audits 
more effectively. However, it cannot be presumed that all experienced auditors are equal and 
show superior performance at all tasks (Libby/Luft 1993). Furthermore, it can be expected 
                                                 
97  In contrast to Rosen et al. (1965), in this sample older auditors participate in job training just as much as 
younger auditors. 
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that auditors with lower grades of salary are highly motivated to promote their careers (see 
e.g., Holmström 1999) so that their performance could have a reversing effect relating to 
time consumption. To investigate this issue, it is useful to study the main field of work of 
the auditor. This consists of the types of cases which the revenue agent audits normally and 
it indicates the task complexity he or she is familiar with (Abdolmohammadi/Wright 1987). 
Due to the matching of the familiar task to the experience level of the auditors (see also 
Frederick/Libby 1986) one can draw conclusions whether the auditor’s deployment is in 
accordance with role and payment.98  
In addition, Hardies et al. (2015) and Ittonen and Peni (2012) investigate audit fees and 
show that female auditors typically get higher fees than their male counterparts. A higher 
perceived audit quality from auditor firms with female partners is described as a possible 
cause by the researchers. In the absence of fees, it is questionable whether female auditors 
earn more money than male auditors within the salary grades. In Germany, Equal 
Opportunities Acts regulate gender equality. According to these acts, in areas in which 
women have been underrepresented historically, they can be given priority for promotion if 
equally suitable, unless reasons concerning the person of a fellow applicant are predominant. 
Consequently, an analogous impact on the audit fees cannot be expected. So the third 
hypothesis can therefore be extended by: 
H3-3: The time consumption does not differ if the revenue agent’s grade of salary 
and main field of work correspond with the case-specific complexity. 
H3-4: If agents conduct audits with a lower (higher) complexity than they are 
accustomed to, time consumption decreases (increases) due to the higher (lower) 
competence level.  
3.3.4 Gender 
Numerous studies have examined gender differences in various scientific disciplines (see 
e.g., Breesch/Branson 2009). However, results from studies not concerning audits should 
not be transferred uncritically to audit domains. Hardies et al. (2011) have shown, e.g., that 
generalizing findings related to overconfidence could not provide evidence to be true in the 
case of auditors. The otherwise stated variations between audit fees for female and male 
                                                 
98  That applies with regard to the Edict of Functional Groups resulting from the Salary Act. 
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auditors can at least not be linked to overconfidence.99 With regard to audit time 
consumption the development of hypotheses follows the approach of task complexity 
(Bonner 1994) and of information processing efficiency. O’Donnell and Johnson 
(2001: 101) found that “female auditors spent significantly less time on the [highly complex] 
task than male auditors did.” But on the low complexity task, “males spent less time on the 
task than females did, but the difference was only marginally significant.” But these 
differences disappear when both genders need to work under time pressure, because women 
as well as men are motivated to adopt simplified processing strategies (Rosenthal/DePaulo 
1979). In addition, the results of Breesch and Branson (2009) indicate, that time pressure 
may be responsible for compensating for women’s advantage in analyzing more complex 
situations, in line with the selectivity hypothesis (Chung/Monroe 2001; Meyers-Levy 1989). 
But during tax audits, time pressure is inherent due to three reasons: the auditor should a) 
minimize his or her residence time at the auditee’s premises, b) endeavor to comply with 
possible existing time constraints, and c) attain (quantitative) goals and objectives. As a 
result, it can be expected that women and men perform audits in the same manner. However, 
as soon as time pressure is lessened, women use their cognitive advantage in complex tasks 
so that their time consumption decreases.100 So the third hypothesis is further extended by: 
H3-5: If female and male auditors are working under time pressure, their time 
consumption does not differ. 
H3-6: In the absence of time pressure, time consumption of male auditor increases 
if the audit task is complex. 
4 Estimation Strategy 
For this study survival analysis is a particularly suitable estimation strategy because the 
survey is based on time-to-event data (e.g., Harrell 2015: 399).101 This means the focus is on 
time from some event, such as the beginning of a field audit, to another event, such as the 
ending of a field audit. Thereby in the investigation unit i with i ≥ 1, an auditee “is said to 
become at risk […] of the event of interest after the initial event has occurred” (Rabe-
                                                 
99  The gender distribution depending on auditors’ salary grade is not equal for all groups in the investigated 
sample. In the first career path were almost no differences, whereas in the second career path female agents 
predominate up to the middle grade (A11), and male agents predominate at higher grades. 
100  In this study, it is not possible to demonstrate that gender differences in accuracy of task performance (see 
e.g., Chung/Monroe 2001) exist, nor that these could be a cause of different time consumption. 
101  The descriptions survival, failure-time, event-history, or duration data are used interchangeably. 
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Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: 743).102 In this study the latter one—the first event in the origin of 
the time scale (t = 0)—occurs when the revenue agent is beginning his or her audit 
preparation. The second event will be achieved once the revenue agent closes his or her 
auditing proceedings. The third event will usually follow if the revenue agent submits his or 
her report. It should be noted that all following processing steps (such as defenses against 
adjustments) are not subjects of this investigation. In order that these three events qualify 
the audit time. A distinction must be made between investigation time on the one hand, 
according to the duration from the first day to the last day of an audit, and on the other hand 
in terms of the actual time consumption in working days. The latter is targeted in the present 
case. 
Yet before the relevant points in time are further defined it is necessary to consider which 
percentage of taxpayers is relevant in this study. In the first instance the range of taxpayers 
is limited to these for which an initial selection is already proceeding. But it should be noted 
that the percentage of P, potential audit cases cumulated, of all tax cases is not known. In 
the second step the population is reduced by cases for which the revenue agents decide that 
a field audit is not required. Even this proportion is not transparently recorded. Hence the 
investigation is limited to A, actual audited cases. Additionally, the period under review 
starts for all cases at the moment when the revenue agent records his or her time 
consumption, and ideally with the start of his or her audit preparation. 
Figure 6: Sample Space Ω of all Taxpayers with Profit or Important Non-Profit Income103 
The Venn diagram in Figure 6 illustrates that the totality of field audits (A) can be 
distinguished between audits without adjustments (U) and audits with adjustments (R=A|U), 
depicted in the shaded area. The latter also includes audits with low outcomes (L).104 For 
both types of outcome the revenue agent examines in the field and so the second event occurs 
                                                 
102  At risk of the event must not be misunderstood: in survival analysis a subject is at risk of an event regardless 
of the perceived threat that either the event will occur or not. 
103  Hence income from employment is not included. 
104  This study abstracts from the occasionally abortion of an audit.  
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after completion of the audit, but with the addition that the time consumption and the risk of 
these competing events do not have to be identical. The second events are competing risks 
because if one of the event types occurs the subject is no longer at risk of the other event 
(Allison 2014); more specifically, as soon as the agent finds an adjustment the auditee is no 
longer at risk of an event without outcome. Comparability in time may be deemed to exist 
for audits without outcome on the one hand if the revenue agent exposes the problems arising 
from his or her findings first and gives these up during the subsequent discussion. On the 
other hand both are comparable if negotiation is unnecessary whether with outcome or 
without findings. However, the basic consideration is that “[a] distinct causal mechanism 
implies that different explanatory variables affect the occurrence of each event type, or that 
the same explanatory variables have different coefficients or different functional forms” 
(Allison 2014). 
The third event depends on the prior event, and it occurs after submission of the audit report, 
or the notice of finishing the audit without adjustment, respectively. The stage of report 
differs from the stage of auditing: if the revenue agent does not find adjustments, he or she 
does not need to write a comprehensive report. The agent only has to inform the auditee in 
written form about his or her decision to terminate the audit beside the administrative actions 
(e.g., internal processing, statistical records, control reports for other taxpayers). Figure 7 
represents the three events differentiated according to outcomes. 
Figure 7: Events in the Tax Audit Process 
 
However, field audits without adjustments must be excluded because not enough cases are 
observed. The first equation takes account of the fact 
 𝑁 = {  𝑁∗0 if 𝑁∗ > 0 (audit with outcome)        otherwise (audit without outcome). (1) 
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An isolated consideration is immediately possible while all other events can be treated as 
censored in the estimating model (Allison 2014).105 Following this preliminary 
consideration, the estimation strategy will be explained as follows. Use of the specialist 
method of survival analysis thereby becomes obvious because the failure time has a skewed 
distribution due to its restriction to positive values. Hence, it will never be normally 
distributed (Harrell 2015: 400). 
The response variable T, the time until an event, is measured in the model in terms of the 
expected failure time, or rather in terms of the survival function 𝑆(𝑡), given by 
 𝑆(𝑡) = P{𝑇 > 𝑡} = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) (2) 
where 𝐹(𝑡) is the cumulative distribution function for T (Harrell 2015: 402), defined for 
discrete and continuous distributions (Kalbfleisch/Prentice 2002: 6). Pursuing, the density 
function, 𝑓(𝑡), can be received from 𝑆(𝑡): 
 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑑𝐹(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 𝑑𝑑𝑡 {1 − 𝑆(𝑡)} = −𝑆 ′(𝑡). (3) 
For the second event in Figure 7, for instance, 𝑆(𝑡) is the probability that the termination of 
field audit occurs after time 𝑡. At least until time 𝑡 the auditee will survive in terms of being 
under stress from the ongoing audit process. The survival function decreases as 𝑡 increases 
because, where 𝑡 = 0, 𝑆(𝑡) is always equal to one and this decreases over time until the last 
field audit in the survey is terminated. So long as an event for the individual has not occurred, 
it is at risk. According to this the hazard function (or rate), ℎ(𝑡), is related to the probability 
that the event occurs in a given small interval around 𝑡 to 𝑡 + Δ (where ∆ is positive), as long 
as the event has not occurred at the beginning of that interval, that is, 𝑇 ≥ 𝑡 (Cox 1972; 
Cox/Oakes 1984: ch. 2.2; Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: ch. 15.3; Harrell 2015: ch. 17.3; 
Cleves et al. 2016: 7). So the instantaneous failure (event) rate (Kalbfleisch/Prentice 2002: 
7, 96), measured in units 1/t, is defined formally by 
 ℎ(𝑡) = limΔ→0+ P{𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 < 𝑡 + Δ|𝑇 ≥ 𝑡}Δ = 𝑓(𝑡)𝑆(𝑡) . (4) 
                                                 
105  In what follows it is unnecessary to distinguish between competing risks (for more details see, e.g., Prentice 
et al. 1978).  
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Taking into consideration that the underlying process—described below—determines the 
shape of the hazard function, the cumulative hazard function measures the accumulated risk 
up to time t (Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: ch. 15.3; Harrell 2015: ch. 17.3; Cleves et al. 
2016: 8), and this is defined by 
 𝐻(𝑡) = ∫ℎ(𝑣)𝑑𝑣𝑡0 = ∫𝑓(𝑣)𝑆(𝑣)𝑡0 𝑑𝑣= −∫ 1𝑆(𝑣) { 𝑑𝑑𝑣 𝑆(𝑣)} 𝑑𝑣 = −ln𝑆(𝑡)𝑡0  
 
or 
 𝑆(𝑡) = exp[−𝐻(𝑡)]  (5) 
so that the relationship between the accumulated risk and the probability of survival is 
disclosed (Harrell 2015). It still holds also for discrete time with the convention  
 𝐻(𝑡) = ∑ log (1 − ℎ𝑞)𝑎𝑞<𝑡  . (6) 
If, as in the present study, the central focus is on probabilities of events then the hazard 
models are represented by the upfront approach (Green 2012). First and foremost this 
estimation is based on the relative risk model of Cox (1972), the standard for the regression 
analysis of univariate failure time data (e.g., Prentice/Hsu 1997):  
 ℎ(𝑡|𝑥) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑟(𝑡|𝑥), 𝑡 > 0 (7) 
with ℎ0(. ) as the baseline hazard function,106 and the relative risk function 𝑟(𝑡|𝑥) which 
specifies the relationship between the covariates x and the failure rate; such as for the 
exponential form 𝑟(𝑡|𝑥) = exp [𝑊(𝑡)′𝛽] where 𝑊(𝑡) = [𝑊1(𝑡), … ,𝑊𝑝(𝑡)]′ “is a vector of 
derived, possibly time-dependent covariates obtained as functions of t and the basic 
covariates x” (Kalbfleisch/Prentice 2002: 96). Given this, the cumulative hazard function is 
                                                 
106  This is the hazard for an individual under the standard condition, x = 0, and hence, r (t | 0) = 1 (Cox/Oakes 
1984: ch. 5.3). 
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 𝐻(𝑡|𝑥) = 𝐻0(𝑡) exp(𝑊(𝑡)′𝛽) . (8) 
Due to the survey design and obtained data it will be assumed that time-dependent covariates 
do not occur (see Appendix F Table 52) so that (8) is simplified to 
 𝐻(𝑡|𝑥) = 𝐻0(𝑡) exp(𝑊 ′𝛽) . (9) 
This approach assumes a proportional hazard (PH) and allows for a semi-parametric method 
of analyzing the estimation of effect of covariates on the hazard rate (Green 2012), whereby 
the assumptions about the predictors on the hazard function are parametric. However, 
relating to a specific shape of the hazard function ℎ(𝑡) itself is an assumption not provided 
(e.g., Harrell 2015: 475). But the selection procedure will be more restricted if the failure 
time is not continuously distributed, the possibility of ties exists, the hazard is non-
proportional, or the baseline hazard contains useful information. 
In this study the recorded time is subdivided into four quarters of a workday. Due to the 
requirements of non-flexible working hours in the investigation area, this division of time is 
usually consistent and comparable. Hence, the observation time until an event of interest is 
discrete and not continuous so that time is grouped in intervals [0, 𝑎1), [𝑎1, 𝑎2),… , [𝑎𝑞−1, 𝑎𝑞), [𝑎𝑞 , 𝑎𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙].107 This means if failure is observed in 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 =𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 then it occurs within the interval [𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙−1, 𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙) whereby in the present study the 
length of this amounts to a constant quarter of a workday (Tutz/Schmid 2016: 51). The 
necessity of integral value requires for the estimation (Allison 1982: 71) that all values of 
intervals and hence of time are multiplied by four (𝑡 = 4𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙). In order that the length of 𝑎𝑞 is equal to one (4(𝑎𝑞 − 𝑎𝑞−1) = 1), this remains constant for all t by which the splitting 
of the time axis into successive intervals is simplified to 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇. Furthermore it is 
assumed that for an auditee occurs at most one event in time interval t, and that all changes 
in the risk set will happen at the end of the time interval (Hamerle 1986). Given that the 
auditee has survived to t the hazard at t for the covariate W is 1 − (1 − ℎ𝑡)exp (𝑊′𝛽) then this 
is defined as the conditional probability of failure at t (Kalbfleisch/Prentice 2002: ch. 1, 2). 
It is also conceivable that for more than one audit an event of interest occurs in the same unit 
of time, whereby ties arise. In addition it is probable that the hazard is non-proportional for 
the whole time of duration because the tax authority specifies most probably a non-binding 
                                                 
107  For all individuals occur an event so that the last interval is not infinite and, thus, also closed. 
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timeframe for the purpose of tax audits, so the shape of the time consumptions needs to be 
taken into account. It can be expected that a timeframe—albeit only in a non-binding 
recommendation—would lead to the bulk of audit finishing occurring around the given time 
mark (Allison 2014). Hence, “the transition rate is somehow bell-shaped” so that “[i]n the 
literature, the log-logistic model along with the log-normal and the sickle distributions are 
the most commonly recommended models” (Blossfeld et al. 2009). Alternatively, “another 
flexible strategy to model bell-shaped transition rates is to use a combination of two time-
dependent variables” (ibid. 2009), or in the sense of Allison (2014) who proposes including 
time and time squared into the model if curvilinearity occurs. The general (linear) notation 
for a log-logistic regression is then 
 log ( 𝐹(𝑡𝑖)1 − 𝐹(𝑡𝑖)) = 𝑏0 +∑𝑏𝑗𝑥𝑗 + 𝑏𝑗+1𝑡𝑖 + 𝑏𝑗+2𝑡𝑖2𝑘𝑗=1  . (10) 
This approach is suitable in the present study for gathering an impression of the effect of the 
regressors, and the shape of the transition curve (see also e.g., Sinha 2010: 355).108 
However, it is not possible to fit the estimation based on the observed curve progression so 
that for the actual estimation a better fitting approach has been chosen, namely, an 
accelerated failure time (AFT) model (Allison 2014; Harrell 2015: ch. 18.3; 
Kalbfleisch/Prentice 2002: ch. 2.3.3; Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: ch. 15.5) where the 
baseline distribution function will be estimated as a restricted (natural) cubic spline function 
(Herndon/Harrell 1990; Royston/Parmar 2011: ch. 5). An AFT model is useful in the present 
study because different individuals accumulate some characteristics at different rates to 
reach the same failure (Hutchinson 1988). 
In contrast to the PH model, which models the effect on the hazard function, the AFT model 
specifies that the effect of a fixed covariate W acts multiplicatively on the failure time or 
additively on the log failure time, log (𝑇) (Wei 1992; Harrell 2015: 436; Kalbfleisch/Prentice 
2002: 44, 218).109 The model is 
                                                 
108 At first I estimate multilevel mixed-effect parametric survival models with this approach, whereby the 
parameters outlined below are included. The results confirm the expected curvilinearity: see the extracts in 
Table 50 in Appendix E. 
109 Compared to the PH model Cox believes “that accelerated life models are in many ways more appealing 
because of their quite direct physical interpretation” (Reid 1994: 450). 
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 𝑆(𝑡𝑖|𝑥) = 𝜓[(log(𝑡𝑖) −𝑊′𝛽/𝜎] (11) 
where 𝜓 is any standardized survival distribution function, 𝑊′ = (𝑊1, … ,𝑊𝑝) is a vector of 
dimension p, obtained as a function of the basic covariates x, and β is a corresponding vector 
of regression coefficients. The parameter σ is called scale parameter and (11) implies that σ 
is a constant independent of 𝑊′. Therefore, each 𝑊𝑝 effects log(T) or 𝜓−1[𝑆(𝑡𝑖|𝑥)] linearly 
if 𝑊′ is free from nonlinear or interaction terms. However, an inclusion of interaction terms 
is unavoidable in the present study so that the assessment procedure will respect this (e.g., 
Harrell 2015: 16-17). 
Furthermore it is necessary to distinguish between three different investigations of time 
consumption so that the estimation will be grouped: the time until the termination of the field 
audit at first, the time of the period of writing the report, and lastly the sum of both time 
periods:  
 𝑡𝑣 = {𝑡1𝑡2𝑡3    for 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑡1    for 𝑡 = 𝑡1, … , 𝑇   for 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇 (audit time consumption)  (report time consumption)(total time consumption)  . 110  
Consequently, a linear modeling gives  
 𝑌𝑣 = log(𝑇𝑖𝑣) = 𝛼𝑡𝑖𝑣 +𝑊 ′𝛽 + 𝜎𝜉𝑖 (12) 
where 𝜉𝑖 is a random variable from the distribution 𝜓 (Cox/Oakes 1984, 64-65). For the set 
of constants it will be assumed that 𝛼𝑡𝑖𝑣 = 𝛾𝑣, even if the present study is based on discrete 
time. It can abstract thereof from different constants at the current time intervals in the same 
period of interest, v.111  
As already stated, the volume of all tax audit cases is separated into four basic size 
categories. Maintaining this distinction indicates that different non-binding timeframe exist 
for each of them so that the estimation needs to be split by means of the size categories. The 
differentiator is d with d=1,…,4. Considering that it is possible that covariates x depend 
either from the current size category or not, a vector of dimension p and d is more precise so 
that 𝑊′ = (𝑊1𝑑, … ,𝑊𝑝𝑑) is obtained as a function of the basic covariates x. The dependence 
                                                 
110  Left-truncation of the time scale is used if the report time consumption is isolated, v = 2. 
111  Thus, leaving them out is analogous to leaving h0(t) out in the PH model (Allison 1982). 
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means here that it will be necessary to specify for the different size categories different 
covariates, or different base-level assumptions, respectively. Furthermore, from the nature 
of the survey—the respondents were invited to describe their last two concluded audit 
cases—it follows that due to the respondents (revenue agents) r, 𝑟 ≥ 1, the investigation 
units i, 𝑖 ≥ 1, are clustered if the described cases belong to the same size category. For this 
within-subject dependence it is indicated to split the residual 𝜉𝑖 into two uncorrelated 
components: a specific permanent component 𝜁𝑟 for each agent r, which is constant across 
(maximum two) units i, and an idiosyncratic component 𝜀𝑑𝑖𝑟, which is specific to each unit 
i in each size category d for each agent r (Rabe-Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: 77). This correction 
enables valid inference to be made, in hand, by using the so-called “sandwich” method of 
Huber (1967) and White (1980) to calculate robust standard errors (Allison 2014; Harrell 
2015: ch. 9.5). Further adjustments in respect of a shared frailty model are not required in 
this study (e.g., Cleves et al. 2016: ch. 15.1.4). Also an additional stratification is not effected 
because suitable arguments (e.g., functional units/separation of workspaces) which might be 
in favor of doing this are interesting itself in the present study so that they may be included 
in the covariates, directly, or indirectly, respectively. From (12) follows then 
 𝑌𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑟 = 𝛾𝑣𝑑 +𝑊 ′𝛽 + 𝜎(𝜁𝑟 + 𝜀𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑟) . (13) 
The use of restricted (natural) cubic spline function is as aforementioned also appropriate 
because this has “the potential for almost unlimited flexibility” (Royston/Sauerbrei 2008: 
203).112 Their ability is to be linear in the unknown parameters and, compared to a linear 
function, increasingly flexible, however, too flexible in the tails so that the function should 
be constrained to be linear in the tails (Stone/Koo 1985). This is in order that only K-1 
parameters need to be estimated besides the intercept so that the restricted spline function 
s(.) with K knots 𝑘1, … , 𝑘𝑘 is generally given by 
 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑧1 + 𝛾2𝑧2 +⋯+ 𝛾𝐾−1𝑧𝐾−1 = 𝛾0 +∑𝛾𝑗𝑧𝑗𝐾−1𝑗=1 . (14) 
The derived variables, 𝑧𝑗 (basis functions), are calculated as follows (Harrell 2015: 24; 
Devlin/Weeks 1986; Royston/Parmar 2002; Lambert/Royston 2009): 
                                                 
112  As above in (8) assumed time-varying covariates will be abstracted (see more detailed Herndon/Harrell 
1995). 
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 𝑧1 = 𝑥 𝑧𝑗 = (𝑥 − 𝑘𝑗)+3 − 𝜆𝑗(𝑥 − 𝑘1)+3 − (1 − 𝜆𝑗)(𝑥 − 𝑘𝐾)+3  ,  𝑗 = 2, … , 𝐾 − 1  
where 𝜆𝑗 = (𝑘𝐾 − 𝑘𝑗)/(𝑘𝐾 − 𝑘1). Due to the possibility that 𝑧𝑗 can be highly correlated the 
derived spline variables are orthogonalized by using Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization (Leon 
et al. 2013; Gram 1883; Schmidt 1907). However, before the formulas (13) and (14) can be 
summarized it is required to prepare from which the choice of knots will be affected and 
which distribution function 𝜓 appears most suitable. 
The fit of the model depends on the choice of k, though the number of knots is crucial, not 
the place (Stone 1986). The knot locations in the Royston/Parmar model used are at the 
centiles of the distribution of uncensored log event times and follow the advice of 
Durrlemann/Simon (1989). It is favorable “to allow the data to be most closely modeled in 
the region of greatest density”, hence, the knots are placed “not so far from the median of 
the survival-time” (Royston/Parmar 2011: 109).113 For the present study this placement is 
ideal because the median validates the expected non-binding timeframe to quite a large 
extent. Relating to the number of knots it is recommended that, depending on sample size, 
between three to five knots are sufficient (ibid.; Durrlemann/Simon 1989; Harrell 2015: 28) 
whereas more than five knots are seldom required (Stone 1986).  
In this investigation several models with different numbers of knots will be compared. The 
choice has been made on the basis of the Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) (Akaike 1973, 
1974), the small-sample version AICc (Sugiura 1978), and the Bayesian information 
criterion (BIC) (Schwarz 1978).114 The latter is a more stringent criterion and will be 
preferred for models with between one and six degrees of freedom (d.f.),115 thus between 
one and five interior knots (Royston/Parmar 2011: 110–111). All tables are presented in 
Appendix G. From the various values this model is best fitted with the smallest value of 
AIC, AICc, or BIC, respectively, but it should be noted that negative values for them are 
better than positive values because the loss of information is lower (Baguley 2012: 402). 
Models have a substantial support if the difference in the values from the best and the second 
best model is less than or equal to two (Burnham/Anderson 2004: 271). 
                                                 
113  Harrell propose a “placing [of] knots at fixed quantiles (percentiles) of a predictor’s marginal distribution” 
(2015: 26). 
114 The formal presentations are omitted here (see for this, e.g., Burnham/Anderson 2002, 2004). 
115 This assumption will be important for choosing in the medium size category, see Table 68 in Appendix G.  
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In order to using the restricted cubic spline function and as perceived already from (11), it is 
expected to select one or more possible distributions 𝜓 of the baseline function because “the 
AFT model requires that the distribution form of the error term be known, or at least 
estimable” (Hutchinson 1988). First and foremost, the above-named log-logistic and log-
normal distributions are eligible for an assumed bell-shaped transition rate in this study.  
The log-logistic model is a parametric proportional odds (PO) model 
 logit{1 − 𝑆(𝑡𝑖|𝑥)} = logit{1 − 𝑆0(𝑡𝑖)} −𝑊 ′𝛽∗ (15) 
with the special feature 𝛽 = −𝛽∗ and the baseline survival function 
 𝑆0(𝑡𝑖) = [1 + {exp (−𝛽0)𝑡𝑖}1𝛾]−1  
where 𝛾 > 0 (Cleves et al. 2016: 275) which is transformed to 
 logit{1 − 𝑆0(𝑡𝑖)} = (−𝛽0 + log𝑡𝑖)/𝛾 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1log𝑡𝑖 (16) 
where 𝛾0 = −𝛽0/𝛾, 𝛾1 = 1/𝛾, and logit{1 − 𝑆0(𝑡𝑖)} = log [{1 − 𝑆0(𝑡𝑖)}/𝑆0(𝑡𝑖)]. The 
parameter 𝛽 is interpreted “as log odds-ratios, with a positive value of regression coefficient 
indicating an increased risk of an event and hence diminished survival” (Royston/Lambert 
2011: 113). An alternative interpretation of 𝛽∗ is only feasible in an AFT model without 
spline terms and therefore negligible.  
A log-normal model is a probit model for a binary outcome and written in survival metric as 
 −Φ−1{𝑆(log𝑡𝑖)} = −Φ−1{𝑆0(log𝑡𝑖)} + 𝑥𝛽 (17) 
with the baseline survival function, transformed with 𝛾1 = 1/𝜎 and 𝛾0 = −𝛽/𝜎,   
 −Φ−1{𝑆0(log𝑡𝑖)} = log𝑡𝑖 − 𝛽0𝜎 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1log𝑡𝑖. (18) 
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Both models have similar underlying density functions. The distributions are symmetric on 
the log scale, but the log-logistic model has longer tails.116 The shape of the hazard functions 
is usually similar as well and tends toward zero as 𝑡 → ∞. 
The sickle distribution—also cited previously as one of the most commonly recommended 
models—is ruled out although a quintessential aspect is that the probability of change to a 
state can depend on the duration of these states themselves, but also immanent is the 
probability that an individual will never change his or her state (Diekmann/Mittag 1983, 
1984; Billari 2001). Whereas the first feature would be suitable; the latter assumption 
prevents use in this study because all investigation units experience the different events 
described in Figure 7 (see Figure 6: extent A rather than P or Ω).  
Moreover, a PH model with Weibull distribution, ℎ0(𝑡𝑖) = 𝛾1𝑡𝛾1−1exp (𝛾0 + 𝜉𝑖),117 seems 
certainly possible too. The placing of knots in the course of the use of the restricted cubic 
spline function enables a redirection of the actual monotonic increasing (𝛾1 > 1) or the 
monotonic decreasing (𝛾1 < 1) of the Weibull hazard function.118 Thus it also provides an 
alternative for a bell-shaped transition and “a (flexible) parametric version of the Cox PH 
model” (Royston/Lambert 2011: 102).119 The baseline hazard function of the cumulative 
hazard function is 
 log𝐻0(𝑡𝑖) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1log𝑡𝑖 (19) 
with shape parameter 𝛾1 for some 𝛾1 > 0 and an ancillary parameter 𝛾0.120  
So three different distributions are available and used hereafter because it is not possible to 
decide a priori which distribution is the most suitable one. This applies all the more so in the 
present study, where four different investigation groups—the size categories d—and three 
time periods—time consumption 𝑡𝑣 of auditing, reporting, and both together—will be 
considered; in sum, thirty-six models (3 x 4 x 3). Furthermore, this accords with “the 
                                                 
116  For log-normal: εi is normal with σ2, and for log-logistic: εi is logistic with variance γ2π2/3. 
117  If the assumption is that the baseline hazard h0(t) is constant, hence h0(t) = λ, then it is convenient due to 
the nonnegative hazard rate λ to write it as λ = exp(γ0); and neglect a disturbance term (Rabe-
Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: 806). 
118  The Weibull hazard function leads to the exponential subcase if it is constant (γ1 = 1). 
119  By convention to the cumulative hazard function, H0 (t) = H (t | 0). 
120  The parameters are named γ instead of (usually) p or α, respectively, and take subscripts in anticipation of 
the restricted cubic spline function and in accordance with the function as defined before. 
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conclusion that the best strategy is always to estimate a broad variety of different models in 
order to find robust estimation results” (Blossfeld et al. 2009).  
In this sense, the flexible parametric model from Royston and Parmar (2002) allows a 
differentiation to be made between either proportional hazards or proportional odds scaling 
of covariate effects, and also the probit class. The relationship of 𝐻(𝑡) = −log𝑆(𝑡) in (5) 
allows (8) to be rewritten in the following equivalent form: 
 log{−log𝑆(𝑡)} = log {−log𝑆0(𝑡)} +𝑊′𝛽 (20) 
where 𝑆0(𝑡) = 𝑆(𝑡|0) is the transformed baseline survival function and will be estimated by 
a restricted cubic spline, see (12) and below (23). After generalizing (20) to 
 𝑔𝜃{𝑆(𝑡)} = 𝑔𝜃 {𝑆0(𝑡)} +𝑊 ′𝛽 (21) 
where 𝑔0(. ) is a monotonic increasing function, depending on a parameter 𝜃, it is enabled 
by using the parametrized link function of Aranda-Ordaz’s (1981)  
 𝑔𝜃(𝑢) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑢−𝜃 − 1𝜃 ) (22) 
where 𝜃 > 0, to obtain a PH model, 𝑔𝜃→0(𝑢) = log (−log𝑢), and a PO model, 𝑔𝜃=1 =log(𝑢−1 − 1) = log{(1 − 𝑢)/𝑢}. Form equation (2) follows the cumulative distribution 
function 𝐹(𝑡) = 1 − 𝑆(𝑡). “[T]hat is, the probability of failure in the interval (0, t)” 
(Royston/Lambert 2011: 118). Written 𝑢 = 𝑆(𝑡) formula (22) results in 𝑔1{𝑆(𝑡)} =log [{1 − 𝑆(𝑡)}/𝑆(𝑡)] = log [𝐹(𝑡)/{1 − 𝐹(𝑡)}]. In addition the third member of the RP 
family, the probit class, 𝑔𝜃(. ) is defined as minus the probit or inverse normal cumulative 
distribution function, −Φ−1(. ), because the parameter 𝜃 is redundant (ibid.).121  
The combining of formulas (13) with (16), (18), and (19) gives under the transformation of 𝑠(log𝑡𝑖|𝑥) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1log𝑡𝑖 then  
                                                 
121  Models with θ not equal to 0 or 1 are not converged in this study so that this expression does not have to 
be described. 
140 
 PH spline models       ∶PO spline models       ∶probit spline models ∶                   log𝐻(𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖)logit{1 − 𝑆(𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖|𝑥)}   −Φ−1{𝑆(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖)}}=  s(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖|𝛾𝑣𝑑) +𝑊 ′𝛽 + 𝜁𝑟 + 𝜀𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑟 (23) 
whereat distinguishing features are investigation unit, 𝑖 ≥ 1; time consumption period of 
interest, 𝑣 = 1,2,3; size category, 𝑑 = 1,2,3,4; and revenue agent, 𝑟 ≥ 1. Further the 
amalgamation of this with spline function (14) and the link function (22) gives 
 𝑔𝜃(𝑢𝑣𝑑𝑖) = −log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 + log(𝛾𝑣𝑑1𝑧1′ + 𝛾𝑣𝑑2𝑧2′ +⋯+ 𝛾𝑣𝑑𝑚+1𝑧𝑚+1′ )+ 𝛾𝑣𝑑0 + 𝛾𝑣𝑑1𝑧1 + 𝛾𝑣𝑑2𝑧2 +⋯+ 𝛾𝑣𝑑𝑚+1𝑧𝑚+1 +𝑊 ′𝛽+ 𝜁𝑟 + 𝜀𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑟 (24) 
where 𝜃 > 0 in addition with m interior knots and two boundary knots and at once 
 𝑧1 = log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 𝑧1′ = 1 𝑧𝑗 = (log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗)+3 − 𝜆𝑗(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛)+3 − (1 − 𝜆𝑗)(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥)+3  𝑧𝑗′ = 3(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗)+2 − 3𝜆𝑗(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛)+2 − 3(1 − 𝜆𝑗)(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥)+2 , 𝑗 = 2,… ,𝑚 + 1 
where 𝜆𝑗 = (𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑘𝑗)/(𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛); alternatively, in a compressed form 
 𝑔𝜃(𝑢𝑣𝑑𝑖) = −log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 +log (𝛾𝑣𝑑1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑣𝑑𝑗[𝑚+1𝑗=2 3(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗)+2 − 3𝜆𝑗(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛)+2− 3(1 − 𝜆𝑗)(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥)+2 ]) +𝛾𝑣𝑑0 + 𝛾𝑣𝑑1log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 +∑ 𝛾𝑣𝑑𝑗[𝑚+1𝑗=2 (log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑗)+3 − 𝜆𝑗(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑖𝑛)+3 − (1 − 𝜆𝑗)(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖 − 𝑘𝑚𝑎𝑥)+3 ] +𝑊 ′𝛽 + 𝜁𝑟 + 𝜀𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑟 
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 (Royston/Parmar 2002; Royston/Sauerbrei 2008: 203-204; Royston/Lambert 2011: 102-
103).122 The regression coefficients for _rscj (see the results below) correspond to the 
parameter 𝛾𝑗 (Royston/Lambert 2011: 98).  The constant (_cons)— 𝛾0 —is dropped because 
the results below are constituted in an exponentiated form. 
The function 𝑊′ = (𝑊1𝑑, … ,𝑊𝑝𝑑) of the basic covariates x differs scattered between the 
size categories and includes several interaction effects so that it is given as follows, separated 
into three groups of features:123 
1. characteristics of the auditee (p = 1,…,7) 𝑊′ = (𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀;𝐷𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶; 𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀 × 𝐷𝐸𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶; 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐺𝑅; 𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃), 
2. characteristics of the audit (p = 8,…,20) 𝑊′ = (𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁; 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅𝐺𝑅 × 𝐸𝑉𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁; 𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐸; 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐸𝑁;𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶; 𝑆𝐻𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐷;              𝑃𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑌;𝑁𝑂𝑁𝐴𝐺𝑅𝐸𝐸; 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝐹𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐺𝐴𝑀𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇; 𝐿𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑃𝐴𝑌; 𝐿𝑁𝐿𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑅𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶) 
 and 
𝑊𝑑′ = {𝑑 = 1 (𝐹𝑌_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇;                     𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑀𝑆𝑀)               𝑑 = 2𝑑 = 3𝑑 = 4 (𝐹𝑌_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇; 𝐹𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑈𝐷;𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑀𝑆𝑀)               (𝐹𝑌_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇; 𝐹𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑈𝐷;𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁_𝑀𝑆𝑀; 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑆)(𝐹𝑌_𝑆𝐻𝑂𝑅𝑇; 𝐹𝑈𝑃𝐴𝑈𝐷;𝐷𝑈𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁           ; 𝑆𝑃𝐸𝐶𝑆)  
3. characteristics of the auditor (p = 21,…,27) 𝑊′ = (𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑌; 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐺𝑅; 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑌 × 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝐺𝑅; 𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸_𝑁𝑀;𝐹𝑂𝑊_𝑁𝑀; 
           𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸_𝑁𝑀 × 𝐹𝑂𝑊_𝑁𝑀; 𝑆𝐸𝑋). 
The estimation of parameters is by maximum likelihood. The likelihood function, 𝑙𝑣𝑑𝑖, can 
described in a simplified form because right-censored observations are not available (Rabe-
Hesketh/Skrondal 2012: 745-746; Cleves et al. 2016: ch. 4.1.1). Let 𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖 = 𝑠(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖|𝛾𝑣𝑑) +𝑊′𝛽 + 𝜁𝑟 + 𝜀𝑣𝑑𝑖𝑟 and its first derivative be 𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖′ = 𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖′ 𝑑𝑠(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖|𝛾𝑣𝑑)/𝑑(log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖) then 
there follows for the three different models 
                                                 
122  See above towards formula (14): if K knots—and thus also the same d.f.—will be estimated then the spline 
function has K — 1 interior knots and when k > 1, two boundary knots. 
123  The description of all variables is shown in Appendix F Table 51. 
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 𝑙𝑣𝑑𝑖 = {𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖′ exp(𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖 − exp𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖)            𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖′ exp (𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖)(1 + exp𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖)−2𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖′  𝜙(𝜂𝑣𝑑𝑖)                                            PH models      PO models       probit models (25) 
where 𝜙(. ) is the standard normal destiny function (Royston/Lambert 2011: 120). To obtain 
estimates of 𝛾 and 𝛽 the necessary starting values will be determined by ordinary least-
squares regression of these three models on log𝑡𝑣𝑑𝑖, 𝑥𝑖 and spline basis functions with the 
desired number of knots (ibid.:121; Royston/Parmar 2002: 2182). The latter will be 
exhausted up to ten, or until convergence no longer arises in the particular model. The criteria 
for the conclusive analysis will therefore also be AIC, AICc, or BIC, respectively (see 
Appendix G).  
Furthermore, effects are classified as robust if significance stays approximate constantly or 
increases in strength with an increase in fitting of the models. Hence occasional effects in 
particular models are not regarded as robust. The effects can be interpreted as tendency if 
the significance of these effects decreases with increase in fitting of the models. 
5 Data 
5.1 Sample Selection 
Research into the conduct of tax audit generates two main problems: due to the stipulations 
of privacy in German tax law, researchers crucially do not have access to German tax audit 
data and, even if this were possible, collected data are either not recorded or not uniformly 
recorded in electronic form. Furthermore, the tax authorities themselves are not allowed to 
match tax audit data with individual information about the revenue agent. Thus, the only 
way to raise field audit as well as revenue agent data is to conduct a survey among revenue 
agents. In order to reach as many of them as possible, and to avoid sample selection bias, I 
used, with the official approval of the Berlin tax authority, an advanced tax law training 
course which was obligatory for revenue agents in Berlin as a means of conducting the 
survey. I taught this course and handed out questionnaires to participants in the second part 
of the first day of a two-day training course. The course took place between October 2010 
and February 2011. In 2010 there were 13,210 revenue agents working in Germany, of whom 
682 worked for the Berlin tax authority. In sum, 646 of them participated in the course and 
from these I received 610 questionnaires, which corresponds to a high response rate of 94 %. 
143 
To gain information of interest about field audit cases, I made use of so-called “experiential 
questionnaires” (Gibbins/Qu 2005). In these the participants were asked to report on the last 
two concluded field audit cases they had experienced and were able to describe in detail. 
The questionnaire is based on several pre-survey interviews to obtain information about firm 
characteristics which revenue agents are usually aware of after completion of a case. It 
emerged from responses to the questionnaires that revenue agents generally remember 
central key characteristics of a case, e.g., the audit result (additional tax burden), the firm’s 
size (profit and sales), audited tax years, industry, ownership structure, and audit issues. 
These data are memorable for two main reasons: firstly, revenue agents have to fill out 
several forms at the beginning and at the end of each case in which they have to report these 
data to the revenue agency, and, secondly, several parameters (e.g., audit results, time 
consumption) may (at least indirectly) affect the personal performance evaluation of the 
revenue agent. In particular, the last point makes it important that I assure revenue agents’ 
anonymity. Therefore, I did not collect any identifying information and officially committed 
myself not to hand over non-aggregated data to the tax authority.  
The questionnaire consists of two parts (see Appendix I): in the central part revenue agents 
report their last two audit cases. In the second part the revenue agents have to answer several 
socio-demographic questions, whereby some of them are introductory questions. Prior to 
final conduct of the survey the questionnaire was pre-tested by two revenue agents who did 
not participate in the final survey and one superior of a local tax audit department to ensure 
that all questions were understandable and that the questionnaire was feasible. On average, 
participants needed about thirty minutes to complete the questionnaire.  
In Berlin, revenue agents completed 8,681 tax audits during 2010. Altogether, I received 
information about 1,244 audit cases.124 From these cases I eliminated those that differed in 
their tax treatment from “normal” business income (e.g., nonprofit associations, charitable 
trust, agriculture and non-business income). In this way, I obtained 1,104 cases so that the 
sample represents rounded 12 % of all completed cases. Insofar as the cases do not or not 
completely contain information about time consumption, these cases are excluded; this 
consequently concerned 72 cases. Furthermore, with respect to equation (1), cases without 
outcome (N = 0) must be disregarded as well. According to these criteria, a total of 987 
observations can be included in my estimation. Table 31 contrasts all registered businesses 
                                                 
124  Some revenue agents voluntarily reported information about further cases in an additional questionnaire 
which was provided on request. Thus, I received slightly more than the expected 1,220 (= 610 × 2) cases.  
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and finished (revenue) tax audits in Germany and in Berlin for the year 2010 as well as the 
sample selection for my analyses, whereby their distribution in size categories is also shown.  
Table 31: Sample Selection (Chapter IV) 
The table shows the registered firms and completed tax audits in Germany and Berlin as well as the sample 
selection step by size categories (year 2010). 
 Total Micro Small Medium Large 
registered businesses in Germany 2010 8,571,515 6,391,015 1,189,727 799,135 191,638 
finished tax audits in Germany 2010 203,903 108,086 55,315 40,502 
registered businesses in Berlin 2010 412,546 330,123 49,015 26,635 6,773 
finished tax audits in Berlin 2010 8,817 2,649 2,315 2,415 1,438 
Original sample 1,244     
Less “non-business cases” 1,104 157 258 363 326 
Less cases without time data 1,032 147 241 340 304 
    audits without outcome (N = 0) 45 17 8 14 6 
    audits with outcome (N = N*) 987 130 233 326 298 
    Less cases without weighting data 959 127 228 318 286 
    Less cases with incomplete covariates 817 112 190 269 246 
 
Another issue is that firms are not randomly selected for audits (see above section IV 2). But 
given that only the current risk set—where in all observations for these the initial event 
occurred—for one of the four different size categories is relevant, a weighting with respect 
to the whole population of companies in Berlin is not required. However, it is necessary to 
ensure that the selection of cases takes place randomly within the risk sets. On the one hand 
this will be achieved through the type of data collection. As all revenue agents ought to 
describe their last two cases, the selection procedure is random and sample selection bias 
does not exist in relation to the subjective case selection due to the participants.125 On the 
other hand it is possible that the distribution is skewed within the risk sets with respect to 
the different types of audit cases. As described above (see Figure 6) completed audit cases 
can be distinguished in cases without outcome (U), with low outcome (L) and all the rest of 
them with outcome (R). The proportion of L and U is a pre-defined requirement and therefore 
has an impact on the risk set structure. The revenue service provided me with confidential 
data containing the average audit results of all cases completed in 2010. From these, the 
proportion of L and U within each size category can be derived and, furthermore, the 
probability that such a case was chosen from the population, grouped at different levels of 
                                                 
125  The Heckman and Roy test is not required. 
145 
audit results.126 The sample weights for my analysis are then calculated as the inverse of 
these probability values (Valliant et al. 2013). Unless otherwise stated the descriptive 
statistics as well as estimation results will be based on the weighted data set.  
Finally, Table 31 shows the minus of observation with regard to incomplete covariates, 
whereby Table 52 in Appendix F contrasts this in detail for the unweighted and the weighted 
data. As far as two covariates are concerned (visible by _NM) I anticipate that not all cases 
with incomplete covariates must be excluded. Instead, it is possible to interpret these cases 
as a summarized control group relating to the base-level assumption for each investigation 
size category. This assumption is permitted because in the survey period an old orientation 
framework provided by the tax administration still affected the revenue departments for both 
covariates.127 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
5.2.1 Magnitude of Time 
According to my model specification the survey contained on the one hand questions on the 
separate time consumption for audit and report, and on the other hand on the duration of the 
field audit from the first day of preparation to the submission of the report. The time 
consumption consists of the working time of a revenue agent and is measured in (working) 
days. However, the duration of an audit is classified and measured in months or years, 
respectively. The latter time specification is in my estimation model an independent variable 
and will be described below (see below subsection 5.2.2). The essential component of my 
model is that, in a departure from the standard hazard model, the dependent variable is not 
the log of the carry-over rate from one to another state but the log of the waiting/process 
time that passes until the event of interest occurs (in the AFT-metric). Given that time 
consumption is the central and key point, it is first necessary to consider more closely which 
assorted characteristics have occurred. Due to the different size categories and bearing in 
mind the related point that a non-binding timeframe of the tax authority relates to the sum 
of audit and report (total) time consumptions—notwithstanding the above consideration of 
whether the audit ends with or without outcome—it seems obvious to compare first the total 
time consumption in my survey. The median is most suitable for this because it is more 
robust toward outliers. The unweighted data produce for audits of micro firms a median of 
                                                 
126 At this derivation were taken into account the six different size categories (Appendix H) with their 
confidential de minimis limits and with additional groups of outcome. 
127 The Edict of Functional Groups resulting from the Salary Act was valid in effect only until 1 July 2002, but 
it had already been affecting administrative decisions pertaining to these groups for around thirty years. 
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7 days, for small firms 8 days, for medium firms 10 days, and for large firms 20 days. The 
latter complies with the source quoted by Strangmeier (2000: 273). Table 32 shows the 
distribution of the total time consumption of unweighted data across the four size categories.  
Table 32: Descriptive Statistics of Total Time Consumption (Unweighted Data) 
The table shows descriptive statistics of the total time consumption across the size categories for the 
unweighted data. 
Size N Incidence Rate p25 p50 p75 
Micro 130 0.12387 5.25 7 10 
Small 233 0.11346 6 8 10 
Medium 326 0.08600 8 10 13 
Large 298 0.02650 14 20 30 
 
Furthermore, Table 32 and Table 33 include the incidence rate which can be interpreted as 
completion velocity of tax audit. This is calculated from the number of subjects divided by 
time at risk, and the inverse represents the mean time at which one subject is at risk of an 
event of interest: audit, report, or total time, respectively. For auditees with large firms it 
follows from this that their tax audit consumes rounded 37.75 days on average altogether 
and thus exceeds even the 75th percentile clearly.128 This already surmises that the 
distribution of time is positively skewed. However, it can be assumed that the skewness 
differs between the size categories.  
According to the summary statistics of weighted data in Table 33 the average total time in 
the micro firm size category amounts to 8.5 days, ranging from 2 to 31 days. It exceeds the 
median of 8 days only negligibly; however, the tail is wide-ranging as the maximum length 
compared to the 75th percentile of 10 days is far outwards. In the small size category the 
situation is different. The average time amounts here to around 14.75 days, ranging from 4 
to 30 days, and exceeds the median of 9 days in evidence so it may be assumed that the 
distribution is positively skewed. Yet a special aspect in this size category is that the 
maximum time consumption corresponds to the 75th percentile. This is because a few outliers 
with significant time consumption are observed. Only 22 cases have an unweighted 
consumption over 13.5 days, and only 4 over 25 days. Moreover, the average time 
consumption increases from rounded 8.75 days for the unweighted data to 14.75 days for 
weighted data. This means that not only are just a few outliers included, but also those whose 
weights strengthen this impact. Another striking effect is that the average report time 
consumption increases so significantly compared to the micro and medium size categories. 
                                                 
128  All values in this chapter are rounded to quarters of a day because this is the unit of measurement in which 
the time shall be recorded as stipulated by the administrative department. 
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To this it will be examined below which covariates could be the causes. In the medium size 
category the average total time amount to rounded 14 days, ranging from 3 to 69 days, and 
considerably exceeds the median of 11.5 days, but not so extremely as is the case with the 
small size category, and not over the 75th percentile. In the large size category the average 
total time amounts to rounded 34.25 days, ranging from 3 to 500 days, and exceeds the 
median with 20 days and the 75th percentile with 32 days. Hence, for both the medium and 
the large size category, it can be assumed that the distribution is highly skewed. 
It should be noted that a summation of the location parameter for audit and report time does 
not necessarily correspond to that of the total time. Different cases produce for various 
reasons different time consumptions. Therefore, it is indispensable for an estimation to split 
the total time consumption into its components. 
Table 33: Descriptive Statistics of Audit, Report, and Total Time Consumption 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of audit, report, and total time consumption which are measured in 
days (α=.25) across the size categories for the weighted data (unweighted N in parentheses).  
  Weighted Data 
Size Parameter N Mean 
Incidence 
Rate 
Min Max p25 p50 p75 
Micro Audit Time 
1,008 
6.9171 0.14457 1 25 4 6 9 
(130) Report Time 1.5933 0.62762 1 6 1 1 2 
 Total Time 8.5104 0.11750 2 31 5 8 10 
          
Small Audit Time 
1,780 
9.6484 0.10364 3 25 6 8 15 
(233) Report Time 5.0902 0.19646 0.5 15 1 2 15 
 Total Time 14.7386 0.06785 4 30 7 9 30 
          
Medium Audit Time 
2,307 
11.8290 0.08454 2 65 7 9 15 
(326) Report Time 2.2802 0.43855 0.5 7 1 2 3 
 Total Time 14.1093 0.07088 3 69 8 11.5 17 
          
Large Audit Time 
1,871 
28.7079 0.03483 2 350 12 18 30 
(298) Report Time 5.4672 0.18291 1 200 2 3 5 
 Total Time 34.1751 0.02926 3 500 14 20 32 
5.2.2 Variables in the Equation 
The transition from an initial state to a target state can be examined in a dynamic perspective 
based on the individual tendency toward a change in status (e.g., Yamaguchi 1990). This 
tendency, in turn, can be affected by different components, based on the parties involved or 
the audit itself. In order to capture the variables influencing this effect, the questionnaire also 
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reveals information about specific characteristics of the auditee, the audit itself, and the 
auditor (qua revenue agent). The following descriptions mirror this division into three 
characteristic groups and are therefore separated according to the four size categories. It is 
expected that for several variables the percentage of observation depends on the size itself 
so that with growing size these are also either increased or decreased. 
5.2.2.1 Characteristics of the Auditee 
According to the derivation of the hypothesis H1-1 I have selected the variable LEGFORM. 
It results from a closing range of different legal forms which I compressed to three main 
groups: individual entrepreneurs, partnerships, and corporations. Each group is 
characterized by consistent properties relating to ownership structure, exclusion of liability, 
and participation rights. Therefore, it is a factor variable with the aforementioned virtual 
dummy variables. Table 34 shows all individual dimensions separated for each size category. 
The proportion of INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR is highest in the micro size category 
with rounded 61.4 % and lowest in the large size category with just 8.4 %. The difference 
amounts to more or less 15 % within SMEs. For the two other legal forms the alteration of 
proportion is not so uniform. PARTNERSHIP achieves the highest proportion in the small 
size category with almost 39.1 %, followed by the large size category (almost 28.8 %), the 
medium size category (almost 19.7 %), and the micro size category with almost 13 %. In 
contrast, the proportion of CORPORATION is highest in the large size category with rounded 
62.8 %, and hence it is in comparison with the INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR similar 
significantly, but in the opposite small size category. The base level in my estimations are 
the INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR for SMEs and the CORPORATION for large firms. 
In addition due to the hypothesis H1-2 I have added four different virtual dummy variables 
through the factor variable DETINC in the equation. The information corresponded to the 
‘responds’ options in my questionnaire. As mentioned above, according to tax law a 
dichotomous classification exists, namely, ACCOUNTING OF INCOME AND 
EXPENDITURE which ranges from 59.6 % in the micro size category to 8.6 % in the large 
one, or balancing of accounts which ranges in sum from 40.4 % to 91.4 % in the same 
direction, respectively. Moreover, for the latter a distinction can be made between three types 
of declaration of taxable results. In the supposed simplest case the tax balance sheet 
corresponds to the trade balance sheet. This variant comprises the major share, fluctuating 
from almost 33 % to rounded 58.4 % of the whole weighted sample. Alternatively, the 
auditee prepares either a separate tax balance sheet besides the trade balance sheet, or 
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submits only a reconciliation from the trade balance sheet to the taxable result (named 
TRANSITION § 60 II EStDV129). Whereas the latter is relevant in the medium (11.1 %) and 
the large size category (31.8 %), the other in the micro (5.6 %) and the large size category 
(31.8 %), otherwise both are only weakly pronounced (< 5 %). 
Considering that there is both a causal relation and a statistical correlation—Cramér’s V 
ranging from 0.347 (small size) to 0.534 (micro size)—between the legal form and the type 
of determination, I have incorporated within the equation their interaction as well. Appendix 
F shows from Table 57 to Table 60 the correlation and from Table 53 to Table 56 it can be 
seen which distributions occur between both variables, differentiated according to the 
different size categories.  
Most of the individual entrepreneurs with micro firm size are not balanced, from the 61.4 % 
there are distributed to this only 4.6 % (this equates to 7.5 %). In the small size category the 
proportion shifts to almost 38.2 % because the share of INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR 
(46.9 %) is split into 29.5 % for non-balancing, 15.7 % for identical balance sheets, and 
2.2 % for INDEPENDENT TAX BALANCE SHEETs. For the medium size category their 
proportion (30.3 %) is split into 20.3 % for non-balancing (this equates to 67.2 %), 9.5 % 
for identical balance sheets, and less than 1 %, and therefore negligible, for INDEPENDENT 
TAX BALANCE SHEETs. And lastly, in the large size category the proportion of 
INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR (8.4 %) is spread almost similarly across non-balancing 
and identical balance sheets. 
According to both of the other legal forms this can be read by analogy. In so doing, striking 
distributions show on the one hand that partnerships are predominantly balanced with 
identical balance sheets (micro 64.4 %, small 77.4 %, medium 54 %, and large 57.8 %). The 
remaining part is allocated for the SMEs almost completely of non-balancing, and only in 
the large size category does a share of 4.8 % of 28.8 % distribute to the reconciliation (this 
equates to 16.5 %). On the other hand, for CORPORATION the distribution is slightly 
different: the type of identical balance sheets is also predominant (micro 78.2 %, small 
80.3 %, medium 76.5 %, and large 41.8 %) but the remaining part is spread to 
INDEPENDENT TAX BALANCE SHEET (micro 14.6 %, medium 3.1 %, and large 15.6 %) 
and reconciliation (micro 7.3 %, small 19.7 %, medium 29.4 %, and large 43 %). The actual 
situation is reflected particularly with regard to the latter. With an increase in the firm size 
the probability of corresponding trade and tax balance sheets decreases so that the alternative 
                                                 
129  German Income Tax Ordinance. 
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types are increased, whereby for the large size category the preparing of an INDEPENDENT 
TAX BALANCE SHEET produces a greater effort in terms of reconciliation so that the 
proportion of the latter is comprehensibly and significantly increased. 
Overall I assume that the base level is non-balancing for the micro and small size categories, 
and I also assume identical balance sheets for the medium and large size categories.  
Starting with the hypothesis H1-3 my questionnaire contains several options to select the 
sector in which the auditee mainly practices its business activities. In accordance with the 
type of activity and the classification of parameters to determine the size categories 
(Appendix H) I have summarized the sectors to four main groups, namely, PRODUCTION, 
TRADING, SERVICE, and UTILITIES. All of them are virtual dummy variables of the factor 
variable SECTORGR. Table 34 shows that the proportion of SERVICE activities in all size 
categories range from almost 57.7 % to 75.6 %, taking into account that I consider this sector 
group as base level in all size categories. Otherwise the PRODUCTION sector ranges from 
10 % to 21.3 %, the TRADING sector from almost 8 % to 15.8 %, and the UTILITIES sector 
from barely 0.1 % to 7.8 %. It should be noted here that in the following group of 
characteristics the sector groups resurface as an interaction effect with SUSPECTED TAX 
EVASION. 
The last variable in this class is GROUP and follows from the hypothesis H1-4. It is also a 
dummy variable and takes a value of one if the auditee is an affiliated company. In the small 
size category their proportion is just nearly 1.6 %, in the micro size category in contrast 
19.3 %, in the medium size category 36.3 %, and finally in the large size category 55.5 %. 
The questionnaire includes several control variables, in place to verify that the auditee is a 
true affiliated company. I asked the participants in detail if the auditee is a controlling or 
controlled enterprise, related to a national or multinational group, and a part of group 
taxation or not.  
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Table 34: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates relating to Characteristics of the Auditee 
The table shows descriptive statistics for covariates relating to characteristics of the auditee. It is a parallel 
chart of weighted and unweighted data across the size categories. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Parameter Size Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
            
legform          
 individual entrepreneur          
  micro 127 1,008 0.6141 0.4887 0 1 130 0.7769 0.4179 
  small 228 1,780 0.4688 0.5001 0 1 233 0.7253 0.4473 
  medium 318 2,307 0.3025 0.4601 0 1 326 0.4080 0.4922 
  large 286 1,871 0.0840 0.2779 0 1 298 0.0839 0.2777 
 partnership          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1299 0.3375 0 1 130 0.0923 0.2906 
  small 228 1,780 0.3909 0.4890 0 1 233 0.1588 0.3663 
  medium 318 2,307 0.1967 0.3981 0 1 326 0.2423 0.4292 
  large 286 1,871 0.2879 0.4536 0 1 298 0.2685 0.4439 
 corporation          
  micro 127 1,008 0.2561 0.4382 0 1 130 0.1308 0.3385 
  small 228 1,780 0.1403 0.3480 0 1 233 0.1159 0.3208 
  medium 318 2,307 0.5008 0.5008 0 1 326 0.3497 0.4776 
  large 286 1,871 0.6281 0.4842 0 1 298 0.6477 0.4785 
detinc          
 accounting of income 
and expenditure 
         
  micro 127 1,008 0.5958 0.4927 0 1 130 0.7462 0.4369 
  small 226 1,761 0.3732 0.4847 0 1 231 0.5498 0.4986 
  medium 318 2,307 0.2700 0.4447 0 1 326 0.3221 0.4680 
  large 284 1,862 0.0860 0.2809 0 1 296 0.0676 0.2514 
 trade balance sheet = tax 
balance sheet 
         
  micro 127 1,008 0.3297 0.4720 0 1 130 0.2154 0.4127 
  small 226 1,761 0.5719 0.4959 0 1 231 0.4113 0.4931 
  medium 318 2,307 0.5841 0.4937 0 1 326 0.5460 0.4986 
  large 284 1,862 0.4740 0.5002 0 1 296 0.4088 0.4924 
 independent tax balance 
sheet 
         
  micro 127 1,008 0.0559 0.2306 0 1 130 0.0231 0.1507 
  small 226 1,761 0.0273 0.1632 0 1 231 0.0303 0.1718 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0345 0.1827 0 1 326 0.0429 0.2030 
  large 284 1,862 0.1222 0.3281 0 1 296 0.1486 0.3563 
 transition § 60 II EStDV          
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  micro 127 1,008 0.0186 0.1358 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
  small 226 1,761 0.0277 0.1644 0 1 231 0.0087 0.0928 
  medium 318 2,307 0.1114 0.3151 0 1 326 0.0890 0.2851 
  large 284 1,862 0.3177 0.4664 0 1 296 0.3750 0.4849 
sectorgr          
 production          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1459 0.3544 0 1 130 0.1154 0.3207 
  small 228 1,780 0.1002 0.3009 0 1 233 0.1502 0.3581 
  medium 317 2,278 0.2127 0.4099 0 1 325 0.1785 0.3835 
  large 286 1,871 0.2077 0.4064 0 1 298 0.2483 0.4328 
 trading          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1575 0.3658 0 1 130 0.2077 0.4072 
  small 228 1,780 0.1348 0.3423 0 1 233 0.2060 0.4053 
  medium 317 2,278 0.0798 0.2715 0 1 325 0.1385 0.3459 
  large 286 1,871 0.1550 0.3626 0 1 298 0.1644 0.3713 
 service          
  micro 127 1,008 0.6189 0.4876 0 1 130 0.6385 0.4823 
  small 228 1,780 0.7555 0.4308 0 1 233 0.6094 0.4889 
  medium 317 2,278 0.6584 0.4750 0 1 325 0.6369 0.4816 
  large 286 1,871 0.5768 0.4949 0 1 298 0.5201 0.5004 
 utilities          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0777 0.2687 0 1 130 0.0385 0.1931 
  small 228 1,780 0.0095 0.0973 0 1 233 0.0343 0.1825 
  medium 317 2,278 0.0491 0.2164 0 1 325 0.0462 0.2101 
  large 286 1,871 0.0605 0.2388 0 1 298 0.0671 0.2506 
group          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1932 0.3964 0 1 130 0.0846 0.2794 
  small 228 1,780 0.0157 0.1246 0 1 233 0.0258 0.1587 
  medium 318 2,307 0.3626 0.4815 0 1 326 0.1871 0.3906 
  large 286 1,871 0.5546 0.4979 0 1 298 0.5772 0.4948 
 
5.2.2.2 Characteristics of the Audit 
Besides the firm characteristics I also obtained several pieces of information about the audit 
itself, in particular issues pertaining to the process of audit, additional parties, outcome, and 
findings. The latter primarily conduce to control participants’ precision. In view of the fact 
that in-depth information about the time consumption of single findings or main topics was 
unrecorded I could not include their explicit responses in my estimation equation, although 
it can be assumed with reasonable certainty that different audit issues produce varying time 
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consumptions. So I envisage additional research opportunities that could be investigated 
through experiments with the collaboration of tax authorites. The situation is different with 
regard to variables which are based on objectively defined criteria, such as can be included 
in the equation. Table 35 shows their descriptive statistics. 
First and foremost and in accordance with the hypothesis H2-1 the questionnaire contains 
the question of whether the revenue agent suspected tax evasion by the auditee during the 
audit. The variable EVASION includes this information, and, in addition, I controlled it by 
means of information about the findings for which the agent had suspicions. The biggest 
percentage of weighted data is obtained in the medium size category with almost 25.4 %, 
followed by the micro size category with almost 15 %, the large size category with 11 %, 
and the small size category with 8.7 %. As already mentioned, I also control for the 
interaction effect between EVASION and the four different sector groups due to the 
assumption that certain business activities are more susceptible to tax evasion than others, 
even though correlation is not observed (Appendix F from Table 53 to Table 56).  
In turn, Appendix F shows from Table 53 to Table 56 the distribution of both interaction 
variables. Above all, for the medium size category it appears that 70.8 % of all suspected 
evasion audits belong to the SERVICE sector (almost 18 % / 25.4 %), followed by the 
PRODUCTION with 23 %, the TRADING with 3.9 %, and the UTILITIES sector with 2.1 %. 
In view of these business activities this means that in almost 27.3 % of all audits in the 
SERVICE sector the revenue agent suspected tax evasion by the auditee. In the 
PRODUCTION sector it is the same in almost 27.5 % of all audits. In contrast, the proportion 
amounts in the TRADING sector to a rounded 7.4 %, and in the UTILITIES sector to 11 % 
of all audits. 
In the micro size category the proportion of suspected tax evasion amounts to 77.1 % in the 
SERVICE, 16.5 % in the PRODUCTION, and 6.5 % in the trading sector. It appears with 
regard to the proportion of audits per sector in this size category that 18.7 % of all audits in 
the SERVICE sector, 16.9 % in the PRODUCTION sector, and 6.2 % in the TRADING sector 
are cases with suspected evasion. For the small size category the relations are the following: 
69.1 % of all cases with suspected evasion are from the service sector, 27.7 % from the 
TRADING sector, and 3.2 % from the UTILITIES sector. In the PRODUCTION sector such 
cases do not occur. For the proportion of audits with suspected evasion per sector it results 
in almost 8 % in the SERVICE sector, 17.8 % in the TRADING sector, and 29.5 % in the 
UTILITIES sector. And finally, in the large size category the proportion of suspected tax 
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evasion amounts to 81.4 % in the SERVICE, 5.9 % in the PRODUCTION, and 12.6 % in the 
TRADING sector. In the UTILITIES sector such cases do not occur. The results of audits 
with suspected evasion per sector amount to 15.5 % in the service sector, 3.1 % in the 
PRODUCTION sector, and almost 9 % in the TRADING sector. 
The hypothesis H2-2 refers to the place of a field audit. For this purpose the questionnaire 
contains a choice of possibilities which are all included as virtual dummy variables in the 
factor variable PLACE. The primary place according to the law is the COMPANY OFFICE 
and hence the base level. In this case the agent works usually on the company premises. 
With regard to the size categories it is observed that audits of small firms take place there 
only in 9.7 % of the cases. In contrast, for audits of medium firms it is ever 24 %, of micro 
firms 31.4 %, and of large firms 59.7 %. If the auditee does not have a suitable business or 
residence office for the revenue agent, German law stipulates that the audit is to be conducted 
in the local TAX OFFICE. This place of work is selected in 28.6 % of audits of micro size 
firms, in almost 43.4 % of small size firms, in 13.5 % of medium size firms, and only in 
9.8 % of large size firms. Another place can be chosen if an exception is proposed. This will 
usually entail an audit in a TAX ADVISER OFFICE. It is obvious that for SMEs this 
exception plays an important role because audits are conducted there in up to 56 % of all 
cases (36.1 % micro size, 42.8 % small size, and 56.4 % medium size). For audits of large 
firms it still remains the place of work in 24.4 % of all cases. The last option in my 
questionnaire affects cases in which the revenue agent worked in multiple locations. This 
ranges from almost 3.9 % (micro size category) to 6.4 % (large size category). 
The hypothesis H2-3 concerns special features of an audit which differs from the usual case 
so that they can affect the time consumption. Therefore, the questionnaire reveals 
information about the first and the last audited fiscal year, whether it is a follow-up audit, 
and whether and which specialist revenue agents are consulted. Firstly, German statutory 
rules stipulate that, if the auditee is a large business, the current audit joins the previous audit 
in general. Besides, the last audit fiscal year should be present and the number of audited 
fiscal years at once should not be more than three fiscal years in audits of SMEs. 
Consequently, an audit can be comprised of more than three fiscal years for large auditees, 
and fewer than three years for SMEs. Thus I compute the number of audited fiscal years at 
once from the first and the last audited fiscal year and hereafter two dummy variables:130 
FY_SHORT if is lower than three and FY_LONG if it is more than three years. Table 35 
                                                 
130  If a piece of information is missing I assume that the usual audit period (3 years) has been taken as a basis. 
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shows that this differentiation is important for the boundary size categories: in 23.3 % of all 
audits in the micro size category the number of audited fiscal years at once is lower than 
three, in 20.4 % of all audits in the large size category it is higher than three. In the other 
cases the proportion of these cases ranges from 1.9 % to almost 8.2 %. 
Furthermore, my equation includes two additional dummy variables: in order to examine the 
effect of activities that arise if the current audit is a follow-up audit I use FUPAUD. With 
regard to the aforementioned rules it can be considered surprising that the proportion of 
follow-up audits is high not only in the large size category (almost 68.1 %), but also in the 
small (43.7 %) and medium size category (49.5 %), though the proportion is 15.3 % in the 
micro size category. The second variable is SPECS. This includes the information on 
whether another specialized revenue agent was consulted during the audit. In the large size 
category this is true in 28.9 % of all cases. In the other categories the proportion is lower 
(micro almost 5 %, small 3.2 %, and medium 14 %). 
In the order of the audit process the questionnaire reveals additional information about the 
process itself. This are useful for examining the hypotheses H2-5 and H2-6. On the one hand 
I include in my equation three dummy variables relating to possible steps the revenue agent 
can take to accelerate the audit process if he or she is of the opinion that the auditee is 
delaying the audit process. One possibility is that the revenue agent has granted only short 
deadlines for reply (SHDEAD). This measure is taken in a range from 31.2 % to 47.7 % of 
all cases, differentiated according to the four size categories. Another option is that the 
revenue agent threatens and determines a penalty for delay (PANDELAY). This measure was 
first introduced into German tax law roughly two years before the survey was conducted and 
is taken in a range from 2.2 % to 5.1 % along the same lines. It is notable that with an increase 
in firm size the proportion decreases. The third alternative is when the revenue agent 
threatens the auditee with a non-agreement at the end of the audit (NONAGREE). This 
measure is taken in a range from 9.7 % to 16.8 % along the same lines. Overall, it can be 
recognized that with increasing of the sanction their proportion of treatment decreases.  
On the other hand I include in my equation a factor variable for the duration of the audit in 
total (hypothesis H2-7), from the first day of preparation to the date of submission of the 
report. Thereby I distinguish between two following characteristics: the variable 
DURATION_MSM is grouped into six virtual dummy variables for SMEs, and the variable 
DURATION is grouped into eight virtual dummy variables for the large size category. In 
detail Table 35 shows that for the micro size category audits survive mostly 4 to 6 months 
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(40.7 %), followed by 1 TO 3 MONTHS (25.3 %), and then 7 TO 9 MONTHS (11 %); for 
the small size category most are OVER 1 YEAR (33.8 %), followed by 1 TO 3 MONTHS 
(30.4 %), and then 4 TO 6 MONTHS (22.1 %); for the medium size category most are 1 TO 3 
MONTHS (28.7 %), followed by OVER 1 YEAR (21.7 %), and then 4 TO 6 MONTHS 
(21.2 %); lastly, for the large size category most audits survive 4 TO 6 MONTHS (18.5 %), 
followed by 1 TO 3 MONTHS (18 %), 7 TO 9 MONTHS (16.7 %), 10 TO 12 MONTHS 
(15.8 %), and then 1 TO 1.5 YEARS (11 %). In contrast to the other size categories the latter 
spreads relatively smoothly over the different duration groups. For the base level I assume 
an increase of the duration over the size categories so that my assumption is for the micro 
and small firms a duration of 4 TO 6 MONTHS, for the medium firms 7 TO 9 MONTHS, and 
for the large firms 1 TO 1.5 YEARS. From this step, I expect also to uncover the effect of 
disparate frequencies of occurrence between the different duration classes on time 
consumption. 
By the end of an audit the findings of the revenue agent should be highlighted. In accordance 
with the hypothesis H2-4 the questionnaire reveals information concerning the conversation 
between auditee, tax adviser, and revenue agent and whether the parties have reached a 
consensus about all findings. From these I accommodate in my equation for the latter the 
dummy variable CONSEN and for the first DISC, which includes the information on whether 
a final discussion took place or not. Table 35 shows that for both cases a large proportion of 
audits end with a final discussion, ranging from 62 % to 80.1 %, and consensus about all 
finding, ranging from 55.7 % to 78.7 %, in each case with regard to the weighted data across 
all size categories. 
Lastly for this group of characteristics I compute, with a view to hypotheses H2-8 and H2-
9, three variables that include information about the outcome of an audit. The first 
distinction, appearing as the dummy variable TRIFLINGAMOUNT, concerns the 
delimitation between whether the case exceeds a specific de minimis limit or not. The 
proportion of minor cases of my observations ranges from 2.9 % in the medium size category 
to 13.3 % in the large size category. The other two variables refer to the results itself. The 
first, LNDIFFPAY, measures the difference between the logarithm of revealed additional tax 
payment and the logarithm of revealed tax refund on completion of the audit, the second, 
LNLOSSREDUC, by contrast, the difference between the logarithm of revealed loss 
reduction and the logarithm of revealed loss increase. For both, the logarithm is taken 
because all underlying parameters are highly positively skewed. After that the mean of 
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LNDIFFPAY increases from 6.031 in the micro size category to 9.166 in the large size 
category, whereas the mean of LNLOSSREDUC fluctuates from 1.793 to 3.332 over all size 
categories.  
Table 35: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates relating to Characteristics of the Audit 
The table shows descriptive statistics for covariates relating to characteristics of the audit. It is a parallel chart 
of weighted and unweighted data across the size categories. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Parameter Size Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
            
evasion          
  micro 124 979 0.1498 0.3584 0 1 127 0.1417 0.3502 
  small 220 1,720 0.0871 0.2826 0 1 225 0.1067 0.3094 
  medium 304 2,205 0.2535 0.4357 0 1 312 0.1314 0.3384 
  large 276 1,830 0.1101 0.3136 0 1 286 0.0629 0.2433 
place          
 company office          
  micro 127 1,008 0.3137 0.4659 0 1 130 0.2308 0.4230 
  small 228 1,780 0.0968 0.2964 0 1 233 0.1030 0.3046 
  medium 317 2,304 0.2402 0.4279 0 1 325 0.2277 0.4200 
  large 286 1,871 0.5973 0.4913 0 1 298 0.6678 0.4718 
 tax office          
  micro 127 1,008 0.2862 0.4538 0 1 130 0.3154 0.4665 
  small 228 1,780 0.4338 0.4967 0 1 233 0.2876 0.4536 
  medium 317 2,304 0.1346 0.3418 0 1 325 0.1508 0.3584 
  large 286 1,871 0.0976 0.2973 0 1 298 0.0638 0.2447 
 tax adviser office          
  micro 127 1,008 0.3614 0.4823 0 1 130 0.3769 0.4865 
  small 228 1,780 0.4276 0.4958 0 1 233 0.5494 0.4986 
  medium 317 2,304 0.5643 0.4966 0 1 325 0.5508 0.4982 
  large 286 1,871 0.2414 0.4287 0 1 298 0.2114 0.4090 
 multiple offices          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0387 0.1936 0 1 130 0.0769 0.2675 
  small 228 1,780 0.0417 0.2003 0 1 233 0.0601 0.2382 
  medium 317 2,304 0.0609 0.2395 0 1 325 0.0708 0.2568 
  large 286 1,871 0.0637 0.2447 0 1 298 0.0570 0.2323 
consen          
  micro 126 989 0.7216 0.4500 0 1 129 0.7287 0.4464 
  small 220 1,760 0.5572 0.4979 0 1 225 0.7911 0.4074 
  medium 314 2,264 0.7123 0.4534 0 1 322 0.7919 0.4066 
  large 283 1,835 0.7872 0.4100 0 1 295 0.8373 0.3697 
disc          
  micro 127 1,008 0.6203 0.4872 0 1 130 0.6154 0.4884 
  small 227 1,777 0.8063 0.3960 0 1 232 0.7241 0.4479 
  medium 315 2,273 0.6863 0.4647 0 1 323 0.6842 0.4656 
  large 286 1,871 0.6832 0.4660 0 1 298 0.6779 0.4681 
shdead          
  micro 127 1,008 0.4773 0.5015 0 1 130 0.5538 0.4990 
  small 227 1,777 0.3121 0.4644 0 1 232 0.4526 0.4988 
  medium 317 2,278 0.4270 0.4954 0 1 325 0.4554 0.4988 
  large 286 1,871 0.3338 0.4724 0 1 298 0.2953 0.4569 
158 
pandelay          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0512 0.2214 0 1 130 0.0462 0.2106 
  small 227 1,777 0.0459 0.2097 0 1 232 0.0431 0.2035 
  medium 317 2,278 0.0348 0.1836 0 1 325 0.0492 0.2167 
  large 286 1,871 0.0218 0.1462 0 1 298 0.0168 0.1287 
nonagree          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1583 0.3664 0 1 130 0.1692 0.3764 
  small 228 1,780 0.0972 0.2969 0 1 233 0.1631 0.3702 
  medium 318 2,307 0.1680 0.3744 0 1 326 0.1442 0.3518 
  large 286 1,871 0.1309 0.3379 0 1 298 0.1376 0.3450 
trifling amount          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0554 0.2297 0 1 130 0.0923 0.2906 
  small 228 1,780 0.0327 0.1782 0 1 233 0.0386 0.1931 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0292 0.1686 0 1 326 0.0276 0.1641 
  large 286 1,871 0.1333 0.3405 0 1 298 0.0570 0.2323 
lndiffpay          
  micro 127 1,008 6.0309 5.3603 -7.7832 12.4292 130 7.4770 3.8022 
  small 228 1,780 8.1183 6.1510 -9.3057 13.8155 233 8.6222 3.1493 
  medium 318 2,307 8.3042 5.3154 -9.4727 14.1520 326 9.0550 3.2295 
  large 286 1,871 9.1657 6.0278 -13.8155 17.5044 298 9.9290 5.1482 
lnlossreduc          
  micro 127 1,008 3.1032 5.5285 -9.9035 15.6073 130 1.6366 4.2265 
  small 228 1,780 1.7926 4.0165 0.0000 12.8992 233 0.9396 3.0243 
  medium 318 2,307 3.3315 5.3894 0.0000 16.0127 326 1.5382 3.9195 
  large 286 1,871 2.4454 6.4493 -16.5236 19.8070 298 1.6816 5.5216 
fy_short          
  micro 127 1,008 0.2333 0.4246 0 1 130 0.2000 0.4015 
  small 228 1,780 0.0760 0.2656 0 1 233 0.0858 0.2807 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0816 0.2742 0 1 326 0.0460 0.2098 
  large 286 1,871 0.0384 0.1924 0 1 298 0.0403 0.1969 
fy_long          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0186 0.1358 0 1 130 0.0077 0.0877 
  small 228 1,780 0.0760 0.2656 0 1 233 0.0386 0.1931 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0364 0.1877 0 1 326 0.0429 0.2030 
  large 286 1,871 0.2038 0.4035 0 1 298 0.2215 0.4159 
fupaud          
  micro 124 995 0.1533 0.3617 0 1 127 0.1260 0.3331 
  small 225 1,755 0.4365 0.4971 0 1 230 0.1957 0.3976 
  medium 315 2,299 0.4208 0.4945 0 1 322 0.2578 0.4381 
  large 286 1,871 0.6806 0.4671 0 1 298 0.7450 0.4366 
duration_msm / duration          
 up to 1 month          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0853 0.2805 0 1 130 0.1154 0.3207 
  small 227 1,777 0.0263 0.1603 0 1 232 0.0560 0.2305 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0432 0.2036 0 1 326 0.0552 0.2288 
  large 285 1,867 0.0121 0.1097 0 1 297 0.0135 0.1155 
 1 to 3 months          
  micro 127 1,008 0.2525 0.4362 0 1 130 0.3231 0.4695 
  small 227 1,777 0.3035 0.4608 0 1 232 0.4267 0.4957 
  medium 318 2,307 0.2868 0.4530 0 1 326 0.3405 0.4746 
  large 285 1,867 0.1796 0.3845 0 1 297 0.1684 0.3748 
 4 to 6 months          
  micro 127 1,008 0.4067 0.4932 0 1 130 0.3308 0.4723 
  small 227 1,777 0.2208 0.4157 0 1 232 0.2802 0.4501 
159 
  medium 318 2,307 0.2118 0.4092 0 1 326 0.2699 0.4446 
  large 285 1,867 0.1848 0.3888 0 1 297 0.2222 0.4164 
 7 to 9 months          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1099 0.3141 0 1 130 0.1000 0.3012 
  small 227 1,777 0.0478 0.2137 0 1 232 0.0733 0.2612 
  medium 318 2,307 0.1555 0.3629 0 1 326 0.1687 0.3751 
  large 285 1,867 0.1666 0.3733 0 1 297 0.1448 0.3525 
 10 to 12 months          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0697 0.2557 0 1 130 0.0769 0.2675 
  small 227 1,777 0.0637 0.2447 0 1 232 0.0776 0.2681 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0861 0.2810 0 1 326 0.0828 0.2760 
  large 285 1,867 0.1580 0.3654 0 1 297 0.1212 0.3269 
 over 1 year          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0758 0.2658 0 1 130 0.0538 0.2266 
  small 227 1,777 0.3381 0.4741 0 1 232 0.0862 0.2813 
  medium 318 2,307 0.2166 0.4126 0 1 326 0.0828 0.2760 
 / 1 to 1.5 
years 
large 285 1,867 0.1096 0.3129 0 1 297 0.1111 0.3148 
 / 1.5 to 2 
years 
large 285 1,867 0.0824 0.2754 0 1 297 0.0943 0.2927 
 / over 2 
years 
large 285 1,867 0.1069 0.3095 0 1 297 0.1246 0.3308 
specs          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0496 0.2181 0 1 130 0.0385 0.1931 
  small 228 1,780 0.0324 0.1774 0 1 232 0.0302 0.1714 
  medium 318 2,307 0.1400 0.3475 0 1 326 0.0828 0.2760 
  large 286 1,871 0.2890 0.4541 0 1 298 0.3054 0.4613 
 
5.2.2.3 Characteristics of the Auditor 
According to the hypotheses from H3-1 to H3-6 the questionnaire reveals several items of 
information about personal characteristics of the revenue agent. Table shows the descriptive 
statistics. At first, I include in my estimation equation the factor variable AGENTY which 
differs between five time-classes to provide information on how long the revenue agent has 
already been conducting field audits. All classes are addressed as virtual dummy variables. 
In the micro size category the highest proportion is observed in the third experience class 10 
TO 15 with almost 32.5 %, closely followed by the first class UP TO 5 with 31.2 %, and the 
others with a range from 8.8 % to 12 %. I assume the third class as the base level for this 
size category because such cases are often audited by experienced revenue agents from 
salary grades without the need for having a general qualification for university entrance. In 
the small size category the highest proportion is in the second class 5 TO 10 with 35.3 %, 
followed by the first class with 24.4 %, the third class with 20.8 %, and the other with 8.2 % 
(fourth), 11.2 % (fifth), respectively. This size category is often the first to be encountered 
by a revenue agent so that I assume the first class as the base level. In the medium size 
category the highest proportion is, in turn, the third class with almost 36 %. The proportions 
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of revenue agents in the other experience classes are 19.3 % (first class), 11.7 % (second 
class), 16.9 % (fourth class), and 16.1 % (fifth class). Due to the—in reality obsolete—Edict 
of Functional Groups (see footnote 127) experience and firm size as well as the grade of 
salary being more or less affiliated with each other, I again assume the third class as the base 
level. This corresponds with my assumption for the micro size category. In the large size 
category the distribution is concentrated on the higher experience classes, in detail, from the 
first class to the last 2.3 %, 14 %, almost 30.6 %, 25 %, and 28.1 %. For the base level I 
continue my aforementioned approach and choose the fourth class. As a result it is very 
possible to control for the previous and following experience classes. 
As reviewed, the age of a revenue agent usually affects his or her performance. So the 
questionnaire contains five possible options for the participants to specify their age based on 
age groups. All of them I have computed as virtual dummy variables of the factor variable 
AGEGR. A query of the exact age was not allowed for me because there were concerns that 
a few of the participants could be identified due to this information being potentially cross-
referenced with other responses. The bulk of revenue agents are members of the third age 
group (i.e., aged between 40 and 50), thus conforming to the average age (48.4) of employees 
in the investigated administration (PStat 2011) so that I assume this class to be the base level. 
Table 36 shows the remaining proportions of age groups per size category. It should be noted 
that the proportion of participants is less than 7 % in the boundary groups, at which the 
highest proportion obtains in the age group OVER 60 for the large size category.  
In accordance with the rules an employee should be not changed into the audit department 
if he or she is older than 45. Thereby, an agent’s experience and age are correlated so that a 
high Cramér’s V value is to be expected. This in fact ranges from 0.347 to 0.5 (see Appendix 
F from Table 57 to Table 60). Therefore, I include in my estimation equation an additional 
interaction effect of both (see ibid. from Table 53 to Table 56 and hereinafter in detail).131 
Because of this I can also control for an early or late change into the agent’s department. 
In the micro size category the share of agents with low experience in the field (31.2 %) is 
spread into 42.8 % at the age of 30 TO 40 (13.3 %), 44 % at the age of 40 TO 50 (13.7 %), 
and only 12.1 % at the age of 20 TO 30 (3.8 %). The latter is dropped in the second step of 
experience (12 %) and the second age group obtains with 68.4 % (8.2 %) a significantly 
greater proportion than the third age group with 32.7 % (3.9 %). In the next experience step, 
                                                 
131  Due to the loss of scattered uncompleted covariates the sum of proportions in Appendix F from Table 53 
to Table 56 is not exactly identical to the individual proportions in Table 33. 
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this is the base level (32.5 %), all but one age group are represented, at which a high 
concentration is observed in the age groups 40 TO 50 with 36.4 % and 50 TO 60 with 36.6 %. 
Then follow the age group 30 TO 40 with 19.4 % and OVER 60 with 8.7 %. The share of 
agents with experience of 15 TO 20 years (15.5 %) is, in turn, spread in only two age groups, 
firstly the base level with 69.5 % (10.8 %), and secondly the age group 50 TO 60 with 29.3 % 
(4.5 %). In the last experience class (8.8 %) the highest proportion is contributed by the age 
group 50 TO 60 with 78.8 % (6.9 %), followed by the group OVER 60 with 18.4 % (1.6 %) 
and 40 TO 50 with 4 % (0.4 %). 
According to the proportions these can be distinguished in the other size categories. In what 
follows only the pronounced distributions shall be described. This comprises for the small 
size category the proportions in the early experience classes. The share UP TO 5 (24.4 %) is 
spread in particular across the age groups 30 TO 40 with 41.4 % (10.1 %) and 40 TO 50 with 
45.6 % (11.1 %). In the next step 5 TO 10 the age group 30 TO 40 already combines to 
87.3 % (=0.308/0.353), the remaining part being dropped to the age group 40 TO 50. For the 
following steps it can be shown that each proportion is essentially spread to the same age 
groups, with the exception of the last step because the age group OVER 60 already 
constitutes 44.6 % (=0.05/0.112). In the medium size category it can be seen that in the first 
experience class 26.2 % of the revenue agents are under 30 years of age (=0.05/0.193) 
whereas the highest proportion is spread to the age group 40 TO 50 with 59.9 % 
(=0.116/0.193). The following two experience steps are dominated by the age groups 30 TO 
40 and 40 TO 50 with together over 90 %. The same applies for the step 15 TO 20 years; 
however, it is changed to the age groups 40 TO 50 and 50 TO 60. In the step OVER 20 years 
the age group 50 TO 60 is most exclusively represented with 85.6 %, OVER 60 representing 
only 9.6 %. Lastly, in the large size category most of the revenue agents have an experience 
above 10 years, at which the third step has a share of 70.9 % revenue agents between 40 TO 
50. Revenue agents from neighboring age groups are in 17.6 % of instances younger and in 
9 % older. In the next step the proportion amounts to 59.5 % for the age group 30 TO 40 and 
39.2 % for the group 40 TO 50. If the experience is OVER 20 years the share of 28.1 % is 
spread into 55.3 % for the age group 50 TO 60 and 22.4 % or 23.6 % for the bordering 
groups. 
On this point, therefore, the conclusion has to be that the distribution of experience and age 
differs between the size categories and, although the strong influence of the base level age 
group is perceived, it cannot be concluded that both alone are relevant for the allocation 
formula of audit cases onto revenue agents. In turn, in respect of the Edict of Functional 
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Groups resulting from the Salary Act (see above footnote 127) the salary grade of a revenue 
agent and his or her usual field of work are issues so that I include both factors, as well as 
their interaction, in my estimation equation.  
A revenue agent belongs to one of two different careers which can distinguished by means 
of grades. The factor variable GRADE_NM includes all grades—partly combined—as 
virtual dummy variables. Those on the first career path are not required to have a general 
qualification for university entrance. Employees are started off after a two-year training in 
this path with grade A6. Those who have proven especially competent in practical work over 
many years get the chance to change in the agent department. These revenue agents are 
salaried usually and in the sample with grade A8 or A9s or rather A9z. However, they shall 
be employed as agents according to the law only in exceptional circumstances so that their 
share is relatively small. Furthermore, according to the Edict of Functional Groups (see 
above footnote 127) such revenue agents may only audit micro- or small-sized firms. As 
shown in Table 36 the proportions of grades A8 and A9s/A9z are very small, with the latter 
grade constituting the majority, and concentrated in the micro and small size categories. I 
assume the grades A9s/A9z, so-called “micro-entity revenue agents”, as the base level for 
the micro size category, although only 9.1 % of all cases in this category are audited by them. 
The largest proportion is represented by the grades A9/A10 with 50.9 %, followed by A11 
with 23.8 %, and A12/A13s with 12.6 %. 
In contrast, employees with a general qualification for university entrance are started after a 
three-year dual curriculum. These achieve a diploma (bachelor degree) upon successful 
graduation and the first salary grade is then A9. Ideally, a change into an agent department 
should not occur immediately. The change can be done in principle in each grade. Due to 
the increase in difficulty levels it occurs up to grade A10 generally and, more rarely, at grade 
A11. At the beginning of working as a revenue agent all beginners have to pass a special 
training course in theory and practice. Since 2003/2004 the training concept has lasted five 
years overall in the geographical area covered by the present study.132 According to the job 
descriptions I have combined the different grades of the second career. Taking into account 
the remaining rules of the Edict of Functional Groups—which are still to a large extent 
followed—for the deployment of different grades in audits depending on firm size, I have 
                                                 
132  The individual elements of this concept were well-established at the time of implementing this concept. 
However, the new feature is the central management of the revenue authority training institute. The 
minimum period of vocational adjustment amounts according to the law to six months. 
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defined as base levels the grades A9/A10 for the small size category, A11 for the medium 
size category, and A12/A13s for the large size category.  
In the small size category the proportion of the base level amounts to almost 42.3 %. The 
grade A11 represents 44.1 % of the weighted data, A12/A13s only 9.1 %. For the next size 
categories Table 36 shows that the base levels represent in each case the highest proportion; 
in the medium size category it is grade A11 with 43.1 %, followed by A9/A10 with 31.1 % 
and A12/A13s with 20.4 %, in the large size category the highest proportion is grade 
A12/A13s with 50 %, followed by A11 with 36.6 % and A9/A10 with only 9.6 %. The virtual 
dummy variable ITEM-NONRESPONSE represents in each size category only a very small 
proportion. 
In addition to this the Edict of Functional Groups suggests the need to control for the main 
field of work. Thus, due to the grade each revenue agent occupies a specific position, making 
it necessary to control whether the revenue agent has been instructed in each case in 
accordance with this position. Therefore, I include in my equation on the one hand the factor 
variable FOW_NM with four virtual dummy variables and on the other hand their interaction 
effect with the virtual dummy variables of GRADE_NM. For the latter my assumption 
corresponds to the high values of Cramér’s V, ranging from 0.594 to 0.732 (see Appendix F 
from Table 57 to Table 60). 
The first dummy variable of FOW_NM is MICRO/SMALL/MEDIUM ENTERPRISES and it 
represents SMEs so that this is also the base level for the corresponding size categories. 
Table 36 shows that for the vast majority of the cases the participants examine according to 
their main field of work. The proportion ranges from 48.3 % in the medium size category to 
86.7 % in the micro size category. A share of 17.4 % examine auditees from the large size 
category instead. In contrast, revenue agents who normally examine LARGE ENTERPRISES 
were only instructed to audit large firms in 40.2 % of these. Looking at the revenue agents 
of medium firms, 31.6 % declare that they usually examine large enterprises, just like 34.4 % 
of revenue agents of small firms. That is rather an improper deployment. The third dummy 
variable CORPORATE GROUPS reflects a concentration of revenue agents of medium 
(16 %) and large firms (38.5 %) as well as of micro firms (6 %). A clear assertion is not 
possible from these data because the increased level of complexity due to the affiliation of 
the auditee is independent of the size category. Relating to a proper deployment it is 
necessary to consider the interaction effect with other than grade A12/A13s. The virtual 
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dummy variable ITEM-NONRESPONSE represents in each size category, in turn, only a 
very small proportion. 
Table 53 in Appendix F shows for the micro size category how the proportions of the 
different grades distribute to the main field of work of revenue agents. Agents who are 
salaried with A8, A9s/A9z, or A9/A10 usually examine SMEs; only from the latter a 
negligible share of 0.6 % examine CORPORATE GROUPS. In grade A11 the proportion of 
SME-auditors amounts to 77.9 % (=0.185/0.238). The remaining proportions are spread over 
LARGE ENTERPRISES (13.3 %) and CORPORATE GROUPS (8.8 %). Unexpectedly, from 
the proportion of revenue agents who are salaried at the A12/13s grade, 55.7 % (=0.07/0.126) 
are dropped to SMEs with the remainder going to LARGE ENTERPRISES (14.7 %) and 
CORPORATE GROUPS (29.6 %). 
For the small size category Table 54 in Appendix F presents the allocations. In detail, as 
before the revenue agents with grade A8 or A9s/9z usually examine SMEs and with grade 
A9/A10 almost completely (96.6 %). In grade A11 the distribution is spread in other ways: 
only 28.5 % declare that they usually audit SMEs, as against 70.1 % usually auditing LARGE 
ENTERPRISES and 1.4 % CORPORATE GROUPS. For the grade A12/A13s the unexpected 
result as before still increases: 75.6 % usually examine SMEs, as against only 22.9 % 
LARGE ENTERPRISES and a mere 1.6 % examining CORPORATE GROUPS. 
Accordingly, Table 55 in Appendix F presents the results for the medium size category. 
Likewise, in grade A8 and A9s/A9z the revenue agents usually examine SMEs but in grade 
A9/A10, however, only 66.7 % of them, while the others declare LARGE ENTERPRISES 
(33.3 %). Agents with grade A11 declare in 56.6 % of the cases a usual auditing of SMEs, 
in 33.1 % of LARGE ENTERPRISES, and in 10.3 % of CORPORATE GROUPS. With grade 
A12/A13s the proportion of SMEs decreases to 10 %, while the proportion of LARGE 
ENTERPRISES increases to 33.3 % and of CORPORATE GROUPS to 56.6 %.  
Lastly, Table 56 in Appendix F presents the distribution of cases in the large size category. 
The grade A8 is not observed and grade A9s/A9z is negligible, so for the sake of completeness 
the latter is dropped to SMEs. Agents with grade A9/A10 declare that they usually examine 
SMEs in 89.1 % of the cases, while the remainder is spread between LARGE ENTERPRISES 
(6.2 %) and CORPORATE GROUPS (4.6 %). In grade A11 the proportion of SMEs 
decreases to 19.9 %, whereas the proportion of LARGE ENTERPRISES significantly 
increases to 68.3 % and of CORPORATE GROUPS to 11.8 %. With grade A12/A13s the 
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proportion of SMEs decreases compared to the previous size category to 2.8 % and of 
LARGE ENTERPRISES to 29.6 %, while the proportion of CORPORATE GROUPS 
increases to 67.6 %. 
Finally, I control in my estimation equation for gender based on the variable SEX. The 
proportion of men ranges from 43.9 % in the micro size category to 63 % in the large size 
category. 
Table 36: Descriptive Statistics for Covariates relating to Characteristics of the Auditor 
The table shows descriptive statistics for covariates relating to characteristics of the auditor. It is a parallel 
chart of weighted and unweighted data across the size categories. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Parameter Size Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
            
agenty          
 up to 5          
  micro 118 918 0.3119 0.4653 0 1 121 0.2727 0.4472 
  small 207 1,702 0.2443 0.4307 0 1 212 0.2642 0.4419 
  medium 289 2,061 0.1930 0.3954 0 1 297 0.1582 0.3656 
  large 261 1,721 0.0232 0.1509 0 1 273 0.0293 0.1690 
 5 to 10          
  micro 118 918 0.1201 0.3264 0 1 121 0.1074 0.3110 
  small 207 1,702 0.3532 0.4791 0 1 212 0.1557 0.3634 
  medium 289 2,061 0.1172 0.3222 0 1 297 0.1212 0.3269 
  large 261 1,721 0.1403 0.3480 0 1 273 0.1392 0.3468 
 10 to 15          
  micro 118 918 0.3249 0.4703 0 1 121 0.3884 0.4894 
  small 207 1,702 0.2082 0.4070 0 1 212 0.2830 0.4515 
  medium 289 2,061 0.3598 0.4808 0 1 297 0.3805 0.4863 
  large 261 1,721 0.3057 0.4616 0 1 273 0.3443 0.4760 
 15 to 20          
  micro 118 918 0.1550 0.3634 0 1 121 0.1405 0.3489 
  small 207 1,702 0.0823 0.2755 0 1 212 0.1509 0.3588 
  medium 289 2,061 0.1689 0.3753 0 1 297 0.1717 0.3778 
  large 261 1,721 0.2500 0.4338 0 1 273 0.1978 0.3991 
 over 20          
  micro 118 918 0.0881 0.2846 0 1 121 0.0909 0.2887 
  small 207 1,702 0.1120 0.3161 0 1 212 0.1462 0.3542 
  medium 289 2,061 0.1611 0.3682 0 1 297 0.1684 0.3748 
  large 261 1,721 0.2808 0.4502 0 1 273 0.2894 0.4543 
agegr          
 20 to 30          
  micro 120 965 0.0354 0.1857 0 1 123 0.0407 0.1983 
  small 221 1,759 0.0305 0.1722 0 1 226 0.0177 0.1321 
  medium 307 2,253 0.0503 0.2189 0 1 315 0.0381 0.1917 
  large 272 1,764 0.0104 0.1014 0 1 284 0.0141 0.1180 
 30 to 40          
  micro 120 965 0.2620 0.4416 0 1 123 0.2276 0.4210 
  small 221 1,759 0.4178 0.4943 0 1 226 0.2478 0.4327 
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  medium 307 2,253 0.1999 0.4006 0 1 315 0.1714 0.3775 
  large 272 1,764 0.1435 0.3513 0 1 284 0.1620 0.3691 
 40 to 50          
  micro 120 965 0.4407 0.4985 0 1 123 0.4228 0.4960 
  small 221 1,759 0.3692 0.4837 0 1 226 0.5044 0.5011 
  medium 307 2,253 0.4466 0.4980 0 1 315 0.4762 0.5002 
  large 272 1,764 0.4989 0.5009 0 1 284 0.4542 0.4988 
 50 to 60          
  micro 120 965 0.2201 0.4161 0 1 123 0.2683 0.4449 
  small 221 1,759 0.1309 0.3381 0 1 226 0.2080 0.4068 
  medium 307 2,253 0.2839 0.4516 0 1 315 0.2857 0.4525 
  large 272 1,764 0.2774 0.4486 0 1 284 0.2817 0.4506 
 over 60          
  micro 120 965 0.0418 0.2009 0 1 123 0.0407 0.1983 
  small 221 1,759 0.0517 0.2218 0 1 226 0.0221 0.1474 
  medium 307 2,253 0.0193 0.1378 0 1 315 0.0286 0.1669 
  large 272 1,764 0.0697 0.2552 0 1 284 0.0880 0.2838 
grade_nm          
 A8          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0146 0.1203 0 1 130 0.0231 0.1507 
  small 228 1,780 0.0178 0.1327 0 1 233 0.0258 0.1587 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0074 0.0858 0 1 326 0.0123 0.1103 
  large 286 1,871 0.0000 0.0000 0 0 298 0.0000 0.0000 
 A9s/A9z          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0907 0.2883 0 1 130 0.1231 0.3298 
  small 228 1,780 0.0192 0.1377 0 1 233 0.0472 0.2125 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0044 0.0664 0 1 326 0.0123 0.1103 
  large 286 1,871 0.0030 0.0545 0 1 298 0.0034 0.0579 
 A9/A10          
  micro 127 1,008 0.5089 0.5019 0 1 130 0.5308 0.5010 
  small 228 1,780 0.4226 0.4951 0 1 233 0.5107 0.5010 
  medium 318 2,307 0.3107 0.4635 0 1 326 0.2883 0.4537 
  large 286 1,871 0.0955 0.2944 0 1 298 0.0906 0.2875 
 A11          
  micro 127 1,008 0.2379 0.4275 0 1 130 0.2462 0.4324 
  small 228 1,780 0.4407 0.4976 0 1 233 0.2918 0.4556 
  medium 318 2,307 0.4310 0.4960 0 1 326 0.4387 0.4970 
  large 286 1,871 0.3629 0.4817 0 1 298 0.3624 0.4815 
 A12/A13s          
  micro 127 1,008 0.1262 0.3334 0 1 130 0.0615 0.2412 
  small 228 1,780 0.0901 0.2869 0 1 233 0.0944 0.2930 
  medium 318 2,307 0.2040 0.4036 0 1 326 0.2025 0.4024 
  large 286 1,871 0.5001 0.5009 0 1 298 0.5067 0.5008 
 item-nonresponse          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0218 0.1465 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
  small 228 1,780 0.0095 0.0973 0 1 233 0.0300 0.1711 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0426 0.2023 0 1 326 0.0460 0.2098 
  large 286 1,871 0.0385 0.1928 0 1 298 0.0369 0.1889 
fow_nm          
 micro/small/medium 
enterprises 
         
  micro 127 1,008 0.8666 0.3413 0 1 130 0.9154 0.2794 
  small 228 1,780 0.6389 0.4814 0 1 233 0.8369 0.3702 
  medium 318 2,307 0.4833 0.5005 0 1 326 0.5920 0.4922 
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  large 286 1,871 0.1742 0.3799 0 1 298 0.1577 0.3651 
 large enterprises          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0503 0.2195 0 1 130 0.0385 0.1931 
  small 228 1,780 0.3440 0.4761 0 1 233 0.1159 0.3208 
  medium 318 2,307 0.3155 0.4654 0 1 326 0.2607 0.4397 
  large 286 1,871 0.4020 0.4912 0 1 298 0.4094 0.4925 
 corporate groups          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0613 0.2407 0 1 130 0.0308 0.1734 
  small 228 1,780 0.0089 0.0943 0 1 233 0.0215 0.1452 
  medium 318 2,307 0.1597 0.3669 0 1 326 0.1043 0.3061 
  large 286 1,871 0.3853 0.4875 0 1 298 0.3960 0.4899 
 item-nonresponse          
  micro 127 1,008 0.0218 0.1465 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
  small 228 1,780 0.0082 0.0902 0 1 233 0.0258 0.1587 
  medium 318 2,307 0.0415 0.1998 0 1 326 0.0429 0.2030 
  large 286 1,871 0.0385 0.1928 0 1 298 0.0369 0.1889 
sex          
  micro 125 1,002 0.4387 0.4982 0 1 128 0.4375 0.4980 
  small 224 1,770 0.5676 0.4965 0 1 229 0.4323 0.4965 
  medium 307 2,244 0.4626 0.4994 0 1 315 0.4698 0.4999 
  large 278 1,829 0.6302 0.4836 0 1 290 0.6138 0.4877 
 
6 Results 
The starting points of the analysis are multilevel mixed-effect parametric survival models. 
Thereby the regression equations from each size category are being based on the Weibull, 
log-logistic, or lognormal distribution, respectively, and include the variables of time 
consumption (audit and report time) in single and squared form (see above equation 10). The 
expected bell-shaped transition rate is proven as the audit (report) single time variables have 
a positive and significant effect in the audit (report) phase whereas their squared values have 
a negative and likewise significant effect.133 
A differentiation is already taking place according to the four different size categories as it 
is more than likely that presumed time requirements are applied for each size category 
separately. With changes of size the influencing factors affect the time consumption in a 
different manner. This is confirmed by Figure 8 which illustrates, for each size category 
based on the weighted data and in relation to the total time consumption, a graph of a 
smoothed hazard estimate, by plotting on a log scale and inclusive of confidence intervals 
(gray-shaded). 
                                                 
133  The extracts of the time variables are summarized in a tabular overview in Appendix E Table 50. 
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Figure 8: Smoothed Hazard Estimates of Total Time Consumption (Equation of Weighted Data) 
 
These hazard functions represent the size-specific averaged hazard rate and stand for the 
instantaneous chance of the event “termination of the audit (total time)” per unit of time, 
given that the termination has not yet occurred.134 The reciprocal of the hazard represents 
how long an auditee still has to wait for completion of the audit at the current hazard rate 
level. In all size categories the hazard initially increases up to a peak and subsequently 
decreases. Of particular interest is the finding that in the medium and large size category a 
second wave follows before the last non-interpretable climbs are arisen. 
It should be noted that a differentiated consideration has been used, since the possibility 
cannot be ruled out that different impacts have canceled each other out within the total audit 
process. Hence the audit phase and the report phase are viewed separately. The results are 
then compared with the total time consumption. At the outset, it will be illustrated 
graphically with the aid of the special feature in the large firm size category. This is an open 
class with three subcategories.135 
                                                 
134  The hazard function, h(t), is a derivation of the cumulated hazard function, H(t). Since the latter is an 
increasing step function, a kernel smoother is needed; here it is the gaussian kernel. However, boundary 
bias and poor estimates in the range should be noted when only a few audit cases remain (Cleves et al. 
2016). Comparative plots of individual variables (not printed) confirm the above assumption of non-
proportional hazards. 
135  See above section IV 2 and Appendix H. 
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Figure 9: Hazard Functions of Audit Time Consumption (Equation of Weighted Data without 
Covariates and Separated according to the Different Large Size Subcategories L3, L2, and L1) 
 
Figure 9 presents for the entire category and each subcategory the hazard function of the 
audit time consumption, this being the total time reduced by time to write the audit report, 
with the best fitted odds (solid line), normal (long dashed line) and hazard (normal dashed 
line) model each.136 The equation is based on weighted data and disregards all covariates, 
but includes the restricted cubic spline function (see above equation 24). 
Due to the cubic splines the curve progression follows the specific hazards more closely. 
Besides, in the subcategory L2 it can be seen that the different models are fitted in part 
differently. Consequently, comparative analyses take place within the three models (PO = 
odds, probit = normal, PH = hazard) to find the one with the best overall fit, and between the 
models to find out the best fitted model, in each case per size category. But this is not enough 
to obtain robust results. As mentioned above, effects are classified as significant if they stay 
approximately constantly or increase in strength with an increase in model fitting. Hence 
occasional effects in particular models are not regarded as significant. Weak significance 
applies in cases where the fitting of the models increases, whereas the significance of the 
effects decreases. Thus the results of all three models are represented in each of the three 
time periods—audit, report and total—and for each size category (3 x 3 x 4), considered on 
the above basis of a segmentation of characteristics of auditee, audit, and auditor. Since in 
                                                 
136  The hazard model includes in the main category the confidence interval (gray-shaded). 
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this study no censoring occurs, it is not necessary to display the whole results. The derived 
coefficients (dxb) comply with the coefficients (xb) so that only the latter are issued in 
exponentiated form. The first output of each size category includes further the coefficients 
of the cubic spline function knots—demarcated in the subdivision dxb—and the additional 
information, especially the selection criteria AIC and BIC. An interesting pattern arises from 
a comparison of the ranking in all size categories. Table 37 shows that the ranking of best 
fitted models is equal for the small and medium size category in all time periods, and for the 
micro and large size category in the audit and total time periods. 
Table 37: Ranking of the Best Fitted Models (Grouped by the Different Time Periods) 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
Size          
Micro 2nd 3rd 1st 1st 2nd 3rd 2nd 3rd 1st 
Small 1st 3rd 2nd 1st 3rd 2nd 1st 3rd 2nd 
Medium 1st 3rd 2nd 1st 3rd 2nd 1st 3rd 2nd 
Large 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 
 
6.1 Characteristics of the Auditee 
This section covers the characteristics of auditees. The relevant parameters are the dummy 
variables for each category of legal form, determining of income, and sector group as well 
as whether the auditee is a member of an affiliated group. The interaction effects of legal 
form and determining of income is included if it contributes to a better fit for the respective 
model. The base references of legal form and determining of income are predetermined 
depending on the respective size category. However, the situation is not the same for the 
working sector. The most frequently occurring one is the service sector in all subsamples so 
that this has been taken as the base reference for the independent variable SECTORGR. The 
other expressions—production industry, trade industry (wholesale and retail), and utilities—
are controlled. 
6.1.1 Micro Firm Size Category 
The legal form is investigated at first, to test the hypothesis H1-1. The INDIVIDUAL 
ENTREPRENEUR is the most common of all relevant legal forms in the micro firm size 
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category (see above section IV 5), and is therefore used as the reference basis in this 
subsample. By comparison, in the case of PARTNERSHIPs the report time is decelerated in 
all models. It can be seen that the significance of this effect varies slightly between them: 
the strongest time lag occurs in the second best fitted probit model (5),137 with one knot in 
accordance with a log-normal model, followed by the best fitted PO model (4), with one 
knot in accordance with a log-logistic model, and the PH model (6), with one knot in 
accordance with a Weibull model. On the whole, it shows clearly that the report phase lasts 
longer compared with INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEURs when the auditee’s legal form is a 
PARTNERSHIP. As this aspect is not visible in the portrayal of the total time consumption, 
it can be assumed that revenue agents anticipate additional report time and as a result they 
attempt to compensate for this due to reduced audit time. This practice is observable in the 
corresponding audit time models, albeit not significant. The audit time is changed with an 
increase in model fitting from an initial decelerating in the probit model (2) to a clear 
accelerating in the best fitted PH model (3). For comparison only, the auditing of 
CORPORATIONs proceeds at a faster pace than that of entrepreneurs, but this effect, 
however, is not significant.  
To test the hypothesis H1-2 the determination of income is specified in more detail. The 
reference basis is in this size category the most commonly used ACCOUNTING OF 
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE. A comparison with the consistent accounting of trade and 
tax balance sheet shows that the audit time is decelerated, but this effect is only in the best 
fitted model (3) and the worst model (2) significant at the .05 level, while in contrast the 
second best fitted model (1) is non-significant. So it lacks a clear and robust result. The 
differences follow rather from the otherness of the determination with acceptable higher 
task-complexity instead of the level of conformity. In addition, the group of audits of 
INDEPENDENT TAX BALANCE SHEETs cannot be unambiguously evaluated as the 
number of representatives is too small and all of these are part of CORPORATIONs.138  
The next test of hypothesis H1-3 concerns three different groups of sectors, namely 
PRODUCTION, TRADING, and UTILITIES. Compared to the SERVICE sector, the 
PRODUCTION sector and the TRADING sector are stressed. The latter shows a significant 
acceleration of audit time in the best fitted model (3) and the worst fitted model (2), but not 
in the second best model (1). Consequently, it lacks a robust result. In the case of the 
                                                 
137  In what follows the numbers in parentheses comply with the number of the model in the respective table. 
138  The obvious interaction effect is not presented because the estimate excluding this gives the lowest BIC 
(see Table 65 in Appendix G). 
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PRODUCTION sector significant effects are likewise shown in two models for the report 
time; however, the ratios are decreased corresponding to the increase in fit and hence the 
best (4) and second best fitted models (5) are significant. It seems justified to conclude that 
writing of reports for PRODUCTION businesses is more time consuming than for SERVICE 
businesses. 
For the test of hypothesis H1-4 the consequences of affiliation to a corporate group are 
considered. In the phase of auditing the time consumption decreases, but the effect is non-
significant. In contrast, the report time decelerates, at which significant effects occur as the 
fitting of the model increases. Both inverse trends appear to neutralize each other in the total 
time consideration. In this size category it can merely be concluded that the report time is 
decelerated if the auditee is an affiliated firm. For the report time an accelerated trend can 
be recognized, but this is non-significant. 
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Table 38: Characteristics of the Auditee in the Micro Firm Size Category 
The table shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditee in the micro firm size category, separately per audit, 
report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. The table lists also: the knots of the restricted cubic spline function, the selection criteria AIC and 
BIC, the number of clusters of respondents whom described two cases in the same size category to calculate cluster-based robust SEs, and the number of observations (waiting 
times of all conducted audit cases). + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb          
partnership 0.527 0.921 1.998 0.015 0.182 0.277 0.289 0.742 1.124 
 (-0.184) (-0.111) (0.560) (-2.984)** (-3.499)*** (-1.986)* (-0.433) (-0.402) (0.099) 
corporation 4.350 2.208 6.491 1.103 0.594 0.690 4.612 2.179 7.287 
 (0.550) (1.232) (1.360) (0.078) (-1.049) (-0.453) (0.637) (1.215) (1.321) 
trade balance sheet = tax balance sheet 0.073 0.273 0.096 0.124 0.833 1.433 0.072 0.249 0.076 
(-1.572) (-2.173)* (-1.981)* (-0.937) (-0.320) (0.451) (-1.605) (-2.381)* (-1.921)+   
independent tax balance sheet 9.6E+06 1855.180 3.6E+04 7.8E+04 341.442 3.5E+04 9.2E+07 4756.631 2.9E+05 
(2.507)* (4.481)*** (3.924)*** (2.509)* (3.448)*** (4.158)*** (3.126)** (4.927)*** (4.348)*** 
production 0.364 0.618 1.550 0.020 0.227 0.296 0.245 0.511 1.083 
 (-0.568) (-0.929) (0.775) (-2.820)** (-2.985)** (-1.269) (-0.841) (-1.401) (0.154) 
trading 10.225 2.397 7.195 0.139 0.478 0.789 8.767 2.099 7.021 
 (1.455) (2.033)* (2.160)* (-1.223) (-1.570) (-0.283) (1.334) (1.690)+ (1.999)*   
utilities 0.384 0.543 0.611 0.168 0.436 1.472 0.456 0.457 0.423 
 (-0.389) (-0.840) (-0.561) (-1.119) (-1.390) (0.304) (-0.346) (-1.107) (-1.019)    
group companies 2.732 1.857 2.463 0.005 0.152 0.043 0.687 1.258 1.277 
 (0.395) (0.770) (0.941) (-2.724)** (-2.457)* (-1.568) (-0.154) (0.288) (0.274) 
dxb                      
_d_rcs1 281.995 15.149 62.309 1216.117 23.808 44.251 5107.292 62.198 784.141 
(5.410)*** (7.552)*** (5.009)*** (5.314)*** (8.327)*** (7.918)*** (3.762)*** (5.806)*** (4.133)*** 
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_d_rcs2 0.183 0.448 0.366    0.431 0.689 0.799 
(-2.631)** (-3.202)** (-2.188)*    (-0.984) (-1.141) (-0.362)    
_d_rcs3 0.531 0.757 0.759    0.450 0.726 0.601 
(-1.307) (-1.746)+ (-1.023)    (-1.393) (-1.802)+ (-1.611)    
_d_rcs4 0.644 0.802 0.726                   
(-1.589) (-2.183)* (-1.820)+                   
AIC -45 105 -106 -234 2 32 -323 -188 -417 
BIC 83 232 21 -108 127 157 -198 -63 -292 
N_clust 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
k 194 194 194 203 203 203 191 191 191 
Observations 2,812 2,812 2,812 644 644 644 3,456 3,456 3,456 
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6.1.2 Small Firm Size Category 
As before, the legal form is considered first. Further, the reference basis is provided by the 
INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR. However, significant effects are not identifiable in the 
small size category for PARTNERSHIPs and CORPORATIONs. Because of this, hypothesis 
H1-1 is in general proven because a concentration of more complex businesses in a specific 
legal form does not occur.  
As well as in the previous size category auditees under the legal form of entrepreneur do not 
make up the balance in the vast majority, and ACCOUNTING OF INCOME AND 
EXPENDITURE is once again taken as the reference basis. Concerning determination of 
income, the results show no significant difference between the basis and corresponding 
accounting, but time decelerates according to hypothesis H1-2 with an increase in 
complexity. Revenue agents consume significantly more audit and total time in the case of 
INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEURs with an INDEPENDENT TAX BALANCE SHEET. The 
report time decelerates too, but this is only significant in the second best model (6). The 
partly opposing effects in the cases of PARTNERSHIPs and CORPORATIONs need not be 
taken into account because the two legal forms concern in relation to entrepreneurs only a 
very small percentage of independent tax accounting (see Appendix F Table 54). 
Furthermore, the same significant effects occur in the case of offsetting and reconciliation; 
however, these are attributed entirely to CORPORATIONs. It should be noted that both types 
of determination of income—independent tax accounting as well as offsetting and 
reconciliation—are only weakly represented in the small size category (see above Table 34). 
Compared to the service sector, the PRODUCTION sector and the UTILITIES sector are 
stressed. The latter show a significant deceleration in all models of audit and total time. But 
their proportion of auditees is quite small so this result should not be overinterpreted. The 
situation is different in the case of PRODUCTION businesses. Their audits are more time 
consuming; however, this effect is only weakly significant in the second best fitted model 
(3) and the worst model (2), but not in the best fitted model (1). Consequently, it lacks a 
robust result even if the tendency seems to confirm the hypothesis H1-3.  
For affiliate firms significant effects are not visible; however, it should be noted that their 
ratio is merely infinitesimal in this subsample.
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Table 39: Characteristics of the Auditee in the Small Firm Size Category 
This table shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditee in the small firm size category, separately per audit, 
report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. The table lists also: the knots of the restricted cubic spline function, the selection criteria AIC and 
BIC, the number of clusters of respondents whom described two cases in the same size category to calculate cluster-based robust SEs, and the number of observations (waiting 
times of all conducted audit cases). + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
          
xb                      
partnership 0.074 0.461 0.388 2.755 1.434 3.196 0.186 0.548 0.774 
 (-1.434) (-1.483) (-0.898) (0.547) (0.480) (0.980) (-1.284) (-1.145) (-0.330)    
corporation 28.325 1.341 12.230 2.615 1.551 5.197 26.921 0.815 9.134 
 (1.162) (0.251) (1.446) (0.281) (0.432) (1.620) (0.912) (-0.164) (1.258) 
trade balance sheet = tax balance sheet 0.810 1.081 0.981 1.716 1.525 1.826 0.953 1.361 1.322 
(-0.179) (0.198) (-0.039) (0.480) (0.931) (0.957) (-0.040) (0.671) (0.694) 
independent tax balance sheet 0.005 0.139 0.018 0.339 0.438 0.139 0.004 0.209 0.024 
(-2.692)** (-2.260)* (-2.859)** (-0.422) (-1.022) (-2.062)* (-2.212)* (-1.700)+ (-2.904)**  
transition § 60 II EStDV 0.001 0.074 0.005 0.035 0.184 0.005 0.000 0.078 0.001 
(-2.329)* (-1.861)+ (-2.145)* (-0.723) (-1.206) (-2.741)** (-2.128)* (-1.710)+ (-2.912)**  
partnership # trade balance sheet = tax balance 
sheet 
8.562 1.781 4.455 0.006 0.084 0.068 0.417 0.484 0.684 
(1.089) (0.811) (1.279) (-1.380) (-1.771)+ (-1.233) (-0.478) (-0.731) (-0.397)    
partnership # independent tax balance sheet 8.3E+04 115.648 5050.389 0.554 1.650 2.644 2.8E+05 92.984 4625.349 
(2.968)** (3.438)*** (4.272)*** (-0.165) (0.443) (0.492) (2.892)** (3.364)*** (4.804)*** 
partnership # transition § 60 II EStDV 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
corporation # trade balance sheet = tax balance 
sheet 
0.152 1.175 0.136 2.881 0.998 0.154 0.488 2.086 0.126 
(-0.630) (0.127) (-1.102) (0.311) (-0.002) (-1.424) (-0.196) (0.553) (-1.119)    
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corporation # independent tax balance sheet 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(1.687)+ (3.609)*** (-2.594)** (2.136)* (3.091)** (2.146)* (2.069)* (3.843)*** (2.965)**  
corporation # transition § 60 II EStDV 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
production 0.397 0.461 0.334 2.375 1.018 1.378 0.872 0.508 0.440 
 (-0.750) (-1.714)+ (-1.743)+ (0.662) (0.046) (0.618) (-0.114) (-1.529) (-1.415)    
trading 1.010 0.888 0.899 2.607 1.243 0.957 2.251 1.076 0.772 
 (0.010) (-0.360) (-0.192) (0.842) (0.597) (-0.097) (0.534) (0.204) (-0.564)    
utilities 0.015 0.071 0.056 0.490 0.580 0.146 0.021 0.117 0.069 
 (-3.250)** (-3.735)*** (-2.918)** (-0.461) (-0.994) (-1.246) (-2.243)* (-3.177)** (-2.918)**  
group companies 0.718 0.679 2.543 0.002 0.157 0.060 0.051 0.516 0.544 
 (-0.136) (-0.314) (0.544) (-1.331) (-1.498) (-1.085) (-0.903) (-0.662) (-0.355)    
dxb          
_d_rcs1 1.7E+04 150.119 1364.072 1.3E+07 716.380 2.9E+04 2.7E+08 3746.499 1.0E+06 
(5.201)*** (6.599)*** (4.675)*** (3.757)*** (5.908)*** (4.455)*** (3.681)*** (5.912)*** (4.212)*** 
_d_rcs2 0.455 1.093 1.453 377.365 10.152 42.567 14.317 3.168 10.461 
(-0.437) (0.289) (0.591) (3.930)*** (4.245)*** (5.013)*** (2.243)* (3.130)** (3.263)**  
_d_rcs3 0.467 0.849 0.941 0.069 0.350 0.183 0.390 0.693 0.557 
(-0.786) (-0.800) (-0.246) (-2.458)* (-3.123)** (-2.620)** (-1.424) (-1.577) (-1.596)    
_d_rcs4 0.447 0.820 0.808                   
(-1.020) (-1.460) (-1.330)                   
_d_rcs5   1.025                   
  (0.336)                   
AIC -1,697 -983 -1,004 -1,122 -533 -1,013 -1,774 -1,217 -1,574 
BIC -1,515 -801 -815 -943 -354 -831 -1,592 -1,036 -1,392 
N_clust 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 167 
k 240 240 243 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Observations 5,384 5,384 5,384 1,166 1,166 1,166 6,550 6,550 6,550 
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6.1.3 Medium Firm Size Category 
The reference basis, in turn, is the INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEUR and, henceforth for the 
first time, corresponding accounting. In respect of legal forms it is recognizable that audits 
of CORPORATIONs are more time consuming than of INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEURs, 
namely in all time periods. This legal form concentrates more complex businesses in the 
present size category. Moreover, revenue agents consume significantly more time in auditing 
in the highly complex issue of offsetting and reconciliation. The single and the interaction 
effect relate primarily to CORPORATIONs because the others with this type of 
determination are not at all represented, or only very weakly, respectively. The results of 
independent tax accounting cannot be taken reliably into account as such cases are not 
sufficiently represented in this size category. In addition, agents consume significantly less 
report time when auditees determine their income due to ACCOUNTING OF INCOME AND 
EXPENDITURE. Since no significant effects appear for PARTNERSHIPs, only an opposite 
tendency, it can be assumed that the acceleration of report time relates to INDIVIDUAL 
ENTREPRENEURs. The results prove hypothesis H1-2 and hypothesis H1-1. 
As far as the group of sectors is concerned, no robust significant effects are shown. Only the 
comparison with the PRODUCTION business provides a significant acceleration of audit 
time, but this relates solely to the best fitted model (1) and the worst model (2) so that even 
though this tendency seems to refute hypothesis H1-3, it cannot be declared a robust result. 
Hypothesis H1-4 is proven. Revenue agents consume less audit time and hence less total 
time to audit an affiliated entrepreneur. This saving of time is only partly compensated for 
if the auditee is a PARTNERSHIP or CORPORATION. But the interaction with the legal 
form—for the vast majority of cases the affiliates are CORPORATIONs in this size 
category—leads to the conclusion that the above result, that audits of CORPORATION take 
longer to complete, explicitly applies only if the CORPORATION is not a member of an 
affiliate group. The effect for the report time cannot be declared a robust result as the best 
fitted model (4) does not show a significant effect. 
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Table 40: Characteristics of the Auditee in the Medium Firm Size Category 
This table shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditee in the medium firm size category, separately per 
audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. The table lists also: the knots of the restricted cubic spline function, the selection criteria 
AIC and BIC, the number of clusters of respondents whom described two cases in the same size category to calculate cluster-based robust SEs, and the number of observations 
(waiting times of all conducted audit cases). + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
partnership 0.337 0.653 0.764 0.454 0.724 0.322 0.342 0.609 0.652 
 (-1.109) (-1.201) (-0.714) (-0.820) (-0.804) (-2.296)* (-1.072) (-1.426) (-1.071)    
corporation 0.141 0.364 0.419 0.294 0.542 0.479 0.141 0.352 0.417 
 (-2.376)* (-3.043)** (-2.148)* (-1.807)+ (-2.195)* (-2.140)* (-2.378)* (-3.215)** (-2.270)*   
accounting of income and expenditure 1.085 1.284 1.107 3.520 1.755 2.058 1.536 1.459 1.355 
(0.114) (0.831) (0.279) (1.892)+ (2.386)* (2.997)** (0.614) (1.341) (0.846) 
independent tax balance sheet 0.674 1.265 3.872 5.785 2.045 2.157 1.502 1.601 3.834 
(-0.301) (0.453) (2.046)* (1.023) (1.022) (0.882) (0.325) (1.046) (2.301)*   
transition § 60 II EStDV 0.047 0.256 0.175 0.197 0.317 0.133 0.038 0.254 0.151 
(-2.677)** (-3.202)** (-2.956)** (-1.413) (-2.501)* (-1.747)+ (-2.695)** (-3.162)** (-2.876)**  
partnership # accounting of income and 
expenditure 
1.462 0.825 0.820 0.386 0.618 1.121 0.986 0.800 0.783 
(0.279) (-0.360) (-0.308) (-0.740) (-1.051) (0.196) (-0.011) (-0.449) (-0.378)    
partnership # independent tax balance sheet 15.589 2.470 1.209 0.025 0.173 0.389 1.519 1.076 0.672 
(0.944) (0.906) (0.160) (-1.244) (-1.568) (-0.801) (0.143) (0.079) (-0.393)    
partnership # transition § 60 II EStDV 0.494 0.530 0.644 12.886 4.953 12.911 1.813 0.994 0.898 
(-0.310) (-0.634) (-0.472) (0.789) (1.518) (1.502) (0.281) (-0.007) (-0.101)    
corporation # accounting of income and 
expenditure 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
corporation # independent tax balance sheet 221.343 13.653 7.910 0.810 1.216 1.757 73.957 8.945 6.240 
(3.326)*** (4.268)*** (2.807)** (-0.111) (0.261) (0.600) (2.894)** (3.753)*** (2.650)**  
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corporation # transition § 60 II EStDV 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(-0.980) (1.500) (-1.111) (-2.365)* (-2.078)* (-3.577)*** (.) (.) (4.070)*** 
production 7.273 2.328 1.618 1.508 1.362 1.027 5.685 2.140 1.504 
 (2.078)* (2.666)** (1.625) (0.508) (0.958) (0.088) (1.874)+ (2.441)* (1.381) 
trading 1.867 1.225 1.009 0.683 0.765 0.705 1.348 1.187 0.990 
 (0.736) (0.591) (0.018) (-0.523) (-0.958) (-1.088) (0.352) (0.539) (-0.024)    
utilities 0.557 0.785 1.176 0.640 0.851 0.852 0.450 0.740 1.172 
 (-0.599) (-0.629) (0.332) (-0.353) (-0.297) (-0.149) (-0.700) (-0.756) (0.268) 
group companies 25.882 3.767 4.714 5.038 2.487 3.210 24.698 3.972 4.994 
 (2.878)** (3.393)*** (3.973)*** (1.593) (2.481)* (2.685)** (2.862)** (3.527)*** (3.930)*** 
dxb                      
_d_rcs1 1137.634 19.508 121.976 1.5E+04 62.990 1306.025 2740.840 58.018 494.784 
(6.421)*** (6.586)*** (9.709)*** (4.856)*** (4.180)*** (6.230)*** (8.186)*** (15.141)*** (6.672)*** 
_d_rcs2 0.701 0.613 1.157 19.011 2.911 11.388   1.832 
(-0.568) (-1.814)+ (0.486) (2.847)** (2.012)* (3.934)***   (1.484) 
_d_rcs3  1.161  0.215 0.525 0.361   0.845 
 (1.035)  (-4.320)*** (-3.503)*** (-4.763)***   (-1.148)    
_d_rcs4  0.989  1.149 1.075 1.167                
 (-0.148)  (0.982) (1.005) (2.154)*                
_d_rcs5  0.980                    
 (-0.356)                    
_d_rcs6  1.034                    
 (0.672)                    
AIC 258 438 430 290 548 396 45 217 177 
BIC 470 665 642 509 768 615 254 425 396 
N_clust 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 225 
k 242 254 242 248 248 248 239 239 245 
Observations 10,136 10,136 10,136 1,995 1,995 1,995 12,131 12,131 12,131 
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6.1.4 Large Firm Size Category 
The reference basis is now the legal form CORPORATION and, as before, corresponding 
accounting. In relation to hypothesis H1-1 the results show no significant changes if the legal 
form is switched. Especially in the case of PARTNERSHIPs, it is only evident that, if ever, 
a tendency for more report time consuming is given in two models, but not in the best fitted 
model (6). In this respect hypothesis H1-1 is proven as agents adapt their working methods 
relating to the legal forms of auditees. 
The further results confirm hypothesis H1-2. In either of the complex types of determination 
of income, audit time and total time are significantly decelerated, even at the .001-level in 
the best fitted model (3), whereas the report time is not affected.139 
The test of hypothesis H1-3 shows that an audit of manufacturing-oriented businesses lasts 
significantly longer than otherwise, and in the best fitted model even at the .001-level. The 
report time decelerates too, but this effect is non-significant. Hence the total time 
consumption increases. An interesting finding relates to time consumption in the case of 
trading-oriented firms. Auditors save significant report time and so compensate for their 
(non-significant) increased audit time consumption. The result is an almost unaffected total 
time consumption. For UTILITIES the significant effect of audit time decreases in evidence 
with increase in model fitting. Thus an effect is no longer visible in the best fitted model (3). 
In the case of affiliated firms, revenue agents consume significantly more report time at the 
.05-level so that hypothesis H1-4 is proven. 
It is stressed that, in contrast to the basic recommendation of Stone (1986), my equation 
includes more than five knots in the large size category. This exception is justified on the 
grounds that the three subcategories L1, L2, and L3 (see above Figure 9) have many 
similarities but that, due to an increase in the size parameters, it is expected that from this 
there follow different degrees of influence on time consumption. The higher level of knots 
takes this into account in a more sensitive manner. 
                                                 
139  The models in the report period are fitted better when interaction effects are included (see Appendix G 
Table 71). 
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Table 41: Characteristics of the Auditee in the Large Firm Size Category 
This table shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditee in the large firm size category, separately per audit, 
report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. The table lists also: the knots of the restricted cubic spline function, the selection criteria AIC and 
BIC, the number of clusters of respondents whom described two cases in the same size category to calculate cluster-based robust SEs, and the number of observations (waiting 
times of all conducted audit cases). + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
individual entrepreneur 1.140 1.468 1.937 1.144 1.036 1.186 1.247 1.367 2.020 
 (0.140) (1.066) (1.469) (0.149) (0.088) (0.322) (0.262) (0.939) (1.767)+   
partnership 0.893 0.928 1.147 0.638 0.831 1.018 0.702 0.826 1.031 
 (-0.222) (-0.349) (0.510) (-0.575) (-0.606) (0.048) (-0.669) (-0.872) (0.111) 
accounting of income and expenditure 1.848 1.160 1.633 2.209 1.650 0.653 2.113 1.357 1.792 
 (1.070) (0.596) (1.420) (0.550) (0.922) (-0.700) (1.259) (1.211) (1.707)+   
independent tax balance sheet 0.074 0.335 0.220 0.512 0.674 0.621 0.095 0.358 0.246 
 (-2.800)** (-3.034)** (-4.241)*** (-0.821) (-1.106) (-1.100) (-2.658)** (-2.960)** (-3.849)*** 
transition § 60 II EStDV 0.156 0.409 0.357 1.108 1.088 1.059 0.185 0.435 0.397 
 (-3.302)*** (-3.798)*** (-3.979)*** (0.180) (0.340) (0.177) (-2.929)** (-3.527)*** (-3.535)*** 
individual entrepreneur # accounting of 
income and expenditure 
   2.479 1.477 5.241                
   (0.499) (0.551) (1.652)+                
individual entrepreneur # independent 
tax balance sheet 
   1.533 1.634 1.202                
   (0.304) (0.767) (0.211)                
individual entrepreneur # transition 
§ 60 II EStDV 
   1.000 1.000 1.000               
   (2.898)** (1.562) (0.828)                
partnership # accounting of income and 
expenditure 
   1.000 1.000 1.000                
   (.) (.) (.)                
partnership # independent tax balance 
sheet 
   0.677 0.811 0.460                
   (-0.238) (-0.296) (-1.236)                
partnership # transition § 60 II EStDV    0.228 0.481 0.331               
    (-1.271) (-1.533) (-2.203)*                
production 0.277 0.474 0.461 0.502 0.686 0.764 0.293 0.497 0.516 
 (-2.618)** (-3.377)*** (-3.436)*** (-1.632) (-1.911)+ (-1.316) (-2.660)** (-3.444)*** (-3.173)**  
trading 0.699 0.860 0.631 3.688 2.114 1.744 1.003 1.061 0.812 
 (-0.594) (-0.553) (-1.473) (1.999)* (2.566)* (1.831)+ (0.006) (0.218) (-0.701)    
utilities 0.297 0.425 0.737 0.822 0.907 1.050 0.334 0.467 0.789 
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 (-2.176)* (-3.409)*** (-1.134) (-0.281) (-0.322) (0.149) (-1.849)+ (-2.994)** (-0.895)    
group companies 0.717 0.875 0.833 0.307 0.562 0.584 0.548 0.803 0.739 
 (-0.621) (-0.575) (-0.659) (-2.095)* (-2.374)* (-1.920)+ (-1.080) (-0.927) (-1.100)    
dxb                      
_d_rcs1 380.360 18.173 55.766 459.259 22.395 55.096 645.272 24.832 83.619 
 (10.399)*** (15.303)*** (12.673)*** (10.848)*** (16.114)*** (13.590)*** (7.366)*** (12.677)*** (7.545)*** 
_d_rcs2 1.083 1.015 1.462 4.958 2.193 4.394 1.688 1.248 2.123 
 (0.272) (0.168) (1.929)+ (4.326)*** (6.504)*** (7.154)*** (0.678) (1.145) (1.458) 
_d_rcs3 2.746 1.634 2.032 0.866  0.809 2.486 1.611 1.811 
 (5.106)*** (5.583)*** (5.173)*** (-0.667)  (-1.777)+ (2.608)** (3.929)*** (2.371)*   
_d_rcs4 0.951 0.987 0.926   1.021 0.914 0.958 0.917 
 (-0.383) (-0.210) (-0.840)   (0.328) (-0.661) (-0.636) (-0.948)    
_d_rcs5 1.190 1.081 1.098    1.118 1.056 1.054 
 (2.743)** (2.720)** (2.421)*    (1.730)+ (1.818)+ (1.320) 
_d_rcs6 0.925 0.959 0.918    0.911 0.953 0.917 
 (-1.247) (-1.359) (-2.139)*    (-1.484) (-1.579) (-2.258)*   
_d_rcs7 0.987 0.993 0.970    0.943 0.969 0.941 
 (-0.293) (-0.291) (-1.190)    (-0.991) (-1.060) (-1.797)+   
_d_rcs8 0.904 0.954 0.901    0.974 0.986 0.950 
 (-1.648)+ (-1.539) (-2.892)**    (-0.460) (-0.492) (-1.604)    
_d_rcs9 1.063 1.032 1.009    1.043 1.021 0.998 
 (1.205) (1.344) (0.295)    (0.871) (0.906) (-0.072)    
AIC 1,376 1,634 1,238 1,950 2,069 1,872 1,368 1,573 1,257 
BIC 1,608 1,858 1,458 2,164 2,276 2,086 1,588 1,790 1,478 
N_clust 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 
k 249 249 249 255 252 258 231 231 231 
Observations 31,366 31,366 31,366 6,081 6,081 6,081 37,447 37,447 37,447 
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6.1.5 Interims Conclusion 
Summarizing the above, it should be noted that revenue agents adapt their working methods 
mainly to the conditions that are shaped by the legal form of the auditee. Hence, a 
differentiation according to the degree of complexity as a rule is not possible. But agents 
consume more report time auditing partnerships in the micro size category than auditing 
individual entrepreneurs. Furthermore, a tendency toward compensation is visible in isolated 
cases of accelerated audit time and generally unaffected total time. This means that in fact 
revenue agents anticipate an increased complexity encouraged by German tax law, in 
particular by a split of tax bases over many (usually heterogeneous) members. So auditors 
decrease their audit effort to compensate for their expected and their actually increased 
consumption of report time under time pressure. This could be due to auditors’ time pressure 
being susceptible to increased task complexity in the micro firm size category as here the 
number of recommended days is the lowest. Such results are not to be found in the other size 
categories.  
As a result, it might be that agents audit less points or less complex focal points in audits of 
partnerships, in order to avoid an increase in their total time consumption. This issue should 
be closely investigated in further research. From the present point of view, it seems advisable 
for the tax agency to reduce time pressure, if partnerships in the micro firm size category are 
audited. So the tax authority can ensure the required equal tax treatment relating to in-depth 
audits regardless of the legal form of the auditee. 
A further result is that audits of unaffiliated corporations are significantly more time 
consuming in the medium size category than audits of individual entrepreneurs, or affiliated 
corporations, respectively. In that respect, hypothesis H1-1 is proven, if auditees show a 
tendency to choose corporation as legal form when their business is more complex, e.g., 
when the business reaches a certain size. 
In addition, the type of determination of income affects revenue agents’ time consumption 
together with the increase in complexity. In the small size category audit time increases in 
the case of entrepreneurs with independent tax accounting and corporations with offsetting 
and reconciliation. This is also visible in the medium size category: the report time decreases 
in the case of accounting of income and expenditure. In the large size category it is also 
shown for independent tax accounting. So hypothesis H1-2 is proven. 
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Differences with regard to the group of sectors are occasionally observed. Compared to 
service-oriented businesses, agents consume more report time for manufacturing-oriented 
businesses in the micro size category, in the small size category only weakly significantly 
more audit time, and in the large size category highly significantly more audit time. In the 
last category they save, furthermore, report time in the case of trading-oriented businesses. 
Overall, hypothesis H1-3 is proven only in part. 
Moreover, with regard to affiliated companies it is shown that in the case of membership in 
such a group the report time increases in the micro size category, and meanwhile the audit 
time decreases, but not significantly. In the large size category the report time increases 
equally. In that respect both size categories are similar. In contrast, in the medium size 
category the audit time decreases highly significantly, the report time likewise, though the 
evidence points to a decrease in significance. Either effect points to the using of certain 
standard patterns for the routine audits of dependent firms. Consequently, hypothesis H1-4 
is proven in part. 
6.2 Characteristics of the Audit 
In this section I assume as a reference basis that auditors do not suspect tax evasion on the 
part of the auditee, conduct the audit in a company office, inspect three fiscal years as 
standard, do not achieve a consensus and do not conduct a final discussion about their 
findings, and that accelerating issues are not required. Furthermore, the outcome exceeds the 
de minimis limits.  
The post estimation parameters from Table 38 to Table 41 are omitted in the following tables 
with the exception of the number of observations. 
6.2.1 Micro Firm Size Category 
In the case of revenue agents’ suspicion of tax evasion—this is the test of hypothesis  
H2-1—the time decelerates in all periods. The effects are significant in the best fitted models 
at the .01-level for audit time (3) and total time (9), and at the .1-level for report time (4). 
Features of the sector groups are not considered. 
If audits are conducted anywhere other than at the company office, the audit time decelerates 
highly significantly in the events of TAX OFFICE and MULTIPLE OFFICES (hypothesis 
H2-2). These effects are also shown in the total time period. Insofar as an audit is conducted 
in a TAX ADVISER’S OFFICE, a tendency is visible for the audit time to be also strongly 
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loaded. But this effect is not significant in the second best fitted model (1) so that it cannot 
be considered a robust result. The same applies for the deceleration of report time in the 
event of MULTIPLE OFFICES as the significance level decreases until it lapses with an 
increase in model fitting. 
In the event of an audit period with less than three years the results confirm hypothesis  
H2-3: the audit time and hence the total time are accelerated, although the significance level 
decreases with increase in model fitting. Hypothesis H2-4 is proven because the time is to 
the greatest possible extent unaffected by the events of CONSENSUS and FINAL 
DISCUSSION. Neither show robust significant effects in each model of the relevant time 
period. In particular, in the event of a FINAL DISCUSSION the surprisingly significant effect 
of report time acceleration—lesser time without CONSENSUS in the case of a FINAL 
DISCUSSION—evaporates with increase in model fitting. Furthermore, the possible issues 
of acceleration in the event of audit delay also show at best sporadic significant effects so 
that hypotheses H2-5 and H2-6 are not proven in this size category. Scattered effects are 
insufficiently significant. 
In comparison with the duration in the reference basis, 4 TO 6 MONTHS, the time span with 
the highest occurrence in this size category, the audit time accelerates in the event of a shorter 
duration and decelerates in the event of a longer duration (up 10 months). This is the 
assumption of hypothesis H2-7. However, only the latter effect is significant in all models, 
even at the .01-level in the best fitted one (3), and hence robust. The time saving effect in 
the report period in the event of the shortest duration loses its significance with increase in 
model fitting. 
Hypothesis H2-8 is applicable as time is unaffected in the event of trifling outcome. Finally, 
hypothesis H2-9 confirms insofar as the audit time is actually unaffected, but the report time 
shows virtually no changes. The exponentiated coefficients amount to a figure of around 
one.
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Table 42: Characteristics of the Audit in the Micro Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 38 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the audit in the micro firm 
size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
          
xb                      
suspected tax evasion=1 0.018 0.151 0.092 0.018 0.166 0.228 0.012 0.141 0.081 
(-2.334)* (-3.055)** (-2.694)** (-1.845)+ (-3.073)** (-2.215)* (-2.414)* (-2.976)** (-2.893)**  
production #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
   28.668 6.628 37.030                
   (1.268) (1.862)+ (1.506)                
trading #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
   1.201 3.597 1.542                
   (0.077) (1.447) (0.197)                
utilities #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
   1.000 1.000 1.000                
   (.) (.) (.)                
tax office 0.008 0.109 0.027 0.134 0.536 0.715 0.013 0.115 0.026 
 (-2.602)** (-3.965)*** (-3.540)*** (-1.488) (-1.401) (-0.466) (-2.478)* (-3.900)*** (-3.230)**  
tax adviser office 0.158 0.424 0.235 0.834 1.151 1.495 0.211 0.437 0.241 
 (-1.607) (-2.093)* (-1.776)+ (-0.245) (0.423) (0.523) (-1.428) (-2.005)* (-1.695)+   
multiple offices 0.008 0.127 0.037 0.057 0.252 0.072 0.007 0.103 0.019 
 (-2.668)** (-3.440)*** (-3.260)** (-1.287) (-1.794)+ (-2.245)* (-2.642)** (-3.342)*** (-3.463)*** 
up to 1 month 2.220 1.692 1.918 11.776 3.036 11.122 3.097 2.043 2.390 
 (0.394) (1.043) (0.768) (1.749) (2.117)* (2.939)** (0.616) (1.284) (1.038) 
2 to 3 months 5.974 2.082 4.882 1.377 1.066 1.121 4.945 1.914 3.756 
 (0.875) (1.982)* (1.836)+ (0.335) (0.176) (0.148) (0.975) (1.698)+ (1.544) 
7 to 9 months 0.018 0.239 0.045 0.034 0.504 1.177 0.030 0.234 0.056 
 (-1.159) (-1.754)+ (-1.326) (-1.501) (-0.869) (0.130) (-1.179) (-1.843)+ (-1.201)    
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10 to 12 months 0.011 0.131 0.027 0.245 0.613 0.453 0.009 0.118 0.023 
 (-2.792)** (-2.947)** (-2.801)** (-0.803) (-0.978) (-0.574) (-2.826)** (-3.408)*** (-2.771)**  
over 1 year 0.003 0.051 0.026 0.593 0.514 0.730 0.003 0.051 0.030 
 (-2.320)* (-4.328)*** (-2.639)** (-0.198) (-0.896) (-0.380) (-2.477)* (-4.083)*** (-2.350)*   
fy_short 102.527 9.016 9.759 3.097 1.504 2.549 130.060 9.382 16.280 
 (2.684)** (4.155)*** (2.523)* (1.000) (1.030) (1.683)+ (2.576)** (4.040)*** (2.552)*   
consensus 0.305 0.649 0.353 1.706 1.022 0.841 0.416 0.743 0.429 
 (-1.021) (-1.090) (-1.255) (0.627) (0.049) (-0.237) (-0.815) (-0.815) (-1.226)    
final discussion 1.626 1.336 3.197 5.208 2.172 5.121 2.379 1.583 4.571 
 (0.348) (0.908) (1.955)+ (1.617) (1.907)+ (2.145)* (0.691) (1.376) (2.623)**  
short deadline for reply 0.420 0.726 0.445 1.941 1.113 0.548 0.349 0.711 0.406 
(-0.866) (-1.193) (-1.436) (0.783) (0.353) (-1.282) (-1.113) (-1.258) (-1.419)    
penalty for delay 0.087 0.293 0.061 1.108 1.820 2.913 0.124 0.391 0.051 
 (-1.184) (-1.800)+ (-2.002)* (0.055) (0.979) (0.700) (-0.822) (-1.282) (-1.895)+   
threat of non-agreement 6.111 2.136 10.780 22.170 2.149 1.207 6.346 2.116 8.024 
(0.896) (1.382) (1.964)* (1.748) (1.396) (0.227) (0.915) (1.407) (1.644) 
trifling amount 0.583 0.879 0.305 0.127 0.544 0.299 0.772 0.824 0.279 
 (-0.349) (-0.235) (-1.445) (-1.136) (-1.151) (-1.615) (-0.192) (-0.374) (-1.637)    
lnlossreduc 0.971 0.999 0.893 1.054 1.032 1.042 0.981 1.002 0.913 
 (-0.111) (-0.013) (-1.592) (0.708) (1.027) (0.449) (-0.097) (0.040) (-1.303)    
lndiffpay 0.907 0.965 0.790 0.997 0.998 0.946 0.948 0.980 0.821 
 (-0.549) (-0.826) (-2.558)* (-0.047) (-0.061) (-0.944) (-0.343) (-0.488) (-2.296)*   
Observations 2,812 2,812 2,812 644 644 644 3,456 3,456 3,456 
 
189 
 
6.2.2 Small Firm Size Category 
In this size category time is unaffected by auditors’ suspicion of tax evasion. The tendency 
suggests a deceleration of audit time and total time, but significance occurs only in the 
respective worst fitted model (2 & 8). This is most probably due to suspected findings being 
related to routine activities, see Appendix F Table 61 and Table 62, and this confirms 
hypothesis H2-1. The results of the interaction effect between suspicion and the UTILITIES 
sector group is not interpretable as the combined occurrence is only marginal (see Appendix 
F Table 54). 
The test of hypothesis H2-2 shows only occasional significant effects. In no event do robust 
results arise. Especially in the event of MULTIPLE OFFICES the deceleration of audit time 
is not significant in the best fitted PO model (1). The same applies in the case of report time 
increasing due to an audit at a TAX ADVISER’S OFFICE. 
Notwithstanding the fact that FOLLOW-UP AUDITS are rather untypical in the prior size 
category, it can now be seen that in this event the audit time and the total time are 
significantly decelerated. In the report time a decreasingly significant effect results so that 
in this case it comes merely from a tendency to spend more time-on-task. This can be 
assumed as the coefficients of all models in the total period are smaller than their 
counterparts in the audit period, i.e., the report time also has a delaying effect. Furthermore, 
a time saving effect does not occur due to there being fewer than three fiscal years in one 
audit. Hence hypothesis H2-3 can be confirmed only in its second part. 
As expected with hypothesis H2-4, achievement of CONSENSUS and conduct of FINAL 
DISCUSSION do not significantly affect time consumption. In contrast, agents’ THREAT 
OF NON-AGREEMENT accelerates the total time with significance and the audit time in 
two of the three models, although not in the best fitted one (1). Nonetheless, hypothesis H2-
6 is proven as it can be expected that auditors use this measure principally to reduce their 
total time consumption in order to improve their own performance. Furthermore, the audit 
time decelerates with significance at the .1-level in the best fitted model in the event of 
PENALTY FOR DELAY. That is hypothesis H2-5.  
In addition, hypothesis H2-7 is proven in part. The reference basis for the duration is once 
again 4 TO 6 MONTHS. The audit time accelerates in the event of a shorter duration, but the 
significance level decreases with an increase in model fitting, hence the effect is no more 
significant in the total time period with the best fitted PO model (7). The total time 
190 
 
decelerates significantly at the .1-level in the latter model in the event of a longer duration 
(OVER 1 YEAR). 
The time is unaffected in the event of trifling outcome (hypothesis H2-8). With regard to the 
other outcome variables this also applies for the audit time period (hypothesis H2-9). 
However, the report time decelerates but this effect is not significant in the best fitted model 
(4) so this does not represent a robust result. 
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Table 43: Characteristics of the Audit in the Small Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 39 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the audit in the small firm 
size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
suspected tax evasion=1 0.143 0.184 0.112 1.270 0.810 0.394 0.583 0.326 0.186 
(-1.075) (-2.374)* (-1.624) (0.064) (-0.328) (-0.708) (-0.242) (-1.729)+ (-1.587)    
production #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
trading #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
0.786 1.533 2.454 0.828 1.100 22.716 0.258 1.176 2.878 
(-0.119) (0.510) (0.646) (-0.034) (0.097) (1.269) (-0.530) (0.197) (0.812) 
utilities #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
7.0E+04 2038.102 1.8E+05 4.065 8.913 270.816 1.5E+05 890.098 8.0E+04 
(3.014)** (4.258)*** (2.791)** (0.242) (1.280) (1.497) (2.156)* (3.951)*** (3.277)**  
tax office 0.803 0.522 0.510 0.136 0.375 0.600 0.301 0.357 0.573 
 (-0.149) (-1.183) (-1.050) (-1.290) (-1.864)+ (-0.632) (-0.531) (-1.709)+ (-0.806)    
tax adviser office 0.927 0.488 0.442 0.225 0.432 0.087 0.233 0.357 0.217 
 (-0.050) (-1.315) (-1.427) (-0.946) (-1.686)+ (-2.386)* (-0.640) (-1.727)+ (-1.947)+   
multiple offices 0.050 0.117 0.047 0.687 0.509 0.071 0.070 0.139 0.031 
 (-1.153) (-2.608)** (-2.781)** (-0.149) (-0.876) (-1.587) (-0.920) (-2.535)* (-3.440)*** 
up to 1 month 108.129 16.188 22.691 9.488 3.723 1.489 688.748 21.223 17.126 
 (2.058)* (3.800)*** (3.251)** (0.762) (1.691)+ (0.432) (1.601) (3.312)*** (2.737)**  
2 to 3 months 6.618 3.101 3.024 0.823 1.031 0.983 4.727 2.425 2.757 
 (1.922)+ (3.327)*** (2.845)** (-0.195) (0.090) (-0.044) (1.351) (2.640)** (2.946)**  
7 to 9 months 0.620 1.170 1.281 0.455 0.690 0.663 0.355 1.139 1.014 
 (-0.326) (0.280) (0.421) (-0.549) (-0.780) (-0.474) (-0.707) (0.230) (0.024) 
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10 to 12 months 0.233 0.477 0.180 0.339 0.585 0.990 0.217 0.505 0.243 
 (-1.003) (-1.608) (-1.305) (-0.639) (-1.355) (-0.011) (-1.133) (-1.589) (-1.300)    
over 1 year 0.114 0.479 0.399 0.014 0.197 0.023 0.009 0.273 0.194 
 (-1.109) (-1.304) (-1.481) (-1.433) (-1.963)* (-2.389)* (-1.739)+ (-1.867)+ (-2.354)*   
fy_short 0.296 0.728 0.478 0.124 0.491 0.951 0.236 0.641 0.545 
 (-0.928) (-0.728) (-1.275) (-0.970) (-1.755)+ (-0.086) (-1.023) (-1.008) (-1.056)    
follow-up audit 0.131 0.443 0.446 0.139 0.365 0.143 0.113 0.377 0.292 
 (-2.065)* (-2.136)* (-2.172)* (-1.288) (-2.509)* (-2.993)** (-2.261)* (-2.537)* (-2.812)**  
consensus 2.729 1.254 1.057 5.256 1.590 1.025 5.222 1.708 1.004 
 (0.724) (0.535) (0.068) (0.772) (1.098) (0.042) (1.025) (1.129) (0.005) 
final discussion 0.672 0.916 1.093 3.621 1.299 1.959 0.634 1.008 1.572 
 (-0.474) (-0.299) (0.179) (1.250) (0.698) (1.074) (-0.481) (0.023) (0.899) 
short deadline for reply 1.872 1.764 1.505 1.027 1.221 1.208 2.353 1.832 1.565 
(0.647) (1.561) (0.882) (0.034) (0.668) (0.363) (0.927) (1.651)+ (0.854) 
penalty for delay 0.028 0.222 0.131 54.055 3.176 0.759 0.205 0.621 0.447 
 (-1.941)+ (-2.092)* (-1.817)+ (1.766) (1.317) (-0.234) (-0.625) (-0.831) (-0.942)    
threat of non-agreement 3.521 2.508 3.027 5.580 2.512 2.046 10.535 2.789 5.404 
(1.192) (1.756)+ (1.685)+ (0.857) (1.631) (0.832) (1.656)+ (1.813)+ (2.081)*   
trifling amount 1.873 1.204 0.675 5.347 1.590 3.493 0.550 1.495 0.764 
 (0.148) (0.257) (-0.449) (0.666) (0.712) (0.828) (-0.109) (0.467) (-0.279)    
lnlossreduc 1.084 1.010 0.956 0.876 0.942 1.094 1.061 1.001 1.063 
 (0.792) (0.230) (-0.683) (-0.711) (-1.476) (0.757) (0.556) (0.039) (0.646) 
lndiffpay 1.052 1.015 0.892 0.794 0.898 0.792 0.998 0.997 0.893 
 (0.725) (0.427) (-1.762)+ (-1.721) (-3.182)** (-5.036)*** (-0.023) (-0.102) (-2.539)*   
Observations 5,384 5,384 5,384 1,166 1,166 1,166 6,550 6,550 6,550 
193 
 
6.2.3 Medium Firm Size Category 
If agents have a suspicion of tax evasion, their audit time decelerates significantly. The report 
time also shows a negative effect, but without significance. In the total time period the effect 
of the audit time period is extant, but this occurs at a lower significance level. In addition, in 
the event of auditing of trading-oriented businesses this effect is generally compensated for, 
in comparison to service-oriented businesses. However, this result is not robust as it does 
not occur in the best fitted models (1 & 7). The same conclusion is obtained in the report 
time period as there the second best model (6) is without a significant effect. Hypothesis H2-
1 is proven, however, with the restriction that this result applies only in the SERVICE sector 
without reservation even though not robustly verified. 
As far as the place of work is affected (hypothesis H2-2), results show that audits with 
MULTIPLE OFFICES consume in total more time. This effect is significant at the .1-level 
in the best fitted model (7). In the individual time periods such effects occurs in two of three 
models in each case, but not in the best fitted models (1 & 4) although there is also a negative 
tendency. The same applies to the event of audits in a TAX ADVISER’S OFFICE. The 
deceleration of report time occurs only in the second best (6) and worst models (5). An audit 
in the TAX OFFICE does not lead to significant time changes. 
In this size category different totals of audited fiscal years are not considered since the 
reasons for fewer (more) than three years occur rather in the case of smaller (larger) 
businesses. Instead additional SPECIALIZED AUDITORS arise more frequently so that their 
occurrence is investigated. The results show that no significant additional time consumption 
follows from their additional involvement. Almost the same result applies in the event of 
FOLLOW-UP AUDITs. Audits in the medium size category are more familiar with this so 
that robust significant time effects do not arise. Thus hypothesis H2-3 is proven. 
Auditors’ time consumption is not affected by the events of CONSENSUS and conduct of a 
FINAL DISCUSSION. All exponentiated coefficients are non-significant in the sense of 
hypothesis H2-4. Measures of acceleration are also without robustly significant time effects 
so that the second part of hypotheses H2-5 and H2-6 cannot be proven in this respect.  
However, hypothesis H2-7 holds true as, in comparison to the reference basis of 7 TO 9 
MONTHS, auditors’ time consumption decreases in all periods in the event of a shorter 
duration (1 TO 3 MONTHS) and increases in the event of a longer duration (OVER 1 YEAR). 
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Only in the audit time period and total time period does the latter show highly significant 
effects at the .001-level. On the contrary the report time period is unaffected. 
In the event of a trifling outcome (Hypothesis H2-8) the time is again unaffected. However, 
the result is different with regard to the other outcome variables. The audit time and the total 
time decelerate with high significance at the .01-level in the best fitted models (1 & 7) if 
additional payments increase. The report time period is unaffected. Modifications of loss 
carried forward show no time results. Thus hypothesis H2-9 is disproved.
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Table 44: Characteristics of the Audit in the Medium Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 40 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the audit in the medium firm 
size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
suspected tax evasion=1 0.198 0.349 0.357 0.328 0.751 0.947 0.218 0.393 0.338 
(-2.145)* (-2.627)** (-2.609)** (-1.182) (-0.830) (-0.135) (-1.919)+ (-2.560)* (-2.549)*   
production #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
1.433 1.175 2.260 0.517 0.654 0.581 1.361 1.151 2.362 
(0.152) (0.195) (1.133) (-0.362) (-0.592) (-0.657) (0.123) (0.171) (1.159) 
trading #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
4.503 3.088 5.080 16.852 3.453 3.653 6.984 3.136 5.618 
(1.062) (1.877)+ (1.958)+ (1.673)+ (2.002)* (1.617) (1.338) (1.891)+ (2.325)*   
utilities #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
12.661 3.000 4.457 0.897 0.930 0.743 8.705 2.750 2.831 
(1.664)+ (1.455) (1.606) (-0.053) (-0.086) (-0.193) (1.243) (1.254) (1.007) 
tax office 0.550 0.787 0.774 0.840 0.624 0.725 0.499 0.710 0.747 
 (-0.664) (-0.641) (-0.567) (-0.167) (-1.230) (-0.745) (-0.836) (-0.963) (-0.612)    
tax adviser office 0.594 0.751 0.775 0.338 0.464 0.522 0.415 0.651 0.782 
 (-0.661) (-0.912) (-0.684) (-1.450) (-2.574)* (-1.890)+ (-1.098) (-1.397) (-0.634)    
multiple offices 0.159 0.389 0.301 0.193 0.380 0.278 0.106 0.343 0.280 
 (-1.553) (-1.803)+ (-2.064)* (-1.347) (-2.005)* (-2.665)** (-1.814)+ (-2.004)* (-2.228)*   
up to 1 month 0.488 1.092 1.032 1.442 1.877 3.327 0.590 1.307 1.247 
 (-0.505) (0.180) (0.053) (0.283) (1.296) (1.735)+ (-0.371) (0.554) (0.397) 
2 to 3 months 5.682 3.017 4.479 5.343 3.614 5.992 7.348 3.493 5.038 
 (2.414)* (3.587)*** (4.068)*** (2.533)* (3.947)*** (3.305)*** (2.619)** (3.986)*** (4.164)*** 
4 to 6 months 1.183 1.218 1.102 1.466 1.623 1.436 1.404 1.371 1.143 
 (0.258) (0.728) (0.320) (0.548) (1.617) (0.825) (0.501) (1.127) (0.437) 
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10 to 12 months 0.221 0.496 0.545 0.802 1.352 1.934 0.264 0.588 0.644 
 (-1.625) (-1.887)+ (-1.230) (-0.216) (0.655) (0.774) (-1.477) (-1.403) (-0.764)    
over 1 year 0.009 0.119 0.121 0.221 0.697 0.961 0.013 0.149 0.137 
 (-4.429)*** (-5.022)*** (-4.009)*** (-1.261) (-0.853) (-0.064) (-4.372)*** (-4.795)*** (-3.355)*** 
consulted specialized auditors 0.184 0.659 0.705 0.392 0.593 0.554 0.238 0.702 0.772 
(-1.421) (-1.038) (-0.810) (-1.115) (-1.497) (-0.899) (-1.438) (-1.019) (-0.581)    
follow-up audit 0.654 0.939 1.640 0.422 0.573 0.585 0.610 0.839 1.554 
 (-0.786) (-0.246) (1.256) (-1.422) (-2.304)* (-1.787)+ (-0.945) (-0.830) (1.152) 
consensus 0.987 0.853 0.795 0.656 0.898 0.772 0.988 0.857 0.768 
 (-0.018) (-0.649) (-0.887) (-0.638) (-0.416) (-0.718) (-0.020) (-0.623) (-0.949)    
final discussion 0.643 0.878 0.886 2.179 1.291 1.402 0.925 0.976 0.988 
 (-0.848) (-0.604) (-0.464) (1.347) (1.164) (0.898) (-0.153) (-0.114) (-0.043)    
short deadline for reply 0.579 0.743 0.598 0.818 0.951 1.128 0.565 0.766 0.656 
(-1.164) (-1.489) (-2.401)* (-0.420) (-0.245) (0.594) (-1.230) (-1.352) (-1.937)+   
penalty for delay 1.620 1.251 1.792 2.040 1.381 1.584 2.127 1.334 1.857 
 (0.498) (0.544) (1.251) (1.198) (1.048) (1.026) (0.897) (0.757) (1.391) 
threat of non-agreement 0.664 0.907 0.648 2.531 1.787 2.344 0.763 1.018 0.752 
(-0.515) (-0.319) (-1.176) (1.640) (2.483)* (2.423)* (-0.348) (0.059) (-0.878)    
trifling amount 1.360 1.512 2.321 1.896 1.357 1.533 1.764 1.879 2.568 
 (0.381) (0.973) (1.507) (0.788) (0.874) (0.948) (0.669) (1.396) (1.689)+   
lnlossreduc 0.960 0.969 0.957 1.018 0.990 0.998 0.964 0.967 0.954 
 (-0.376) (-1.034) (-1.477) (0.206) (-0.353) (-0.070) (-0.359) (-1.122) (-1.573)    
lndiffpay 0.786 0.887 0.873 1.090 1.030 1.025 0.815 0.900 0.897 
 (-3.068)** (-3.754)*** (-4.569)*** (1.026) (0.885) (0.669) (-2.721)** (-3.421)*** (-3.755)*** 
Observations 10,136 10,136 10,136 1,995 1,995 1,995 12,131 12,131 12,131 
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6.2.4 Large Firm Size Category 
In the event of a suspicion of tax evasion, auditors’ audit time and total time decelerate 
highly significantly at the .001-level in the best fitted PH models (3 & 9). The report time 
shows no significant effects. From the interaction effect with the sector groups there result 
no additional significant effects.140 Hypothesis H2-1 is proven. 
When audits take place in AUDITORS’ TAX OFFICES, time accelerates highly significantly 
at the .001-level in the PH models. This effect occurs in the audit time and total time period, 
but agents also consume less time in the report period. This could stem from the fact that 
auditors perform all work steps rather in summarized form in this event. The audit itself and 
the report writing are conducted at the same place of work. In contrast, in the reference basis 
the audit is conducted at the business place. The report writing can then proceed across 
different places. In general the TAX OFFICE is appropriated, but in the case of large 
businesses it is also possible that agents write their report on the firm’s premises as all their 
records are on site. It is presumed that report writing would take place in each case at TAX 
OFFICEs, and it should not make a difference whether an agent audits in his or her office 
or on the firm’s premises. Consequently, the significant report time effects must be a result 
of writing on the firm’s premises. However, whether this assumption is true cannot be proven 
as the participants did not make a statement specifically about this. In addition, the sporadic 
effects in the event of MULTIPLE OFFICES are not robust because the second best fitted 
PO model shows no significance. But the actual place where agents write their report is 
relevant, as in the previous cases when audits were conducted at MULTIPLE OFFICES. In 
sum, hypothesis H2-2 is proven and outstanding issues should be elucidated by further 
research. 
Revenue agents’ time consumption increases when more than three fiscal years are audited; 
this is at least relevant in approximately 20 % of all audit cases in this size category (see 
above Table 35). The significance increases in the audit time period with increasing fitting 
of the model and achieves the .001-level in the PH model. This effect is mitigated due to the 
report time period so that in the total time period the significance falls at the .01-level in the 
PH model. Besides this, the deceleration in the report is not significant in the best fitted PH 
model, even though the conclusion is allowed that with an increase in the number of audited 
fiscal years the time consumption also increases as a whole. Furthermore, the involvement 
                                                 
140  See for an including of interactions Appendix G Table 71. 
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of SPECIALIZED AGENTS affects time consumption only in scattered cases and hence 
without a robust result. In addition, FOLLOW-UP AUDITs decelerate time, but without any 
significance. That is, in sum, hypothesis H2-3. 
To hypothesis H2-4 a distinction should be drawn between cases of CONSENSUS and 
FINAL DISCUSSION. In the event of the latter, report time decelerates significantly at the 
.05-level. This result is valid in the case of non-agreement and shows that agents spend more 
time in report writing following a FINAL DISCUSSION than without such an intensive 
exchange. In my opinion this could be caused by an additional effort to deal with any 
arguments or disagreements submitted against auditors’ findings. Results also show that in 
the event of CONSENSUS an opposite effect does not occur in the report time; however, the 
audit time accelerates, but without significance in the best fitted PH model. Due to this 
hypothesis H2-4 is not proven, but a tendency is recognizable. 
Concerning possible issues of acceleration, the measure of SHORT DEADLINES FOR 
REPLY shows a deceleration of audit time in fact, with significance at the .1-level in the PH 
model. This reinforces the assumption (hypothesis H2-5) that time consumption is actually 
increased when revenue agents perceive audit delay by auditees as conscious and they are 
tempted to counteract. For the other measures no significant effects result.  
Insofar as it concerns the duration, hypothesis H2-6 is tested on the reference basis of a 
relatively long period (1 TO 1.5 YEARS). The results show a significant acceleration of audit 
time and total time as well as of report time in the first two duration intervals. In contrast, if 
the audit lasts longer then report time decelerates significantly, but this is not applicable to 
the audit time and total time even though a similar tendency is visible. 
The test of hypothesis H2-8 proves the exception that the de minimis limit does not affect 
revenue agents’ time consumption. All models have no significant effects. The situation is 
different in the cases of additional payments and reduction of loss carried forward. With an 
increase in the latter reduction, audit time and report time decelerate at the .1-level of 
significance in the best fitted PH models. The report time decelerates too, but the significant 
effect is lacking in the PH model so that this result is not classified as robust. The same 
occurs with regard to additional payments as the second best PO model has no significant 
effects whereas the best fitted are significant at the .01-level, and the worst fitted probit 
model at the .1-level. Thus hypothesis H2-9 is not explicitly proven.
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Table 45: Characteristics of the Audit in the Large Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 41 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the audit in the large firm 
size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
suspected tax evasion=1 0.067 0.246 0.168 0.798 0.799 1.265 0.088 0.288 0.225 
(-2.897)** (-3.268)** (-3.836)*** (-0.324) (-0.686) (0.606) (-3.778)*** (-4.292)*** (-4.340)*** 
production #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
0.713 0.882 1.091 0.536 0.896 0.456                
(-0.274) (-0.226) (0.124) (-0.429) (-0.161) (-1.058)                
trading #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
2.506 2.263 2.342 0.668 0.581 0.182                
(0.466) (0.976) (0.842) (-0.302) (-0.685) (-1.372)                
utilities #  
suspected tax evasion=1 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000                
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)                
tax office 12.724 2.769 3.537 14.024 4.118 4.467 14.995 3.554 4.008 
 (2.082)* (2.712)** (3.428)*** (4.094)*** (4.707)*** (3.826)*** (2.491)* (3.487)*** (3.707)*** 
tax adviser office 1.073 1.078 1.435 1.432 1.162 1.535 1.057 1.102 1.484 
 (0.139) (0.350) (1.324) (0.610) (0.639) (1.451) (0.105) (0.447) (1.391) 
multiple offices 0.650 0.750 0.769 0.302 0.483 0.353 0.483 0.648 0.516 
 (-0.483) (-0.853) (-0.589) (-1.621) (-2.031)* (-2.685)** (-0.725) (-1.177) (-1.392)    
up to 1 month 759.640 15.124 13.321 252.549 16.687 89.931 1383.555 21.685 20.748 
 (3.519)*** (3.478)*** (2.170)* (4.797)*** (6.398)*** (6.913)*** (3.925)*** (3.805)*** (2.585)**  
2 to 3 months 52.768 6.178 12.949 7.480 2.891 5.116 55.575 6.461 13.605 
 (3.951)*** (5.094)*** (5.784)*** (2.633)** (3.502)*** (4.629)*** (4.065)*** (5.276)*** (6.267)*** 
4 to 6 months 5.192 1.930 2.349 2.442 1.610 2.104 4.936 1.935 2.401 
 (2.396)* (2.304)* (2.451)* (1.293) (1.624) (2.319)* (2.289)* (2.276)* (2.637)**  
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7 to 9 months 3.788 1.701 2.658 1.284 1.169 1.513 3.466 1.628 2.404 
 (1.727)+ (1.775)+ (2.885)** (0.339) (0.541) (1.316) (1.656)+ (1.657)+ (2.708)**  
10 to 12 months 3.583 1.710 1.757 1.284 1.162 0.885 3.860 1.755 1.595 
 (1.486) (1.618) (1.548) (0.285) (0.456) (-0.287) (1.501) (1.688)+ (1.251) 
1.5 to 2 years 0.398 0.583 0.512 0.218 0.438 0.305 0.356 0.567 0.484 
 (-1.029) (-1.411) (-1.601) (-1.798)+ (-2.194)* (-2.775)** (-1.136) (-1.440) (-1.833)+   
over 2 years 0.551 0.765 0.548 0.143 0.417 0.332 0.525 0.704 0.564 
 (-0.844) (-0.746) (-1.722)+ (-2.649)** (-2.624)** (-3.210)** (-0.933) (-1.019) (-1.722)+   
consulted specialized auditors 0.608 0.870 0.642 0.522 0.748 0.805 0.538 0.790 0.625 
(-0.953) (-0.546) (-1.738)+ (-1.337) (-1.298) (-0.997) (-1.183) (-0.943) (-1.790)+   
fy_long 0.286 0.670 0.495 0.491 0.692 0.867 0.298 0.630 0.532 
 (-2.451)* (-1.749)+ (-3.392)*** (-1.720)+ (-1.858)+ (-0.651) (-2.419)* (-2.189)* (-3.238)**  
follow-up audit 0.689 0.710 0.730 0.924 0.950 0.984 0.732 0.735 0.764 
 (-0.734) (-1.361) (-1.128) (-0.145) (-0.230) (-0.068) (-0.586) (-1.235) (-1.016)    
consensus 2.810 1.708 1.311 1.066 1.053 0.824 2.254 1.557 1.223 
 (1.980)* (2.328)* (1.167) (0.128) (0.215) (-0.822) (1.513) (1.901)+ (0.864) 
final discussion 0.571 0.737 0.720 0.335 0.613 0.585 0.509 0.722 0.682 
 (-1.435) (-1.700)+ (-1.611) (-1.984)* (-2.277)* (-2.417)* (-1.573) (-1.768)+ (-1.823)+   
short deadline for reply 0.484 0.740 0.704 1.066 1.018 1.073 0.542 0.750 0.740 
(-1.976)* (-1.775)+ (-1.790)+ (0.143) (0.091) (0.363) (-1.715)+ (-1.814)+ (-1.619)    
penalty for delay 1.765 1.439 1.711 0.874 1.021 1.414 1.482 1.319 1.759 
 (0.686) (1.038) (1.151) (-0.168) (0.049) (0.824) (0.448) (0.750) (1.184) 
threat of non-agreement 0.580 0.729 0.704 0.736 0.858 0.977 0.607 0.753 0.750 
(-0.987) (-1.261) (-1.257) (-0.472) (-0.619) (-0.078) (-0.868) (-1.127) (-1.007)    
trifling amount 1.146 1.149 1.742 0.673 0.911 1.052 1.011 1.106 1.689 
 (0.200) (0.495) (1.622) (-0.616) (-0.345) (0.157) (0.016) (0.358) (1.550) 
lnlossreduc 0.949 0.977 0.973 0.961 0.981 0.986 0.950 0.977 0.976 
 (-2.079)* (-1.944)+ (-1.957)+ (-1.930)+ (-1.733)+ (-1.205) (-2.160)* (-1.968)* (-1.764)+   
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lndiffpay 0.988 0.995 0.978 0.952 0.972 0.949 0.974 0.988 0.969 
 (-0.271) (-0.295) (-1.122) (-1.358) (-1.744)+ (-2.626)** (-0.566) (-0.658) (-1.518)    
Observations 31,366 31,366 31,366 6,081 6,081 6,081 37,447 37,447 37,447 
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6.2.5 Interims Conclusion 
If a suspicion of tax evasion arises, revenue agents’ time consumption increases during the 
audit time period and hence also for the total time period if micro, medium, or large firms 
are subject to the audit. So far as micro firms are audited, the report time increases too, as 
the fraudulent adjustments require more detailed representations. So it is expected that the 
strongest time pressure in labor-intensive tasks, such suspected tax evasion, occurs in the 
smallest size category. This effect vanishes the more familiar the agent becomes with the 
relevant findings—routine activities—and time pressure decreases as well. This explains the 
absence of results in the small size category. Again, attention should be directed to the 
summarized presentations of findings in Table 61 and Table 62 in Appendix F. Apart from 
this, the results do not show an impact of the group of sectors on agents’ time consumption 
for suspected tax evasion. 
By way of derogation from the principle of an audit on business premises, the different 
places of work lead to various results. If auditors conduct audits in a local tax office their 
consumption of audit time and total time increase in the case of micro firms and decrease in 
the case of large firms. In addition, insofar as the report time is further affected it could be 
caused by the assumption that auditors usually write a report on an audit of large firms on 
those firms’ actual premises, so that report time will accelerate in the event of an audit in a 
tax office. This cannot be proven by this study, as the place of report writing was not queried 
in the questionnaire. This outstanding issue should be addressed by further research. If audits 
are at several offices simultaneously, audit time and total time increase in the case of micro 
firms. In the case of medium firms only audit time increases; for the total time consumption 
the results show merely a tendency. This tendency shows in the case of small firms too. 
Neither trends are considered as robust.  
Furthermore, audit time and total time consumption decrease significantly in the micro size 
category, if agents audit less than three fiscal years. However, the significance of this effect 
decreases with an increase in model fitting. Additionally, this effect does not occur in the 
next size category. No evidence for an explicit time saving has been provided for shorter 
audit periods (fewer than three fiscal years). So new aspects to the ongoing debate arise from 
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these findings. If agents audit more than three fiscal years in the case of large firms,141 their 
time consumption increases significantly. 
Relating to follow-up audits revenue agents consume more time when they audit small firms. 
With an increase in firm size such effects disappear. In all size categories it is without an 
effect whether the parties reach an agreement about auditors’ findings or not. For SMEs the 
same is true for final discussions. However, in the case of large firms agents spend more 
time in report writing following a final discussion, probably caused by additional effort 
required to address any arguments submitted against auditors findings.  
If revenue agents perceive audit delay caused by auditees or by their tax advisers, they are 
tempted to counteract. The results of the observed accelerating measures show that time-on-
task is unaffected in most cases. Thus it appears that the use of such counteracting measures 
is often successful. Only in two cases does audit time increase, namely in the event of penalty 
in the small and of short deadlines in the large size category. In addition, the results prove 
in part the assumption that agents use the threat of non-agreement to cut their own time-on-
task in the case of smaller auditees in part.   
A further interesting issue is that audits with an outcome less than the de minims limits have 
no effect on revenue agents’ consumption of audit time and report time, regardless of the 
size category. As well as the obtained outcomes, these do not affect the time consumption 
in the micro and small size category. In contrast, the audit time increases with an increase in 
additional payments in the medium size and reductions of loss carried-forward in the large 
size category. 
As expected, audit duration affects time consumption. With regard to the reference basis, in 
each case the consumption increases in the event of a longer duration. The difference 
between the different size categories is that either the audit and/or total time is affected 
(SMEs) or the report time (large businesses). In the event of a shorter duration it is similar: 
either the audit and total time is affected (small businesses) or all time periods (medium and 
large businesses). 
Finally, with regard to medium and large-sized businesses, time consumption is unaffected 
by an additional involvement of specialized agents. This means that auditors’ time-on-task 
neither increases nor decreases. The first effect is in line with the administrative motivation 
                                                 
141  This situation is obligatory in accordance with German tax law if audits have to connect to prior audits in 
the case of a delayed beginning.  
204 
 
to implement specialized agents. However, the latter is surprising as auditors have vacant 
time windows due to the transfer of highly complex focal points. 
6.3 Characteristics of the Auditor 
With regard to the characteristics of auditors I assume as reference basis a female agent who 
is between 40 and 50 years of age. This category includes the average age in the Berlin tax 
administration. The other parameters depend on the respective size category. 
The post estimation parameters from Table 38 to Table 41 are once again omitted in the 
following tables with the exception of the number of observations. 
6.3.1 Micro Firm Size Category 
This size category departs from the others as so-called “micro-entities agents” conduct field 
audits in many cases. These agents usually have a lower education level and are paid less 
than auditors from a higher career path. Therefore the female agents in the reference basis 
are salaried according to the grade A9s/A9z, predominately conduct audits of SMEs, and 
have between 10 and 15 years’ experience as auditors. 
The results show that in the event of beginning as an auditor the audit time is significantly 
decelerated. This effect is mitigated due to the report time period so that in total time robust 
effects cannot be assumed as the second best fitted PO model loses its significance. But audit 
time also decelerates to a greater extent with experience. In the group of 15 TO 20 years the 
significance of this effect still decreases with an increase in model fitting so that in the best 
fitted PH model no significance is found. However, in the most experienced group this effect 
is robust with regard to the audit time at the .1-level, and to the total time even at the .05-
level. Taking interaction effects into account, the results show that the effect relating to the 
experience group 15 TO 20 concerns almost exclusively the age group 50 TO 60 because 
older agents are only represented in two experience groups, namely in the reference basis 
and OVER 20 (see Appendix F Table 53). The adjusted result is that the level of coefficients 
is closer together.142 Besides, the combination of OVER 20 years’ experience and older than 
60 is only poorly represented so that the interacting effects are not interpretable. 
Consequently, hypothesis H3-1 is only partly proven as the time consumption is also 
increased if agents have already changed at an early stage in their careers to the audit 
                                                 
142  PO model: .034 × 3.326 = .113; probit model: .195 × 1.928 = .378; PH model: .237 × .486 = .115. 
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department. In other words, for the same age group and the same career path and step those 
agents who changed at a younger age consume more audit time per case. 
With regard to auditors’ age, hypothesis H3-2 is partly proven as only older agents (50 TO 
60) consume more report time. This effect is significant at the .1-level across all models. 
Agents who are salaried on a lower career step (A8) consume significantly more audit time. 
This effect is weakened as shown in the total time period. Due to only a few representatives 
making up this subgroup the result should not be overvalued. Agents from a higher career 
path consume time in different manner. Agents with salary grades A9/A10 audit with more 
time-on-task but this result is not robust. The report time is decelerated with significant 
effects, although not in the best fitted model. Nonetheless, the comparison of agents in the 
entry salary grades of the second career path with agents in the highest salary grade in the 
lower career path shows that the consumption of audit time hardly differs and the 
consumption of report time increases. However, audit time decelerates significantly when 
the main field of work of agents with grades A9/A10 is with corporate companies instead of 
SMEs (PH model: .970 × .00007 × 168.679 = .012), in which case the report time then 
accelerates significantly (PO model: .306 × .0007 × 9,446.593 = 2.057). The latter follows 
from their greater experience in more complex tasks. Agents from the lower career path do 
not audit LARGE ENTERPRISES or corporate companies in general (see Appendix F Table 
53). However, agents on the higher career path and who declare up to 15 years’ experience 
as an agent and their main field of work in SMEs should consume less time. It could be 
assumed that their performance is weaker so that they were not promoted to higher grades 
in the past. But agents with higher salary grades do not consume less time in each case. In 
detail, if the main field of work is SMEs, agents with salary grades A11 or A12/A13s 
consume less audit time and report time in the best fitted models, at which a significant effect 
occurs only in the highest grades A12/A13s. It should be noted that audits of SMEs are not 
the main field of work for the highest salaried agents in general. Therefore, these results do 
not count as robust. It is taken into account though that the main field of work becomes more 
complex with an increase in salary grade. The interaction results show that agents with grade 
A11 consume significantly less audit time and report time,143 whereas audits conducted by 
                                                 
143  If the main field of work is large enterprises, PH model (audit period): 2.234 × 8.62E-16 × 6.02E+14 = 
1.159 and PO model (report period): 1.658 × 8.65E-16 × 4.45E+16 = 63.833, and if it is corporate 
companies, PH model: 2.23 × .00007 x 1,204,170 = 195.590 and PO model: 1.658 × .0007 x 8,596.107 = 
10.155. 
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agents with A12/A13s significantly decelerate, with the exception of report time which 
accelerates in the event of corporate companies representing the main field of work.144 
The conclusion from these results provides that an increase in experience measured in salary 
grades does not affect revenue agents’ time consumption in the event of the same experience 
as an auditor and the same main field of work (SME). Hypothesis H3-3 is proven, but this 
result is surprising and requires further research into the quality of audits. Two main 
questions are obvious: 1) Do differences exist between agents of either career path as their 
education is different, or not? In the first alternative agents of the second career path audit 
more complex focal points than their counterparts of the first career path in the same time, 
and in the second alternative all agents audit focal points with comparable complexity in the 
same time. 2) Why do agents with a less complex main field of work than their salary grade 
demands—A12/A13s and SMEs—not save significant time? If the main field of work 
changes to more complex fields—in connection with increased salary grades—it is shown 
that report time accelerates significantly due to more experience in task complexity. Hence 
hypothesis H3-4 is proven. However, only agents with grade A11 can apparently fit their 
working methods to cases of the micro size category relating to their audit time and report 
time. Agents with the highest grades (A12/A13s) consume much more audit time than 
reference agents from the lower career path. It can be assumed that they apply their methods 
of working for LARGE ENTERPRISES and corporate companies to micro firms so that, 
consequently, they spend more time-on-task. Agents with grade A11 are still more familiar 
with audits of SMEs than higher salaried agents who usually conduct audits of more complex 
firms. 
In addition, hypothesis H3-5 is valid since in the smallest size category time pressure is 
inherent and the results relating to auditors’ SEX are almost identical. The exponentiated 
coefficient for male auditors differs only slightly compared to 1.
                                                 
144  If the main field of work is large enterprises, PH model (audit period): 143.188 × 8.62E-16 =1.234E-13 
and PO model (report period): 3074.243 × 8.65E-16 = 2.659E-12, and if it is corporate companies, PH 
model: 143.188 × .00007 = .010 and PO model: 3,074.243 × .0007 = 2.190. 
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Table 46: Characteristics of the Auditor in the Micro Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 38 and Table 42 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditor in 
the micro firm size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
up to 5 0.012 0.127 0.016 0.326 1.001 0.985 0.024 0.170 0.014 
 (-2.054)* (-2.887)** (-2.585)** (-0.644) (0.002) (-0.014) (-1.554) (-2.574)* (-2.493)*   
5 to 10 0.155 0.654 0.039 7.655 2.783 7.065 0.522 0.867 0.075 
 (-0.226) (-0.375) (-1.120) (1.641) (1.616) (1.473) (-0.113) (-0.143) (-0.923)    
15 to 20 0.034 0.195 0.237 0.101 0.379 0.128 0.054 0.238 0.235 
 (-1.872)+ (-2.722)** (-1.159) (-1.384) (-1.321) (-1.114) (-1.828)+ (-2.518)* (-1.151)    
over 20 0.005 0.088 0.060 0.035 0.317 0.756 0.008 0.098 0.053 
 (-1.946)+ (-3.023)** (-1.905)+ (-1.217) (-1.441) (-0.200) (-1.985)* (-2.934)** (-2.150)*   
20 to 30 6.673 2.710 20.373 10.155 2.054 4.624 7.765 3.072 21.496 
 (0.744) (1.220) (2.691)** (1.548) (1.188) (1.674)+ (0.805) (1.384) (2.594)**  
30 to 40 5.920 2.258 4.870 1.177 0.957 2.230 7.231 2.707 5.030 
 (0.873) (1.084) (0.968) (0.097) (-0.066) (0.699) (1.002) (1.400) (0.927) 
50 to 60 0.244 0.546 0.519 0.023 0.304 0.162 0.156 0.494 0.280 
 (-0.861) (-1.116) (-1.044) (-1.907)+ (-1.719)+ (-1.693)+ (-1.052) (-1.323) (-1.792)+   
over 60 0.016 0.234 0.022 0.000 0.079 0.013 0.003 0.187 0.006 
 (-0.628) (-0.962) (-1.781)+ (-2.020)* (-1.353) (-1.057) (-1.075) (-1.145) (-2.015)*   
up to 5 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
up to 5 # 30 to 40 4.066 1.999 8.925 0.711 0.738 0.264 2.552 1.421 7.888 
 (0.490) (0.748) (1.039) (-0.189) (-0.385) (-0.864) (0.321) (0.370) (0.992) 
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up to 5 # 50 to 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
up to 5 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # 30 to 40 1.198 0.730 24.422 0.123 0.296 0.116 0.292 0.435 6.913 
 (0.023) (-0.275) (1.021) (-0.888) (-1.488) (-1.248) (-0.225) (-0.784) (0.628) 
5 to 10 # 50 to 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
15 to 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
15 to 20 # 30 to 40 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
15 to 20 # 50 to 60 3.326 1.938 0.486 5.784 2.237 14.075 3.447 1.613 0.475 
 (0.368) (0.621) (-0.499) (0.578) (0.797) (1.486) (0.354) (0.469) (-0.459)    
15 to 20 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (2.629)** (2.987)** (4.435)*** (.) (.) (.) (1.770)+ (2.144)* (3.100)**  
over 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
over 20 # 30 to 40 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
over 20 # 50 to 60 0.101 0.563 0.036 0.011 0.291 0.008 0.011 0.382 0.011 
 (-0.366) (-0.429) (-1.148) (-1.041) (-0.734) (-2.240)* (-0.863) (-0.616) (-1.453)    
over 20 # over 60 8.1E+04 104.553 3.9E+04 489.032 1.375 1.256 4.0E+04 53.420 2.7E+04 
 (1.669)+ (2.688)** (3.426)*** (1.046) (0.171) (0.056) (1.838)+ (2.288)* (3.014)**  
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A8 0.013 0.108 0.047 2.484 2.289 4.209 0.023 0.158 0.131 
 (-1.743)+ (-2.862)** (-2.863)** (0.272) (0.860) (1.124) (-1.536) (-2.396)* (-1.653)+   
A9/A10 0.191 0.433 0.970 0.306 0.405 0.146 0.091 0.355 0.753 
 (-0.803) (-1.361) (-0.028) (-1.095) (-1.755)+ (-2.025)* (-1.211) (-1.721)+ (-0.240)    
A11 0.360 0.579 2.234 1.658 0.995 1.194 0.305 0.539 1.612 
 (-0.523) (-1.015) (0.991) (0.461) (-0.009) (0.206) (-0.734) (-1.156) (0.532) 
A12/A13s 7.674 1.466 143.188 3074.243 4.405 9.307 21.345 1.978 247.249 
 (0.616) (0.294) (2.360)* (2.018)* (1.028) (0.856) (0.857) (0.510) (2.382)*   
large enterprises 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-3.517)*** (-6.146)*** (-4.425)*** (-3.163)** (-4.396)*** (-4.356)*** (-3.884)*** (-6.473)*** (-4.269)*** 
corporate groups 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.137 0.043 0.000 0.012 0.000 
 (-2.023)* (-2.616)** (-4.206)*** (-1.649)+ (-1.354) (-1.474) (-2.217)* (-2.945)** (-4.227)*** 
A8 #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A8 #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9/A10 #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9/A10 #  
corporate groups 
309.890 16.187 168.670 9446.593 29.462 96.191 615.495 31.966 392.239 
(1.273) (1.742)+ (2.443)* (2.531)* (2.022)* (2.113)* (1.573) (2.289)* (2.881)**  
A11 #  
large enterprises 
1.1E+20 1.3E+09 6.0E+14 4.4E+16 1.6E+06 1.5E+09 3.6E+21 3.2E+09 3.0E+16 
(3.460)*** (5.973)*** (4.339)*** (3.191)** (4.206)*** (4.150)*** (3.934)*** (6.163)*** (4.249)*** 
A11 #  
corporate groups 
4.7E+05 612.686 1.2E+06 8596.107 44.322 99.797 5.0E+05 838.018 9.4E+05 
(2.107)* (3.327)*** (4.105)*** (1.824)+ (2.273)* (2.047)* (2.310)* (3.736)*** (3.800)*** 
A12/A13s #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A12/A13s #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
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sex 0.923 0.967 0.990 0.766 0.925 1.029 0.883 0.940 0.828 
 (-0.106) (-0.122) (-0.022) (-0.380) (-0.297) (0.071) (-0.197) (-0.236) (-0.402)    
Observations 2,812 2,812 2,812 644 644 644 3,456 3,456 3,456 
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6.3.2 Small Firm Size Category 
This size category is normally the starting point for new revenue agents. The reference basis 
is 5 TO 10 years’ experience as an agent on the basis of having undergone training on the 
job within the first five years of the career. The reference basis comprises, moreover, the 
first two salary grades of the second career path (A9/A10) and SMEs as the main field of 
work. 
The results show no robust effects of more experience on time even though the tendency 
suggests an acceleration in the groups 10 TO 15 and 15 TO 20. Neither do any robust results 
occur relating to auditors’ age. Only the youngest auditors save time, but this effect is not 
significant in the audit time period in the second best fitted model (3) and in the total time 
period in the best fitted model (7). The same applies with regard to the interaction effect of 
experience and age. The expected deceleration effect on report time (H3-2) is not proven in 
the event of older agents with more experience. In no cases are all models significant. 
Furthermore, the results cannot prove hypothesis H3-4. More experienced auditors do not 
save audit and/or report time. This is true regardless of more complex main fields of work 
and also in the interaction of salary grade A11 and CORPORATE GROUPS. The significance 
of the latter results solely from too few participants appearing within this combination.  
Hypothesis H3-5 is valid as before. Time pressure is also inherent in the small size category 
and significant effects do not occur. Hence there are no existing differences in time 
consumption between the SEXes.
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Table 47: Characteristics of the Auditor in the Small Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 39 and Table 43 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditor in 
the small firm size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
up to 5 0.430 1.887 11.301 6.527 2.836 2.757 0.730 2.606 11.772 
 (-0.302) (0.718) (1.162) (0.939) (1.670)+ (0.780) (-0.115) (1.129) (1.350) 
10 to 15 2.411 2.944 15.301 46.693 5.630 4.032 10.434 3.873 21.012 
 (0.300) (1.098) (1.251) (1.168) (2.029)* (0.821) (0.683) (1.397) (1.534) 
15 to 20 6.935 6.446 34.484 118.839 8.511 2.153 20.902 10.104 26.274 
 (0.671) (1.903)+ (1.465) (1.854)+ (2.459)* (0.497) (0.848) (2.395)* (1.692)+ 
over 20 2.006 1.399 0.702 0.296 0.678 1.058 1.083 1.211 2.919 
 (0.231) (0.296) (-0.211) (-0.273) (-0.462) (0.032) (0.028) (0.215) (0.545) 
20 to 30 77.939 7.540 7.165 1.206 1.060 1.344 67.884 5.807 24.935 
 (2.788)** (2.694)** (1.306) (0.063) (0.077) (0.275) (1.723) (2.284)* (2.530)* 
30 to 40 0.153 1.142 3.455 0.037 0.298 0.036 0.038 0.544 1.631 
 (-0.579) (0.141) (0.541) (-0.835) (-1.331) (-1.621) (-0.931) (-0.748) (0.258) 
50 to 60 0.145 0.383 0.194 274.622 3.716 0.126 0.346 0.964 0.065 
 (-0.623) (-0.751) (-0.686) (1.333) (1.362) (-0.925) (-0.298) (-0.035) (-0.944) 
over 60 2.106 2.922 23.609 5.356 2.086 2.253 28.293 5.126 14.869 
 (0.473) (1.079) (1.608) (0.669) (1.173) (0.870) (1.559) (1.909)+ (1.936)+ 
up to 5 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
up to 5 # 30 to 40 21.854 1.006 0.231 10.121 1.794 5.838 48.930 1.454 0.472 
 (0.880) (0.005) (-0.571) (0.502) (0.567) (0.992) (0.960) (0.388) (-0.389) 
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up to 5 # 50 to 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
up to 5 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
10 to 15 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
10 to 15 # 30 to 40 11.974 1.454 0.223 0.821 0.731 3.104 22.902 2.355 0.426 
 (0.651) (0.291) (-0.590) (-0.040) (-0.271) (0.549) (0.700) (0.729) (-0.396) 
10 to 15 # 50 to 60 0.307 0.724 1.026 0.000 0.105 2.880 0.082 0.296 2.237 
 (-0.343) (-0.239) (0.011) (-1.590) (-1.879)+ (0.454) (-0.633) (-0.997) (0.294) 
10 to 15 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.699) (1.753)+ (-4.871)*** (-0.986) (-0.988) (0.990) (0.267) (0.892) (1.574) 
15 to 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
15 to 20 # 30 to 40 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
15 to 20 # 50 to 60 0.036 0.280 0.343 0.000 0.017 1.405 0.012 0.068 1.712 
 (-0.677) (-0.873) (-0.457) (-2.280)* (-3.084)** (0.124) (-1.024) (-1.960)* (0.163) 
15 to 20 # over 60 0.054 0.054 0.011 0.000 0.015 0.114 0.000 0.011 0.024 
 (-0.732) (-1.698)+ (-1.577) (-1.783)+ (-3.169)** (-0.927) (-1.227) (-2.643)** (-2.089)* 
over 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
over 20 # 30 to 40 0.002 0.092 0.411 1.321 1.239 0.298 0.040 0.222 0.129 
 (-1.696)+ (-1.479) (-0.405) (0.044) (0.145) (-0.317) (-0.661) (-1.006) (-0.754) 
over 20 # 50 to 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
over 20 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
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A8 1.177 1.001 1.105 0.480 0.728 2.599 0.459 0.931 1.586 
 (0.092) (0.001) (0.113) (-0.374) (-0.418) (1.098) (-0.518) (-0.128) (0.707) 
A9s/A9z 9.229 3.497 3.175 0.061 0.403 0.620 4.216 2.620 3.590 
 (1.321) (1.849)+ (1.516) (-1.458) (-1.658)+ (-0.523) (0.846) (1.455) (1.686)+ 
A11 0.385 0.594 0.604 0.603 0.607 0.577 0.222 0.576 0.575 
 (-0.951) (-1.357) (-0.738) (-0.463) (-1.604) (-1.207) (-1.364) (-1.487) (-0.999) 
A12/A13s 0.650 0.805 0.551 2.521 1.732 1.272 0.367 0.831 0.427 
 (-0.220) (-0.364) (-0.754) (0.544) (0.728) (0.255) (-0.369) (-0.283) (-0.880) 
large enterprises 0.149 0.491 2.349 0.027 0.411 0.776 0.028 0.338 0.717 
 (-1.282) (-0.911) (0.502) (-0.810) (-0.800) (-0.143) (-1.386) (-1.706)+ (-0.370) 
corporate groups 4.001 4.982 28.951 0.015 0.295 6.074 5.628 5.232 171.423 
 (0.551) (1.554) (1.681)+ (-1.087) (-1.014) (1.160) (0.540) (1.508) (1.804)+ 
A8 #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
A8 #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
A9s/A9z #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
A9s/A9z #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
A11 #  
large enterprises 
0.471 0.719 0.069 0.024 0.210 0.020 0.517 0.434 0.020 
(-0.276) (-0.323) (-1.101) (-1.055) (-1.433) (-1.612) (-0.207) (-0.865) (-1.177) 
A11 #  
corporate groups 
0.003 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.062 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.000 
(-1.807)+ (-2.987)** (-2.146)* (-0.864) (-1.637) (-1.819) (-1.890) (-3.389)*** (-2.365)* 
A12/A13s #  
large enterprises 
1.082 0.706 0.325 4.049 0.925 3.068 3.214 0.984 2.451 
(0.029) (-0.258) (-0.419) (0.250) (-0.065) (0.427) (0.404) (-0.017) (0.594) 
A12/A13s #  
corporate groups 
313.273 12.100 3.594 100.089 3.183 0.589 688.616 7.098 1.893 
(1.617) (1.661)+ (0.429) (0.716) (0.614) (-0.175) (1.449) (1.322) (0.277) 
 215 
sex 2.053 1.228 1.336 0.487 0.753 1.260 1.627 0.934 1.204 
 (0.948) (0.722) (0.850) (-0.436) (-0.855) (0.595) (0.534) (-0.222) (0.606) 
Observations 5,384 5,384 5,384 1,166 1,166 1,166 6,550 6,550 6,550 
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6.3.3 Medium Firm Size Category 
The reference basis is further characterized by 10 TO 15 years’ experience, the middle salary 
grade A11, and as before SMEs as the main field of work. 
Agents with the lowest experience (UP TO 5) consume significantly less audit time and total 
time whereby the latter is weakened due to partly significantly increased report time. This 
result applies in the reference age group (40 TO 50). In the case of agents between 30 and 
40 the results show that audit time further accelerates (e.g., PO model: 13.746 × 2.757 × 
.465 = 17.619) and report time changes from deceleration to acceleration (e.g., PO model: 
.290 × 1.611 × 9.924 = 4.636). The same results occur in the case of the age group 20 TO 
30; audit time (e.g., PO model: 13.746 × 16,295 × .00003 = 6.832) and report time accelerate 
(e.g., PO model: .290 × 2,183.475 × .013 = 8.232), as does total time. In addition, agents 
with age from 30 TO 40 and experience between 15 and 20 years consume more audit time 
(e.g., PO model: 1.841 × 2.757 × .001 = .005) and total time than the older reference group 
with lower experience. In contrast, the report time (e.g., PO model: .270 ×1.611 × 3.236 = 
1.408) accelerates. The results cannot be interpreted as robust in the cases of agents between 
50 and 60 and experience between 5 and 10 as well as agents OVER 60 and experience 
OVER 20 years as the number of participants is not enough in these subgroups. The 
conclusion is that younger agents with less experience consume less time than the reference 
group. New agents with the reference age also audit faster than their experienced 
counterparts. Hence with an increase in experience the audit time increases and with 
additional increases in age the report time increases too. The exact causes of this surprising 
result should be investigated by further research. Possible clues are the interaction between 
life experience on the one hand, and on the other hand task-complexity as well as the building 
and maintenance of task-specific knowledge (legal basics and technical implementation). 
The results of the test of hypotheses H3-3 and H3-4 contain in part interaction effects. At 
first, it is shown that the time consumption is not affected by different salary grades in the 
reference main field of work. But, agents with the reference salary grade A11 consume more 
audit time in the event of more experience in more complex audits of large enterprises and 
corporate companies. In the latter case this effect is highly significant. Their report time 
accelerates in either of the events, although these represent non-significant effects. In 
comparison, agents with the highest salary grades A12/A13s and LARGE ENTERPRISES as 
the main field of work consume less audit time (PO model: 4.812 × .242 × .894 = 1.041) and 
less report time (PO model: 3.855 × 1.281 × .383 = 1.891). In the event of CORPORATE 
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GROUPS as the main field of work they consume lesser audit time (e.g., PO model: 4.822 
× .010 × 24.257 = 1.170) and more report time (e.g., PO model: 3.855 × 6.811 × .035 = 
.919). Either effect is weakly significant in the best fitted models, but not robust in either 
case. 
Moreover, a salient finding is that agents consume more audit time (e.g., PO model: .337 × 
.242 × .076 = .006) and significantly more report time (e.g., PO model: 1.246 × 1.281 × .005 
= .008) when they are salaried at their first career steps in the second career path—salary 
grades A9/A10—and audit predominately large enterprises. It seems that they apply their 
working methods from already familiar more complex tasks to less complex audits. Further 
research could indicate whether they audit more complex focal points due to their increased 
experience. As a result of this the description of more complex adjustments in the final report 
usually needs more report time so that the above finding can be explained. 
Hypothesis H3-5 is valid as before. Time pressure is likewise inherent in the medium size 
category. The exponentiated coefficients vary somewhat more strongly than before, but 
robust significant effects are not shown. Differences between SEXes do not exist relating to 
time consumption.
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Table 48: Characteristics of the Auditor in the Medium Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 40 and Table 44 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditor in 
the medium firm size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
up to 5 13.746 3.427 3.383 0.290 0.495 0.386 7.616 2.609 2.656 
 (2.472)* (2.687)** (2.043)* (-1.071) (-1.813)+ (-1.981)* (1.855)+ (2.110)* (1.721)+   
5 to 10 0.657 1.130 1.483 0.298 0.497 0.385 0.421 0.974 1.031 
 (-0.401) (0.285) (0.948) (-0.794) (-1.191) (-1.171) (-0.785) (-0.058) (0.058) 
15 to 20 1.841 1.043 0.806 0.270 0.495 0.822 0.930 0.846 0.853 
 (0.719) (0.109) (-0.376) (-1.744)+ (-2.243)* (-0.466) (-0.086) (-0.468) (-0.305)    
over 20 12.120 3.209 7.922 0.288 0.430 0.377 5.631 2.477 8.702 
 (0.613) (1.433) (2.354)* (-0.496) (-1.127) (-1.361) (1.246) (1.732)+ (3.100)**  
20 to 30 1.6E+04 65.214 675.759 2183.475 67.167 411.061 3.2E+04 93.066 999.160 
 (3.280)** (3.369)*** (5.206)*** (2.816)** (4.107)*** (3.160)** (3.351)*** (3.630)*** (5.213)*** 
30 to 40 2.757 1.665 2.855 1.611 1.028 1.087 2.136 1.526 2.708 
 (1.050) (1.379) (2.166)* (0.531) (0.072) (0.205) (0.852) (1.204) (2.175)*   
50 to 60 0.885 0.938 1.075 1.338 1.136 1.694 0.778 0.943 1.253 
 (-0.162) (-0.198) (0.164) (0.407) (0.429) (1.368) (-0.305) (-0.177) (0.526) 
over 60 0.002 0.048 0.014 0.896 1.108 1.438 0.004 0.069 0.013 
 (-1.397) (-3.028)** (-3.816)*** (-0.039) (0.113) (0.424) (-2.703)** (-3.471)*** (-4.669)*** 
up to 5 # 20 to 30 0.000 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.099 0.024 0.000 0.014 0.001 
 (-2.676)** (-2.876)** (-4.538)*** (-1.180) (-1.904)+ (-2.185)* (-2.492)* (-2.740)** (-4.309)*** 
up to 5 # 30 to 40 0.465 0.820 0.796 9.924 5.031 6.690 1.042 1.216 0.886 
 (-0.449) (-0.316) (-0.292) (1.389) (2.729)** (2.674)** (0.023) (0.305) (-0.168)    
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up to 5 # 50 to 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
up to 5 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # 30 to 40 1.175 0.947 0.339 7.663 3.197 4.742 3.113 1.280 0.555 
 (0.099) (-0.084) (-1.633) (1.113) (1.513) (1.737)+ (0.646) (0.377) (-0.834)    
5 to 10 # 50 to 60 224.957 7.234 7.633 14.953 2.964 6.481 180.970 6.115 8.898 
 (2.153)* (1.884)+ (1.948)+ (0.849) (1.041) (1.044) (2.077)* (1.861)+ (1.822)+   
5 to 10 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (3.586)*** (0.094) (2.767)** (1.426) (2.221)* (0.750) (.) (.) (-1.554)    
15 to 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
15 to 20 # 30 to 40 0.001 0.038 0.023 3.236 3.354 4.827 0.005 0.076 0.035 
(-3.319)*** (-4.139)*** (-3.360)*** (0.790) (1.723)+ (2.055)* (-2.968)** (-3.519)*** (-3.153)**  
15 to 20 # 50 to 60 0.156 0.496 0.794 0.971 0.954 0.502 0.253 0.531 0.592 
(-1.531) (-1.300) (-0.353) (-0.031) (-0.104) (-1.182) (-1.243) (-1.269) (-0.865)    
15 to 20 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (3.930)*** (1.164) (3.072)** (1.556) (2.477)* (1.033) (.) (.) (1.380) 
over 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
over 20 # 30 to 40 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
over 20 # 50 to 60 0.109 0.416 0.176 0.544 0.873 0.846 0.159 0.433 0.118 
 (-0.526) (-0.944) (-1.778)+ (-0.228) (-0.160) (-0.207) (-1.065) (-1.225) (-2.529)*   
over 20 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (-3.459)*** (-0.414) (-2.634)** (2.008)* (2.557)* (1.900)+ (.) (.) (-0.408)    
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item-nonresponse 0.026 0.127 0.301 0.002 0.038 0.023 0.021 0.095 0.209 
 (-1.991)* (-2.991)** (-1.663)+ (-2.887)** (-4.301)*** (-3.982)*** (-2.457)* (-3.487)*** (-2.236)*   
A8 0.672 0.869 0.813 11.136 2.555 7.652 1.249 1.242 1.159 
 (-0.312) (-0.267) (-0.235) (1.714)+ (1.471) (1.742)+ (0.150) (0.398) (0.154) 
A9s/A9z 0.847 1.071 2.022 4.068 1.849 2.602 1.326 1.280 2.161 
 (-0.130) (0.134) (1.764)+ (1.302) (1.171) (1.415) (0.240) (0.583) (2.052)*   
A9/A10 0.337 0.679 0.527 1.246 0.963 1.145 0.408 0.717 0.628 
 (-1.233) (-1.228) (-1.596) (0.254) (-0.138) (0.439) (-0.997) (-1.070) (-1.198)    
A12/A13s 4.822 2.198 2.194 3.855 1.506 1.888 5.587 2.170 2.188 
 (1.450) (1.746)+ (1.405) (1.273) (0.922) (1.284) (1.580) (1.810)+ (1.361) 
large enterprises 0.242 0.496 0.266 1.281 0.914 0.712 0.325 0.533 0.301 
 (-1.474) (-1.903)+ (-2.272)* (0.258) (-0.245) (-0.852) (-1.274) (-1.832)+ (-2.178)*   
corporate groups 0.010 0.164 0.112 6.811 2.686 1.465 0.033 0.261 0.156 
 (-3.819)*** (-3.247)** (-3.340)*** (1.141) (1.851)+ (0.356) (-3.147)** (-2.539)* (-2.755)**  
item-nonresponse #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
item-nonresponse #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A8 #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A8 #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9s/A9z #  
large enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9s/A9z #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9/A10 #  
large enterprises 
0.076 0.332 0.382 0.005 0.066 0.056 0.040 0.236 0.221 
(-1.115) (-1.340) (-0.962) (-2.892)** (-4.249)*** (-2.620)** (-1.497) (-1.799)+ (-1.420)    
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A9/A10 #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(2.014)* (1.748)+ (1.431) (-1.802)+ (-2.523)* (-1.387) (.) (.) (0.769) 
A12/A13s #  
large enterprises 
0.894 1.138 2.014 0.383 0.799 0.590 0.577 1.044 1.690 
(-0.080) (0.203) (0.799) (-0.657) (-0.369) (-0.845) (-0.402) (0.073) (0.607) 
A12/A13s #  
corporate groups 
24.257 3.328 2.852 0.035 0.176 0.169 6.898 2.029 1.863 
(2.014)* (1.748)+ (1.431) (-1.802)+ (-2.523)* (-1.387) (1.283) (1.066) (0.769) 
sex 1.315 1.087 0.994 2.062 1.413 1.485 1.456 1.127 1.100 
 (0.540) (0.420) (-0.025) (1.427) (1.694)+ (1.569) (0.778) (0.629) (0.405) 
Observations 10,136 10,136 10,136 1,995 1,995 1,995 12,131 12,131 12,131 
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6.3.4 Large Firm Size Category 
Agents of the reference basis have experience as an agent between 15 and 20 years, are paid 
in accordance with the highest salary grades in this career path (A12/A13s) and conduct 
mostly audits of large enterprises. 
The group of agents aged between 30 and 40 with experience between 10 and 15 years is 
heavily represented. Their time consumption differs from the reference basis: audit time 
(e.g., PH model: 2.025 × .396 × 5.316 = 4.263) and report time (e.g., PH model: .685 × .568 
× 5.139 = 1.999) accelerate significantly. And in the event of less experience (5 TO 10) the 
acceleration of audit time (e.g., PH model: .992 × .396 × 3.208 = 1.260) is also shown in this 
age group. In contrast, if age is only changed to the group 30 TO 40, audit time increases 
significantly. This means in effect than more experience decelerates the audit. Furthermore, 
agents aged OVER 60 at the reference level of experience consume significantly more time 
in total. The results of the age group 20 TO 30 are not meaningful as only a few participants 
are observed. The same applies for 50 TO 60 and experience between 5 and 10 years. 
If large firms are audited by agents who are salaried at the lowest salary grades and who 
usually conduct audits of SMEs, the audit time (e.g., PH model: 1.013 × 20.255 × .037 = 
.759) and report time (e.g., PH model: 8.093 × 21.868 × .004 = .708) increase significantly. 
These effects are intensified when the agents are salaried in accordance with A11 so that 
audit time (e.g., PH model: 1.057 × 20.255 × .017 = .364) and report time (e.g., PH model: 
.499 × 21.868 × .016 = .175) decelerate even more compared to the reference basis. 
However, in the event of agents with the highest salary grade who atypically conduct mostly 
audits of SMEs, the time consumption decreases significantly at the .001-level. But this 
finding should not be overvalued as only a few participants are observed. The effects of 
corporate companies as the main field of work on report time are not robust because for the 
reference salary grades the second best model is not significant. In the case of the salary 
grade A9/10 only a few participants are observed. 
Time pressure decreases in the large size category. However, the complexity of disclosed 
breaches increases and hence their presentation in the report produces an increase in time. 
The results show that female auditors require less time-effort for this. In other words, male 
auditors consume more report time with significance at the .001-level (PH model).145
                                                 
145  Either SEX is sufficiently represented in the subcategories L1, L2, and L3 (see Appendix H).  
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Table 49: Characteristics of the Auditor in the Large Firm Size Category 
This table is the continuation of Table 41 and Table 45 and shows the exponentiated coefficients and the z statistics in parentheses for the group of characteristics of the auditor in 
the large firm size category, separately per audit, report and total time consumption with a PO, probit and PH model in each case. + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
Time Periods Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 odds normal hazard odds normal hazard odds normal hazard 
xb                      
up to 5 2.935 1.244 3.438 2.188 2.619 0.527 3.725 1.369 2.913 
 (1.027) (0.456) (2.024)* (0.163) (0.771) (-0.547) (1.167) (0.589) (1.543) 
5 to 10 0.527 0.545 0.992 1.641 1.368 2.093 0.634 0.607 1.094 
 (-0.599) (-1.498) (-0.016) (0.585) (0.906) (1.279) (-0.464) (-1.310) (0.179) 
10 to 15 3.414 1.664 2.025 1.151 1.134 0.685 3.120 1.606 1.741 
 (1.791)+ (1.770)+ (2.073)* (0.207) (0.411) (-1.093) (1.704)+ (1.647)+ (1.600) 
over 20 0.595 0.877 1.061 1.389 1.226 1.251 0.752 0.957 1.061 
 (-0.544) (-0.281) (0.157) (0.381) (0.483) (0.529) (-0.322) (-0.098) (0.168) 
20 to 30 11.810 3.896 14.993 0.000 0.012 0.017 2.033 1.691 6.829 
 (1.503) (1.779)+ (3.167)** (-4.955)*** (-5.233)*** (-4.869)*** (0.443) (0.684) (2.290)*   
30 to 40 0.055 0.213 0.396 0.135 0.335 0.568 0.063 0.221 0.410 
 (-2.131)* (-2.817)** (-2.263)* (-1.510) (-2.020)* (-1.281) (-2.131)* (-2.955)** (-2.230)*   
50 to 60 1.285 0.904 0.901 0.364 0.638 0.398 1.085 0.846 0.792 
 (0.302) (-0.288) (-0.233) (-1.272) (-1.274) (-2.388)* (0.097) (-0.466) (-0.517)    
over 60 0.160 0.346 0.590 0.472 0.769 0.982 0.122 0.309 0.497 
 (-1.479) (-2.183)* (-1.065) (-0.678) (-0.585) (-0.038) (-1.689)+ (-2.464)* (-1.428)    
up to 5 # 20 to 30 0.141 0.343 0.063 2.3E+05 342.846 866.339 0.807 0.850 0.210 
 (-0.885) (-1.066) (-2.294)* (2.183)* (3.497)*** (4.129)*** (-0.096) (-0.159) (-1.296)    
up to 5 # 30 to 40 14.936 4.729 3.956 1.128 0.547 7.629 6.153 3.179 4.040 
 (1.493) (1.944)+ (1.636) (0.024) (-0.417) (1.332) (0.967) (1.376) (1.467) 
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up to 5 # 50 to 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
up to 5 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
5 to 10 # 30 to 40 53.783 13.959 3.208 9.961 4.444 0.964 48.918 13.135 2.787 
 (2.322)* (3.671)*** (1.820)+ (1.329) (2.174)* (-0.043) (2.258)* (3.643)*** (1.504) 
5 to 10 # 50 to 60 14.906 2.397 4.338 2.400 2.738 4.414 40.896 5.954 10.398 
 (1.381) (0.870) (1.291) (0.498) (1.170) (0.789) (2.316)* (2.262)* (2.471)*   
5 to 10 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.166) (0.068) (-0.517) (-1.843)+ (-1.966)* (-2.927)** (3.361)*** (3.982)*** (4.736)*** 
10 to 15 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
10 to 15 # 30 to 40 36.620 7.338 5.316 17.011 6.315 5.139 43.000 8.100 6.249 
(2.024)* (2.746)** (2.492)* (1.678)+ (2.617)** (2.445)* (2.057)* (2.922)** (2.684)**  
10 to 15 # 50 to 60 0.129 0.459 0.502 8.558 2.669 3.980 0.261 0.593 0.782 
(-1.751)+ (-1.569) (-1.208) (1.409) (1.435) (2.275)* (-1.161) (-1.043) (-0.469)    
10 to 15 # over 60 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (0.462) (0.912) (0.600) (-1.166) (-0.126) (-0.376) (1.132) (1.293) (1.103) 
over 20 # 20 to 30 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
over 20 # 30 to 40 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
over 20 # 50 to 60 0.306 0.610 0.495 0.517 0.630 0.643 0.278 0.567 0.484 
 (-0.870) (-0.845) (-1.092) (-0.593) (-0.839) (-0.770) (-1.000) (-0.991) (-1.163)    
over 20 # over 60 3.915 1.703 1.253 0.471 0.562 0.475 4.146 1.791 1.470 
 (0.890) (0.817) (0.353) (-0.557) (-0.945) (-1.166) (0.970) (0.928) (0.623) 
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item-nonresponse 0.129 0.484 0.716 0.191 0.433 0.797 0.113 0.421 0.746 
 (-1.547) (-1.308) (-0.621) (-1.388) (-1.578) (-0.353) (-1.773)+ (-1.788)+ (-0.646)    
A9s/A9z 0.321 0.469 0.586 0.065 0.306 0.201 0.252 0.473 0.428 
 (-0.707) (-1.084) (-0.590) (-1.579) (-1.582) (-2.123)* (-0.804) (-1.105) (-0.973)    
A9/A10 2.966 1.778 1.013 239.930 19.108 8.093 7.753 3.030 1.205 
 (0.625) (0.711) (0.015) (2.887)** (3.343)*** (2.172)* (1.083) (1.330) (0.212) 
A11 1.627 1.344 1.571 0.382 0.515 0.499 1.194 1.165 1.284 
 (0.769) (1.030) (1.192) (-1.303) (-2.053)* (-1.987)* (0.297) (0.547) (0.680) 
item-nonresponse 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
micro/small/medium enterprises 38.844 6.933 20.255 51.317 6.279 21.868 63.378 8.882 32.616 
(3.330)*** (4.203)*** (4.025)*** (2.537)* (2.795)** (4.445)*** (3.481)*** (4.597)*** (4.961)*** 
corporate groups 1.840 1.405 1.658 0.304 0.535 0.425 1.317 1.244 1.342 
 (1.066) (1.297) (1.737)+ (-1.613) (-1.887)+ (-2.621)** (0.493) (0.839) (1.019) 
item-nonresponse #  
item-nonresponse 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(0.769) (1.030) (1.192) (-1.951)+ (-2.956)** (-7.109)*** (-5.556)*** (-7.292)*** (-6.304)*** 
item-nonresponse #  
micro/small/medium enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
item-nonresponse #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9s/A9z #  
item-nonresponse 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9s/A9z #  
micro/small/medium enterprises 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9s/A9z #  
corporate groups 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
A9/A10 #  
item-nonresponse 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
 226 
A9/A10 #  
micro/small/medium enterprises 
0.004 0.076 0.037 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.033 0.019 
(-2.728)** (-2.693)** (-2.624)** (-4.227)*** (-4.740)*** (-5.308)*** (-3.347)*** (-3.426)*** (-3.411)*** 
A9/A10 #  
corporate groups 
0.243 0.522 1.565 0.006 0.050 0.361 0.091 0.304 1.534 
(-0.742) (-0.672) (0.489) (-2.121)* (-2.663)** (-0.854) (-1.127) (-1.201) (0.450) 
A11 #  
item-nonresponse 
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(0.769) (1.030) (1.192) (-1.809)+ (2.910)** (-4.112)*** (2.977)** (4.594)*** (4.355)*** 
A11 #  
micro/small/medium enterprises 
0.003 0.058 0.017 0.004 0.085 0.016 0.002 0.047 0.010 
(-3.518)*** (-4.312)*** (-4.509)*** (-2.698)** (-2.952)** (-4.366)*** (-3.567)*** (-4.512)*** (-5.205)*** 
A11 #  
corporate groups 
0.137 0.639 0.295 1.437 1.183 2.177 0.167 0.569 0.341 
(-1.570) (-0.605) (-2.475)* (0.248) (0.268) (1.128) (-1.233) (-0.797) (-2.057)*   
sex 0.533 0.726 0.657 0.290 0.525 0.393 0.483 0.660 0.589 
 (-1.529) (-1.753)+ (-2.000)* (-2.726)** (-3.355)*** (-4.449)*** (-1.697)+ (-2.261)* (-2.473)*   
Observations 31,366 31,366 31,366 6,081 6,081 6,081 37,447 37,447 37,447 
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6.3.5 Interims Conclusion 
The impact of characteristics of auditors varies for the four size categories. According to the 
individual parameters the results can be summarized as followed.  
In the micro size category audit time decreases with an increase in experience up to the 
reference basis and increases after it. It is noteworthy, that the latter occurs predominantly 
for older agents who changed into an audit department at a younger age. In addition, agents 
consume more report time if they are older than the reference basis. These findings apply 
with regard to the reference salary group, which is the highest grade in the first career path. 
This path has a lower level in education than the second career path. Such effects cannot be 
observed in the entry audit category for new agents of the second career path, in the small 
size category. Here the audit and report time consumption is not affected by either experience 
as an auditor or age at a robust significant level. In the medium size category the results 
show that younger agents with less experience consume less time than the reference group. 
New agents with the reference age also audit faster than their more experienced counterparts. 
Hence with an increase in experience the audit time increases and with additional increases 
in age the report time increases, too. The results of the large size category show likewise that 
audit time increases with an increase in experience as an auditor. In comparison with the 
reference basis audit time and report time partly accelerate significantly if agents have less 
experience as auditors. This result persists if auditors’ age decreases. In contrast, if auditors 
are aged older, their time consumption increases significantly in all time periods. 
Age and experience as an agent affect time consumption in different ways. Their 
interdependence as factors must also be taken into account. The interaction between life 
experience on the one hand and, on the other hand, task-complexity as well as the building 
and maintenance of task-specific knowledge (legal basics and technical implementation) 
have apparently significant effects on time consumption. So it should be emphasized that a 
later entry into an audit department decreases revenue agents’ time consumption with regard 
to the middle salary grade (A11) in the medium size category. The exact causes of this result 
should be investigated by further research. Also time increases if agents have reached the 
highest salary grades and have a higher level of experience as an agent (large size category). 
This effect can be caused by an increased level of task complexity or a loss of auditors’ 
motivation and sense of challenge.  
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If experience is measured on the basis of salary grades, the results show that revenue agents’ 
time consumption is not affected by an increase in the experience level with regard to the 
reference basis in each case and for the case of the same experience as an auditor as well as 
the same main field of work in the firm size categories of SMEs so that hypothesis H3-3 is 
proven. Furthermore, it is absolutely essential to include the interdependent effect of salary 
grades and agents’ main field of work as latter depends from the salary grade in principal. 
This interaction tests hypothesis H3-4 and results in different findings. Agents who are more 
familiar with more complex tasks save report time in comparison to the reference salary 
grade in general. This effect is significant in the micro firm size category and a tendency in 
the medium firm size category.146 The small firm size category is without any effect in this 
respect.  
However, the results differ in relation to audit time. More highly experienced agents with 
salary grade A11 consume less audit time in the micro firm size category, but not in the 
medium firm size category. In contrast, agents with salary grades A12/A13s and a more 
complex main field of work consume significantly more audit time in the micro firm size 
category and less audit time in the medium firm size category, though the latter is not a 
robust significant effect. If lower salaried agents with higher experience in more complex 
tasks—salary grades A9/A10 and already large enterprises as the main field of work—audit 
firms with a lower level of complexity, they consume more audit time and significantly more 
report time. This result is shown in the medium firm size category. In the large size category 
the results prove hypothesis H3-4 since less experienced agents—with the lower salary 
grades A9/A10 or A11 and SMEs as the main field of work—consume significantly more 
audit time and report time. However, further research is required, because hypothesis H3-4 
is only partly proven. Here the audit quality is predominantly interesting along the 
dimensions of complexity of audit adjustments and auditors’ motivation, who usually are at 
the end of their career path.  
Finally, the results show that no differences occur with regard to gender under time pressure. 
In the audit time period it is customary that the audit is conducted in one go. In doing so 
auditees’ burden can minimize. This applies in particular if audits are not conducted in the 
local tax office. However, time pressure decreases if firm size increases and therefore task 
                                                 
146  Exceptions are agents at salary grades A12/A13s and large enterprises as the main field of work in the 
micro firm size category and at the same salary grades with corporate companies as the main field of work 
in the medium firm size category. 
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complexity, too. Consequently, in the large size category, differences are visible. Female 
auditors save audit time and report time, while the latter point is highly significant as soon 
as time pressure is hardly observable in the report time period. 
7 Conclusion 
Tax audit duration and revenue agents’ time consumption have only been investigated in 
isolated cases to date. Sinha (2007, 2010) and Alissa et al. (2014) used the time-on-task to 
estimate auditors’ effort. Franzoni (2008) points to tax audit length as a possible means of 
putting pressure on auditees. However, the determinants of time consumption or duration 
itself are not examined. My study fills this gap insofar as revenue agents’ time consumption 
is considered. The smallest unit of measurement is a quarter of a working day. I have 
considered the observed time as the waiting period. This period includes the phases of 
auditing and reporting. Both phases are characterized by a large number of parameters with 
different influences on revenue agents’ time consumption and/or audit duration. The 
parameters can be assigned to the characteristic groups of auditee, audit, and auditor as well 
as agency. Though agency is a negligible group in terms of representation in this study. Each 
group is based on objective and individual parameters. But only objective parameters are 
currently observable in this highly sensitive data area so that my study is limited to such 
parameters.  
The time consumption cumulates up to occurrence of the event of interest. This failure time 
is restricted to a positive value so that the observed time has a skewed distribution (Harrell 
2015). Some control estimations prove this assumption and, on top, show bell-shaped 
transition rates (Allison 2014) in all four investigated firm size categories. Furthermore, it is 
expected that different parameters and the different ways these parameters combine 
influence the failure time in different manners (Hutchinson 1988). Besides, an optimal 
approach needs the flexibility to consider the possibility of truncation—in the case of an 
investigation of isolated time periods—and censoring if required. Censoring is not an issue 
in the present study, but it can be recommended as a fertile area for future research. 
Consequently, my estimation strategy is based on the methods of survival analysis.  
In addition, it has been known that each method of the survival analysis is fitted to the data 
in a different manner so that my approach consists of three different models. Thereby the 
order of fitting changes in part. Nonetheless, all results have been subjected to a comparative 
analysis to identify robust results (Blossfeld et al. 2009). A result is robust, if a significant 
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effect of an individual variable occurs in each of the three models. Furthermore, an effect 
has a considerable tendency in the event of increased model fitting along with increased 
significance of this effect. But the selection of all potential distributions is an unconditional 
prerequisite for meaningful results. So I have used two of the three models most 
recommended in the literature for such right-skewed distribution (ibid.)—namely a log-
logistic model and a log-normal model—and along with these a Weibull model. The latter 
is used due to implement of a restricted cubic spline function as a baseline so that my 
approach has almost unlimited flexibility (Royston/Sauerbrei 2008). As an aside, sickle 
distribution (Diekmann/Mittag 1983, 1984)—the third recommended model—is another 
appropriate model for further research if the population includes taxpayers who never will 
be audited. 
The analysis of the results discloses in part the expected effects and even surprising effects. 
At the same time it calls attention to further research topics. At the beginning of this study, 
the characteristics of auditees were investigated. These include parameters of: legal form, 
types of determination of income, group of sectors, and corporate company. All of them 
typify auditees’ complexity because the first main hypothesis suggests an increase in revenue 
agents’ time consumption for higher task complexity (Anderson/Zéghal 1994). However, 
firm size is of particular importance as the shape of time consumption depends on four given 
categories of firm size. Each category is studied separately so that size-specific effects are 
distributed equally within the respective boundaries. The micro and the large firm size 
categories include an open boundary condition (see Appendix H).  
The results show with regard to the legal form that generally agents adapt their working 
methods to the specific conditions of each organizational form. Therefore, it is not possible 
to define a general appraisal of the influence of different legal forms on revenue agents’ time 
consumption. But two points of task complexity have to be emphasized: agents consume 
significantly more report time in the case of audited micro-sized partnerships, as well as 
more audit and report time in the case of audited medium-sized (unaffiliated) corporations.  
Since the number of recommended days is the lowest in the micro size category, the total 
time consumption is susceptible to increased task complexity. The result is an increase in 
auditors’ time pressure. Revenue agents usually anticipate increased complexity during their 
audit preparation and the findings of my study suggest that agents decrease their audit effort 
in the audit phase with the aim of compensation of the expected increased report time. 
However, such a procedure harbors the risk of a reduction in the number of focal points for 
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audit and/or a greater prevalence of auditors’ avoidance of more complex focal points in the 
case of micro-sized auditees. Further research is needed to tease out the implications of this 
assumption. Until that time, audit departments are advised to reduce time pressure for audits 
of partnerships in the micro firm size category, in order to enable the tax authority to ensure 
the required equal tax treatment relating to in-depth audits regardless of the legal form of the 
auditee. 
As far as medium-sized firms are concerned, compared to the other legal forms and in line 
with the findings of Cole and Sokolyk (2015), the results indicate a pooling of more complex 
businesses under the legal form of corporations. However, this legal form is not necessarily 
per se more complex than other forms. But the legal form of corporation offers numerous 
options for engaging in more complex business. Further, it can be expected that the business 
gets more and more complex at the threshold from SMEs to large firms. This is confirmed 
by the increased time consumption auditing medium-sized corporations. As a consequence, 
audit departments are advised to make a distinction between legal forms in their staff 
planning and formulation of targets for the medium size category. 
However, in doing so, audit departments should also take into account that agents need less 
audit time if the audited medium-sized corporation is a member of an affiliated group. 
Thereby the time saving effect weakens the increased time consumption of medium-sized 
corporations. Furthermore, the results suggest that a large quantity of such audits are 
conducted as routine operations. This particularity appears only in the medium size category 
and can be explained by two facts: most agents benefit from audit guidelines provided by an 
executive revenue agent and from repetitive tasks, so that the savings in audit and total time 
are significant for audits of affiliated firms. In contrast, other audits of affiliates cause more 
time-on-task in the report period. 
The types of determination of income are also relevant. The results show in the event of 
increased complexity a repeated increase in audit and total time as well as occasionally an 
increase in report time. Here the complexity is reflected in the partly absence of book-tax 
conformity and the chosen approach to handle this lack. The more difficult the disclosure of 
differences within the auditee’s documents, the longer the time spent on audit.  
To summarize this point, industry affiliation plays a less prominent part relating to revenue 
agents’ time consumption. In my study the predominant proportion of auditees pursue a 
service-oriented business. Differences from the other groups of sectors occur only in isolated 
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cases. In particular, the results point out that the expected and highly significant increase in 
time consumption for manufacturing-oriented businesses is observable in the large size 
category only. Additionally, if agents suspect tax evasion, an auditee’s sector does not affect 
agents’ time consumption. This means that the time-on-task spent on detected breaches is 
not affected by the group of sectors even though type, frequency, and extent of any breaches 
can depend on the auditee’s industry sector (Chan/Mo 2000; Hanlon et al. 2005). 
Moreover, the results show that if agents suspect tax evasion, they consume significantly 
more audit and total time, as well as more report time under time pressure. However, the 
investigated data suggest, moreover, an interdependency between type and frequency of 
detected breaches (with or without a suspicion) and auditee’s firm size (see Appendix F 
Table 61 and Table 62). So this explains that the impact on time decreases, if agents are 
more familiar with the relevant focal points audited. But in this study it has not been possible 
to examine whether an interrelationship exists between time-on-task and the extent of 
suspected tax evasion, with regard to an auditee’s industry sector and firm size, exists.  
Previous research (e.g., Hanlon et al. 2005; Rice 1992; Slemrod 2007) indicates the existence 
of this phenomenon, so clearly supplementary research is needed. Correspondingly, it would 
be useful to examine the impacts of the point in time during the audit, at which the agents 
suspect tax evasion initially, the suspected fraudulent part of the outcome, and the 
interdependence between agent’s attitude and conscientiousness (intrinsic factors), as well 
as the impact of time pressure on the detection of breaches and on revenue agents’ time 
consumption. 
Apart from the influence of suspected tax evasion on time-on-task, the second group of 
characteristics investigated includes further parameters intrinsic to the audit, because the 
second main hypothesis suggests a sensitive reaction in agents’ time consumption. In detail, 
the place of work, deviation of the normally three fiscal years audited, the cases of follow-
up audits and consulted additional specialized agents, the conducting of a final discussion 
and the achievement of consensus, accelerating issues in the event of audit delay, the audit 
duration in total, and the outcome of the audit are investigated. The multitude of results can 
be summarized as follows.  
Auditees or their tax advisers often seek to conduct a field audit out of auditees’ business 
premises and it is also possible that agents switch between alternative offices. The causes 
are various and mainly influenced by subjective factors so that particular motivations are not 
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observable. However, the study results show, compared to business or residence offices, a 
significant increase (decrease) in audit and total time consumption in the micro (large) firm 
size category, if agents conduct an audit in their own tax office. The audit and total time 
consumption increase—significantly or with a tendency toward significance—moreover, in 
the case of audits of SMEs and alternative offices. In contrast, the audit time consumption is 
unaffected almost without exception, if audits take place at a tax adviser’s office. On that 
note, time saving is not a justification for the exceptional case of an audit not taking place at 
the auditees’ business premises and not at the local tax office. 
According to German tax law, usually a field audit usually consists of three concluded fiscal 
years. Agents can audit without much ado less years in the case of SMEs. The results for 
such situations show that the audit and total time consumption decrease only in the micro 
firm size category with decreasing significance. In the small size category, the time 
consumption is unaffected due to a reduction in the scrutiny period. In contrast, the time-on-
task increases with a highly significant effect, if agents audit more than three years in the 
large size category. New aspects to the ongoing debate around timely tax audits arise from 
these findings. 
Follow-up audits cause a significant increase in audit and total time consumption only in the 
small size category. This is not surprising as such a situation is quite unusual for small-sized 
firms according to German tax law. Calling in specialized agents prevents an increase in 
revenue agents’ time consumption. Otherwise, this does not lead to a time saving effect due 
to the transfer of highly complex focal points. There are mainly for two reasons: agents use 
the extra time capacity for additional focal points or they need the time window for legwork 
and for further processing of specialized agents’ findings. 
Furthermore, the decision concerning the conducting of a final discussion and the 
achievement of consensus about auditor’s findings lack influence, according to the result 
above. Only the report time consumption increases if a final discussion is held in the large 
size category. Apart from this, all time periods are unaffected in all size categories. This 
result is surprising insofar as agents use the threat of non-agreement to force acceleration to 
shorten their own time-on-task in the case of smaller sized auditees. With regard to other 
means for acceleration, the results show mostly no significant effects on time consumption. 
Because the measures are being used if a audit delay caused by auditees or their tax advisers 
is perceived, the absence of time effects are a sign of effectiveness. Only in two 
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constellations do the affected persons seem unimpressed so that revenue agents’ audit time 
increases. 
Further, audit time consumption exists in a reciprocal relationship with audit duration. The 
results prove in comparison to the actual base level the assumption that time-on-task 
increases (decreases) in one or more time periods when the audit duration is significantly 
longer (shorter). 
The final intriguing issue of the second investigation group relates to the outcome. If should 
be stressed that revenue agents’ time consumption is unaffected if the outcome falls below 
the respective de minimis limit. In addition, a higher outcome increases the time-on-task 
only in the medium and large size category and not in the event of smaller-sized audits. 
The third group of characteristics includes the parameters of revenue agents and measures 
the impact of agent’s competence on his or her own time consumption. In detail, this is 
represented as dependent on agents’ experience, age, salary grade, main field of work, and 
gender. The results partly indicate unexpected impacts and stress the importance of research 
concerning personal characteristics of active parties. In summary, it can be seen that greater 
experience does not necessarily equate to decrease in time consumption. Further, the latter 
is lastingly affected by the agent’s age at the date of a revenue agent’s entry to an audit 
department. 
With respect to the different size categories it appears that either the audit time consumption 
follows a U-shaped trajectory with an increase in experience in the case of micro-sized 
auditees, is unaffected in the case of small-sized auditees, or is subject to a rising trajectory 
in the case of medium and large-sized auditees. The report time consumption increases, 
moreover, for older, highly experienced agents in the case of micro- and small-sized 
auditees. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that a later entry into an audit department 
decreases revenue agents’ time consumption with regard to the middle salary grade (A11) 
in the medium size category. 
On the other hand, time consumption is unaffected by an increase in experience level—
measured on the basis of salary grades—compared to the reference basis in each case and in 
the event of the same experience as an auditor as well as the same main field of work in the 
firm size categories of SMEs. However, agents save report time in these categories if they 
are more familiar with more complex tasks. This effect holds true solely in part for audit 
time. It seems that only agents with salary grade A11 and experience in more complex tasks 
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are able to adapt their working method on a lower level so that they save audit time in the 
case of micro-sized auditees, since agents with salary grades A12/A13s and a higher 
experience level consume significantly more audit time in the micro firm size category. 
The exact causes of these results should be investigated by further research. Thereby the 
audit quality is predominantly interesting with regard to the dimensions of complexity of 
audit adjustments, because it could be possible that more highly experienced agents disclose 
more complex findings so that they need more time. In doing so, it is desirable to cover more 
detailed objective parameters, e.g., individual records of time consumption of focal points 
with or without findings and their detailed outcomes. However, if this is not the cause, a 
possible reason could be a loss of auditors’ motivation and sense of challenge. Hence further 
research also ought to analyze subjective parameters such as attitude, motivation, 
conscientiousness, goal orientation, environment of the tax authority, and relationship 
between agency and agents. 
Finally, the results validate previous research (Breesch/Branson 2009; Chung/ Monroe 
2001) into the differences relating to auditors’ gender. Under time pressure male and female 
agents consume the same audit and report time. However, the impact of time pressure 
diminishes in the large size category, so that female agents save time, partly with a highly 
significant effect. However, might lead to hasty conclusions, and so it seems advisable to 
investigate the complexity of audited focal points and audit adjustments once again, because 
evidence can only be provided, once all factors relating to work performed are taken into 
account.  
This doctoral thesis breaks fresh ground in the area of the relationship between governments 
and their citizens. Tax audits combine various impacts from either side so that the above 
findings should provide fertile soil for further research. Thereby, it is advisable to include 
additional determinants such as, e.g., negotiation, delaying tactics, subjective feeling and 
personal skills. Furthermore, the cause-and-effect chain of time pressure is of vital 
importance and should therefore be investigated more closely.
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8 Appendix E 
Table 50: Control Estimation for the Influence of Time Consumption 
Extract of coefficients from 9 multilevel mixed-effect parametric survival models, subdivided according to the size categories and three time periods. The estimations do not include 
interaction effects. It is issued the audit days and their square as well as the report days and their square. 
Time Period Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Individuals per Size 
Category  
Weibull log-logisitc log-norm Weibull log-logisitc log-norm Weibull log-logisitc log-norm 
Micro          
auditdays 1.068 1.068 1.075 0.997 0.999 0.999 1.062 1.064 1.067 
 (20.361)*** (19.106)*** (21.272)*** (-3.015)** (-0.409) (-1.606) (32.609)*** (18.834)*** (21.472)*** 
auditdays2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 
 (-14.501)*** (-8.924)*** (-11.055)*** (2.871)** (0.865) (2.570)* (-16.415)*** (-9.744)*** (-11.648)*** 
reportdays    1.275 1.262 1.267 1.007 1.003 0.994 
    (77.418)*** (27.324)*** (47.586)*** (1.264) (0.236) (-0.645)    
reportdays2    0.994 0.994 0.994 1.003 1.003 1.003 
    (-16.962)*** (-10.280)*** (-19.451)*** (7.234)*** (3.207)** (4.689)*** 
Small          
auditdays 1.054 1.058 1.056 1.002 1.013 1.008 1.042 1.049 1.047 
 (13.304)*** (42.000)*** (34.083)*** (0.529) (3.555)*** (2.818)** (7.486)*** (38.172)*** (28.179)*** 
auditdays2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (-6.324)*** (-22.773)*** (-15.689)*** (-0.458) (-2.982)** (-2.722)** (-2.588)** (-21.606)*** (-11.679)*** 
reportdays    1.195 1.191 1.178 1.029 1.033 1.029 
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    (16.882)*** (18.655)*** (36.605)*** (9.288)*** (15.597)*** (11.467)*** 
reportdays2    0.998 0.998 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 
    (-14.075)*** (-16.316)*** (-28.949)*** (-7.425)*** (-9.132)*** (-7.786)*** 
Medium          
auditdays 1.029 1.033 1.030 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.025 1.027 1.026 
 (35.595)*** (6.994)*** (30.704)*** (-0.566) (1.552) (0.341) (38.024)*** (6.092)*** (33.174)*** 
auditdays2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (-26.458)*** (-2.629)** (-12.670)*** (-0.778) (-1.552) (-1.115) (-25.926)*** (-2.126)* (-14.580)*** 
reportdays    1.219 1.279 1.249 1.048 1.049 1.052 
    (61.476)*** (43.008)*** (17.088)*** (15.731)*** (7.564)*** (11.803)*** 
reportdays2    0.996 0.993 0.995 0.999 0.999 0.998 
    (-32.646)*** (-19.431)*** (-7.719)*** (-11.130)*** (-5.243)*** (-8.751)*** 
Large          
auditdays 1.008 1.008 1.008 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.007 1.008 1.007 
 (11.104)*** (10.483)*** (15.870)*** (2.881)** (2.071)* (3.109)** (11.393)*** (10.829)*** (14.366)*** 
auditdays2 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (-9.282)*** (-7.351)*** (-9.995)*** (-3.935)*** (-2.852)** (-3.896)*** (-8.433)*** (-7.169)*** (-9.257)*** 
reportdays    1.033 1.030 1.023 1.004 1.003 1.002 
    (6.191)*** (3.812)*** (6.495)*** (1.327) (1.310) (1.790)+   
reportdays2    1 1 1 1 1 1 
    (-5.266)*** (-3.478)*** (-5.769)*** (-1.265) (-0.925) (-1.333)    
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9 Appendix F 
Table 51: Variables Definitions 
If it is a factor variable, the virtual variables are also included. 
Characteristics of the Auditee  
Variable Variables Definition 
legform 
Factor variable of legal forms. It distinguishes between the following three 
types. Missing values do not occur. 
 1 
individual 
entrepreneur 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee is an individual entrepreneur.  
 2 partnership Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee is organized as a partnership.  
 3 corporation Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee is a corporation.  
detinc 
Factor variable of four different types of determining income. Four missing 
values are remained unchanged. In detail: 
 1 
accounting of 
income and 
expenditure 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee determines the amount of taxable profit with 
accounting of income and expenditure. 
 2 
trade balance sheet 
= tax balance sheet 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee determines the taxable profit with consistent 
trade and tax balance sheets. 
 3 
independent tax 
balance sheet 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee determines the taxable profit with an 
independent tax balance sheets. 
 4 
transition § 60 II 
EStDV 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee determines the taxable profit with offsetting and 
reconciliation to the trade balance sheet without preparing of a tax balance sheet. 
sectorgr 
Factor variable of four groups of sectors. One missing value is remained 
unchanged. In detail: 
 1 production 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee operates in the construction, the manufacturing, 
or the food, beverage and tobacco industry. 
 2 trading Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee operates in the wholesale or the retail industry. 
 3 service 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee is a freelancer or operates in the banking and 
insurance, the accommodation and food service, or other service industries. 
 4 utilities 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditee operates in the information an communication, 
the transportation, or other utilities industry.  
group 
Dummy, 1 if the auditee is a group company, notwithstanding the above as 
dominant or controlled. If no such information was available I assumed control 
group=0.  
Characteristics of the Audit  
Variable Variables Definition 
evasion 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor suspected (illegal) tax evasion, zero otherwise. Missing 
values are remained unchanged. 
place 
Factor variable of the place of work during the tax audit. One missing value is 
remained unchanged. In detail: 
 1 company office Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditor conducts the field audit in a company office. 
 2 tax office Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditor conducts the field audit in the local tax office. 
 3 tax adviser office Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditor conducts the field audit in a tax adviser office. 
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 4 multiple offices 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the auditor conducts the field audit in different of the 
mentioned offices. 
consen 
Dummy, 1 if auditee/tax adviser and auditor reached an agreement about audit 
findings. If the parties involved do not agree on a solution, or if no such 
information was available I assumed control group=0. 
disc 
Dummy, 1 if the parties involved conducted a final discussion about auditor’s 
findings. If such discussion was not necessary or if such information was not 
available I assumed control group=0. 
shdead 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor considers necessary to take action to accelerate 
proceedings and for this he received that a short deadline for reply is suitable. In 
all other cases of actions for this or if such information was not available I 
assumed control group=0. 
pandelay 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor considered necessary to take action to accelerate 
proceedings and received that a penalty for delay is suitable. This measure was 
first introduced rough two years before the survey conducted. In all other cases 
of actions for this or if such information was not available I assumed control 
group=0. 
nonagree 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor considered necessary to take action to accelerate 
proceedings and received that the threat of a non-agreement is suitable. In all 
other cases of actions for this or if such information was not available I assumed 
control group=0. 
triflingamount 
Dummy, 1 if it is a petty case due to the additional result falls below the de 
minims limit. If such information is unendorsed or was not available I assumed 
control group=0. 
lndiffpay 
Balance of the log of additional tax burden and the log of tax refund due to the 
tax audit findings. 
lnlossreduc 
Balance of the log of reduction and log of raising of loss carried forward due to 
the tax audit findings. 
fy_short 
Dummy, 1 if the number of fiscal years < 3, zero otherwise; in particular to the 
general case with 3 fiscal years. 
fy_long 
Dummy, 1 if the number of fiscal years > 3, zero otherwise; in particular to the 
general case with 3 fiscal years. 
fupaud Dummy. 1 if the current audit is a follow-up audit, zero otherwise. 
duration_msm / duration 
Factor variable for the duration of the tax audit. Two missing values are 
remained unchanged. In detail: 
 1 up to 1 month Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit is conducted within a month, zero otherwise. 
 2 2 to 3 months 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit is finished within the limits of one and three 
month after it started, zero otherwise. 
 3 4 to 6 months 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit is finished within the limits of four and six month 
after it started, zero otherwise. 
 4 7 to 9 months 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit is finished within the limits of seven and nine 
month after it started, zero otherwise. 
 5 10 to 12 months 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit is finished within the limits of ten and twelve 
month after it started, zero otherwise. 
 6 
over 1 year                   
/ 1 to 1.5 years 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit of a micro, small, or medium business is finished 
after one year, or of a large business within the limits of one and one and a half 
year after it started, zero otherwise. 
 7 / 1.5 to 2 years 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit of a large business is finished within the limits of 
one and a half year and two years after it started, zero otherwise. 
 8 / over 2 years 
Virtual dummy, 1 if the audit of a large business is finished after two years after 
it started, zero otherwise. 
specs 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor consulted specialized auditors. If such information is 
unendorsed or was not available I assumed control group=0. 
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Characteristics of the Auditor 
Variable Variables Definition 
agenty 
Factor variable for groups of agent experience in years. Eighty four missing 
values are remained unchanged. In detail: 
 1 up to 5 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor’s agent experience is shorter period than five years, 
zero otherwise. 
 2 5 to 10 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor’s agent experience is within the limits of five and 
ten years, zero otherwise. 
 3 10 to 15 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor’s agent experience is within the limits of ten and 
fifteen years, zero otherwise. 
 4 15 to 20 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor’s agent experience is within the limits of fifteen and 
twenty years, zero otherwise. 
 5 over 20 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor’s agent experience is longer period than twenty 
years, zero otherwise. 
agegr 
Factor variable for age groups. Thirty nine missing values are remained 
unchanged. In detail: 
 1 20 to 30 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is aged between twenty and thirty years, zero 
otherwise. 
 2 30 to 40 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is aged between thirty and forty years, zero 
otherwise. 
 3 40 to 50 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is aged between forty and fifty years, zero 
otherwise. 
 4 50 to 60 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is aged between fifty and sixty years, zero 
otherwise. 
 5 over 60 Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is aged sixty years, zero otherwise. 
grade_nm Factor variable for salary grades. In detail: 
 1 A8 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is salaried based on grade A8 (penultimate grade in 
career without graduation diploma), zero otherwise. 
 2 A9s/A9z 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is salaried based on grade A9s/9z (last grade in 
career without graduation diploma), zero otherwise. 
 3 A9/A10 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is salaried based on grade A9/10 (first grades in 
career with degree), zero otherwise. 
 4 A11 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is salaried based on grade A11 (middle grade in 
career with degree), zero otherwise. 
 5 A12/A13s 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor is salaried based on grade A12/13s (highest grades 
in career with degree but not university degree), zero otherwise. 
 0 item-nonresponse Virtual dummy, 1 if the participant gives no answer to this, zero otherwise. 
fow_nm 
Factor variable for the auditor’s mainly field of work in terms of firm size and 
groups. In detail: 
 1 
micro/small/medium 
enterprises 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor examines predominant micro, small, or medium 
enterprises, zero otherwise. 
 2 large enterprises 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor examines predominant large enterprises, zero 
otherwise. 
 3 corporate groups 
Virtual dummy, 1 if auditor examines predominant corporate groups, zero 
otherwise. 
 0 item-nonresponse Virtual dummy, 1 if the participant gives no answer to this, zero otherwise. 
sex 
Dummy, 1 if the auditor is male, 0 if she is female. Twenty five missing values 
are remained unchanged. 
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Table 52: Descriptive Statistics for Constant, Varying, or Missing Variables 
The table shows the number of subjects for each variable and distinguishes between constant, varying, or 
missing values. It is a parallel chart of weighted and unweighted data.  
 Unweighted data Weighted data 
   missing    missing 
Variable constant varying never always sometimes constant varying never always sometimes 
           
legform 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
detinc 983 0 983 4 0 955 0 955 4 0 
sectorgr 986 0 986 1 0 958 0 958 1 0 
group 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
evasion 950 0 950 37 0 924 0 924 35 0 
place 986 0 986 1 0 958 0 958 1 0 
consen 971 0 971 16 0 943 0 943 16 0 
disc 983 0 983 4 0 955 0 955 4 0 
shdead 985 0 985 2 0 957 0 957 2 0 
pandelay 985 0 985 2 0 957 0 957 2 0 
nonagree 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
triflingamount 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
lndiffpay 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
lnlossreduc 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
fy_short 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
fy_long 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
fupaud 977 0 977 10 0 950 0 950 9 0 
duration_msm 985 0 985 2 0 957 0 957 2 0 
duration 985 0 985 2 0 957 0 957 2 0 
specs 986 0 986 1 0 959 0 959 0 0 
agenty 903 0 903 84 0 875 0 875 84 0 
agegr 948 0 948 39 0 920 0 920 39 0 
grade_nm 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
fow_nm 987 0 987 0 0 959 0 959 0 0 
sex 962 0 962 25 0 934 0 934 25 0 
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Table 53: Descriptive Statistics for Interaction Variables in the Micro Size Category 
The table shows descriptive statistics for interaction variables in the micro size category. It is a parallel chart 
of weighted and unweighted data. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Interaction Variables Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
legform detinc          
1 1 127 1,008 0.5681 0.4973 0 1 130 0.7000 0.4600 
1 2 127 1,008 0.0459 0.2102 0 1 130 0.0769 0.2675 
1 3 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
1 4 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
2 1 127 1,008 0.0276 0.1646 0 1 130 0.0462 0.2106 
2 2 127 1,008 0.0836 0.2779 0 1 130 0.0385 0.1931 
2 3 127 1,008 0.0186 0.1358 0 1 130 0.0077 0.0877 
2 4 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
3 1 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
3 2 127 1,008 0.2002 0.4017 0 1 130 0.1000 0.3012 
3 3 127 1,008 0.0373 0.1902 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
3 4 127 1,008 0.0186 0.1358 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
sectorgr evasion          
1 0 124 979 0.1255 0.3326 0 1 127 0.1024 0.3043 
1 1 124 979 0.0247 0.1558 0 1 127 0.0157 0.1250 
2 0 124 979 0.1455 0.3540 0 1 127 0.1811 0.3866 
2 1 124 979 0.0097 0.0983 0 1 127 0.0236 0.1525 
3 0 124 979 0.4992 0.5020 0 1 127 0.5354 0.5007 
3 1 124 979 0.1155 0.3209 0 1 127 0.1024 0.3043 
4 0 124 979 0.0800 0.2723 0 1 127 0.0394 0.1952 
4 1 124 979 (empty)    127 (empty)  
agenty agegr          
1 1 115 909 0.0377 0.1912 0 1 118 0.0424 0.2023 
1 2 115 909 0.1334 0.3415 0 1 118 0.1017 0.3035 
1 3 115 909 0.1371 0.3455 0 1 118 0.1186 0.3247 
1 4 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
1 5 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
2 1 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
2 2 115 909 0.0821 0.2757 0 1 118 0.0763 0.2666 
2 3 115 909 0.0393 0.1951 0 1 118 0.0339 0.1817 
2 4 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
2 5 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
3 1 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
3 2 115 909 0.0629 0.2438 0 1 118 0.0593 0.2372 
3 3 115 909 0.1182 0.3242 0 1 118 0.1525 0.3611 
3 4 115 909 0.1190 0.3253 0 1 118 0.1695 0.3768 
3 5 115 909 0.0282 0.1664 0 1 118 0.0169 0.1296 
4 1 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
4 2 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
4 3 115 909 0.1077 0.3113 0 1 118 0.0847 0.2797 
4 4 115 909 0.0454 0.2092 0 1 118 0.0508 0.2206 
4 5 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
5 1 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
5 2 115 909 (empty)    118 (empty)  
5 3 115 909 0.0035 0.0591 0 1 118 0.0085 0.0921 
5 4 115 909 0.0694 0.2552 0 1 118 0.0593 0.2372 
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5 5 115 909 0.0162 0.1266 0 1 118 0.0254 0.1581 
grade_nm fow_nm          
0 0 127 1,008 0.0218 0.1465 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
0 1 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
0 2 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
0 3 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
1 0 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
1 1 127 1,008 0.0146 0.1203 0 1 130 0.0231 0.1507 
1 2 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
1 3 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
2 0 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
2 1 127 1,008 0.0907 0.2883 0 1 130 0.1231 0.3298 
2 2 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
2 3 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
3 0 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
3 1 127 1,008 0.5058 0.5019 0 1 130 0.5231 0.5014 
3 2 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
3 3 127 1,008 0.0031 0.0561 0 1 130 0.0077 0.0877 
4 0 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
4 1 127 1,008 0.1853 0.3901 0 1 130 0.2077 0.4072 
4 2 127 1,008 0.0317 0.1759 0 1 130 0.0308 0.1734 
4 3 127 1,008 0.0209 0.1435 0 1 130 0.0077 0.0877 
5 0 127 1,008 (empty)    130 (empty)  
5 1 127 1,008 0.0703 0.2566 0 1 130 0.0385 0.1931 
5 2 127 1,008 0.0186 0.1358 0 1 130 0.0077 0.0877 
5 3 127 1,008 0.0373 0.1902 0 1 130 0.0154 0.1236 
Table 54: Descriptive Statistics for Interaction Variables in the Small Size Category 
The table shows descriptive statistics for interaction variables in the small size category. It is a parallel chart 
of weighted and unweighted data. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Interaction Variables Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
legform detinc          
1 1 226 1,761 0.2947 0.4569 0 1 231 0.4805 0.5007 
1 2 226 1,761 0.1566 0.3642 0 1 231 0.2294 0.4214 
1 3 226 1,761 0.0223 0.1481 0 1 231 0.0216 0.1458 
1 4 226 1,761 (empty)    231 (empty)  
2 1 226 1,761 0.0784 0.2694 0 1 231 0.0693 0.2545 
2 2 226 1,761 0.3026 0.4604 0 1 231 0.0779 0.2686 
2 3 226 1,761 0.0035 0.0595 0 1 231 0.0043 0.0658 
2 4 226 1,761 (empty)    231 (empty)  
3 1 226 1,761 (empty)    231 (empty)  
3 2 226 1,761 0.1127 0.3169 0 1 231 0.1039 0.3058 
3 3 226 1,761 0.0014 0.0371 0 1 231 0.0043 0.0658 
3 4 226 1,761 0.0277 0.1644 0 1 231 0.0087 0.0928 
sectorgr evasion          
1 0 220 1,720 0.1023 0.3037 0 1 225 0.1511 0.3590 
1 1 220 1,720 (empty)    225 (empty)  
2 0 220 1,720 0.1140 0.3186 0 1 225 0.1822 0.3869 
2 1 220 1,720 0.0241 0.1536 0 1 225 0.0267 0.1615 
3 0 220 1,720 0.6896 0.4637 0 1 225 0.5333 0.5000 
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3 1 220 1,720 0.0602 0.2384 0 1 225 0.0711 0.2576 
4 0 220 1,720 0.0070 0.0838 0 1 225 0.0267 0.1615 
4 1 220 1,720 0.0028 0.0531 0 1 225 0.0089 0.0941 
agenty agegr          
1 1 205 1,693 0.0316 0.1755 0 1 210 0.0190 0.1370 
1 2 205 1,693 0.1011 0.3022 0 1 210 0.1238 0.3302 
1 3 205 1,693 0.1114 0.3154 0 1 210 0.1190 0.3246 
1 4 205 1,693 0.0014 0.0379 0 1 210 0.0048 0.0690 
1 5 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
2 1 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
2 2 205 1,693 0.3082 0.4629 0 1 210 0.0762 0.2659 
2 3 205 1,693 0.0469 0.2120 0 1 210 0.0810 0.2734 
2 4 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
2 5 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
3 1 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
3 2 205 1,693 0.0151 0.1223 0 1 210 0.0429 0.2030 
3 3 205 1,693 0.1291 0.3361 0 1 210 0.1762 0.3819 
3 4 205 1,693 0.0651 0.2473 0 1 210 0.0667 0.2500 
3 5 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
4 1 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
4 2 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
4 3 205 1,693 0.0441 0.2057 0 1 210 0.0762 0.2659 
4 4 205 1,693 0.0336 0.1805 0 1 210 0.0667 0.2500 
4 5 205 1,693 0.0037 0.0607 0 1 210 0.0048 0.0690 
5 1 205 1,693 (empty)    210 (empty)  
5 2 205 1,693 0.0038 0.0618 0 1 210 0.0048 0.0690 
5 3 205 1,693 0.0284 0.1664 0 1 210 0.0381 0.1919 
5 4 205 1,693 0.0266 0.1612 0 1 210 0.0810 0.2734 
5 5 205 1,693 0.0500 0.2184 0 1 210 0.0190 0.1370 
grade_nm fow_nm          
0 0 228 1,780 0.0082 0.0902 0 1 233 0.0258 0.1587 
0 1 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
0 2 228 1,780 0.0014 0.0369 0 1 233 0.0043 0.0655 
0 3 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
1 0 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
1 1 228 1,780 0.0178 0.1327 0 1 233 0.0258 0.1587 
1 2 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
1 3 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
2 0 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
2 1 228 1,780 0.0192 0.1377 0 1 233 0.0472 0.2125 
2 2 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
2 3 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
3 0 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
3 1 228 1,780 0.4083 0.4926 0 1 233 0.4893 0.5010 
3 2 228 1,780 0.0130 0.1135 0 1 233 0.0172 0.1302 
3 3 228 1,780 0.0014 0.0369 0 1 233 0.0043 0.0655 
4 0 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
4 1 228 1,780 0.1254 0.3319 0 1 233 0.2189 0.4144 
4 2 228 1,780 0.3091 0.4631 0 1 233 0.0601 0.2382 
4 3 228 1,780 0.0062 0.0788 0 1 233 0.0129 0.1130 
5 0 228 1,780 (empty)    233 (empty)  
5 1 228 1,780 0.0681 0.2525 0 1 233 0.0558 0.2300 
5 2 228 1,780 0.0206 0.1423 0 1 233 0.0343 0.1825 
5 3 228 1,780 0.0014 0.0369 0 1 233 0.0043 0.0655 
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Table 55: Descriptive Statistics for Interaction Variables in the Medium Size Category 
The table shows descriptive statistics for interaction variables in the medium size category. It is a parallel chart 
of weighted and unweighted data. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Interaction Variables Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
legform detinc          
1 1 318 2,307 0.2034 0.4031 0 1 326 0.2301 0.4215 
1 2 318 2,307 0.0947 0.2933 0 1 326 0.1626 0.3695 
1 3 318 2,307 0.0044 0.0664 0 1 326 0.0153 0.1231 
1 4 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
2 1 318 2,307 0.0666 0.2497 0 1 326 0.0920 0.2895 
2 2 318 2,307 0.1063 0.3087 0 1 326 0.1319 0.3389 
2 3 318 2,307 0.0145 0.1198 0 1 326 0.0092 0.0956 
2 4 318 2,307 0.0093 0.0959 0 1 326 0.0092 0.0956 
3 1 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
3 2 318 2,307 0.3831 0.4869 0 1 326 0.2515 0.4346 
3 3 318 2,307 0.0155 0.1239 0 1 326 0.0184 0.1346 
3 4 318 2,307 0.1022 0.3033 0 1 326 0.0798 0.2713 
sectorgr evasion          
1 0 304 2,205 0.1559 0.3634 0 1 312 0.1667 0.3733 
1 1 304 2,205 0.0584 0.2349 0 1 312 0.0128 0.1127 
2 0 304 2,205 0.0701 0.2558 0 1 312 0.1186 0.3238 
2 1 304 2,205 0.0100 0.0998 0 1 312 0.0192 0.1376 
3 0 304 2,205 0.4764 0.5003 0 1 312 0.5449 0.4988 
3 1 304 2,205 0.1796 0.3845 0 1 312 0.0929 0.2908 
4 0 304 2,205 0.0441 0.2057 0 1 312 0.0385 0.1926 
4 1 304 2,205 0.0054 0.0735 0 1 312 0.0064 0.0799 
agenty agegr          
1 1 287 2,051 0.0506 0.2197 0 1 295 0.0373 0.1898 
1 2 287 2,051 0.0276 0.1641 0 1 295 0.0407 0.1979 
1 3 287 2,051 0.1157 0.3205 0 1 295 0.0814 0.2738 
1 4 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
1 5 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
2 1 287 2,051 0.0046 0.0676 0 1 295 0.0034 0.0582 
2 2 287 2,051 0.0607 0.2393 0 1 295 0.0610 0.2398 
2 3 287 2,051 0.0466 0.2112 0 1 295 0.0508 0.2201 
2 4 287 2,051 0.0058 0.0762 0 1 295 0.0068 0.0822 
2 5 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
3 1 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
3 2 287 2,051 0.1208 0.3265 0 1 295 0.0712 0.2576 
3 3 287 2,051 0.2033 0.4032 0 1 295 0.2508 0.4342 
3 4 287 2,051 0.0338 0.1811 0 1 295 0.0576 0.2334 
3 5 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
4 1 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
4 2 287 2,051 0.0058 0.0762 0 1 295 0.0068 0.0822 
4 3 287 2,051 0.0663 0.2492 0 1 295 0.0847 0.2790 
4 4 287 2,051 0.0976 0.2973 0 1 295 0.0814 0.2738 
4 5 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
5 1 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
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5 2 287 2,051 (empty)    295 (empty)  
5 3 287 2,051 0.0071 0.0839 0 1 295 0.0102 0.1005 
5 4 287 2,051 0.1382 0.3457 0 1 295 0.1322 0.3393 
5 5 287 2,051 0.0154 0.1232 0 1 295 0.0237 0.1525 
grade_nm fow_nm          
0 0 318 2,307 0.0415 0.1998 0 1 326 0.0429 0.2030 
0 1 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
0 2 318 2,307 0.0011 0.0333 0 1 326 0.0031 0.0554 
0 3 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
1 0 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
1 1 318 2,307 0.0074 0.0858 0 1 326 0.0123 0.1103 
1 2 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
1 3 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
2 0 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
2 1 318 2,307 0.0044 0.0664 0 1 326 0.0123 0.1103 
2 2 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
2 3 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
3 0 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
3 1 318 2,307 0.2071 0.4059 0 1 326 0.2669 0.4430 
3 2 318 2,307 0.1035 0.3052 0 1 326 0.0215 0.1452 
3 3 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
4 0 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
4 1 318 2,307 0.2439 0.4301 0 1 326 0.2669 0.4430 
4 2 318 2,307 0.1428 0.3504 0 1 326 0.1411 0.3487 
4 3 318 2,307 0.0442 0.2060 0 1 326 0.0307 0.1727 
5 0 318 2,307 (empty)    326 (empty)  
5 1 318 2,307 0.0205 0.1418 0 1 326 0.0337 0.1808 
5 2 318 2,307 0.0680 0.2522 0 1 326 0.0951 0.2938 
5 3 318 2,307 0.1154 0.3201 0 1 326 0.0736 0.2616 
Table 56: Descriptive Statistics for Interaction Variables in the Large Size Category 
The table shows descriptive statistics for interaction variables in the Large size category. It is a parallel chart 
of weighted and unweighted data. 
  Weighted Data Unweighted Data 
Interaction Variables Obs Weight Mean SD Min Max Obs Mean SD 
legform detinc          
1 1 284 1,862 0.0364 0.1876 0 1 296 0.0270 0.1624 
1 2 284 1,862 0.0450 0.2078 0 1 296 0.0507 0.2197 
1 3 284 1,862 0.0015 0.0384 0 1 296 0.0034 0.0581 
1 4 284 1,862 (empty)    296 (empty)  
2 1 284 1,862 0.0496 0.2176 0 1 296 0.0405 0.1976 
2 2 284 1,862 0.1663 0.3730 0 1 296 0.1453 0.3530 
2 3 284 1,862 0.0227 0.1491 0 1 296 0.0304 0.1720 
2 4 284 1,862 0.0476 0.2133 0 1 296 0.0507 0.2197 
3 1 284 1,862 (empty)    296 (empty)  
3 2 284 1,862 0.2626 0.4408 0 1 296 0.2128 0.4100 
3 3 284 1,862 0.0981 0.2980 0 1 296 0.1149 0.3194 
3 4 284 1,862 0.2701 0.4448 0 1 296 0.3243 0.4689 
sectorgr evasion          
1 0 276 1,830 0.2012 0.4016 0 1 286 0.2378 0.4265 
1 1 276 1,830 0.0065 0.0808 0 1 286 0.0105 0.1021 
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2 0 276 1,830 0.1403 0.3480 0 1 286 0.1503 0.3580 
2 1 276 1,830 0.0139 0.1175 0 1 286 0.0140 0.1176 
3 0 276 1,830 0.4865 0.5007 0 1 286 0.4790 0.5004 
3 1 276 1,830 0.0896 0.2861 0 1 286 0.0385 0.1926 
4 0 276 1,830 0.0618 0.2413 0 1 286 0.0699 0.2555 
4 1 276 1,830 (empty)    286 (empty)  
agenty agegr          
1 1 260 1,700 0.0075 0.0863 0 1 272 0.0110 0.1046 
1 2 260 1,700 0.0065 0.0807 0 1 272 0.0074 0.0856 
1 3 260 1,700 0.0095 0.0971 0 1 272 0.0110 0.1046 
1 4 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
1 5 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
2 1 260 1,700 0.0033 0.0572 0 1 272 0.0037 0.0606 
2 2 260 1,700 0.0777 0.2683 0 1 272 0.0846 0.2787 
2 3 260 1,700 0.0577 0.2337 0 1 272 0.0478 0.2137 
2 4 260 1,700 0.0033 0.0572 0 1 272 0.0037 0.0606 
2 5 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
3 1 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
3 2 260 1,700 0.0537 0.2259 0 1 272 0.0588 0.2357 
3 3 260 1,700 0.2164 0.4126 0 1 272 0.2426 0.4295 
3 4 260 1,700 0.0274 0.1635 0 1 272 0.0404 0.1974 
3 5 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
4 1 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
4 2 260 1,700 0.0044 0.0665 0 1 272 0.0074 0.0856 
4 3 260 1,700 0.1488 0.3566 0 1 272 0.1066 0.3092 
4 4 260 1,700 0.0981 0.2980 0 1 272 0.0809 0.2732 
4 5 260 1,700 0.0016 0.0402 0 1 272 0.0037 0.0606 
5 1 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
5 2 260 1,700 (empty)    272 (empty)  
5 3 260 1,700 0.0629 0.2432 0 1 272 0.0478 0.2137 
5 4 260 1,700 0.1552 0.3628 0 1 272 0.1618 0.3689 
5 5 260 1,700 0.0660 0.2488 0 1 272 0.0809 0.2732 
grade_nm fow_nm          
0 0 286 1,871 0.0385 0.1928 0 1 298 0.0369 0.1889 
0 1 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
0 2 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
0 3 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
1 0 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
1 1 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
1 2 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
1 3 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
2 0 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
2 1 286 1,871 0.0030 0.0545 0 1 298 0.0034 0.0579 
2 2 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
2 3 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
3 0 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
3 1 286 1,871 0.0851 0.2795 0 1 298 0.0738 0.2619 
3 2 286 1,871 0.0059 0.0770 0 1 298 0.0101 0.1000 
3 3 286 1,871 0.0044 0.0666 0 1 298 0.0067 0.0818 
4 0 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
4 1 286 1,871 0.0722 0.2593 0 1 298 0.0671 0.2506 
4 2 286 1,871 0.2478 0.4325 0 1 298 0.2517 0.4347 
4 3 286 1,871 0.0429 0.2030 0 1 298 0.0436 0.2046 
5 0 286 1,871 (empty)    298 (empty)  
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5 1 286 1,871 0.0139 0.1174 0 1 298 0.0134 0.1153 
5 2 286 1,871 0.1482 0.3560 0 1 298 0.1477 0.3554 
5 3 286 1,871 0.3379 0.4738 0 1 298 0.3456 0.4764 
 
 249 
 
Table 57: Correlation Coefficients and Cramer’s V for the Micro Size Category 
This table presents for two variables (ln~) their correlation coefficients with all other variables and otherwise Cramer’s V, based on the unweighted data of the micro size category 
(N=119). 
 lndiff-
pay 
lnloss-
reduc 
agegr agenty consen detinc disc duration evasion fow_nm fupaud fy_long fy_short 
grade 
_nm 
group legform 
non-
agree 
pan-
delay 
place sectorgr sex shdead specs 
trifling-
amount 
                         
lndiffpay 1.000                        
lnlossreduc -0.435 1.000                       
agegr -0.046 0.003 1.000                      
agenty 0.038 0.038 0.411 1.000                     
consen -0.105 0.000 0.199 0.164 1.000                    
detinc -0.297 0.302 0.349 0.173 0.087 1.000                   
disc 0.027 0.086 0.087 0.138 0.174 0.169 1.000                  
duration -0.023 0.303 0.182 0.296 0.351 0.475 0.338 1.000                 
evasion 0.230 -0.139 0.110 0.235 -0.124 0.171 0.005 0.241 1.000                
fow_nm -0.126 0.267 0.185 0.246 0.129 0.303 0.110 0.380 0.109 1.000               
fupaud -0.003 0.210 0.277 0.110 -0.015 0.370 -0.029 0.445 0.101 0.549 1.000              
fy_long . . 0.103  0.053 0.169 -0.110 0.115 -0.035 0.027 -0.033 1.000             
fy_short -0.120 -0.073 0.162 0.163 -0.033 0.137 -0.109 0.306 -0.041 0.130 -0.077 -0.042 1.000            
grade_nm -0.141 0.211 0.304 0.304 0.152 0.346 0.283 0.283 0.333 0.632 0.243 0.082 0.208 1.000           
group -0.351 0.465 0.105 0.131 0.048 0.657 -0.104 0.374 -0.114 0.380 0.214 0.290 -0.009 0.434 1.000          
legform -0.302 0.325 0.338 0.271 0.064 0.534 0.103 0.313 0.162 0.190 0.239 0.228 0.124 0.252 0.573 1.000         
nonagree 0.094 0.169 0.179 0.187 -0.245 0.207 -0.016 0.444 0.214 0.325 0.136 -0.038 -0.170 0.185 0.085 0.011 1.000        
pandelay -0.121 0.051 0.116 0.155 0.070 0.059 0.110 0.224 0.098 0.166 0.013 -0.020 0.053 0.245 -0.068 0.050 0.163 1.000       
place 0.229 -0.161 0.165 0.146 0.123 0.201 0.087 0.220 0.143 0.136 0.090 0.112 0.204 0.225 0.335 0.317 0.099 0.160 1.000      
sectorgr -0.235 0.198 0.129 0.145 0.144 0.181 0.157 0.313 0.111 0.151 0.098 0.245 0.140 0.226 0.241 0.229 0.053 0.069 0.183 1.000     
sex 0.051 0.104 0.077 0.267 0.077 0.196 0.065 0.181 0.102 0.251 0.189 0.098 -0.064 0.232 0.230 0.032 0.059 -0.044 0.178 0.117 1.000    
shdead -0.086 0.069 0.211 0.115 0.143 0.088 0.024 0.145 0.059 0.138 0.028 -0.095 0.075 0.196 -0.166 0.116 -0.107 0.140 0.061 0.102 -0.059 1.000   
specs -0.139 0.428 0.248 0.200 0.034 0.317 -0.010 0.519 -0.079 0.202 0.162 -0.016 0.003 0.144 0.373 0.303 0.018 -0.044 0.250 0.343 0.066 0.096 1.000  
trifling-
amount 
-0.038 -0.010 0.149 0.194 0.201 0.124 0.095 0.227 -0.131 0.103 -0.123 -0.027 0.030 0.180 -0.003 0.136 -0.143 -0.074 0.115 0.158 -0.032 0.089 0.203 1.000 
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Table 58: Correlation Coefficients and Cramer’s V for the Small Size Category 
This table presents for two variables (ln~) their correlation coefficients with all other variables and otherwise Cramer’s V, based on the unweighted data of the small size category 
(N=205). 
 
lndiffpay lnlossreduc agegr agenty consen detinc disc duration evasion fow_nm fupaud fy_long fy_short grade_nm group legform 
non-
agree 
pan-
delay 
place sector-gr sex shdead specs 
trifling-
amount 
                         
lndiffpay 1.000                        
lnlossreduc -0.169 1.000                       
agegr -0.001 -0.016 1.000                      
agenty 0.004 0.053 0.347 1.000                     
consen -0.103 0.007 0.058 0.105 1.000                    
detinc -0.079 0.164 0.220 0.161 0.112 1.000                   
disc -0.039 -0.043 0.195 0.104 0.129 0.068 1.000                  
duration 0.030 0.108 0.221 0.178 0.391 0.177 0.130 1.000                 
evasion 0.160 -0.025 0.099 0.149 -0.201 0.082 -0.053 0.269 1.000                
fow_nm 0.066 0.063 0.082 0.195 0.105 0.203 0.071 0.209 0.154 1.000               
fupaud -0.067 0.104 0.111 0.074 -0.190 0.192 -0.011 0.269 0.030 0.109 1.000              
fy_long 0.075 0.044 0.144 0.207 0.048 0.139 0.024 0.309 0.002 0.045 0.177 1.000             
fy_short 0.013 -0.110 0.110 0.112 -0.014 0.083 0.067 0.122 -0.064 0.088 -0.046 -0.060 1.000            
grade_nm 0.016 0.003 0.188 0.247 0.067 0.145 0.091 0.162 0.103 0.594 0.140 0.100 0.101 1.000           
group 0.069 0.240 0.115 0.112 -0.049 0.121 0.039 0.285 0.030 0.168 0.122 0.250 -0.049 0.161 1.000          
legform -0.079 0.271 0.224 0.193 0.069 0.347 0.046 0.223 0.049 0.171 0.089 0.155 0.094 0.119 0.157 1.000         
nonagree 0.146 -0.100 0.093 0.126 -0.302 0.125 -0.039 0.335 0.174 0.130 0.005 0.088 -0.024 0.170 -0.070 0.096 1.000        
pandelay 0.033 0.171 0.119 0.164 -0.047 0.094 -0.010 0.309 -0.005 0.240 -0.050 0.070 -0.064 0.092 0.101 0.186 0.019 1.000       
place 0.048 0.016 0.151 0.157 0.165 0.123 0.134 0.146 0.086 0.147 0.050 0.061 0.141 0.161 0.202 0.097 0.055 0.087 1.000      
sectorgr -0.007 -0.012 0.116 0.109 0.095 0.150 0.078 0.149 0.133 0.123 0.078 0.075 0.118 0.107 0.129 0.147 0.111 0.130 0.150 1.000     
sex 0.048 -0.061 0.087 0.156 0.103 0.183 0.072 0.147 0.033 0.126 -0.015 0.055 -0.151 0.180 0.134 0.086 -0.048 0.162 0.139 0.036 1.000    
shdead 0.033 -0.154 0.080 0.164 -0.097 0.191 0.025 0.209 0.010 0.095 -0.060 -0.015 -0.018 0.061 -0.100 0.190 0.090 -0.075 0.169 0.115 -0.151 1.000   
specs -0.114 -0.047 0.133 0.143 -0.049 0.116 0.052 0.156 -0.060 0.133 -0.021 -0.033 0.118 0.162 -0.027 0.120 0.055 -0.035 0.097 0.191 -0.028 0.029 1.000  
trifling-
amount 
-0.098 0.067 0.046 0.065 0.064 0.040 -0.128 0.111 -0.076 0.054 -0.057 -0.042 0.002 0.111 -0.034 0.057 -0.043 -0.044 0.088 0.064 -0.024 0.066 -0.037 1.000 
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Table 59: Correlation Coefficients and Cramer’s V for the Medium Size Category 
This table presents for two variables (ln~) their correlation coefficients with all other variables and otherwise Cramer’s V, based on the unweighted data of the medium size category 
(N=291). 
 
lndiffpay lnlossreduc agegr agenty consen detinc disc duration evasion fow_nm fupaud fy_long fy_short grade_nm group legform 
non-
agree 
pan-
delay 
place sector-gr sex shdead specs 
trifling-
amount 
                         
lndiffpay 1.000                        
lnlossreduc -0.374 1.000                       
agegr 0.019 -0.176 1.000                      
agenty -0.001 -0.134 0.436 1.000                     
consen -0.052 -0.065 0.108 0.103 1.000                    
detinc -0.049 0.268 0.133 0.159 0.055 1.000                   
disc 0.148 -0.059 0.107 0.112 0.068 0.079 1.000                  
duration 0.068 0.159 0.185 0.177 0.354 0.155 0.112 1.000                 
evasion 0.144 -0.051 0.093 0.085 -0.315 0.150 0.092 0.248 1.000                
fow_nm 0.055 0.153 0.159 0.217 0.043 0.221 0.041 0.162 0.091 1.000               
fupaud -0.067 0.220 0.128 0.220 0.007 0.266 -0.070 0.173 0.082 0.193 1.000              
fy_long 0.040 0.013 0.101 0.118 -0.006 0.105 -0.070 0.140 0.050 0.180 0.041 1.000             
fy_short 0.042 -0.025 0.067 0.143 -0.026 0.057 0.031 0.174 0.044 0.091 0.032 -0.047 1.000            
grade_nm 0.050 0.009 0.222 0.260 0.077 0.142 0.069 0.147 0.084 0.665 0.109 0.134 0.099 1.000           
group -0.058 0.357 0.151 0.181 0.057 0.371 0.049 0.229 -0.029 0.417 0.342 0.051 0.043 0.151 1.000          
legform -0.037 0.353 0.239 0.232 0.014 0.413 0.053 0.164 0.124 0.233 0.189 0.116 0.084 0.149 0.451 1.000         
nonagree 0.085 0.041 0.098 0.096 -0.201 0.048 0.052 0.275 0.035 0.128 0.057 -0.044 -0.008 0.121 0.034 0.065 1.000        
pandelay 0.081 -0.074 0.078 0.120 -0.130 0.118 0.002 0.205 0.172 0.083 -0.026 -0.047 -0.049 0.087 -0.030 0.066 0.070 1.000       
place -0.019 0.047 0.199 0.131 0.211 0.178 0.148 0.162 0.185 0.152 0.136 0.052 0.104 0.130 0.249 0.238 0.147 0.164 1.000      
sectorgr -0.040 0.103 0.133 0.110 0.063 0.214 0.113 0.134 0.077 0.105 0.089 0.092 0.062 0.247 0.148 0.147 0.044 0.065 0.105 1.000     
sex 0.034 0.040 0.179 0.032 0.196 0.153 0.032 0.148 -0.036 0.172 0.062 -0.029 -0.041 0.108 0.172 0.055 -0.033 -0.044 0.130 0.072 1.000    
shdead 0.138 -0.052 0.038 0.138 -0.089 0.056 0.071 0.153 -0.018 0.076 0.106 0.063 -0.007 0.132 -0.025 0.010 0.172 -0.063 0.106 0.107 -0.040 1.000   
specs -0.044 0.143 0.109 0.070 -0.015 0.185 0.042 0.196 -0.008 0.109 0.131 -0.011 -0.014 0.053 0.141 0.197 0.096 0.136 0.162 0.041 0.053 -0.015 1.000  
trifling-
amount 
-0.092 0.054 0.110 0.075 0.044 0.140 -0.069 0.136 -0.066 0.084 -0.020 0.133 0.044 0.136 0.011 0.029 -0.069 -0.038 0.052 0.089 0.012 -0.088 -0.051 1.000 
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Table 60: Correlation Coefficients and Cramer’s V for the Large Size Category 
This table presents for two variables (ln~) their correlation coefficients with all other variables and otherwise Cramer’s V, based on the unweighted data of the large size category 
(N=270). 
 
lndiffpay lnlossreduc agegr agenty consen detinc disc duration evasion fow_nm fupaud fy_long fy_short grade_nm group legform 
non-
agree 
pan-
delay 
place sector-gr sex shdead specs 
trifling-
amount 
                         
lndiffpay 1.000                        
lnlossreduc -0.207 1.000                       
agegr -0.004 -0.025 1.000                      
agenty -0.012 0.001 0.500 1.000                     
consen -0.152 0.015 0.096 0.146 1.000                    
detinc 0.002 0.078 0.131 0.158 0.183 1.000                   
disc 0.117 0.084 0.113 0.059 -0.058 0.134 1.000                  
duration -0.039 0.056 0.158 0.163 0.197 0.209 0.136 1.000                 
evasion 0.111 -0.048 0.132 0.119 -0.292 0.213 0.067 0.139 1.000                
fow_nm 0.052 0.094 0.167 0.217 0.071 0.240 0.090 0.225 0.041 1.000               
fupaud 0.040 0.029 0.127 0.140 -0.059 0.211 0.018 0.175 -0.133 0.168 1.000              
fy_long 0.033 0.006 0.209 0.183 0.017 0.103 -0.104 0.252 -0.041 0.127 0.026 1.000             
fy_short 0.135 0.022 0.083 0.085 -0.088 0.069 -0.057 0.140 0.017 0.066 0.007 -0.111 1.000            
grade_nm 0.042 0.099 0.245 0.264 0.080 0.162 0.092 0.183 0.067 0.732 0.191 0.136 0.121 1.000           
group -0.052 0.085 0.076 0.108 0.056 0.423 -0.005 0.465 -0.175 0.410 0.339 0.051 0.012 0.347 1.000          
legform -0.045 0.126 0.178 0.127 0.043 0.379 0.109 0.200 0.065 0.232 0.047 0.092 0.055 0.091 0.312 1.000         
nonagree -0.009 0.074 0.086 0.200 -0.191 0.101 -0.028 0.222 0.048 0.130 -0.004 -0.019 0.055 0.080 0.022 0.038 1.000        
pandelay 0.067 0.010 0.097 0.077 -0.061 0.088 -0.001 0.080 -0.037 0.038 -0.082 -0.075 -0.029 0.073 -0.024 0.078 0.078 1.000       
place -0.072 0.001 0.136 0.135 0.111 0.193 0.160 0.180 0.154 0.173 0.315 0.047 0.088 0.180 0.412 0.224 0.065 0.272 1.000      
sectorgr -0.069 -0.036 0.106 0.111 0.063 0.168 0.182 0.144 0.086 0.104 0.106 0.051 0.097 0.108 0.131 0.065 0.132 0.043 0.102 1.000     
sex 0.114 0.099 0.199 0.098 0.116 0.210 0.057 0.211 -0.046 0.098 0.065 -0.034 0.003 0.143 0.071 0.135 -0.060 0.017 0.081 0.103 1.000    
shdead 0.083 -0.101 0.044 0.086 -0.090 0.179 0.066 0.123 0.105 0.146 -0.151 -0.127 0.043 0.188 -0.070 0.128 0.186 0.115 0.087 0.079 0.034 1.000   
specs 0.097 0.058 0.101 0.110 -0.033 0.256 0.118 0.427 0.006 0.295 0.093 0.119 0.001 0.216 0.307 0.180 0.129 -0.042 0.235 0.160 -0.037 -0.017 1.000  
trifling-
amount 
-0.039 0.040 0.056 0.091 0.108 0.116 -0.100 0.209 -0.063 0.083 0.006 -0.094 -0.049 0.059 -0.056 0.138 -0.015 -0.033 0.081 0.143 0.019 0.002 -0.097 1.000 
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Table 61: Cumulated Number of Focal Points 
The table shows the cumulated number of focal points, sorted by the essential topics pursuant to the 
Rationalization Edict from 1995 (see section IV 2). It is a parallel chart for each size category of focal points 
without and with findings with regard to all cases. 
 Micro Small Medium Large 
Focal Points 
without 
Findings 
with 
Findings 
without 
Findings 
with 
Findings 
without 
Findings 
with 
Findings 
without 
Findings 
with 
Findings 
completeness of 
revenues 
24 48 37 112 40 84 13 16 
delimitation between 
business and private 
17 62 26 119 29 155 17 97 
value added tax 13 35 20 69 45 89 25 86 
corporate 
relationships 
3 1 2 11 10 15 12 45 
contracts between 
related parties 
2 10 4 6 9 36 17 28 
sale of business, 
termination of 
business, leasing of 
business 
1 1 5 10 6 13 2 11 
properties  
(acquisition, sale, 
change of use) 
3 2 1 10 5 10 1 10 
investment 
grant/special write-
downs 
3 8 4 20 8 26 1 10 
foreign relations  2 2 2 1 4 6 32 
financial assets, 
investments, 
securities 
 1  6 2 11 1 20 
adaptation of 
taxpayers’ balance 
sheets in follow-up 
audits 
   4 1 5 6 21 
valuation 
adjustments on 
accounts receivable 
     4 2 8 
audit of essential 
non-business income 
 7 1 9  8  8 
capital gain 
unexplained 
   1    1 
miscellaneous 141 147 242 248 316 333 261 279 
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Table 62: Cumulated Number of Findings with Suspected Tax Evasion 
The table shows the cumulated number of finding with revenue agents’ suspicion of tax evasion. It is a parallel 
chart for each size category with regard to all cases. 
Findings with Suspicion of Tax Evasion Micro Small Medium Large 
completeness of revenues 14 15 15 4 
third-party services 1 1 8         
value added tax 1  6 2 
private expenses 2 1 4         
control reports 2 2 2 1 
business expenses 1 1 2 3 
fixed assets 1 1 2         
loans   2 1 
shareholder   2 4 
cash book 1 1 1 1 
deposits 1  1         
goods purchase 1 1 1 2 
clients’ money  1 1         
current assets   1         
employment relationships with relatives   1         
foreign facts   1         
affiliated companies    2 
direct insurance    1 
investment grant    2 
voluntary declaration  1          
miscellaneous 1 1   
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Table 63: Control Estimation for the Audit Duration 
The table shows the estimation results of an ordered logistic regression with DURATION_MSM as dependent 
variable in the firm size categories of SMEs and DURATION in the large firm size category as well as different 
independent variables. The latter are zero at the base levels and in the case of the PLACE OF WORK this 
corresponds to an office on the firms’ premise. If the exponentiated coefficients are > 1 (< 1), the independent 
variable increases (decreases) the duration of an audit whereas this depends on the cutpoints too. The cutpoints 
correspond to the categories of duration.  
Exponentiated coefficients. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Dependent Variable = duration_msm/duration Micro Small Medium Large 
Variables      
audit time (days)  1.302* 1.216** 1.178* 1.018* 
report time (days)  1.112 1.438*** 1.472 1.128* 
member of an affiliated group=1  0.325 3.414 6.720*** 4.450*** 
suspected tax evasion=1  1.462 1.291 1.014 0.945 
place of work      
       tax office  0.420 0.559 1.989 1.087 
       tax adviser office  1.007 0.187* 1.926 1.481 
       multiple offices  0.195** 0.043* 1.179 1.125 
consulted specialized auditors=1  23.490* 0.487 0.660 2.002* 
follow-up audit=1  15.225 0.986 1.084 1.059 
short deadline for reply=1  0.897 1.585 0.933 0.787 
penalty for delay=1  3.317 0.341 2.066 0.578 
threat of non-agreement=1  7.442* 4.037* 1.179 1.838 
consensus=1  0.582 0.167*** 0.290** 0.300* 
final discussion=1  0.610 0.573 0.670 0.785 
feeling of time pressure due to statistical 
guidelines 
 0.981 1.004 0.923 0.923 
cut1 = up to 1 month _cons 0.189 0.009** 0.163  0.006***  
cut2 = 2 to 3 months _cons 1.818 0.453 3.198 0.282 
cut3 = 4 to 6 months _cons 29.009* 3.939 12.534* 1.009 
cut4 = 7 to 9 months _cons 117.853** 6.703 37.840** 2.958 
cut5 = 10 to 12 months _cons 439.591*** 19.014* 92.552*** 8.042** 
cut6 = 1 to 1.5 years _cons    21.318*** 
cut7 = 1.5 to 2 years _cons    49.734*** 
N  113 201 282 248 
N_clust  98 176 232 191 
N_cd  0 0 0 1 
chi2  73.600 112.842 90.105 90.407 
r2_p  0.261 0.437 0.230 0.157 
ll  -1.0E+03 -1.3E+03 -2.6E+03 -2.7E+03 
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Table 64: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Micro Size Category 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) and the ideal number of knots (underlined) for the restricted cubic spline function. 
It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the micro size category. 
 Audit Time (2,812 obs) Report Time (644 obs) Total Time (3,456 obs) 
Model, K ll(model) df AIC BIC ll(model) df AIC AICc BIC ll(model) df AIC BIC 
odds d.f. 1 -28.019 44 144.038 405.471 162.772 46 -233.544 -225.082 -28.030 147.972 44 -207.943 62.563 
odds d.f. 2 40.684 45 8.631 276.006      184.217 45 -278.433 -1.779 
odds d.f. 3 53.659 46 -15.319 257.997      207.560 46 -323.119 -40.317 
odds d.f. 4 69.514 47 -45.027 234.231          
normal d.f. 1 -107.242 44 302.485 563.918 45.091 46 1.818 10.280 207.333 89.332 44 -90.664 179.842 
normal d.f. 2 -38.172 45 166.345 433.719      121.292 45 -152.585 124.069 
normal d.f. 3 -24.793 46 141.587 414.903      139.851 46 -187.702 95.100 
normal d.f. 4 -5.252 47 104.504 383.762          
hazard d.f. 1 33.620 44 20.761 282.193 29.917 46 32.166 40.628 237.680 212.252 44 -336.504 -65.997 
hazard d.f. 2 70.339 45 -50.679 216.695      233.334 45 -376.668 -100.014 
hazard d.f. 3 78.145 46 -64.290 209.026      254.720 46 -417.441 -134.639 
hazard d.f. 4 100.235 47 -106.469 172.788          
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Table 65: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Micro Size Category (Interaction Effects) 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) with interaction effects or not and the number of knots for the restricted cubic 
spline function (distribution (d): o = odds, h = hazard; K knots). It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the micro size category. 
 Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Interaction Effects d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC 
without o 5 -175.20 47 444.40 723.65 o 1 -43.25 43 172.51 364.62 o 5 -25.54 47 145.09 434.04 
legform#detinc o 5 -171.03 48 438.06 723.26 o 1 -42.33 44 172.66 369.24 o 5 -23.74 48 143.47 438.57 
sectorgr#evasion o 5 -161.34 49 420.68 711.82 o 1 -32.07 45 154.15 355.19 o 5 -11.84 49 121.68 422.92 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion 
o 5 -157.73 50 415.45 712.53 o 1 -31.07 46 154.15 359.66 o 5 -10.30 50 120.60 427.99 
agenty#agegr o 5 -142.60 50 385.21 682.29 o 1 -35.20 46 162.39 367.91 o 5 -0.73 50 101.47 408.86 
grade_nm#fow_nm o 5 22.52 45 44.96 312.34 o 1 115.87 41 -149.75 33.43 h 3 158.14 43 -230.28 34.07 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
h 4 100.23 47 -106.47 172.79 o 1 153.07 44 -218.15 -21.57 h 3 254.72 46 -417.44 -134.64 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
h 3 80.70 48 -65.41 219.79 o 1 162.77 46 -233.54 -28.03 h 3 260.08 48 -424.15 -129.05 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
h 3 80.79 49 -63.58 227.56 o 1 163.62 47 -233.25 -23.27 h 3 260.22 49 -422.44 -121.19 
 
 
 258 
Table 66: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Small Size Category 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) and the ideal number of knots (underlined) for the restricted cubic spline function. 
It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the small size category. 
 Audit Time (5,384 obs) Report Time (1,166 obs) Total Time (6,550 obs) 
Model, K ll(model) df AIC BIC ll(model) df AIC AICc BIC ll(model) df AIC BIC 
odds d.f. 1 628.689 53 -1,151.377 -802.044 90.811 53 -75.622 -64.264 192.629 704.953 54 -1,301.907 -935.397 
odds d.f. 2 684.567 54 -1,261.135 -905.211 95.414 54 -82.828 -71.019 190.484 720.534 56 -1,329.069 -948.984 
odds d.f. 3 833.339 55 -1,556.678 -1,194.162 615.891 55 -1,121.782 -1,109.511 -843.409 943.107 56 -1,774.213 -1,394.129 
odds d.f. 4 904.293 56 -1,696.586 -1,327.479          
odds d.f. 5 893.054 57 -1672.108 -1296.411          
normal d.f. 1 414.696 53 -723.391 -374.058 -154.330 53 414.660 426.017 682.911 457.236 55 -804.471 -431.174 
normal d.f. 2 434.547 54 -761.094 -405.170 -154.101 55 418.202 430.473 696.575 459.596 55 -809.193 -435.896 
normal d.f. 3 519.586 55 -929.171 -566.656 321.305 55 -532.610 -520.339 -254.236 664.703 56 -1,217.406 -837.322 
normal d.f. 4 547.413 56 -982.825 -613.719          
normal d.f. 5 549.296 57 -984.592 -608.894          
hazard d.f. 1 458.876 53 -811.753 -462.420 10.405 54 87.190 98.999 360.502 563.367 54 -1,018.734 -652.224 
hazard d.f. 2 461.055 55 -812.110 -449.595 12.050 56 87.899 100.642 371.334 563.459 55 -1,016.919 -643.622 
hazard d.f. 3 542.805 55 -975.610 -613.094 562.284 56 -1,012.567 -999.824 -729.132 842.785 56 -1,573.569 -1,193.485 
hazard d.f. 4 546.487 57 -978.974 -603.276          
hazard d.f. 5 559.868 58 -1003.736 -621.448          
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Table 67: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Small Size Category (Interaction Effects) 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) with interaction effects or not and the number of knots for the restricted cubic 
spline function (distribution (d): o = odds, h = hazard; K knots). It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the small size category. 
 Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Interaction Effects d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC 
without o 4 742.48 48 -1,388.95 -1,072.57 o 3 434.01 47 -774.02 -536.14 o 3 732.20 47 -1,370.39 -1,051.39 
legform#detinc o 4 788.04 49 -1,478.07 -1,155.11 o 3 458.97 48 -821.94 -579.00 o 3 777.58 48 -1,459.17 -1,133.38 
sectorgr#evasion o 4 778.09 50 -1,456.17 -1,126.61 o 3 441.50 49 -784.99 -536.99 o 3 769.99 49 -1,441.98 -1,109.41 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion 
o 4 825.36 51 -1,548.71 -1,212.56 o 3 468.94 50 -837.87 -584.81 o 3 818.77 51 -1,535.54 -1,189.39 
agenty#agegr o 4 800.36 52 -1,496.73 -1,153.99 o 3 554.64 51 -1,007.28 -749.15 o 3 823.49 53 -1,540.97 -1,181.25 
grade_nm#fow_nm o 4 758.31 49 -1,418.61 -1,095.64 o 3 452.30 49 -806.61 -558.60 o 3 755.44 49 -1,412.87 -1,080.30 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
o 4 820.11 53 -1,534.23 -1,184.90 o 3 581.64 52 -1,059.27 -796.08 o 3 851.64 52 -1,599.29 -1,246.35 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
o 4 851.87 55 -1,593.75 -1,231.23 o 3 583.45 54 -1,058.89 -785.58 o 3 886.27 54 -1,664.55 -1,298.04 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
o 4 904.29 56 -1,696.59 -1,327.48 o 3 615.89 55 -1,121.78 -843.41 o 3 943.11 56 -1,774.21 -1,394.13 
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Table 68: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Medium Size Category 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) and the ideal number of knots (underlined) for the restricted cubic spline function. 
It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the medium size category. 
 Audit Time (10,136 obs) Report Time (1,995 obs) Total Time (12,131 obs) 
Model, K ll(model) df AIC BIC ll(model) df AIC AICc BIC ll(model) df AIC BIC 
odds d.f. 1 -75.945 58 267.890 686.873 -475.666 58 1,067.333 1,081.048 1,392.040 35.374 58 45.252 474.656 
odds d.f. 2 -70.197 59 258.394 684.601 -410.356 59 938.711 952.928 1,269.017 37.516 59 42.968 479.776 
odds d.f. 3 -69.258 60 258.517 691.948 -293.024 60 706.049 720.777 1,041.953 42.660 61 36.679 488.294 
odds d.f. 4 -63.722 62 251.444 699.322 -83.874 61 289.748 304.998 631.251 42.348 61 37.303 488.918 
odds d.f. 5 -64.116 63 254.232 709.334      53.196 63 19.607 486.029 
odds d.f. 6 -52.282 63 230.563 685.666      52.571 64 22.858 496.683 
odds d.f. 7          54.535 65 20.931 502.160 
normal d.f. 1 -190.428 58 496.856 915.839 -507.308 58 1,130.615 1,144.330 1,455.322 -50.447 58 216.894 646.298 
normal d.f. 2 -184.549 59 487.097 913.305 -443.115 59 1,004.231 1,018.448 1,334.536 -49.092 59 216.183 652.991 
normal d.f. 3 -179.776 60 479.551 912.982 -364.985 60 849.969 864.698 1,185.873 -47.928 60 215.856 660.068 
normal d.f. 4 -168.064 61 458.128 898.783 -213.245 61 548.490 563.740 889.992 -47.829 62 219.658 678.676 
normal d.f. 5 -168.652 63 463.305 918.407      -33.313 62 190.625 649.644 
normal d.f. 6 -156.150 63 438.300 893.403      -33.893 64 195.787 669.612 
normal d.f. 7          -32.716 65 195.432 676.661 
hazard d.f. 1 -158.937 59 435.874 862.082 -449.645 58 1,015.289 1,029.004 1,339.996 -44.623 58 205.245 634.649 
hazard d.f. 2 -155.976 59 429.952 856.159 -426.092 59 970.183 984.400 1,300.489 -40.824 60 201.647 645.858 
hazard d.f. 3 -155.820 61 433.641 874.295 -369.353 60 858.706 873.434 1,194.610 -27.364 61 176.728 628.343 
hazard d.f. 4 -153.859 61 429.718 870.372 -136.965 61 395.930 411.180 737.432 -25.997 62 175.993 635.011 
hazard d.f. 5 -153.176 63 432.351 887.454      -20.007 63 166.013 632.435 
hazard d.f. 6 -143.726 63 413.451 868.554      -21.130 65 172.259 653.488 
hazard d.f. 7          -20.113 66 172.226 660.858 
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Table 69: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Medium Size Category (Interaction Effects) 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) with interaction effects or not and the number of knots for the restricted cubic 
spline function (distribution (d): o = odds, h = hazard; K knots). It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the medium size category. 
 Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Interaction Effects d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC 
without o 1 -273.98 45 637.96 963.03 o 4 -304.67 48 705.33 974.06 o 1 -148.06 45 386.12 719.28 
legform#detinc o 1 -244.96 48 585.92 932.67 o 4 -290.05 51 682.10 967.62 o 1 -120.71 48 337.42 692.79 
sectorgr#evasion o 1 -251.17 48 598.35 945.09 o 4 -271.10 51 644.20 929.72 o 1 -122.65 48 341.30 696.67 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion 
o 1 -223.11 51 548.22 916.63 o 4 -252.56 54 613.11 915.42 o 1 -94.48 51 290.96 668.54 
agenty#agegr o 1 -166.70 50 433.40 794.60 o 4 -238.33 53 582.67 879.38 o 1 -55.87 50 211.75 581.92 
grade_nm#fow_nm o 2 -244.24 49 586.47 940.44 o 4 -158.34 51 418.67 704.19 o 5 -103.63 52 311.26 696.24 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
o 2 -107.42 54 322.83 712.92 o 4 -121.33 56 354.67 668.18 o 3 8.46 55 93.09 500.28 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
o 2 -95.96 57 305.92 717.68 o 4 -104.08 59 326.16 656.47 o 1 9.97 56 92.06 506.66 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
o 1 -70.20 59 258.39 684.60 o 4 -83.87 61 289.75 631.25 o 1 35.37 58 45.25 474.66 
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Table 70: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Large Size Category 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) and the ideal number of knots (underlined) for the restricted cubic spline function. 
It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the large size category. 
 Audit Time (31,366 obs) Report Time (6,081 obs) Total Time (37,447 obs) 
Model, K ll(model) df AIC BIC ll(model) df AIC BIC ll(model) df AIC BIC 
odds d.f. 1 -911.054 55 1,932.108 2,391.549 -1,023.391 58 2,162.782 2,552.131 -823.333 56 1,758.665 2,236.383 
odds d.f. 2 -837.710 57 1,789.420 2,265.568 -920.080 61 1,962.160 2,371.648 -708.163 56 1,528.326 2,006.044 
odds d.f. 3 -802.562 59 1,723.124 2,215.979 -914.014 61 1,950.028 2,359.516 -698.401 56 1,508.801 1,986.519 
odds d.f. 4 -806.932 61 1,735.864 2,245.426 -912.634 62 1,949.267 2,365.469 -700.352 57 1,514.704 2,000.953 
odds d.f. 5 -781.669 61 1,685.338 2,194.900     -680.630 58 1,477.259 1,972.039 
odds d.f. 6 -788.028 61 1,698.056 2,207.619     -681.567 60 1,483.133 1,994.974 
odds d.f. 7 -761.830 62 1,647.660 2,165.576     -657.673 61 1,437.345 1,957.717 
odds d.f. 8 -721.837 64 1,571.675 2,106.297     -639.872 61 1,401.744 1,922.116 
odds d.f. 9 -622.210 66 1,376.421 1,927.750     -620.810 63 1,367.620 1,905.053 
odds d.f. 10         -627.598 62 1,379.197 1,908.099 
normal d.f. 1 -1,047.712 56 2,207.423 2,675.218 -1,108.553 60 2,337.105 2,739.881 -952.370 54 2,012.739 2,473.396 
normal d.f. 2 -972.184 59 2,062.368 2,555.224 -975.567 59 2,069.133 2,465.196 -820.470 58 1,756.941 2,251.720 
normal d.f. 3 -921.893 58 1,959.786 2,444.288 -972.281 61 2,066.561 2,476.050 -803.521 58 1,723.041 2,217.821 
normal d.f. 4 -926.935 61 1,975.870 2,485.432 -970.603 63 2,067.206 2,490.120 -804.937 59 1,727.874 2,231.185 
normal d.f. 5 -900.949 60 1,921.898 2,423.107     -788.156 57 1,690.311 2,176.560 
normal d.f. 6 -906.829 63 1,939.658 2,465.927     -788.501 60 1,697.003 2,208.844 
normal d.f. 7 -883.254 64 1,894.508 2,429.131     -759.260 60 1,638.521 2,150.362 
normal d.f. 8 -844.461 67 1,822.922 2,382.605     -742.208 61 1,606.416 2,126.788 
normal d.f. 9 -752.989 64 1,633.979 2,168.601     -724.425 62 1,572.850 2,101.752 
normal d.f. 10         -731.198 63 1,588.396 2,125.829 
hazard d.f. 1 -992.019 56 2,096.039 2,563.833 -1,150.976 59 2,419.951 2,816.014 -936.018 56 1,984.036 2,461.755 
hazard d.f. 2 -764.164 59 1,646.328 2,139.183 -894.933 58 1,905.865 2,295.215 -649.287 57 1,412.573 1,898.822 
 263 
hazard d.f. 3 -746.669 58 1,609.338 2,093.839 -878.207 61 1,878.414 2,287.902 -646.808 58 1,409.616 1,904.396 
hazard d.f. 4 -750.140 60 1,620.280 2,121.489 -875.195 61 1,872.390 2,281.878 -645.060 57 1,404.121 1,890.369 
hazard d.f. 5 -706.525 62 1,537.050 2,054.966     -615.101 61 1,352.203 1,872.574 
hazard d.f. 6 -712.999 62 1,549.997 2,067.913     -614.680 61 1,351.360 1,871.732 
hazard d.f. 7 -690.853 62 1,505.707 2,023.623     -600.287 64 1,328.575 1,874.538 
hazard d.f. 8 -655.939 66 1,443.878 1,995.208     -583.180 60 1,286.359 1,798.200 
hazard d.f. 9 -555.764 63 1,237.527 1,763.797     -565.662 63 1,257.324 1,794.757 
hazard d.f. 10         -569.954 63 1,265.908 1,803.341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 264 
Table 71: Comparison of the Information Criterions for the Large Size Category (Interaction Effects) 
The table shows a comparison of the information criteria for choosing the best fitted model (bold) with interaction effects or not and the number of knots for the restricted cubic 
spline function (distribution (d): o = odds, h = hazard; K knots). It is a parallel chart for the audit, report and total time consumption for the large size category. 
 
Audit Time Report Time Total Time 
Interaction Effects d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC d K ll df AIC BIC 
without h 9 -658.56 56 1,429.12 1,896.91 h 4 -1,030.78 49 2,159.55 2,488.48 h 9 -672.15 56 1,456.30 1,934.02 
legform#detinc h 9 -649.36 59 1,416.72 1,909.57 h 3 -1,008.31 51 2,118.62 2,460.98 h 9 -666.06 58 1,448.12 1,942.90 
sectorgr#evasion h 9 -653.43 56 1,418.87 1,886.66 h 3 -1,019.07 51 2,140.14 2,482.50 h 9 -671.78 58 1,459.56 1,954.34 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion 
h 9 -644.01 62 1,412.02 1,929.94 h 3 -992.06 53 2,090.11 2,445.90 h 9 -665.59 62 1,455.18 1,984.08 
agenty#agegr h 9 -622.13 61 1,366.26 1,875.82 h 3 -982.66 54 2,073.32 2,435.82 h 10 -639.24 62 1,402.47 1,931.37 
grade_nm#fow_nm h 9 -589.25 61 1,300.51 1,810.07 o 2 -982.17 51 2,066.34 2,408.70 h 9 -595.96 60 1,311.93 1,823.77 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
h 9 -558.45 65 1,246.90 1,789.88 o 3 -925.76 54 1,959.52 2,322.02 h 9 -565.66 62 1,255.32 1,784.23 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
h 9 -555.76 64 1,239.53 1,774.15 h 4 -901.90 60 1,923.79 2,326.57 h 9 -565.58 65 1,261.15 1,815.65 
legform#detinc & 
sectorgr#evasion & 
agenty#agegr & 
grade_nm#fow_nm 
h 9 -545.12 69 1,228.25 1,804.64 h 4 -875.19 61 1,872.39 2,281.88 h 9 -557.41 69 1,252.83 1,841.44 
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Appendix H 
Table 72: Classification into Size Categories according to German Law 
  Size categories for individual business and corporate incomes (year 2010)  
 attribute for Micro Firms Small Firms Medium Firms Large Firms Large Firms Large Firms 
 assessment in €    (L3) (L2) (L1) 
Trading Firms 
sales or ≤160,000 >160,000 >840,000 >6,900,000 ≥10,000,000 ≥39,000,000 
taxable income ≤34,000 >34,000 >53,000 >265,000 - - 
Manufacturing Firms 
sales or ≤160,000 >160,000 >480,000 >4,000,000 ≥10,000,000 ≥39,000,000 
taxable income ≤34,000 >34,000 >53,000 >235,000 - - 
Self-Employed 
sales or ≤160,000 >160,000 >790,000 >4,300,000 ≥10,000,000 ≥39,000,000 
taxable income ≤34,000 >34,000 >123,000 >540,000 - - 
Other 
sales or ≤160,000 >160,000 >710,000 >5,300,000 ≥10,000,000 ≥39,000,000 
taxable income ≤34,000 >34,000 >59,000 >305,000 - - 
Banks and Credit 
Institutions 
assets ≤10,000,000 >10,000,000 >33,000,000 - >128,000,000 ≥1,000,000,000 
taxable income ≤43,000 >43,000 >180,000 - >530,000 - 
Insurance Enterprises, 
Pension Funds 
annual amount 
of insurance 
premium 
≤1,700,000 >1,700,000 >4,600,000 - >28,000,000 ≥100,000,000 
Benevolent Funds  - all - - - - 
Agriculture and 
Forest Enterprises 
value of self‐  
cultivation area 
or  
≤44,000  >44,000 >100,000 >210,000 - - 
taxable income ≤34,000  >34,000 >60,000 >116,000 - - 
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Appendix I 
Tax Auditor Survey – Questionnaire (Translated Extract, Original: German) 
Please think of your last two completed audit cases. Please answer the following questions. 
Case 1 
Size group:  Micro  Small  Medium  L3  L2  L1  Other 
Legal form:  sole proprietorship  civil law partnership  general partnership  limited partnership  partnership limited  
    by shares 
 GmbH & Co. KG  non-typical silent  
    partnership 
 stock corporation  corporation  cooperative 
 association  foundation  partnership  _________________________ 
Listed company / part of a listed group of affiliated companies:  yes  no  not specified 
Family firm (majority shareholding of one family):  yes  no  not specified 
Controlling owner-manager:  yes  no  not specified 
Determination of  
taxable income: 
 cash accounting  financial balance sheet  
     = tax balance sheet 
 independent tax  
     balance sheet 
 § 60 II Income Tax  
    Implementing Ordinance 
Type of income:  commercial business  self-employment income  agriculture and forestry  non-business  
Industry: 
 construction  banking and insurance  accommodation and food services 
 retail trade  wholesale trade  other services 
 manufacturing  information and communication  transportation 
 freelancer  food industry and semi-luxury industry  public utilities 
Does the taxpayer belong to a group of affiliated companies?  
 no  yes, to a:  national group  multinational group 
  as subsidiary company  as controlling company   as both 
Represented in tax matters:  yes  no taxpayer has an own accounting department:  yes  no 
 and a separate tax department:  yes  no 
Place of the field audit:   in the company  at the tax advisor's office  in the tax office 
Period of auditing: from ____________ to ____________ 
Follow-up audit:  yes  no Number of examinations by you:  1x  2x  3x  __x 
Highest sales in the audit period (€): 
 < 155k  155k-450k  450k-800k  800k-2M  2M-3.5M  3.5M-6.5M 
 6.5M-8M  8M-15M  15M-20M  20M-32M  > 32M  not specified 
Highest taxable income in the audit period (€): 
 loss  0 < 32k  32k-50k  50k-115k  115k-250k  250k-500k 
 500k-1M  1M-5M  5M-10M  10M-20M  > 20M  not specified 
Was the participation of other revenue agents or their support needed?   yes  no 
 specialist for foreign relations  specialist for reorganization  specialist for auditing software 
 specialist for valuation  building expert  actuary 
Which result could you achieve in the audit? 
 without  
    result 
 additional tax assessment approx.: ___________________  tax credit approx.: _____________________ 
 reduction accumulated losses brought  
    forward approx.: _________________________________ 
 increase accumulated losses brought  
    forward approx.: ______________________ 
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If specialized revenue agents took part in the auditing, which share is allotted to their audit? 
 < 10%  10 < 25%  25 < 33%  33 < 50%  50 < 66%  66 < 75%  75 < 90%  100% 
How high would you estimate the share of the audit adjustments that merely result in temporary income shifting? ca._____ % 
If audit adjustments result in temporary income shifting, will these reverse within 5 years after the last audited year? 
 yes  no, but:  within ___ years  not at all 
How many days for auditing and reporting were required? auditing:___ reporting:___ 
How long did the audit approximately last (from the preparation up to completion of the audit report)? 
 < 1 month  2 to 3 month  4 to 6 month  7 to 9 month 
 10 month to 1 year  1 to 1.5 years  1.5 to 2 years  > 2 years 
How many weeks ago did you complete your tax audit report? _________ weeks ago. 
Which were the key issues of the audit? 
1.  ______________________ 2. ________________________ 3. ________________________ 
4. ______________________ 5. ________________________  none 
Which of them led to adjustments? 
 no. 1  no. 2  no. 3  no. 4  no. 5  not one 
If further adjustments were made, please indicate them: 
6. ______________________ 7. ________________________ 8. ________________________ 
9. ______________________ 10. _______________________ 11. _______________________ 
Has tax evasion been suspected and if yes, in which case? 
 no  yes:  no. 1  no. 2  no. 3  no. 4  no. 5 
  no. 6  no. 7  no. 8  no. 9  no. 10  no. 11 
Did a final audit conference take place?   yes  no 
If yes, did the section head take part in it?   yes  no 
How many participants were there altogether?  tax office: ____ taxpayer: ____ tax advisor: ____ 
Did you come to an agreement on the adjustments?   yes  no 
How did you agree on adjustments? 
 I waived small adjustments in favor of  
     one large adjustment 
 No agreement on all adjustments.  Agreement on all adjustments. 
 I waived adjustments because the firm’s  
     “pain threshold” was reached. 
 I waived uncertain adjustments to  
    avoid the risk of litigation. 
 I waived adjustments because the  
    other side has convinced me. 
 
How would you describe the atmosphere? 
 friendly  cooperative  unfriendly  objective  emotional 
 constructively  entrenched  reproachful  non-factual  ___________ 
 
Which statements describe the behavior of the taxpayer and the tax advisor? Please put a cross on yes or no! 
  yes no   yes no 
1. Appealed to the economic  
    situation of the company 
Taxp.:   2. Set deadlines, but did not  
    adhere to them 
Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
3. Threatened with Tax court, 
    disciplinary complaint, etc. 
Taxp.:   4. Kept you waiting or disrupted  
    meetings 
Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
5. Imposed time pressure Taxp.:   6. Was authoritarian Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
7. Referred to an established  
    system 
Taxp.:   8. Was particularly friendly Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
9. Information was  
    withholded/filtered 
Taxp.:   10. Referred to actions of other  
      auditors 
Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
11. Information was  
      manipulated/extenuated 
Taxp.:   12. Appeared self-confident Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
13. Permanently interrupted  
      you 
Taxp.:   14. Offered agreement on minor  
      assessments 
Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
15. Said what you want to hear Taxp.:   16. Offered agreement on major  
      assessments 
Taxp.:   
Adv:   Adv:   
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Finally, you are asked to answer a few questions regarding yourself, personal valuation as well as training course A24a. 
Please indicate on each scale to what extent the following statements apply to you! 
  disagree         agree 
I felt exposed to a strong statistical pressure during my auditing.      
There is a statistical pressure which, however, does not affect me since  
I regularly achieve my target. 
     
Due to the statistical pressure I consider the audit target to be achieved 
by reaching the de minimis level. 
     
Taxpayer aim to declare everything correctly.      
Nearly every taxpayer would cheat on their tax declaration if there was 
no control by the tax authority. 
     
Taxpayer without a tax department/tax advisor are overburdened by 
their tax obligations. 
     
Taxpayer seek to minimize their tax burden by all permitted means.      
Tax advice abates taxpayer´s material and formal deficiencies reducing 
the number and amount of adjustments. 
     
Tax advice accelerates audit procedures.      
Supporting the audit, the tax advisor promotes the opportunity to settle 
an agreement.  
     
Fact-finding measures provided by the tax advisor are hindered.      
You are:  female  male 
You work at a:  tax office for individuals  tax office for corporations 
Your salary level is: ___________ 
Highest education 
qualification: 
 University  University of  
     applied science 
 university- 
    entrance  
    diploma 
 General Certificate of  
    Secondary Education 
 Certificate of  
    Secondary  
    Education 
 other 
Age (in years):  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-60  over 60 
revenue agent since (in years):  < 5  5-10  10-15  15-20  over 20 
Working in the tax authority (in years):  < 5  5-10  10-15  15-20  over 20 
You examine mainly:  micro/small/medium companies  large companies  groups 
 associations/nonprofit limited liability  
     companies 
 public-law institutions   cooperatives 
 
 
 
